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Pre face 
In the early 19 70s the emergence of a large number of locally 
based mass movements appeared to be one of the more interesting 
aspects of the rapid political and social change taking place in 
Melanesia . The proli fe ration of s·uch movements had important 
implications for governments seeking at the same time to promote 
national unity and to encourage local development initiative . It 
was also o f  considerable interest to scholars , particularly in 
relation to Melanesia ' s  history of ' cargo cults ' and related responses 
to the stresses imposed by European colonization , and to the study of 
social and political change under conditions of rapid modernization 
and political aggregation . 
As director o f  what was then the Australian National University ' s  
New Guinea Research Unit (which , following the handover o f  the Unit to 
the Papua New Guinea government in 19 76 , has become the Institute o f  
Applied Social and Economic Research ) , around 19 74 I initiated a series 
of studies by local observers o f  some of the more important of these 
movements . The contributors - who included anthropologists , political 
scientists and economists - were given a set of guidelines which 
directed them, under a series of s ubheadings , to have regard to specifi c  
aspects of each movement ' s  ori gins , obj ectives and methods , and sources 
of support and opposition , and asked them to assess the achievements , 
strength and prospects of the movement according to a number of listed 
criteria .  But while i t  was considered important for comparative 
purposes that all the studies attempt to answer some basic questions , ·  
i t  was recognized that with the dive rsity o f  the movements covered it 
would not be possible to approach each study in the same way . In the 
event some comparability has been achieve d ,  though the circumstances o f  
each movement and the predilections o f  individual authors have largely 
determined the shape of each chapter.  
At the same time I endeavoured to put together a collection of 
statements by movement leaders which set out their philosophies and 
intent . For a number of reasons this proved to be a di fficult task 
x 
and only two such statements have been included in the volume -
that by Mel on the Highlands Liberation Front ( chapter 13 ) and a 
' Basic Document on Papua Besena ' reproduced as an appendix to 
chapter 11 . 
For a variety o f  reasons , roc>st of which wi ll  doubtless be 
familiar to those who have been involved in an ambitious editorial 
undertaking , it took some time to get the collection together .  
However i n  early 1978 the completed manus cript was lodged with a 
maj or European publishe r .  Subsequent financial di ffi culties o n  the 
part o f  the publisher forced the abandonment o f  the proj ect and in 
1980 the manuscript was returned .  It has s ince been revised and 
two contributions missing from the 19 78 collection have been adde d .  
In the course o f  putting the volume together (roc>re than once) , 
I have become indebted to a number of people . In particular I 
gratefully acknowledge the editorial assistance o f  Mary-Lou Allen , 
Susan Faircloth and Charlotta Blomberg, the cartography o f  Harold 
Ellwand and Theo Baumann, and the typing of Jan Bretherton , Emma 
Bundari , Aiva Kutson , Hilary Bek and Claire Smith . Photos included 
in the volume are reproduced by kind permission of the Sydney Morning 
Herald and the Post-Courier newspapers . 
R . J . M .  
October 1982 
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INTRODUCTION 

Chapter l 
MICRONATIONALISM IN PERSPECTIVE* 
R . J .  May 
One o f  the most remarkable aspects of social and political change 
in Papua New Guinea in the late 1960s and early 19 70s was the proli feration 
of spontaneous local movements , di ffering in their origins and speci fic 
obje ctives but sharing a broad concern with the achievement of economic , 
social and politi cal deve lopment through communal action . Some of the 
movements emerged from a background of local cult activi ty ; others were 
establi shed ostensibly to organize local opposi tion to parti cular poli cies 
of central government but came to assume wider obje ctives ; sti ll others 
were speci fically motivated by a desire to achieve development through local 
community action ; a few emerged to press for a geographically more broadly 
based regional autonomy . 
In an earlier paper (May 1975 )  a preliminary attempt was made to 
provide a brief survey of the more signi ficant of these movements and to 
place them in some sort of social , cultural and hi storical perspective . 
The term ' micronationalism' was introduced in that paper to describe a 
varied collection of movements which di splayed a comroon tendency , at least 
at an ideologi cal or psychologi cal leve l ,  to di sengage from the wider 
economic and political systems imposed by colonial rule , seeking in a sense 
a common identity and purpose , and through some combination of traditional 
and modern values and organi zational forms , an acceptable formula for their 
own development . 
In employing this term to describe so disparate a group of movements 
it was our principal intention to draw attention to the convergence in 
* 
Some of the material in this chapter has appeared in a preliminary and 
abbreviated form in May ( 1979 ) .  
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obj ectives and organizational style of movements with often widely 
divergent origins and in particular to emphasize their common tendency 
towards di sengagement or withdrawal (but not , as a rule , formal secession) 
from the larger , national community . Although most of the movements 
described possessed a loosely de fined ethnic base , many of them cut across 
lingui stic and tribal boundaries and few placed much emphasis on ethnicity , 
some even specifically seeking a multiracial membe rship ; for these reasons 
(and also because ' ethnici ty ' is at best a slippery concept , 1 especially 
in the culturally complex situation of Melanesia) we avoided the term 
' ethnonationalism ' ,  which has been employed by some authors to des cribe 
somewhat similar movements in other countries . 2 We also rejected the term 
'primordial ' ( Shils 195 7) , which has been attached to comparable movements 
in other new states but generally seems to imply greater internal coherence 
and intensity than most Papua New Guinea movements have possesse d ;  
simi larly , terms such a s  ' communal association ' and ' voluntary associ ation ' ,  
used to describe groups in Asia ,  Africa and Latin Ameri ca ,  seemed to suggest 
more clearly de fined membership and organizational structures than was the 
case with movements we described for Papua New Guinea in 19 75 . 
In chapter 14 , which follows the detailed studies , we have attempted 
to set down an anatomy of micronationalism; for the present , howeve r ,  the 
essential characteristics of the movements we have described as micro-
na tionalist might be sununari zed : ( a} membership is based on community or 
region and is typical ly fairly loosely de fine d ;  ( 2 )  obj ectives are uni­
versali stic but place major importance on broadly based and generally 
egalitarian ' development ' ;  ( 3 ) ideologically ( i f  not always in practice ) 
emphasis is on achieving objectives through communal self-help , rather than 
through dependence on that colonial creation , ' the state ' . I t  is in thi s  
last sense that we speak of ' disengagement ' and ' withdrawal ' ( and by 
implication distinguish micronationalist movements from pressure groups and 
1 
2 
For some cautionary comments on the use of this term see various papers 
in van den Berghe ( 1965 ) , especially that by Mercier;  Connor ( 19 7 3 ) ; 
Cohen ( 19 78) . Also see Heeger ( 19 74 : 88-94 ) . 
And by at leas t two authors (Premdas 19 77 and Gri ffin 1975c)  in reference 
to movements des cribed in this volume . (Also see Griffin p. 138 below . ) 
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1 . . . 1 , po i tical parties . At the same time , although we have included in the 
category ' mi cronationali s t '  some movements which might be described as 
' separatist ' ( see pp . 22-24 below) , micronationalism does not imply 
political separatism in the usual sense of that term ( c f .  Gri ffin 19 7 3a ,  
19 76 ; Premdas 19 7 7 ;  Woolford 1976 : chapter 11) ; nor does political 
separatism necessarily imply micronationali sm. 
By way of further clari fi cation it might be use ful to say what we 
have not included within the ambit of micronationalism. We have not 
included relatively narrowly- focussed interest groups (such as farmers ' 
clubs and cattlemen ' s associations ) ,  whose membership tends to be restric­
tive , whose objectives tend to be speci fic , functional and individualisti c ,  
and whose activities are primarliy concerned with access to government 
servi ce s .  W e  are not concerned with politi cal parties2 ( though the fact 
that some micronationalist movements have sponsored electoral candidates 
does not disquali fy them from our de finition) . Nor are we looking at 
3 ' cargo cults ' .  More tentatively , we have sought to confine the term to 
movements which extend beyond the level of a single village or clan , thus 
excluding the numerous smal l ' village development associations ' which have 
sprung up (partly in response to government stimulus ) since around the 
1 
2 
3 
Cf. Wol fers ( 1970 ) and Stephen ( 19 7 2 )  both of whom included the 
Mataungan Association and Napidakoe Navitu in their surveys of 
political parties .  
For a comment on the definition o f  political parties ,  with re ference 
to Papua New Guinea , see Wol fers ( 19 70 ) . 
' Cargo cults ' might be broadly des cribed as movements which seek to 
achieve a substantial increase in material wel fare ( ' cargo ' ) through 
mystical or quasi mysti cal means ( cf .  Jarvie ( 196 3 : 1) : ' Cargo Cults 
are apocalypti c millenarian movements , primarily of Melanesi a ,  which 
promise a mi llenium in the form of material and spiritual cargo'). 
Outside the more precise anthropological literature , however ,  the 
term has been attached loosely , and often pe jorati vely , to a variety 
of spontaneous local movements , many of which have had little to do 
with cargo expectations narrowly defined ( cf .  Walter 1981) . The 
extent of a link between cargo cult and micronationalist movement is 
a subject to which we will return ( see below pp . 10-12 and chapter 14) . 
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mid 19 70s .  ( In formation on grants approved by the Office o f  Village 
Development up to 19 78 suggests that there were probably wel l  over a 
hundred such organizations scattered throughout the country towards the 
end of the 19 70s . )  Finally , though they are closely related to the micro­
nationalist phenomenon , we have excluded from our de finition ethnic and 
regional as sociations formed among urban migrants (see p .  25 below) . 
In retrospe ct , ' micronationalism ' may seem an overly dramatic term 
to use in the description of the local movements we have identi fie d ,  
especially in a country which has displayed the high degree of  politi cal 
stability which independent Papua New Guinea has ; neverthe less the term 
has gained some currency and we wil l continue to use it in this volume as 
a convenient umbrella,  albeit one which casts a wide and perhaps poorly­
de fined shadow. 1 
In the chapters which follow ,  eleven of the more notable movements 
which emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s are examined in detail . 
A concluding chapter seeks to extract from these studies certain broad 
characteristics of the movements , to account for their proliferation in 
this period , and to assess thei r  place in the process of political and 
soci al change in Papua New Guinea . As a preliminary to this the remaining 
pages of  this chapter describe the broad historical background against 
which the movements developed and to indicate brie fly the dimensions of 
the micronationalist phenomenon of  the 1960s- 19 70s . 
1 Gerritsen , also writing in 19 75 , used the term ' dynamic conununal 
associ ation ' in reference to at least some of the movements included 
in our 19 75 survey ( contrasting such community based organizations 
with ' " clas s "  based'  interest as sociations )  (Ge rritsen 19 75 : 14 ) . 
More recently , Walter ( 1981) has used the term ' conununity development 
association ' in a similar context . 
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Be fore European contact Papua New Guinea ' s  population consisted 
almost entirely of small , largely independent communities of  subsistence 
cultivators . Within these coimnunities social , political and economic 
relationships were generally c�ose and fairly well de fined. Between them, 
notwithstanding some extensive trading networks and enduring political 
alliance s ,  relations tended to be limited.  
Under the impact o f  missions , traders and colonial administrators 
the situation gradually changed.  As tribal fighting diminished and as 
plantations and commercial and administrative centres were established 
people began to move outside traditional tribal boundaries and to take up 
wage employment in the colonial economy . Late r ,  encouraged by the colonial 
administration , rural villagers turned increasingly to cash cropping , 
producing mostly export crops whose income provided the means with which 
to acquire the goods and services of the modern sector and sometimes also 
to buy into traditional systems of status attainment . In time co-operatives 
were introduced as a method of promoting col lective local enterprise and 
steps were taken to foster individual and group enterprises in secondary 
and tertiary as well as primary production . As in other parts of the 
developing world , a growing proportion of the population shi fted at least 
temporarily to towns where they became wage earners or used established 
networks of kins folk to stay on as pasindia.1 
Politically , the colonial administration sought to foster partici­
pation in the imposed system through local government councils  at the 
local leve l  and through a systematic programme of politi cal education to 
reinforce the introduction of Westminster style political institutions at 
the national leve l .  
The early relationship between the colonial regime and its subj ects 
was , howeve r ,  essentially exploitative . Traditional vil lagers and those 
on the periphery of the colonial society sensed an inability to bridge the 
gap between their own situation and that enjoyed by their colonial masters ; 
this in turn generated a sense of deprivation and frustration which 
1 From the English , passenge r ;  hence one who is ' carried ' ,  dependent. 
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mani fested itself from time to time in spontaneous local movements which 
sought , through a variety of means , to remove the blockages to the people ' s  
enjoyment of material wealth and power . Usually such movements were 
mystical and mi llenarian in nature but sometimes too they expressed them­
se lves through acts of de fiance against government and mission . With 
rare exception the colonial regime regarded such movements , loosely lumped 
together under the term ' cargo cults ' , with suspicion and hosti lity and 
frequently they were repressed unde r  the various regulations which pre­
scribed against i llegal cults , illegal singsing and spreading false 
reports . 
As in other parts of the Paci fi c ,  the experience of the second 
world war stimulated the growth of  spontaneous local movements seeking 
change : it  demonstrated the vulnerability of the colonial regime , it 
diminished at least tenporarily the status inequalities between coloni zers 
and colonized, and for many Papua New Guineans who came into contact with 
large numbers of people from other parts of the two territories for the 
first time it brought a vague sense of  national identity . It also helped 
to produce a number of men with a broader world view and better under­
standing of the proce ss of modernization than their elders , some of whom 
returned to thei r  villages after the war with ambitious plans for social , 
economi c and politi cal reorganization and improvement for thei r  people 
through communal e ffort . 
Despite the fact that many of these movements displayed a fai rly 
high degree of e conomic pragmatism and political moderation (even though 
a large number expressed opposition to incorporation in local government 
counci ls ) ,  official atti tudes towards them remained ,  at bes t ,  guarded.  
Other observers , however , recognized in their obj ectives and organization 
a change from cargo cult to political movement , a shi ft ' from religion 
1 to pragmati sm, from myth to self-he lp ' . 
1 See for example Belshaw ( 1950) , Bodrogi ( 1951 ) , Guiart ( 19 5 lb) , 
Lawrence ( 19 5 5 , 1964) , Worsely ( 1957 ) , Mead ( 1964)  and Cochrane 
( 19 70 ) . The quotation is from Cochrane ( 19 70:157) . 
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The record o f  these early postwar movements was generally di s­
appointing. Some degenerated into a pattern of behaviour reminiscent of 
prewar cults ; others s imply fizzled out as expectations failed to 
materialize and popular support gradually di ssipated. The histories of 
the two best documented movements ,  that founded in Manus by Paliau Maloat 
( Schwartzl962 ; Mead 1956 , 1964)  and that formed in the Papuan Gul f by 
Tommy Kabu (Maher 195 8 ,  196 1 ;  Oram 1967) , are illustrative of a general 
1 pattern . 
Paliau , a former policeman , came back to Manus at the end of the 
war with plans for a comprehensive social , economic , politi cal; religious 
and cultural transformation .  His ' New Way ' (Niupela Pasin} envisaged a 
break with traditional social organization and religion , the construction 
of new villages , a progranune of organized communal work and saving, and 
the establishment of schools , counci ls and village courts . The movement 
also sought to bring together traditionally conflicting tribal groups 
within the Manus Province . It sought cooperation with government but was 
antipatheti c to the mi ssions . In 194 7 and again in 1952 supporters of 
Paliau were caught up in cargo cults which emerged in the area in competi­
tion with the Paliau movement .  These cults involved expectations o f  a 
'Second Coming ' of Chris t ,  destruction of prope rty , and cemetery rituals ; 
cultists had vi sions and experienced ' shaking ' .  Paliau resisted these 
mani fe stations of cargo cult but as prophecies went unful filled he was 
able to capture most of the large membership they mobi lized.  At its peak 
the Paliau movement had about five thousand supporters ( around a third of 
the total population of Manus} and included several of the province ' s  
twenty-five language groups . However , with the establishment in 1950 of 
the Baluan Local Government Council (of which Paliau became president) 
and with the general failure of the Paliau movement to fulfil its economic 
objectives , the movement began to decline from around the mid 1950s , though 
Paliau went on to become a member o f  the House o f  Assembly and gain the 
respect of the colonial admini stration . 
Tommy Kabu was another whose wartime experiences inspired him to 
reorgani ze his people to improve their wel fare and status . Like Paliau , 
1 For accounts of simi lar movements in other parts of Melanesia in this 
period see Guiart ( 1952 }  on the Malekula Native Company (Vanuatu) and 
Cochrane ( 19 70 }  and Keesing ( 1978)  on the Marching Rule ( Solomon Islands ) . 
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Kabu was a former policemen . On his return to the Purari delta after 
the war Kabu set up a movement , known as ' the New Men ' , whose principal 
obj ective was to further the economic development of the area on an auto­
nomous , cooperative basis . Traditional customs were reje cted;  new , 
decentralized , villages were bui lt ; produce associations were established 
with a view to marketing sago and copra in Port Moresby , and a kompani 
was formed and some shares issued.  Income from produce sales was to be 
divided between returns to producers on. a cooperative basis and inve stment 
in new undertakings . The movement brought together vi llages from several 
tribes and Hiri Motu, the lingua franca of Papua , was adopted as a common 
language . For a whi le the movement ' suspended ' Australian administration 
in the area , establi shing its own police force and vi llage courts and 
organizing mi litary style ceremonies , but this was quickly and peace fully 
stopped by the government . Within a few years , however,  it was clear that 
the economic programme was a failure ; the intertribal kompani collapse d ,  
though several supporters o f  the movement went into individual business 
ventures ;  and around the mid 1950s the movement seems to have faded out . 
Another well documented movement , whi ch emerged a few years later 
and is sti l l  in existence , provides something of a link be tween the early 
postwar movements and those which sprang up in the late 1960s and early 
19 70s . The Hahalis Wel fare Society was created in 1960 as a breakaway 
from the East Coast Buka So ciety established a few years earlier.  The 
East Coast Buka Society was formed by traditional leaders in opposition 
to the introduction of local government councils and cooperatives ; when 
the majority of i ts members was persuaded by the government to support 
the council ,  the Wel fare was set up on the initiative of some younger 
vi llagers to continue the resistance and pursue development instead 
through local communal action . Its broader aims have been described as 
being to integrate the whole community as a productive unit ; to invest the 
group ' s  income in an enterprise in which all would share equally ; and to 
establi sh a relation of mutual respect and assistance between traditional 
leaders , the younger men and women with education , and government-appointed 
officials (Rimoldi 19 76:2 ) . Although there seems to have been a mi lle­
narian streak in the movement ' s  activities during the early 1960s , the 
Wel fare had a firm business orientation , being involved in copra and cocoa 
production and marketing , trade stores , trucks , road bui lding and a credit 
9 
union . Its leaders expounded a communalistic social philosophy - the 
most publi cized aspect of which was the Hahalis matrimonial clubs , or 
' baby gardens ' - which incorporated both tradi tional and western elements . 
In 1962 , following a decision not to pay annual head tax , there was a 
violent confrontation between the government and the Wel fare , which 
resulted in the arrest of the movement ' s  leaders ,  John Teosin and Francis 
Hagai , and almost six hundred supporters , most of whom were re leased after 
a court appeal . Subsequently Hahalis supporters resumed the payment of 
taxation and the government le ft the movement pretty much to itse l f .  
With the construction o f  a road across the island i n  the early 1960s , 
the provision of a high school , and improvements in government servi ces , 
some rapprochement was achieved . The church , howeve r ,  has remained hostile . 
In 1966 the Hahalis Welfare Society was regi stered as a private company . 
While shareholders provided a membership core , its adherents were said 
to comprise hal f the population of  Buka in 19 7 3  ( that is , half of about 
25 , 000) (Olive r  197 3 : 15 3) and some villagers on northern Bougainvi l le .  
Since then , and especially since the death o f  Hagai in 19 76 , the Wel fare 
seems to have gone into decline , though it supported Bougainville 
separatism and has cooperated with the new provincial government . 1 
During the 1960s and early 19 70s there was a pronounced acceleration 
in the pace of social , economic and poli ti cal change in Papua New Guinea .  
Among the important elements o f  this were a marked increase i n  the absolute 
level of Papua New Guinean participation in the cash economy , a belated 
and correspondingly rapid - localization of the bureaucracy , and a 
conscious e ffort on the part o f  the colonial administration to promote a 
sense of national unity . Inevitably , the structural adj ustments which 
accompanied these developments created tensions in the society and the 
rapid movement to se lf-government and independence in the 19 70s served to 
focus these tensions , much as Geertz had described in his much quoted 
study of primordial tendencies in new states ( Geertz 196 3 ;  also see 
Ake 196 7) . 
1 
For a irore detailed account of the Hahalis Wel fare Society see 
Rimoldi ( 19 7 1 ,  1976) , Hagai ( 1966) , Kiki ( l968 : chapter 7) and Oliver 
( 19 7 3) .  
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This reaction took di fferent forms . Some groups , displaying a 
higher degree o f  continuity with historical antecedents , turned to a 
mixture of mystici sm and modern busine s s  aspirations , with varying degrees 
of antipathy towards government ; these groups might be loosely described 
1 as marginal cargo cults . Others emerged as organized opposition to 
existing or proposed local government councils or to large s cale develop­
ment projects in the area , but came to assume wider obj e ctives . A third 
type of response , probably the most common , was the formation of what 
might be termed self-he lp development movements . These typically drew 
their membership from a small number of clans or villages and their broad 
and o ften vaguely expressed objectives were to achieve social and 
economic improvement through communal e f fort . A few groups , for whom 
questions o f  political status seem to have been particularly important , 
sought to mobilize a broad regional consciousness as a basis  for demands 
for greater autonomy . The following paragraphs brie fly describe some of  
the movements which were active during the 19 70s , using the categories 
suggested above . But as we have argued earlier , and as wil l  become more 
apparent from the detailed studies presented in other chapters , these 
categories are flui d ;  indeed what is  interesting about the movements 
which proli ferated in the late 1960s and early 19 70s is  not so much their 
di fferences as thei r  convergence , over time , on similar obj ectives and 
behaviour . 
Marginal cargo cul ts . Among the movements which came into being in the 
early 19 70s two attracted particular popular attention because o f  thei r  
large scale , broadly based membership , and their association with move­
ments in which mystical practi ces designed to increase money or improve 
materi al conditions played an important part . These were the Peli  
Association (whose story is  told in chapter 2 ) and the Pitenamu Society 
( described in chapter 3 ) .  
Th e  Peli As sociation was established in 19 7 1  i n  the aftermath o f  
what was described a t  the time a s  one of  the biggest and most explosive 
cults in the country ' s  history . It quickly gained massive support 
1 Cf.  Guiart ' s  description o f  the Malekula Native Company (Vanuatu) 
as being ' en marge du "Cargo Cult" ' ( Guiart 195 la) . 
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throughout the Sepik P rovinces but, fol lowing a split in the leadership 
and growing disil lusionment among its members , it de clined. Be fore its 
decline the Pe li Association had successfully contes ted a national election 
and by-election and had taken·faltering steps towards the establishment of 
orthodox business enterprise s .  
Pitenamu first came to public notice i n  the same year. Having its 
origins in the Morobe highlands and , like Pe li , strong links with earlier 
cargo cults in the are a ,  the movement soon won widespread support throughout 
the Province . Although it is sometime s di fficult to disentangle Pitenamu ' s 
more ' secular ' from its more ' cargoistic ' e lements , like other micro­
nationalist movements it expressed a clear demand for greater po litical 
autonomy - re flected in antipathy to local government and in its early 
sel f-identi fi cation with the Pangu Pati - and for economic development , 
to be achieved through communally supporterd modern bus iness enterprise . 
By 19 76 , however ,  the movement was in a state of decline with little to 
show in material terms other than a small shareholding in a foreign-owned 
company . 
Another movement with strong linkages to an earlier cargo cult is 
the Tutukuvul I sukal Association ( TIA) of New Ire land ( though TIA in its 
present form might more properly be regarded as a sel f-help development 
movement) . In the early 1960s there was unrest in the Lavongai Council 
area on New Hanover and extensive government action was taken against tax 
defaulters. Then in the 1964 national e lections people in the area 
insisted on voting for ' Johnson of America'  and after the e lection about 
KlOOO was collected to pay for the US president ' s  fares to New Hanove r ,  
where it was hoped h e  would s e t  u p  a new administration . The Johnson 
Cult , as it became known , was led by young but uneducated villagers . It 
had no speci fically cargo phi losophy and emphasized work rather than ritual ; 
between 1965 and 196 7  there was some organi zed communal planting of coco­
nuts as a cash crop . However ,  its main objective was to get rid of the 
Australian admini stration and to bring in the Americans as a means of 
inproving the wel fare and status of the people . The movement quickly 
attracted several thousand supporters in southern New Hanover and on the 
mainland of New I reland. Its members re fused to pay counci l taxes and 
boycotted gove rnment cooperatives , and there were violent confrontations 
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with government fie ld officers (Billings 1969 ) .  In an attempt to divert 
the people ' s  energies along more pro fitable lines , in 1966 TIA was formed 
as an ' investment society '  by an expatriate catholic priest at Lavongai . 
The Association received strong support from the cultists , as well  as from 
opponents of the cult,  and by 196 7  had collected Kl2 , 000 . Initially it  
sought deve lopment through communal copra production and development o f  
unused land ( tu tukuvu l i suka l may be translated a s  ' stand together and 
plant ' ) ;  subsequently it acquired a freezer,  a small sawmill , workboats , 
and in 19 77 three plantations . In 196 8  a TIA candidate easily won the 
national election in the Kavieng Open electorate . Payment of local govern­
ment council taxes has been a condition of membership of TIA;  however , many 
members remain antipathetic to the council and this antipathy seems to 
have increased since 19 75 when university students from New Ireland worked 
with the movement during a university vacation . 
Local protes t movemen ts . Several of the more prominent micronationalist 
movements of the 19 70s had their origins in organized local opposition to 
government policies . Among these may be listed the Napidakoe Navitu o f  
the North Solomons ( formerly Bougainville) Province , the Mataungan 
Association of East New Britain , the Nemea Landowners ' Association o f  
the Central Province , the Koiari Association o f  the Central Province , 
the Ahi Association o f  villages near Lae , and the Musa Association o f  the 
Northern ( Oro ) Province. 
The history of Napidakoe Navitu is  recounted in chapter 4 .  Its 
establishment was the outcome of a series of public meetings held at Kieta 
in 1969 to protest the government ' s  proposed resumption of Arawa plantation 
and press for a conference on other land problems associated with the 
Bougainvi lle copper mine . Subsequently it represented the people o f  
Rorovana and Arawa villages i n  an unsuccess ful legal action against the 
government ' s resumption o f  land and in the s uccessful negotiation of com­
pensation . Navitu, howeve r ,  assumed objectives beyond the immediate issue 
of land . Its main aims were said to be the economi c ,  social and political 
development of Bougainvi lle , poli tical autonomy , and better education ; 
a supplementary list of obj ectives included the unity o f  all racial groups 
and poli ti cal and re ligious bodies on Bougainvi lle , promotion of traditional 
culture , maintenance of respect for marriage and the stability of the family , 
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early sel f-government , and the nomination of candidates for election to 
the House o f  Assembly . The Navitu also became involved in business enter­
prise s ,  though these did not prove to be particularly successful . Support 
for the m:::>vement ,  which initially came almost entirely from the Nasioi 
people , grew rapidly ; within twelve m:::>nths it claimed six thousand 
members from 116 villages in the Kieta District (Middlemiss 1970 : 101) 
and support cut acros s  linguisti c and religious divisions . 
Napidakoe Navitu was generally hostile to the government and it 
saw the Kieta Local Government Council as 1dominated by kiaps [ government 
field offi cers ] •  (Middlemiss 1970 : 10 1) . Expatriate domination of local 
business enterprises also came under fire . The movement was critical of  
many aspects of  the mining proj ect on Bougainville , especially the share 
of profits retained locally , but did not oppose the mine or the operating 
company . Increasingly the Navitu became an advocate of Bougainvi lle 
secession and a supporter of a referendum on the i ssue of  separatism. 
By the early 19 70 s ,  however , other developments in Bougainvil le - parti­
cularly the emergence o f  a more broadly based Bougainville nationali sm -
and internal dissention began to undermine the political signi ficance of  
Navitu; it also suffe red an economic decline . Nevertheles s ,  the :movement 
survives ,  with some of its early detractors now holding offi ce . 
The Mataungan Association was founded in the same year as Napidakoe 
Navitu. Its formation came after a series of public meetings organized 
to protest the government ' s  deci sion to form a multiracial local govern-
ment counci l on the Gazelle Peninsula . The Association ' s  interests , 
however , soon spread to a range o f  other issues , including land matters , 
economic enterprises , education , and the preservation of certain aspects 
of traditional Tolai culture . Opposition to the proposed multiracial 
council was expressed through mass meetings and marches and a partially 
successful attempt to have the council elections boycotted ;  subsequently 
Mataungan officials seized the keys to the council building and there 
were physical attacks on a number of Tolai leaders who supported the 
multiracial counci l ,  resulting in the arrest o f  several Mataungan 
Association exe cutives . After the counci l was ele cted ,  Mataungan supporters 
refused to acknowledge it and instead of paying council taxes paid equiva­
lent amounts to the Association , which in due course set up its own ' council ' ,  
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the Warkurai Nigunan . They also boycotted the council-run Tolai Cocoa 
Project.  In 19 70 the Associ ation ' s  patron , Oscar Tammur , pre sented a 
submission to the Select Committee on Constitutional Development calling 
for an independent government for the Gazelle Peninsula and threatening 
that ' the Association and its followers would break away from the 
Territory of Papua and New Guinea i f  its wishes were not satis fied'  
( Select Commi ttee on Constitutional Development 19 71 : 3 ) . 
The government's initial reaction to the Mataungan Association was 
a show of force . Large numbers of police were flown in and some vi llages 
known to be sympathetic to the Association were raide d .  A Commission of  
Inquiry into local government and other matters in the Gazelle Peninsula 
was set up in 1969 , but its report did nothing to ease the situation . 
Eventually the government acceded to demands for a re ferendum on the 
council issue but the Association re fused to accept the government ' s  con­
dition of a secret ballot . A further attempt to settle the issue by 
negotiation between the Association and seve ral prominent Tolai s ( the 
Warmaram group) also failed . The Gazelle Local Government Council was 
suspended in June 19 72 . Three months late r ,  in what was generally 
regarded as a victory for the Mataungan Association , the government 
introduced legislation designed to create ' a  new type o f  local self-
1 government for the Gaze lle ' .  The legis lation provided for a trust 
to manage the property of the council and for the recognition of three 
groups : the Warkurai Nigunan , the Warbete Kivung (a group of Tolai who 
have re fused to participate in local government since i ts inception) and 
the Greater Toma Council ( comprising groups loyal to the Gazelle Council , 
who had he ld in formal elections towards the end o f  19 72 ) . These groups , 
to be represented on the executive of the trust ,  were given power to tax 
registered members and the executive of the trust was given responsibility 
for deciding on economic and community projects . 
Mataungan Association candidates success fully contested the 19 72 
and 19 77 national e lections and have held senior portfolios in both the 
coalition governments of Michael Somare and of Julius Chan . From an e arly 
stage , too , the Mataungan Associ ation has been involved in economic 
1 HAD I I I  ( 8) : 10 1 1 ,  29 September 19 72 . 
Confrontation between pol i ce and Mataungan s upporters , 19 7 1  
( Photo courtesy The Sydney Morning Herald) 

15 
enterprise , establishing a market (in competition with the Rabaul Council ' s  
market) , and acquiring interests in plantations , cocoa and copra marketing, 
trade stores and a tavern . In 1972 a New Guinea Development Corporation 
was registered , with authori zed share capital of K250 , 000 , to carry on 
the Association ' s  business activitie s .  
Mataungan Association leadership has come mostly from young 
educated Tolai and support for it has cut across traditional intertribal 
enmities .  I n  late 19 73 an o fficial estimate o f  Mataungan Association 
supporters on the Gazelle Peninsula was 15 , 000 ; although less active now 
than in the early 1970s , the Mataungan Association is sti l l  a movement of 
substantial political importance locally and the Development Corporation 
has become a successful model of local capitalist enterprise . Its place 
in Papua New Guinea ' s  recent political history is analysed in chapter 5 . 
The Mataungan Association was a source of inspiration to a number 
of individuals and groups with feelings of grievance against the govern­
ment and a desire to see economic , social and politi cal development take 
place through local community action . Among movements which have acknow­
ledged the influence of the Mataungan model are the Kabisawali Association , 
the Boera and Hiri Associations and Komge Oro ( see below) . 
The Nemea Landowners ' Association emerged in 19 70 near Abau in the 
Central Province to express dissatis faction both over land alienation in 
the area and with the government ' s  closure of the Cloudy Bay Local Govern­
ment Council .  Its members sought to form their own ' government ' and to 
achieve economic and social development in the area , with financial 
assistance from the central government . The Association i s  examined in 
detail in chapter 6 .  Two smaller movements appeared in the same district 
at about the same time . The Wake Association was formed ostensibly , like 
Nemea , to secure registration of tenure over tribal land , though clearly 
it was strongly motivated by a desire to counter Nemea influence in the 
are a .  The Ganai Association whose establishment probably also owed 
something to Nemea activitie s ,  was set up to oppose prospecting and timber 
exploitation in the area . 
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Demands for a separate local government counci l and for compen­
sation for tribal land taken over by the Papua New Guinea Electrici ty 
Commission appear to have motivated the formation in 19 73  of the 
ethnically based Koiari Association . The Koiari , who occupy the foothills 
of the Owen Stanley range behind Port Moresby , have also voiced general 
aspirations for local social and economic development .  I n  19 7 3  a deputa­
tion from the Association , accompanied by the regional MHA, Josephine 
Abai j ah ,  presented a schedule of demands to the Electricity Commi ssion ; 
the Association secured the promi se of a road link to Koiari vil lages 
and in 1976 the Koiari were given their own council . Subsequently they 
received a substantial cash compensation . 
The Ahi Association was established in 19 71 following release by 
the government of an urban development plan for Lae . The Association , 
which represents five peri-urban vi llages , was created in the first 
instance to prevent the imposition of town plan proposals which might 
be contrary to the interests of the villages and to take up claims against 
the government for compensation in respect of alienated land . A compensa­
tion settlement was negotiated in 1974 and funds received were subsequently 
invested in the purchase of a large commercial building complex in Lae . 
Other social and economic ventures have included the construction of a 
market and the establishment of a provincial cultural centre . The Ahi 
Associ ation has also provided a means of political expression for the se 
peri-urban vi llages . Its story is  told in detai l in chapter 7 . 
The Musa Association compri ses people of several tribes in the upper 
and middle Musa river area of the Northern Province . Its formation in 
19 75 appears to have been prompted by local opposition to a government 
decision to dam the Musa river and relocate the affected villages . 
However , the movement declared i ts main obj e ctive to be communal economic 
deve lopment . To this end it collected subscriptions which were used to 
finance the establishment of a wholesale store and to start cattle proj ects 
in the area . Leadership of the movement has come primarily from older 
villagers , though the Association has been assisted by a young educated 
' adviser ' .  
Two other local protest movements merit brief mention . The Purari 
Action Group was established in 19 74 by a group of young educated Gulf 
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Province people in Port Moresby to organize opposition to a large scale 
hydro electric project in their Province . 1 In opposing the scheme the 
Group has called for ' alternative development on a more realistic scale , 
based on agriculture and farming' ( Pardy et al . 1978 : 216) . The West New 
Britain Action Group emerged about the same time to protest against 
development projects in that province based on resettlement of migrants 
from other Provinces . Unlike the local protest movements already mentioned ,  
howeve r ,  neither the Purari Action Group nor the West New Britain Action 
Group appears to have extended its activities beyond the immediate 
objective of protest . 
Self-help developmen t movements . While a number of the movements which 
began ostensibly as movements of local protest subsequently adopted 
broader objectives of autonomous local development ,  many of the movements 
whi ch emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s were established speci fi­
cally to pursue development through communal action (though, to complete 
the circle , some later acted as local protest groups ) .  
One of the most prominent o f  these was the Kabisawali Association , 
whose early history i s  documented in chapter 8 .  The aims o f  the Kabisa­
wali movement , as stated by a supporter ( Mwayubu 1973), embrace political , 
economic and social aspitations : 
First i t ' s a move to tell the gove rnment and the leaders we do 
exist as it seems we have been overlooked for any development . 
Secondly to fulfill the meaning of the Association broadly 
speaking , wants to run its own affairs like running the Touri st 
Industry with hotels and tourist amenities . It wants to revive 
the islands happy li fe with festivals and traditions without 
too much of a loss to the western world .  
I n  19 72 supporters o f  the Association established a Kabisawali People ' s  
Government .  The following year Kabisawali candidates contested the 
Kiriwina Local Government Council ele ctions and having won a majority 
proceeded to dissolve the council ,  a move which was tacitly accepted by 
the central government . The m:>vement ' s  business activities have included 
1 For a more detailed discus sion of the Purari issue see Pardy et a l .  
( 19 78)  and Kairi ( 19 77) . 
18 
involvement in trade stores , trucks , road bui lding , tourism, arti facts 
trading , and a variety of more ambitious proj ects . Following the 
Mataungan model , a Kabisawali Village Development Corporation was 
establi shed in 19 74 to undertake business and other activities , including 
traditional k ula exchanges , artistic and cultural activities ,  and promotion 
of youth and adult education . Compared with other sel f-help development 
movements , relatively little en;ihasis was placed on subsistence agriculture . 
From about 19 75 , and especially following the imprisonment of the movement ' s  
effective leade r ,  John Kasaipwalova , in 19 77 on a charge of stealing funds 
allocated by the National Cultural Council ,  Kabisawali appears to have 
declined as a popular local movement and its organizational centre o f  
gravity seems t o  have shi fted,  for a whi le , to Port Moresby and Lae . In 
19 7 3  Kabisawali ' s  successes prompted the movement ' s  opponents in the 
Trobriand Islands to form a rival organization , Tonenei Kamokwi ta , with 
similar social and economic aims but without Kabisawali ' s hosti lity 
towards the central government .  This  movement is des cribed brie fly in 
chapter 9 .  
The other conspicuous followers of the Mataungan-Kabisawali model 
were the Boera and Hiri Associ ations , and Komge Oro . The Boera Association 
was established in 19 72 at Boera village near Port Moresby to promote 
. . 1 vi llage development on a self-he lp basi s .  The main initiative for its 
formation seems to have come from young university graduate , former public 
servant and Pangu Pati chairman , Moi Avei . The Boera Association sub­
sequently extended its activities to other nearby Motu villages and a 
large r ,  ethnically base d ,  movement , the Hiri Association , was formed .  
Later a Hiri Vi llage Deve lopment Corporation was set up to manage the 
organization ' s  economic interests , which included passenger motor vehicles , 
trade stores and an arti fact and local fabric fashion shop in Port Moresby . 
The Hiri Association had little success with its business activities and 
from about 19 76 support for the movement gradually fell away . 
Komge Oro claims to have been formed in 1969 , consisting mainly o f  
people o f  the Binandere , Aega , Chiriwa and Biage tribes in the Northern 
(Oro ) Province . (Komge is an acronym from the five rivers in the region 
and oro is the Binandere word for the tradi tional.men's house ) . However 
1 
For an analysis of the impact of the Boera Association on the vi llage 
people see Moi ( 1979 ) . 
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the movement did not attract public attention until 19 74 when it success­
fully organized local opposition to a proposal to establish a large timber 
processing plant in the area.1 As stated by its principal spokesman , 
unive rsity graduate John Waiko , 
Komge Oro and i ts_ members are committed to pursuing cultural , 
social and economi c activities based on village conununity initiative , 
and to developing resources with village leadership . . • .  The emphasis 
is  placed upon subsi stence living as  a basis for self-reliance , 
and the acceptance of cultural activities that are bound up with 
that way of li fe .  Any other innovation , be i t  in the form of 
technology , crops or technique s , must be geared towards supporting 
and improving the subsi stence bas i s  rather than distorting or 
replacing it with a cash economy (Waiko 19 76 : 17-18) .  
Under the gui dance o f  two vocational school graduates ,  village pig and 
poultry breeding centres were established and vi llage youth clubs were 
organized to help clear and plant gardens large enough ' to hold ceremonies 
not only within a village or a clan but beyond the tribal and indeed the 
regional level ' ;  appropriate technology was to be promoted ,  small village 
industries established ,  and a vi llage barter system encouraged (Waiko 
19 76 ) . Waiko was also reported as saying that members hoped that Komge 
Oro would be a springboard for the mobilization of the whole Northern 
Province , ' leading the people towards true sel f-reliance and control over 
their own destiny ' and called on the Province ' s  trained leaders throughout 
the country to ' come home • . 2 
One of the Northern Province ' s  trained leaders , senior civil 
servant Simon Kaumi , did return home in 19 74 , after being suspended for 
making public attacks on the government. Kaumi became patron o f  another 
local se lf-help development movement , the Eriwo Development Association . 
The Association , formed in 1974 , expressed antipathy towards the central 
3 government (Kaumi was reported as s aying in 1975 that i f  Papuan separatism 
1 
2 
3 
See Waiko ( 19 77) . 
Post-Courier 12 August 1974. 
movement see Yaman ( 19 75).  
Post-Courier 16 January 19 75 . 
For some critical assessments of the 
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failed hi s people would try to set up a ' Northern Province Republi c ' ) 
and to local government counci ls (the Eriwo established their own 
' counci l ' , named Bubesa). Soon after the formation o f  the Association , 
a wing of i t ,  adopting the bold title of ' Papuan Republic Fighters ' Army ' 
and led by Kaumi , seized an expatriate-owned plantation and occupied it 
in the name o f  the Association. P lans were subsequently announced for 
vi llage redevelopment , cattle proj ects , supermarkets , and touri sm 
development on the seized plantation . The central government responded 
by negotiating the purchase of the plantation for the Eriwo people , but 
the development plans were never ful filled and popular local support for 
the movement appears to have dissipated. 
Another sel f-help deve lopment movement which achieved some pro­
minence in the early 19 70s and which is  examined in detai l in this volume 
is the Damuni Association of the Mi lne Bay Province (see chapter 10 ) . 
The Association was created by prominent councillors in the Province in 
the late 1960s following rej ection by the connnissioner for local govern­
ment of proposals for council involvement in certain business interests. 
Through an associated company , Darnuni Economic Corporation Limited,  the 
Association acquired plantation interests in copra and cattle , and a 
freezer. In 1975 the movement ' s  leader was elected to the National 
Parliament. Since about 19 76 , howeve r ,  thi s  movement , too , seems to have 
been in a state of decline. 
On Goodenough Island in the Mi lne Bay Province three connnunally­
based sel f-help movements appeared at about the same time. The Kobe 
Association , formed around 19 70 on the ini tiative of an expatriate 
schoolteacher ,  sought to promote sel f- reliant development but was also an 
outspoken criti c of government policy generally and local government council 
activity speci fically. The I sland Development Association , set up in 19 71 
by Goodenough Islanders working in Port Moresby , had similar aims but was 
stronger in its criticisms of central government , local government and 
expatriate bus ine s s , its president at one stage threatening to chase 
government personne l and expatriate businessmen from the island 
( Kaidadaya 19 74 ) . In 19 74 a third organization , the Aioma Association , 
was establi shed along simi lar lines. None of the Goodenough movements , 
howeve r ,  appears to have been very active. 
2 1  
Among a number o f  smaller self-help movements whi ch sprang up in 
the Central and Milne Bay Provinces the Hood Lagoon Development Associa­
tion i s  notable primarily because it was the subject of a pamphlet 
circulated by the government in 19 76 as part of its government liaison 
(politi cal education) programme (Office of Information 19 76) . The 
Association , established in 19 74 , mobilized communal labour and capital 
for a self-help development effort whi ch included road construction and 
the purchase of a truck and freezers to facilitate the marketing of fish 
in Port Moresby . 
Self-help development movements were slow to emerge in the high­
lands but by the mid 1970s there were several , mostly small , local move­
ments .  One o f  the larger. and more succes s ful o f  these has been the 
Piblika (or Pipilka) Association . The Piblika are an ethnic group , 
comprising a number of clans which claim common ancestry , in the vi cinity 
o f  Mt Hagen in the Western Highlands Province ; they number about six 
thousand . Formation of the Associ ation followed a meeting in l9 74 
organi zed by a local bigman in an attempt to bring an end to a long 
period of tribal fighting in the area ( Timbi n . d . ; also see Mark 19 75) . 
Having succeeded in engendering a sense of Piblika solidarity , the bigman 
went on to suggest that the Piblika combine in a joint business venture . 
Initially trade stores and a petrol station were mentioned ,  but following 
advice from two young educated Piblika men then in Port Moresby more 
ambitious plans were formulated .  I n  1975 , having raised Kll , 000 from 
members and with a government loan of K212 , 000 the Piblika Development 
Corporation acquired a local plantation which the government had purchased 
from its expatriate owners . Aided by unusually high coffee prices in 
19 76- 7 7 ,  the group repaid its loan within a year , declared a 100 per cent 
dividend to its shareholder members , and proceeded to purchase another,  
smaller plantation , make a substantial downpayment on a large motel in 
Mt Hagen , and purchase several trucks to be used mostly for coffee buying . 
There was also talk of establishing a special fund to provide loans to 
member clans for vi llage development . Up til l  19 77  the enterprises were 
run as be fore by European manage rs with plantation labour mostly from 
outside the Province . In that year , however , inter clan disputes led to 
the subdivision of the large plantation and its partial reorganization on 
a smallholder basis . 
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Regional separa ti st movements . Opposition to existing local government 
councils and general antipathy to central government characterized many 
of the movements which have been described in the foregoing paragraphs . 
In a few instances such autonomist sentiments expressed themselves through 
the creation of what mi ght be termed regionally-based separatist ll'Ovements . 
In describing these movements as ' separatist ' ,  however ,  it should be said 
that , with the possible exception of the North Solomons , what the movements 
seem to have been after was not secession (which except for the North 
Solomons was not a practical option) but recognition by the national 
government of spe ci fic regional interests . The threat of separatism ,  in 
other words , was probably more strategic than real - even though not all 
the supporters of ' separatis t '  movements appreciated such a distinction . 
The two most commonly cited examples of separatist movement are the 
North Solomons ( Bougainvi lle )  and Papua Besena . 
The existence of a strong separatist sentiment in Bougainvi l le was 
evidenced at least as early as 1968 when a group of Bougainvi llean leaders 
and students , meeting in Port Moresby , called on the government to hold a 
referendum to determine Bougainvi llean feeling towards separation . This  
request was not granted but the issue remained a live ly one and in 197 3  
a Bougainvi lle Special Political Commi ttee was establishe d ,  under the 
chairmanship of university graduate Leo Hannett , to help de fine Bougain­
ville ' s politi cal aspirations and act as a pressure group for political 
change (Mamak and Bedford 1974 : 2 2 ) . The committee brought together 
traditional leaders and young educated Bougainvilleans , including MHAs , 
presidents of local government counci ls , representatives o f  non-council 
areas and outlying i slands , and representatives o f  the Hahali s  Welfare 
Society , Napidakoe Navitu and the Mungkas Association ( an urban-based 
association founded by Bougainvillean students in other P rovinces )  . 
After protracte d ,  and o ften acrimonious , negotiations with the central 
government an interim district government was e stablished in 197 3  and a 
Provincial government ( the fi rst under the new constitution ) in 1976 , the 
latter , however ,  not before frustrated Bougainvi lleans had made a symbolic 
uni lateral declaration of independence for the ' North Solomons Republic ' .  
The story of North Solomons nationalism has been told elsewhere . 1 
1 The most comprehensive account of the period to 1974  is that of Mamak 
and Bedford ( 1974) . Also see Gri ffin ( 19 7 3a ,  1974 , 1976 ) , Hannett 
( 19 75 ) and Conyers ( 19 76 ) . 
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It will  not b e  repeated here ; although North Solomons nationalism has 
had much in common with the micronationali st phenomenon which is the 
subj ect of this volume , it is distingui shed from the movements des cribed 
here in that it was much more a coalition of political forces at a point 
of time than a coherent single movement . Moreover ,  while the movements 
we describe as micronationalist have been characterized by a package o f  
broad social , economic and political objectives , North Solomon 
nationali sm appears to have had the specifi c  objective of politi cal 
separatism, and,  with the granting of provincial autonomy the ' movement ' 
seems to have lost its coherence . 
Papua Besena is subjected to examination in chapter 11.  This 
movement emerged in 19 73 under the leadership of Josephine Abai j ah MHA ,  
in opposition to the Australian government ' s connnitment to granting inde­
pendence to a uni fied Papua New Guinea ,  and with the stated aim of 
liberating Papua not only from Australian colonial rule but also from 
domination by New Guineans . But apart from the broad objective of 
' liberating the minds of the Papuan people ' ,  the aims of Papua Besena 
have been vague and sometimes apparently inconsistent . Papua Besena claims 
to be a Papua-wide movement with supporters in all the Papuan Provinces .  
Lacking a coherent organizational structure , it has chosen to work with 
and through a number of Papuan organizations with similar objectives . 
( These have included the Social Workers ' Party of Papua New Guinea ,  the 
Papuan Black Power Liberation Movement , the Papua Group , Simon Kaumi ' s  
Papuan Republic Fighters ' Army , and the Koiari Association . )  But in fact , 
as McKi llop argues below , the movement has drawn most of its support 
from villages in the National Capital and Central Provinces and has serve d ,  
primarily , the interests of an educated elite . I n  March 19 75 , s i x  months 
before Papua New Guinea ' s  independence , Papua Besena staged a unilateral 
declaration of independence , but no attempt was made to take this declara­
tion beyond the symbolic act and in 19 77 Besena candidates successfully 
contested the national elections . The movement ' s  ' parliamentary wing ' 
subsequently became part of a highlands-dominated coalition which ,  following 
a vote of no confidence against prime minister Somare in 1980 , formed the 
new government . 
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A rather di fferent sort of separatist movement is the Highlands 
Liberation Front (HLF) , which is the subj ect of chapters 12 and 1 3 . It 
was set up towards the end o f  1972 anongst students from the ( then) four 
highlands Provinces at the University of Papua New Guinea with the prin­
cipal aim of liberating ' all highlands people from white and coastal 
domination in the public service , private enterprise and the armed forces • . 1 
As we ll as demanding the appointment of highlanders to senior admini stra­
tive positions in the central government , it advocated a high degree of 
political decentrali zation and a majority local equity in all business 
enterprises in the highlands ; there was talk of establishing a highlands 
development corporation to control tourism and to establi sh small businesse s .  
Acknowledging inspiration from the Mataungan Association and Napidakoe 
Navitu, the HLF supported e conomic development through local community 
efforts and economi c sel f-sufficiency , was concerned with adult education , 
and identi fied with traditional social forms . In 19 72 a model vi llage 
project, initially designated ' HLF Demonstration Vi llage No .  1 1 , was 
established at Olu Bus in the Western Highlands Province to give practical 
expre ssion to the se lf-help phi losophy of development ( see Kaman 19 75 ; 
Reay 1979) . The HLF claimed to have the support of about one thousand 
highlanders in the public service and tertiary institutions and from 
several highlands members of parliament but it failed to attract a signi­
ficant following in the rural vi llages , remaining essentially a movement 
of the educated e lite ,  and by 1976 was moribund. 
On a smaller scale , the Wahgi Tuale was created in the Western 
Highlands in the early 19 70s to press for a separate province in the 
Wahgi-Jimi area.  The Tuale appears to have been a loosely structured 
organization with both local bigmen and university students occasionally 
acting as spokesmen . At least some of the latter , including Philip Kaman , 
the founder of Olu Bus , seem to have seen the Tuale as a potential sel f­
help movement with broad social and economic goals .  Othe r ,  less articula­
ted movements emerged at about the same time to press for separate provin­
ces within the exi sting West Sepik (Sandaun ) ,  Eastern Highlands and Morobe 
Provinces (May 1975 : 40 ) . 
1 Post-Courier 28 November 1972 . 
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Two associated developments of the late 1960s-1970s which are 
clearly related to the micronationalist phenomenon are not discussed 
in this volume but merit a brief note . One is the emergence of ethnic 
associations among urban migrant groups ( see Ske ldon 1977)  . To date 
this has not occurred in Papua New Guinea on the s cale it has in parts 
of Africa and Latin America ,  and the obj ectives of such associations have 
generally been confined to a limited range of wel fare and sporting 
activities . The other concerns the establishment of at leas t one 
regionally-based women ' s  movement . The movement , best known by the 
titles Wok Meri or Kafaina has branches throughout the Chimbu Province 
and in the Eastern Highlands . It has much in common , ideologically and 
organizationally , with the micronationalist movements des cribed in this 
volume and has been the subject of several s tudies elsewhere (Munster 
1975 ; Anggo 19 75 ; Sexton 1980 ) . 
Micronationalism and government policy 
In this brief survey we have attempted to convey something of the 
mood of the late 1960s and 19 70s , against which micronationalism developed , 
and to i l lustrate both the variety in which micronationalism manifested 
itself and, at the same time , the convergence by various movements on 
simi lar obj ectives and patterns of behaviour . In the concluding chapter 
we will return to a more systematic examination of obj ectives and organi­
zation and we will take up the question of why micronationalist movements 
proliferated in the way we have suggested when they did .  Before turning 
to the detailed studies , however ,  it is perhaps useful to sketch in one 
more element of the general background , namely the changing attitude and 
policies of government. 
It  has already been observed (p . 5 )  that the historical atti tude 
of colonial governments towards spontaneous local movements was one of 
suspicion and hosti lity .  Apart from the facts that they frequently 
followed practices unacceptable to offi cialdom and that their leaders were 
often suspected ( sometimes with good reason) of exploiting their followers , 
such movements were commonly regarded as a threat to the authority of 
government and church . Official policy towards them was at best neutral 
and more o ften actively repressive . 
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By the 1960s government policy had become rather more tolerant but 
movements were still seen primarily as a source of local disturbance and 
a potential threat to the orderly progression to self-government and inde­
pendence as a united country (cf .  Rowley 1969 ) . As late as 1971 an official 
review of the politi cal education programme in Papua New Guinea recommended 
that the recent deve lopment of micronationalist movements such as Napidakoe 
Navitu , the Mataungan Association , and the Papuan Front organization must 
be resi sted and countered , and the same year Papua New Guinea ' s  deputy 
administrator told the House of Assembly that separati st movements would 
d .  
1 f be i scouraged no matter who started them. A particular source o con-
cern was the frequent opposition of micronationalist movements to local 
government councils and re fusal by their members to pay council taxe s .  
I t  was this more than anything e lse which prevented the Australian adminis­
tration from taking a more sympathetic attitude to the movements and it 
was thi s which led to the early violent confrontation with Hahali s  and 
the Mataungans .  
The accession to power o f  a national government ,  fol lowing the 
country ' s  third general ele ctions in 1972 , produced a more substantive 
shi ft in attitudes and policies . In 19 75 prime minister Soma.re wrote in 
his autobiography , 
During recent years one of the most important developments 
in Papua New Guinea has been the emergence o f  spontaneous 
e fforts by village and ethnic based organizations encouraging 
self-reliance . The government recognizes the importance o f  
[ such ] groups ( Soma.re 1975 : 139) . 
In relation to individual movements , the new government displayed 
a wil lingness to negotiate at ministerial leve l  and to make settlements 
( as it did with the Mataungans , Kabisawali , Ahi , the Nemea Association , 
the Koiari Association and ,  eventually , the North Solomons )  to meet the 
circumstances of particular situations . It also provided a good deal of 
financial and technical assistance to particular movements . 
In the area of national policy making,  a speci fic commitment to 
decentralization and sel f-re liance was embodied in the Eight Point Plan 
1 HAD I I (l7)  : 12 3 ,  20-24 September 19 7 1 .  
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announced by the government i n  l9 72 , and the potential importance of 
local movements as a means of implementing the Eight Aims was recognized 
in a number of policy de cisions which gave positive encouragement to local 
groups . The most important measures in this context were the creation in 
19 74 o f  a Task Force on Village Deve lopment ( initially headed by Moi Avei , 
the organizational force behind the Boera Association) , whose purpose was 
to assi st village groups , and the establishment of a Vil lage Economi c 
Development Fund to provide grants for village group (but not individual) 
projects . Village groups also received assistance through favoured access 
1 to the Rural Improvement Programme , through the establishment of a 
Plantation Redistribution Scheme , the administration of which favoured 
village groups , and through grants from the National Cultural Counci l to 
support local cultural projects . Development Bank lending policy was 
also revised to favour village sel f-help movements and requests from them 
for technical assistance were received sympatheti cally . Other re levant 
measures included the introduction of village courts and the establi shment 
of experimental Komuni ty Ka unsil in Kainantu (Uyassi 1975 ; Mogu and 
Bwaleto 197 8 ;  Warren 19 76 ) and ,  under the North Solomons provincial 
government , o f  vil lage government (Anis 19 76 ; Connell 19 7 7 )  as alternatives 
to local government council s .  
I n  19 74 Papua New Guinea ' s  Constitutional Planning Committee gave 
consideration to the possibility of making special provi sion for local 
movements within the consti tution . But while welcoming the growth o f  
' associations spontaneously formed by the people outside the framework 
of local government ' i t  was ' unable to foresee a situation in which these 
bodies might act as the main link between the national government and 
village people ' ;  the Committee , however ,  expressed the belie f that ' such 
bodies should seek representations on district-level [i . e .  Provi ncial ] 
assemblies ' (Constitutional Planning Committee 19 74 : 10/3 ) . 
There i s  li ttle doubt that the Somare government ' s more sympathetic 
attitude to local movements encouraged their proli feration . At the same 
time , it seems likely that the shift in government attitudes and policies 
to local movements did some thing to modify the micronationalist response ; 
it is arguable that the government ' s  apparent sympathy towards micro­
nationalist movements enabled it to divert the energies of at least some 
1 Note , however ,  the comment of Colebatch ( 19 79 : 12 0 ) , that ' few of the 
local development associations appeared as [ RIP ] proj ect sponsors ' .  
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potentially troublesome movements into social , economi c and even 
political activities which accorded with the changing priorities of 
the government and in that way to incorporate them into the system. 
In this  way , paradoxi cally , the government may have contributed to a 
decline in micronationalism. This is an argument to which we will return 
in chapter 14 . 
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MARGINAL CAR GO C ULTS 

Chapter 2 
THE VIEW FROM HURUN : THE PELI ASSOCIATION* 
R . J .  May 
Early in the morning of 7 July 1971 - the seventh day 
of the seventh month - a large number of people climbed to the summit 
of Hurun (Mt Turu) near Yangoru patrol post in the East Sepik 
Province . There , after a prayer meeting , they removed two cement 
markers . These were strung on bamboo poles and carried down the 
mountain while villagers lining the route said prayers and counted 
rosary beads ; subsequently , and somewhat anticlimactically , they were 
deposited outside the patrol post at Yangoru. 
This  marked the end of a phase of cargo cult activity in the 
area.  But it was the preface to the establishment of an association 
which soon claimed a huge membership in the East and West Sepik 
Provinces . Thi s  association provided an organizational base from 
which the cult ' s  leader was elected to the House of Assembly with a 
massive maj ority and a financial base around which were formulated 
vague ambitions for regional economic development. 
* 
Unless otherwise stated, the information on which this paper is 
based has been drawn from newspaper reports , personal interviews 
and patrol reports . I am grateful to a large number of people -
villagers , government officials , missionaries and others - who 
have co-operated in the study , and in particular to former East 
Sepik Provincial Commissioner,  Tony Bai s ;  former OIC , Yangoru , 
Tony Maddern ; Albert Crichton , and Hawina and Yaliwan . 
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The area 
Yangoru patrol post1 i s  situated in the southern foothills o f  
the Prince Alexander range in the East Sepik Province close t o  the 
foot of Hurun . Hurun, a 1213 metre peak frequently covered in clouds , 
i s  a prominent local landmark and a sacred place . The Yangoru sub­
district covers an area containing , in 1971 , about 18 , 000 people ; it 
is  within the Maprik District . The people within the sub-district 
are mostly Boiken speakers but the area also includes some Arapesh 
speakers to the north and northwest and Sawos speakers to the south . 
The Boiken speaking area extends to the east , towards Wewak , which is  
the Provincial centre ; to the west of the Yangoru sub-district are 
some 39 , 000 Abelam speakers who along with the Boiken and Sawos form 
part of the Ndu linguistic family (Laycock 1965 , 19 73 ) . 
Traditionally the people around Yangoru , like the Abelam, were 
shifting cultivators , their main foods being yam and taro . The 
region has a rich material culture and ritual and magic , particularly 
the ceremonies associated with yam growing , play an important part in 
the peoples '  live s .  Traditiona.lly people built cult houses (ha.us 
tambaran) in which were stored powerful ceremonial and magic objects . 
Ancestor spirits ( in the Boiken language , kori-yava) are important in 
traditional religion and each clan had its spirit (masaZai ) which 
dwelt in sacred places and could cause personal affliction , failure 
of gardens or shortage of game to those who offended i t .  The Yangoru 
people also recognize a ' big ' masaZai , named WaZe-rur ' n ,  whose sacred 
place is on top of Hurun and gives Hurun its name . 
For the Yangoru people , and for most of the people of the 
Maprik District , European contact was established early in the 
century but until the second world war it was minimal . The Catholic 
Church apparently bought land at Ambukan j a  in 1914 but there appears 
to have been little mission activity in the Yangoru area until after 
1 S ince 1976 areas administered from what were patrol posts have been 
redesignated sub-districts . 
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the second world war . Administration patrols were infrequent though 
there was labour recruitment in the area in the 1920s and 1930 s  and 
in 1931-32 Margaret Mead and Reo Fortune carried out fieldwork among 
the Arapesh. Following the discovery of gold in streams near Maprik 
in the early 1930 s ,  a substantial European presence was establ ished 
at Maprik and a road built between Maprik and the Sepik river at 
Pagwi . 
During the second world war there was a large number of 
Japanese in the East Sepik and heavy fighting in the Yangoru area ; 
the final Japanese surrender took place there . After the war village 
people received substantial war compensation payments . 
In the early postwar years European influence began to exert a 
more pervasive pressure on traditional society . A patrol post was 
established at Yangoru soon after the war and patrolling became more 
frequent . Cash cropping was introduced in the early 1950 s ,  with 
coffee , rice , peanuts and later cocoa and cattle being developed 
around Yangoru . (There are no European plantations . )  Labour 
recruitment also expanded in this period and since the early 1950s 
it has not been uncommon for villages in the Yangoru area ( and 
other parts of the Province) to have absentee rates among work age 
males of over 40 per cent . During the 1960s a fairly good road 
system was developed ;  by 1968 it linked Wewak , Yangoru and Maprik . 
In 1948 the Catholic mission was reestablished in the are a ,  
moving from Ambukanja t o  Negri , west of Hurun , and subsequently 
setting up several other stations nearby. Later an Assemblies of 
God mission was established at Yangoru and in the late 1960 s there 
was a Jehovah ' s  Witness missionary and a Seventh Day Adventist pastor 
in the region. 
The Yangoru Local Government Counci l  was formed in 1962 , with 
38 wards and 45 members , and five years later became multi-racial . 
Co-operatives and Rural Progress Societies were also established . 
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What development did take place i n  the Yangoru area , however , 
( and this is equally true of the Sepik Provinces generally) fell  well 
short of people ' s expectations . Their disappointment was re flected 
in continued high rates of outmigration , the recurrence of cargo 
cults (one of whose leaders , Hombine i , came from Ambukanja) , and a 
good deal of antipathy towards local government . It probably 
contributed ,  also , to the popularity of Australian Bonanza and other 
chain letter schemes promising easy wealth , which flourished in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s before being outlawed by the government . 
The cult 
The Hurun cult seems to date back to about 1969 when two men , 
Matias Yaliwan and Daniel Hawina , became convinced that a number of 
1 cement survey markers placed on top of Hurun were preventing 
material benefits from flowing to the people . Yaliwan and Hawina 
led an attempt to remove the markers . There was , it seems, no promise 
of cargo in the form of material goods if the markers were removed ;  
Yaliwan said only that the markers were erected without consulting 
the people and that if they were removed garden crops would improve , 
game would become more plentiful and the rivers and creeks would 
abound with fish . 2 In December 1969 Yaliwan , Hawina and some others 
removed one of the markers . They were arrested and sentenced to gaol 
terms ranging from four to nine months . 
1 
2 
There were four markers on Hurun : three were geodetic survey 
markers put there by the US and Australian air forces in 1962 ; 
the fourth was a survey marker placed there in the 1930s by former 
Sepik District Commissioner Townsend (Hwekmarin et al . 1971 : 2 ) . 
In some versions Yaliwan is reported to have said that the 
erection of the markers was a violation of the sacred place of 
Wale-r>ur> 'n . Almost certainly this attitude was present . In 1971 
Ward 7 of the Yangoru Counci l  (which includes Ambukanj a and 
Marambanj a) vetoed applications for prospecting authorities in the 
region of Hurun and in 1972 the Peli Association successfully 
opposed moves to construct a radio telephone tower on Hurun . 
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Yaliwan , a man in his early forties in 19 7 1 , comes from 
Arnbukanj a ,  near the Yangoru patrol post . For some years Yaliwan was 
in the police force , serving in Goroka and Madang , but he left the 
force sometime around 1960 . Subsequently he was employed by the 
Catholic mission in Wewak , where for a while he worked in the power 
house . While in Wewak he was an active member of the Legion of Mary , 
a Catholic lay religious organization with a strong following in the 
Province , and arranged prayer meetings in wewak . He also became a 
member of the Christian Democratic Party , a political party begun in 
1966 , apparently on the initiative of a Catholic missionary worker at 
Boiken , 1 and which in November 1967 was said to have over 1000 
members and to have collected K450 in the Yangoru area . Yaliwan 
left the mis s ion in 1966 and in 1968 , supported by Hawina , he 
contested the national general election . He was however an 
inconspicuous candidate : he received few votes and brief 
biographical notes on the candidates prepared by government offi cials 
at the time listed him as having no known mis sion or political 
affiliations . About this time also Yaliwan wrote several letters to 
the Administrator and other senior officials who dismissed him as a 
religious crank . Yaliwan is a quiet man but with a strong 
personality . He is intensely religious and claims that he 
communicates with God and that God has given him special powers , 
including the power to interpret the hidden meaning of passages in 
the Bible , and to foretell the future . Yaliwan has been described 
(Hwekmarin et a Z .  1971 : 5 ) as ' a  recluse who spends long periods in 
prayer and lives away from other villagers on a ridge where he often 
locks himself in his house for long periods ' .  In May 1971 , when 
asked by the press to comment on some of the bizarre stories 
surrounding the cult,  Yaliwan replied that he did not go walking 
around the villages and as a result did not know what the talk was 
1 Stephen ( 19 72 : 74- 5 )  gives a brief account of the Christian/United 
Democratic Party . In the 1968 e lection six ( including Yaliwan) of 
the nine candidates contesting the Arnbunti-Yangoru e lectorate 
were listed as either CDP or United Democratic Party . 
Matias Yaliwan address ing a Pe l i  meeting on Hurun , 19 76 
( Photo courtesy R . J .  May ) 
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in them. He is widely believed to have supernatural powers , 
including the ability to overhear conversations held many miles away -
a fact which in 1971 helped to silence his critics . 
Hawina ( also known as Daniel Wavingian) , who was in his mid 
thirties in 1971 , comes from nearby Marambanj a  and is related to 
Yaliwan by marriage . His father is a prominent man in the area , being 
a former paramount ZuZuai 1 and at one stage pres ident of the Yangoru 
Rural Progress Society .  Hawina was educated to standard 3 in Wewak 
and then attended the Kerevat Forestry School in East New Britain , 
subsequently being posted to New Ireland . He returned to the Yangoru 
area in 1962 and began working with Yaliwan in 1966 . As with Yaliwan , 
the dominant mission influence on Hawina has been Roman Catholic but 
while in Rabaul he came under the influence of the Jehovah ' s  
Witnesses . He has the reputation o f  being a heavy drinker and has 
been involved in a number of brawls ,  at least two of which have 
brought him periods in gaol . He is a willing and effective public 
speaker . In  1971 he was widely believed to have the ability to 
create money ,  a secret he had bought from a man in Rabaul for KlOO . 
A third person who became prominent in the movement in 1971 
was Peter Koe . Koe , a carpenter from Yule I sland in the Central 
Province , came to Wewak in 1959 and in 1962 became associated with 
Yaliwan . Although he was not among the cultists gaoled in 1969 Koe 
took an active part in the happenings in July 1971 and subsequently 
he became Yaliwan ' s  personal secretary . In 1973 Koe le ft the 
movement and went to the West Sepik Province where , with assistance 
from the then Department of Business Development , he became a 
successful building contractor . 
Following release from gaol , Yaliwan and Hawina returned to 
their preoccupation with the survey markers and began enlisting 
1 LuZuai were village officials appointed by government . A 
paramount ZuZuai was normally responsible for an area roughly 
equivalent to a census division .  
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support . They visited a number of villages in the area and in the 
early months of 1971 Hawina addressed mas s  meetings around Wewak . 
Yaliwan told followers that God had said the survey markers must be 
removed and both Yaliwan and Hawina called for immediate independence . 
The removal of the markers was set down for the seventh day of 
the seventh month . The cult quickly built up a substantial following 
in both the East and West Sepik Provinces , most of whom had paid a 
Kl2 membership fee . Some of this  money was collected by Hawina in 
the name of the Solomon Association and Hawina is  alleged to have told 
some people that 50 toea of their fee was for membership of the 
Christian Democratic Party . By July 7 the cult leaders had 
accumulated about K22 , 000 . The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wewak , 
Bishop Arkfeld , and the provincial commissioner , Mr E .  Hicks , were 
asked to hold sums of money for the movement but both declined . 
The government , recognising that strong opposition to the cult 
might only strengthen belief in it , adopted what is generally 
described as a ' low profile approach ' .  Field officers o f  the 
Division of District Administration (DDA) were instructed to 
discourage support for the cult , enlisting non cultist villagers to 
speak against it ' and to generally " rubbish" it ' ; 1  broadcasts through 
Radio Wewak , the government run radio station in the Province , were 
directed against it , and a senior DDA official was brought to Wewak to 
assist the anti cult forces . However no attempt was made to take 
action against cult leaders or supporters . The secretary of the 
Department of the Administrator,  Mr Tom Ellis , told The House of 
Assembly in June 1971 that 
1 
2 
. . •  the Government cannot stop the cult until 
there is  solid evidence that people are 
interfering with the liberty or rights of the 
individual or that the law is being broken . 2 
Post-Couriier 19 May 1971 . 
HAD I I  (14)  : 41 71 ,  1 June 1971 . 
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The government rej ected suggestions that it attempt to undermine the 
cul t  by itself removing the survey markers and said i t  had no 
intention o f  defending the marker against rellX)val by others ; 
however , Ellis told the House , ' legal action will  be taken against 
any person who may rellX)Ve the said marker ' .  In a supporting 
statement, the member for East Sepik Regional, Michael Somare , said 
'I feel we should not introduce the subj ect for discussion on the 
1 floor of this House because it will  give a bad name to this country ' .  
In May 1971 , doubtless prompted by colourful accounts of the 
cult,  including reports of planned human sacrifices , Ellis visited 
the East Sepik Province to investigate its activities . In Wewak he 
spoke with local MHAs Beibi Yembanda (Wewak Open) and Michael Soma.re . 
Somare supported the government in its attempts to discourage suppor t  
for the cult but Yembanda was a n  active cult member and though under 
goverment pressure he disowned the cult , he announced that he still 
believed in it and would show members of the House of Assembly a 
magic stone and pictures and letters in support of the cult from 
local government councillors . 2 The MHAs from Maprik (Pita Lus ) and 
Dreikikir (KokollX) Ulia)  also campaigned against the movement - Lus 
seeking legislation to prevent cargo cults - but the MHA for 
Ambunti-Yangoru , Nauwi Sauinambi , himself from Washkuk some 120 
kilometres distant from Yangoru , while expressing opposition to the 
cult seems to have taken no active part in the campaign against i t .  
Shortly before 7 July government o fficials met with Hawina and after 
cordial discussions it was agreed that there would be no violence 
when the markers were rellX)ved . 
1 
2 
HAD II ( 14 )  : 417 2 ,  1 June 1971 . 
I t  was said that Yembanda had purchased the secret of llX)ney making 
from Hawina . Yembanda ' s  wrist had been cut and the wound fi lled 
with lime ; a coin was then bandaged over the wound . When the 
bandage was rellX)ved a few days later , it was said , Yembanda had the 
ability to make llX)ney . Also at this time he acquired a stone from 
Hurun which , it was alleged , possessed magical money making powers . 
( See Post-Gou.Pier 1 7  May 1971 ) . 
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Local government counci llors , like villagers generally , were 
divided on their attitude to the cult . Many openly supported it ; 
some were concerned by a rumour that local government councils would 
cease to exist after 7 July and called on the government to act 
against Yaliwan and Hawina , as it had against earlier cult leaders . 1 
However the East Sepik Provincial Advisory Committee in June 
expressed its support for the measures taken by the government to 
combat the cult.  
Missions in the area , who were responsible for some of the 
more exotic accounts of cult activities , were active opponents of the 
cult and the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wewak was enthusiastic in 
denouncing it and forecasting hunger and violence when cult 
supporters ' expectations were not fulfilled . Bishop Arkfeld also 
said that the cult had Jehovah ' s  Witness e lements to it (Hawina was 
in the habit of quoting from a Jehovah ' s  Witness publication) but 
this was promptly denied by a Jehovah ' s  Witness ministe r .  Ironically , 
however , missions participated in the growth of the cult through a 
substantial increase in sales of copies of Nupe Za Testamen (the 
pidgin translation of the New Testament) and cult rituals drew 
heavily on those of the Roman Catholic Church . 
As 7 July approached thousands of people converged on Hurun . 
As far away as Vanimo ( 250  kilometres to the west)  there were reports 
of workers leaving their j obs to j ourney to the mountain . Trade 
stores in the area made record sales of food , blankets , and kerosene . 
Police and extra government officials , including the director of 
Civil Defence and Emergencies , set up camp at Yangoru but i t  was 
announced that no special action would be taken to watch the 
ceremony on Hurun and no police or government officials would be 
present . ' We do not expect violence ' ,  the Administrator said , ' so 
1 One patrol report in 1971 notes that several Yangoru counci l lors 
were opposed to the cult and says of one councillor ' s  opposition , 
' This has some signi ficance because [he ] is a man so sensitive to 
the maj ority opinion that he has been known to vote in a Council 
meeting against a motion proposed by himself a few moments earlier ' .  
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we have not made preparation for i t ' . Neverthe less in Wewak the 
police riot squad was put through an intensive training programme and 
in Yangoru a senior member o f  the police special branch , wearing 
dark glasses , was to be seen serving over the counter of an 
expatriate owned trade store . In view of a cult prophecy that 400 
American aircraft would arrive at Hurun1 aircraft were asked to keep 
clear of the area . In the surrounding villages followers of the cult , 
and many non-followers of the cult , prayed , read their bibles ,  and 
observed a number of taboos laid down from Marambanja . 
The removal of the survey markers was accomplished without 
incident . The following Sunday cultists returned to the mountain and 
after a prayer session removed a third survey marker (earlier it had 
been reported that Koe would remove one of the markers as a symbolic 
ges ture towards national unity ) . 2 Yaliwan then announced to 
followers that he was the one true leader of Papua New Guinea and had 
renamed the country Papina (meaning one country ) . After this people 
gradually returned to their homes and the additional government 
presence was quietly removed.  Despite Ellis ' s  earlier statement, no 
charges were made . Asked what he intended to do with the money which 
had been collected , Yaliwan told reporters that it would be used to 
set up an association to bring together people from all over the 
world . 
The Pe Zi Association 
Late in July 1971 the formation of the Peli Association was 
announced . Pe Zi in the Boiken language is a species of hawk ; it is  
said to symbolize strength , intelligence and unity . I t  is  also 
1 
2 
Thi s  was one of a number of stories associated with the cult , some 
of which are recorded in Hwekmarin et a i .  (1971 ) . 
A fourth marker was removed in 197 3 .  
42 
Hawina ' s  c lan totem. 1 Hawina was named as president , Wi lliam Hawari , 
the founder and secretary of the Wewak-based National Labour Party 
(NLP) and a friend of Hawina , 2 was named as advisor , and Elizabeth 
Samuk as treasurer ;  Yaliwan , though acknowledged as ' leader ' of the 
as sociation , did not take office . 
The Association established its headquarters in Marambanj a  and 
later in 1971 a substantial and wel l  equipped office was set up there . 
The contract for construction of the office was given to Koe . It was 
also said that the Association would share an office in Wewak with 
Hawari . Early in 1972 the Peli office was employing a full time 
clerk and two ' banking ' officers . 
Membership of the Association was open and a membership fee of 
70 toea ( as opposed to the ' contributions ' of Kl2 or so which had 
been collected previously , and continued to be collected) was payable . 
In at least some instances membership receipts carried the name of the 
Christian Democratic Party. Membership money was sent to Marambanj a  
and Peli officials occasionally went round villages to ' check the 
accounts ' .  It is less clear what happened to the ' contributions ' ,  
e specially after 1972 when some decentralization took place in Peli 
organization , but most seems to have gone to Maramban j a .  
1 
2 
It is perhaps significant , too , that chapter 8 of the Book of 
Revelation in the Nupeta Testamen is illustrated with a line 
drawing of an eagle ( see below) • 
Hawari was born in 1943 near Wewak . In 1969 , in Rabaul , he formed 
the Sepik Youth Movement , a trade union type organization which 
aimed at improving working conditions throughout Papua New Guinea 
and securing the return of all tribal land to traditional 
landholders . Although the Sepik Youth Movement seems never to have 
got off the ground Hawari did attract some support from trade 
unions and left wing groups in Australia and in 1970 was invited to 
Australia . On his return he established the NLP , with a platform 
similar to that of the Sepik Youth Movement . In 1972 he stood as 
NLP candidate in the Wewak Open electorate but polled poorly . The 
NLP did not attract much support and it seems l ikely that in his 
association with Peli (and later also with the East Sepik District 
Workers ' Association) Hawari was seeking a wider base of support . 
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Committee members (komiti) were appointed for each village o r  
group of villages i n  which there was support for the Association1 ( in 
some villages two or three komiti were appointed) and between late 
1971 and 1973 these j ourneyed frequently between their own villages 
and the Association ' s  headquarters at Marambanj a to hold discussions 
with and receive instructions from Yaliwan and Hawina . Komiti were 
generally appointed to the position by Peli supporters in the village , 
though some were self appointed . Often they were leaders in 
traditional village activities but the group included some notable 
innovators and many had travelled outside the Province . Beneath the 
komiti there were usually representatives (bosboi ) at roughly clan or 
hamlet level and these in turn were assisted by a large number of young 
men ( ' workers ' )  and girls ( ' flowers ' ) , generally chosen by komiti , 
some of whom appear to have taken on the work voluntarily and some 
under pressure from their elder s .  
The obj ectives of the Peli Association were never clearly 
stated.  At its first public meeting, attended by about 200 people , 
it was said that the Association ' s  aims were the removal of 
Australians and Chinese from local government couneils , greater 
development in the Sepik with more roads and bridges ,  and control of 
the funds collected by the cult.  The first of these echoed a demand 
voiced earlier in 1971 by Hawari as spokesman for the NLP , a large 
number of whose supporters attended the inaugural meeting of the Peli 
Association, but was subsequently denied by Hawina who said that the 
Association ' s  leaders were in favour of multi-racial councils . 2 On 
its general attitude to non nationals the movement was also 
ambivalent . On the one hand Yaliwan is reported as believing that the 
1 
2 
The idea of komiti seems to have been taken from the CDP . 
In August 1971 Hawari said that the Administration , businessmen and 
the Christian missions were to be blamed for the birth of the Hurun 
cult , which ' gained support because the people are dissatis fied 
with their wages and living conditions. � . .  The Administration does 
nothing towards development in this area . The business community 
is slow to localise ' .  This again reflected the NLP platform. 
44 
Australian government and Europeans living in Papua New Guinea were 
a hindrance to a better system of independent government by the people 
of Papua New Guinea (Hwekmarin et al. 1971 : 10 ) ; on the other hand cult 
leaders , Yaliwan in particular , preached the unity and harmony of all 
people and had we lcomed non nationals to witness the ceremonies on 
Hurun . 1 Allen (1976 ) also noted in 1972 that while the Association 
prided itself on its indigenous nature there seemed to be a common 
desire to have European members . Towards the government the 
Association was generally antipathetic . Although there was no overt 
confrontation between the government and the Association , Peli fed 
upon a sense of dissatisfaction with government generally and local 
government councils specifically ; in 1972 Peli  members were 
directed not to pay council taxes and some members were prosecuted . 
Notwithstanding this ,  however , at the he ight of Pel i ' s  career about 
half the local government councillors in the area were Peli 
supporters . Government fie ld officers also reported a general lack 
of cooperation from villages where the Association was most 
influential . In its attitude to the missions , also , the Peli 
Association was generally antipathetic but not openly hosti le . 
Several stories associated with the Hurun cult in 1971 involved 
missionaries ,  and specifically the Catholic father at nearby Wilaru, 
cheating the people (Hwekmarin et al . 1971) . 
However there is little doubt that what attracted the great 
mass of the Association ' s  following were its cargoistic elements . 
Some believed that Yaliwan and Hawina had discovered the secret of 
creating money;  others , while not really believing , j oined the 
Association j ust in case (a frequent comment by villagers in 1972 
1 Koe , who apparently had made hostile comments against Australian 
reporters on this occasion , was subsequently reprimanded at a 
meeting of the Wewak-But Local Government Council .  
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was ,  ' We are j ust giving it a try ' ( 'Mipe Za traim taso Z ' > ; others 
succumbed to social pressures to conform. 1 
Yaliwan undoubtedly played on peoples ' expectations of cargo . 
In occasional , usually ambiguous , pronouncements from Marambanj a ,  
Yaliwan said that Papua New Guineans had been deceived by the missions 
and had ignored t�e word of God ; as a result they had been denied the 
material well-being enjoyed by Europeans . By implication Yaliwan had 
access to the word and could achieve that material well-being. In 
support of this Yaliwan made extensive re ference to Nupe Za Testamen , 
and especially to the Book of Revelation particular passages and 
illustrations in which were said to have special meaning . Publicly , 
however ,  Yaliwan denied that the Peli Association was a cargo cult 
and emphasized that ' cargo ' was not free and would not come without 
work or money earned . In March 1972 he said that Peli Association 
officers would tell village people to plant and harvest cash crops 
from whence the money would come . 
There were political elements ,  also , in the doctrines 
expounded by Yaliwan : he preached the unity of all people , quoting 
in support chapter 7 of ReveZesan in the NupeZa Testamen , and 
advocated independence for Papua New Guinea . One of the stories 
associated with Yaliwan was that he had a key which had been given 
to him by God ;  God had given the same key to the Samoans and 
Fij ians who , after removing cement markers from their mountains , were 
able to get independence . This ,  it was claimed,  was the key 
illustrated on page 844 of Nupe Za Testamen (Hwekmarin et a Z .  1971 : 10 ,  
2 2 - 3 ) . Allen ( 19 7 6 )  argues that these beliefs provided the basis for 
a coherent political doctrine : 
1 On this last point see Stent ( 1973a,  197 3b ) . Stent refers 
particularly to the importance in traditional society of such 
pressures and the likelihood of an individual incurring blame , 
for example for a poor yam harvest,  if he has not observed the 
taboos laid down by the society .  
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Because the Book of Revelation requires all men 
to be of one mind , only one man could be elected 
to the House of Assembly for the whole of New 
Guinea .  I f  everyone voted for Matias Yaliwan , 
the unity of the nation would be clearly 
demonstrated . Once Matias Yaliwan took over the 
leadership of the country he would proclaim 
independence.  Exactly what was expected to 
happen after that is not at all clear . It seems 
in view of later events that Matias expected to 
' Kamap long wanpela ples klia ' , that is , he 
would have revealed to him the secrets of 
monetary wealth .  
Hawina , also , appealed to supporters primarily in cargoistic 
terms . One of the stories associated with Hawina was that he had 
discovered the entrance to an underground ' heaven ' which was the 
source of monetary wealth .  
Rituals designed to increase money became a central component 
of Peli Association activities . Hawina ' s  ability to create money has 
been referred to above . In the early stages of the cult activities 
there were reports also of people burning money and rubbing the ashes 
on their faces or on cuts on their wrists in order to make their money 
increase and of people cleaning up graveyards and burying suitcases 
which they expected to have filled with money. At the time of the 
ceremonies on Hurun there was in Marambanj a  village a ' power house ' 
(paua haus ) in which were stored certain magic obj ects of the cult 
leaders and the money they had collected . Subsequently the word 
spread that it was in such paua haus , or ' banks ' that money was 
created and there was a move to establish paua haus in a number of 
village s .  In  these paua haus the ' workers ' and ' flowers ' carried out 
an activity referred to as ' washing money ' or ' fighting the dishes ' , 
in whi ch sums of money collected by Peli members were tipped back and 
forth between two large enamel basins ; 1 i f  thi s  was performed 
correctly , it was claimed,  the activity would bring about an increase 
in the amount of money in the basins . 
1 There is an illustration of this in National GeogPaphia Magazine 
144 (3 ) , September 1973 : 363 . 
' Memo rial Gardens ' near Maramban j a  vi l lage 
(Photo courtesy Post-Courier) 
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Since failure to achieve a n  increase was generally attributed 
to a failure on the part of the worker or flower it seems that in at 
least a few cases an increase was achieved at the personal expense of 
the worker or flower or his or her parents or friends ( see Stent 
1973a) . Paua haus activity probably reached a peak in 197 3 . In March 
1972 there were two paua haus , at Yangoru and near Kubalia , and twenty 
flower girls , from all over the East Sepik Province , were employed to 
count money , which , said Koe , was flowing l ike a rive r .  In May it was 
announced that additional paua haus were to be built in Wewak , in 
villages along the Sepik River and in the West Sepik Province . Money 
produced in the paua haus was to remain the property of the Peli 
Association but it was said that dividends would be paid to members in 
June or July. By July there were 9 paua haus and plans to build 600 , 
and there were said to be more than 60 flower girls . In November the 
As sociation claimed there were 49 paua haus . The number probably 
increased during 197 3 ,  but by September some paua haus had been 
abandoned .  Patrol reports in early 1974 noted a definite decline in 
both paua haus and memorial gardens and a report dated October 1974 
conunented that the ' majority of people consider it a j oke nowadays ' .  
A second ' money creating ' activity involved the finding of 
money in graveyards or ' memorial gardens ' .  In some instances 
suitcases were buried and it was said that when these were dug up 
again they would be full of money . There were some memorial gardens 
operating as early as 1971 . In July 1972 it was reported that 800 
memorial plots had been sold at Marambanj a ,  each with a wooden cross 
and the name and number of the member ,  at a cost of KlO per plot . In  
the same month a large number of supporters claimed that when they had 
opened suitcases which they had obtained from the memorial gardens 
their money had not increased. Hawina explained that these people 
must have broken the ' law' of the Peli Association (recognition of 
traditional taboos regulating social behaviour was an important 
element of the money making activities)  and that those who believed 
in his special powers had found their suitcases full (but were each 
expected to donate KSO of their winnings to the Association ) . Those 
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who were unsuccessful would get another chance , after they had 
confessed their wrong-doings . 
Both paua haus and memorial gardens were promoted by three men 
from the Aiome area of the Madang Province who j oined Peli in 1971 , 
apparently at the invitation of a former president of the Kubalia 
Counci l ,  and subsequently settled in the area ; it has been alleged 
(by Hawina , amongst others)  that these men imported the ideas . 1 
However , graveyard rituals , at leas t ,  seem to have been going before 
their arrival . Hwekmarin et aZ . ( 1971)  suggest that in this people 
may have been influenced by graveyard rites they saw performed by the 
Japanese during and after the second world war . 
From the second half of 1971 until well into 1973 support for 
the Association continued to grow and the Association ' s  membership 
spread throughout the East and West Sepik Province s .  At March 1972 
Yaliwan claimed a membership of 62 , 489 and subscriptions amounting to 
about Kl00 , 000 . Estimates of the Association ' s  membership at the 
peak of its activity in 1973 range between 1 00, 000 and 200 , 000 ( a  
patrol report from Nuku i n  the West Sepik Province , for example , 
recorded that in 1972 ' nearly almost all people ' were Peli members ) 
and funds collected probably exceeded K2 00, 000. During 1971-72 the 
government negotiated the purchase of large areas of land at Kunauki 
and Chimbian-Timbunke in the relatively undeveloped grass country 
south of the Sepik highway and paid out about Kl66 , 000 to traditional 
landowners ; thi s  region has a history of antipathy towards 
government and was an area of strong support for Peli and much of this 
money is  believed to have found its  way into the Peli  Association ' s  
funds . 
1 Stent (1973b : 2 2 )  records that it was one of these men , Mangaravi , 
who introduced the idea of memorial gardens to the Kambangei branch 
of the Peli Associaton - and was paid K60 for doing so . 
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Pe Zi in po litics 
The movement ' s  early association with the CDP and the NLP has 
been referred to above . However in the first few months of its 
career no attempt was made to identify Peli with a political party . 
In August 1971 the MHA for Maprik , Pita Lus , accused Hawari of trying 
to get control of the Peli Association and divert its funds to the 
NLP but Hawari denied this and indeed there was no apparent evidence 
for the statement . 
Towards the end of 1971 it was announced that Yaliwan intended 
to contest the national election to be held in February and March 
1972 . It was reported that he would oppose the si tting member for 
East Sepik Regional , Michael Somare , but in the event , lacking the 
educational quali fications necessary to contest a regional seat , he 
nominated for the new Yangoru-Saussia electorate (and Somare was 
re-elected unopposed) . 
The government declared a moratorium on the cult during the 
elections but said it would continue its campaign against it after 
the elections if support for the cult continued . 
Seven candidates contested the Yangoru-Saussia electorate , 
including the sitting member for Wewak , Yembanda , but according to the 
official report of the election only two conducted any campai gn :  the 
Pangu candidate , Bais Yambinangra , and Yaliwan . During late 1971 and 
early 197 2 ,  accompanied by Hawina and Koe , Yaliwan travelled 
extensively in the Sepik Provinces preaching the Peli philosophy , 
promising an end to council taxes and workdays and cessation of 
malaria spraying, 1 and calling for national unity and early 
independence under his leadership . At this stage Yaliwan seems to 
1 
Malaria spraying , which o ften makes a mess  of personal belongings 
and results in the death of chickens and cats , is opposed in a 
number of village s .  When this opposition became identified with 
the Peli Association , however ,  a number of villages which had 
previously resisted spraying came forward to request visits from 
spraying teams . 
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have made no reference to the CDP . Although in some of the 
villages Yaliwan was not received well {Allen (1976)  records that in 
one incident , between Maprik and Dreikikir , Peli leaders and Pangu 
Pati supporters actually came to blows ) , the widespread network of 
Peli komiti assured him of a better general reception than most other 
candidates in the Sepik electorates . 
In March 1972 Yaliwan was returned with an overwhelming 
maj ority , receiving 7684 first preference votes (82 per cent of the 
total votes cast) to his nearest opponent ' s  474 . 
Yaliwan ' s  influence on the election , however ,  was not 
restricted to the Yangoru-Saussia electorate . In December 1971 , 
notwithstanding the fact that candidates in at least two other Sepik 
electorates were professed Peli supporters , Peli komiti were 
advising people outside the Yangoru-Saus sia e lectorate to vote for 
Yaliwan by writing his name on their ballot papers ; the following 
month at a meeting at Marambanj a ,  they were instructed to advise 
people not to vote . Government concern over the possibilities of a 
large informal vote or a widespread abstention were sufficiently 
strong that in January the chie f e lectoral o fficer , Simon Kaumi , flew 
to the Sepik to investigate the situation and there followed an 
intensive campaign to emphasize to voters that they could only vote 
for candidates in their own electorates . Despite this , as the pol ling 
date approached there was a substantial movement of people from nearby 
electorates into the Yangoru-Saussia electorate and in the Maprik 
District the people of four villages said they would boycott the 
election because they could not vote for Yaliwan . At end February 
1972 Kaumi estimated that Peli had ' possible majority following ' in 
the Yangoru-Saussia , Dreikikir and Maprik electorates and a strong 
following in the Wewak electorate . Early voting figures confirmed the 
government ' s fears : while the turnout in Yangoru-Saussia was high , 
in nearby electorates it was low (on the first day of polling in Wewak 
it was reported that 380 out of about 16 , 000 eligible voters had 
voted) and the proportion of informal votes high .  A second visit by 
the chief electoral officer after voting had commenced fai led to halt 
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thi s  trend . Allen ( 1976}  has suggested that Peli activity may have 
affected the outcome of the election in Dreikikir but its impact on 
other electorates seems to have been inconsequential . 
At a celebration party in Wewak after his election Yaliwan said 
that he would call for immediate independence for Papua New Guinea.  
The same month he announced that Peli had taken over the CDP and would 
develop the party to seek independence . Shortly after , it was 
announced that the Peli Association would ask the Mataungan 
Association and the People ' s  Progress Party to merge with it ; at the 
same time Koe critici zed the Pangu Pati , saying that it should request 
independence not self-government .  Yaliwan later visited Rabaul where 
he sought support for the Peli Association amongst Sepik migrants but 
a proposed meeting with Mataungan Association patron , Oscar Tammur , 
fell  through ( it was alleged that Yaliwan refused to see Tammur} . 
Shortly before the opening of the House of Assembly a rally was held 
in Wewak , at which Yaliwan , Koe , Jimmy Simbago (at one stage Peli 
Secretary} and Hawari spoke . Hawari announced that the NLP and Peli 
leaders would hold several protest marches during the year . 
The Third House of Assembly was opened on 20 April 1972 . It 
was rumoured that after the governor-general ' s  speech Yaliwan would 
declare himself the leader of Papua New Guine a ,  however the day passed 
without incident except that the clerk of the House confiscated a 
photo, taken during the adj ournment of the House , of Yaliwan standing 
beside the speaker ' s  chair .  Four days late r ,  during the course of 
debate of address and reply , Yaliwan delivered his brief maiden 
speech , in which he said : 
1 
My name is Matias Yaliwan and I am the elected 
member for Yangoru-Saussia . It is my wish that 
I am the leader of Papua New Guinea .  It is also 
my wish that immediate self-government should be 
achieved followed by immediate independence . 
This i s  what I ,  Matias Yaliwan , leader of Papua 
New Guinea want . l 
HAD I I I  (1)  : 13 ,  24 April 1972 . 
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The speech drew no conunent . Subsequently Yaliwan spoke 
briefly on the need to upgrade the Yangoru-Saussia road and in 
support of the national flag but he was otherwise an inconspicuous 
member of the House . 
In an interview with Yaliwan in 1975 , Yaliwan confirmed that 
he was , in 1972 , the leader of Papua New Guinea ,  adding ( somewhat 
oddly in view of the first claim) that he was also deputy leader of 
the United Party. 
In June 1972 , in response to a statement by Pita Lus calling 
on the government to take action against the cult led by Yaliwan , 
Yaliwan told the House that he had resigned from the movement and had 
nothing whatsoever to do with it and that his name must not be 
associated with it any longer .  Four months later Yaliwan announced 
that he was resigning from the House of Assembly . His formal 
resignation was eventually received in June 197 3 .  
I n  the ensuing by-election eight candidates nominated : Lainus 
Hepau, who succeeded Koe as Yaliwan ' s  secretary in 197 3 ;  Peli member 
Winias Kwakbimalu ; three Pangu candidates ( including Tony Bais , 
subsequently provincial commissioner , whose father had stood against 
Yaliwan unsuccessfully in 1972 ) and three others . Hepau led all the 
way in the fairly closely contested election defeating the endorsed 
Pangu candidate , John Wauwia , on the sixth distribution of pre ferences .  
(Winias was eliminated on the second count . )  I n  a speech to the House 
in March 1974 Hepau told members : 
The people want the Government not to establish 
any sort of proj ect on Mount Turu . God made 
man on this mountain , and man has since spread 
to other parts of the world . It is time now for 
all the countries of the world to come together 
as one big country , yet nobody has told my people 
the meaning of self-government or independence . 
The only person who told us anything about these 
two things was Matias Yaliwan , when he removed 
the marker from the mountain.  No one with the 
proper knowledge of the two things concerned 
has mentioned anything to us about them. I ,  
Lainus Hepau , believe in what Matias Yaliwan 
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told me , and this can be proved i n  Chapter 
9 of S t .  Matthew' s  Gospel ,  if you care to 
read i t . 1 
Peli in business 
One of the stated obj ectives of the Peli Associaton was to 
control the funds collected by the Hurun cult leaders . Earlier 
several odd uses for the funds had been suggested , one of which was 
to send the money to the American based Four Square Gospellers ' 
Interdenominational Church , which it was believed could alter the 
times of day and night to make the rising and setting of the sun in 
Papua New Guinea coincide with those in the US ; a spokesman of the 
church, however ,  said that the church would not accept the money . An 
attempt by the manager of the Conunonwealth Bank in Wewak to persuade 
the Association to deposit its funds in the bank was unsuccessful . 
Initially a good deal of the money collected went on the 
construction and equipment of the Peli Association office at 
Marambanj a  and on paying for the movement of Peli leaders around the 
East and West Sepik Provinces , but subsequently a somewhat more 
definite business orientation seems to have emerged . Late in 1971 
the Association purchased two trucks and in July 1972 announced plans 
to purchase another seven ; these , it said , would be used for 
transporting Peli members and carrying copra and coffee bought by the 
Association. These and other vehicles bought by the Association later 
(which seem to have had a fairly high mortality rate ) were used 
extensively for the private transport of Peli members but the 
Association itself never did become involved in copra or coffee 
buying. Application was made for a passenger motor vehicle (PMV} 
2 
licence but this has never been granted. Another idea was to use 
1 
2 
HAD III  (25 ) : 3291 , 1 March 1974 . 
On one occasion the Association was charged with carrying 
passengers without a PMV licence but the charge was dismissed when 
it was established that the passengers had not been carried for 
gain . 
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Peli Association funds to make loans of around Kl00-300 to members 
for business purposes . Some such loans were made (mostly , it seems , 
to copra , coffee and cocoa growers) but no systematic record was kept 
and in practice many in effect became grants . 
In October 1971 the deputy provincial commissioner at Maprik 
was reported as saying that if the Peli Association ' s  future plans 
were to help the people the Administration could offer advice but the 
Association would not advise the Administration of their future plans . 
And again in announcing the election time moratorium in February 1972 
it was said that the Administration would support the Peli Association 
if  it was truly something directed at the economic development of the 
area . In fact , however ,  neither the Department of Bus iness 
Development nor the ( then) Department of Agriculture , Stock and 
Fisheries made any move to assist Peli and Peli did not seek their 
assistance . 
Towards the end of 1974 the Peli Association purchased a 
European owned trade store at Yangoru for around Kl0 , 0<00 and acquired 
the liquor licence which went with it . The liquor licence , however , 
was suspended and subsequently cancelled and the store manager (Peli 
secretary, Jimmy Simbago) 1 prosecuted for selling liquor outside the 
prescribed hours . Applications to regain the licence were 
unsuccessful and in 1976 the store was sold , at a substantial loss , 
to one of Hawina ' s  brothers . Thus despite the vast sums col lected 
since 1971 the movement has little to show: by 1976 only two 
roadworthy vehicles ; an investment of Kl , 500 with the Papua New 
Guinea Investment Corporation , and some cash held by Hawina and , 
allegedly , by Yaliwan (see below) . A good deal of the money has gone 
on vehicles now written off , a large sum disappeared with a young 
1 In early 1975 Simbago was sacked for alleged misuse of funds and 
attempts were being made to persuade Hawina ' s  brother ,  Andrew 
Wafimbukia ( then manager of the Sepik Producers ' Co-operative 
Association at Maprik) , to accept the position . He declined . 
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expatriate at one time employed at the Catholic mission at Wilaru , 
and a sizeable amount must have been spent on travelling expenses and 
on beer ; where the rest has gone no one seems to know. 
Peli in decline 
Membership of the Peli Association continued to grow following 
Yaliwan ' s  election to the House and by mid 1972 had spread well into 
the West Sepik Province . But from the early months of 1972 some 
reaction appears to have set in . In January there were reports that 
nineteen villagers had gone to Marambanj a  to withdraw their 
contributions and had been turned away by Hawina . In March the 
Greater Maprik Local Government Council passed a resolution calling on 
the government not to employ Peli members and called for the dismissal 
of councillors who belonged to the Peli  Association . Then at a 
meeting in May 1972 , from which Yaliwan walked out , Hawina was told 
that Yaliwan had until the third session of the House to fulfil his 
promises ; i f  he had not done so by then , the people said, they would 
call for a by-election . Soon after there were reports that Peli 
Association members threatened to destroy all the buildings in Yangoru 
if the money they had paid was not returned.  In May also the Wewak­
But Local Government Council expressed concern that the growth of Peli 
was ' going unchecked ' by the government and asked the Association to 
open its power houses for a day so that people could see for 
themselves whether or not they should remain with Pe l i ;  Hawina 
refused . The same month Pita Lus announced that he would introduce 
legislation against cargo cults in the next session of the House . 1 
1 Somare made a similar statement in Wewak in May 1972 . Subsequently 
Lus told the House (HAD III  ( 3 ) : 22 0 ,  19 June 1972)  that ' anybody 
who is a trouble stirrer and who confuses people , should he happen 
to come from another district [the implicit reference was to Koe ] , 
should be deported to his own area ' , but in September 1972 Lus said 
that he had spoken to the government about a law to prevent cargo 
cults but the chief minister had advised against it (HAD III  ( 6 )  : 
552-3 , 4 September 1972) . Lus went on to say that to counteract 
the cult the government should build schools , roads and bridges ; 
ironically , this was an early obj ective of the Peli  Association . 
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Yaliwan also began to have misgivings about his role . In early 
June 1972 he resigned from Peli , ostensibly because Hawina refused to 
enforce an order by Yaliwan that Peli members leave Maramban j a  to 
return to their village s ,  work in their gardens ,  work for the councils 
and pay council tax. In his reply to Pita Lus in the House of 
Assembly in June Yaliwan said : 
The Honourable member has no right to talk 
about this business of cargo cult.  It is  
the people ' s  own doing and it is their money 
and not Pita Lus ' s  or mine . We have to watch 
and see what they are doing and whether it is  
true or false . • •  What the people are doing is  
what they like doing . I ,  mysel f ,  have not 
seen this money .  It is the affair of the 
people • • •  I resigned from this movement 
because I discovered that its beliefs are 
not true and I have had nothing whatsoever 
to do with it since . I 
And again in September Yaliwan told the press that there were 
many things about Peli which disturbed him;  money could not multiply 
without hard work . Subsequently Yaliwan has said that while removal 
of the markers from Hurun was his idea (and was success ful , in that 
gardens had improved and game become more abundant) , paua haus and 
memorial gardens were Daniel ' s  proj ects , though Yaliwan himself was 
prepared to give them a try until it became clear that they were not 
generating wealth . 
With the resignation of Yaliwan , Hawina took control of Peli 
and , it seems , most of the Association ' s  money and its vehicles . 
Yaliwan was to have received the revenue raised through the 7 0  toea 
membership fees paid to Peli and Hawina claims he gave Yaliwan 
K36 , 000 ; but Yaliwan says he has received nothing. Accompanied by 
Koe , Yaliwan withdrew to a hamlet near Wamoin , about 35 kilometres to 
the southeast of Yangoru and near the home of former MHA Yembanda . 
There he established a headquarters with impressive buildings and 
gardens enclosed by a barbed wire fence . 
1 HAD III ( 3 ) : 22 1 ,  19 June 1972 . 
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In  retrospect the split between Yaliwan and Hawina was 
probably developing for some time . There is little doubt that Hawina 
provided the main organizational force behind the Peli Association 
and he appealed most directly to people ' s  cult-nurtured hopes of 
monetary returns . It seems also that Hawina was largely responsible 
for the anti government, anti mission , anti expatriate elements of 
Peli . Yaliwan ' s  role seems to have been much more that of spiritual 
leader and it seems as though , to some extent , Hawina exploited 
Yaliwan ' s  reputation for having supernatural powers to give status to 
his own organizational efforts . Yaliwan , despite his somewhat 
ambiguous pronouncements , had repeatedly denied that Peli was a cargo 
cult and it seems that after his election to the House continued 
pressure on him by the government , and perhaps also evidence of 
disillusionment among some o f  the Peli Association supporters , 
increased his concern on this issue . When in October Yaliwan 
announced his intention of resigning from the House he said that he 
was a victim of Peli sorcery , that the Peli Association had called on 
sorcerers to make him sick in the head and that visits to a doctor in 
Port Moresby had failed to cure him. 
In September 1972 Hawina , Peli vice president Marcus Yaklesambi 
and five other Peli members were arrested as the result of a brawl at 
the Maprik Hotel and despite a deputation to the Provincial Office and 
threats of violence by Peli supporters Hawina was sentenced to ten 
months imprisonment and the others to shorter terms . Yaliwan was 
asked to resume leadership of the Association but refused . In the 
meantime a young man named Kami , from Holik village , appointed himself 
leader of the movement and claimed that Yaliwan ' s  powers had been 
transferred to him. Kami attracted some of the Peli supporters away 
from Marambanj a  (a patrol report of November 1972 refers to Peli 
activities in terms of ' Marambanj a  style ' (power houses }  and ' Holik 
style ' (memorial gardens} }  but the Holik breakaway was only one 
element of a more general decentralization of Peli organization which 
took place during 197 3 , and with this decentralization came eventual 
decline . 
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At the time of Yaliwan ' s  resignation from Peli Koe said that he 
and Yaliwan would reform the Christian Democratic Party and Yaliwan 
subsequently announced that he would form a new association with a new 
name but carrying out activities similar to Peli .  This was done in 
November 1972 with the creation of the Mt . Hurun Christian Democratic 
Association , later renamed the Seven Association , 1 after the seven 
sacraments of the Roman Catholic Church . According to Yaliwan the 
Seven Association had nothing to do with the Peli Association though 
he invited Peli members to j oin by paying a 70 toea membership fee . 2 
There is some confusion as to the aims of the Seven Association . 
In announcing its obj ectives , in March 1973 , Yaliwan said the 
Association was a Christian group and believed in God . Its sole and 
somewhat ambiguous obj e ctive was to establ ish the law of God ; 3 in 
this , the Seven Association had no conflict with the government or 
missions . Yaliwan specifically denied any interest in economic or 
political activities (though he continued to call for the unity of all 
people and, prior to September 1975 , independence) and said that the 
Seven Association had nothing to do with paua haus or memorial gardens . 
Yaliwan fought with Hawina and said he would have nothing further to 
do with him. He also believed that the Peli Association opposed the 
election of Hepau in 1973 . Hawina , on the other hand , claimed that 
the Peli and the Seven Associations had the same obj ectives and when 
asked (May 1975)  if Peli would contest the next national elections 
replied that Peli would support whoever Yaliwan decided to nominate . 
Meanwhile , despite some geographical alignment - with Seven 
1 
2 
3 
In 1977 the Association was known as ' Four Corners ' .  
In 1973 a common distinction was between ' Daniel members ' (who 
allegedly had paid Kl2) and ' Matias members ' who had paid 70 toea . 
Here Yaliwan referred to Nupe la Testamen, Rom 1 3  - ' Yumi mas 
aninit long ol gavman ' ( ' We must support the government ' ) . 
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Association support concentrated around the Kubalia area1 and Peli 
support around Marambanj a  and places to the west - Peli supporters 
not directly involved in the dispute between Yaliwan and Hawina 
seemed to have little awarenes s  of the split and still tended to 
identify Peli with Yaliwan . 
In January 197 3 , following the alleged disappearance of money 
from paua haus , a protest meeting against the Peli Association was 
held at Yangoru . The meeting appears to have been organi zed by 
students from the area home on vacation . Reporting on the meeting the 
Post-Courier ( 2  January 1973)  recorded:  
Spokesman for the meeting , House of Assembly 
interpreter John Wauwia [the unsuccessful 
Pangu candidate in the 1973 by-election] said 
it had been decided to combat cult activities 
in the area through the Yangoru Youth Club . 
The club is associated with the Roman Catholic 
Young Workers ' Association . At a later stage 
the youth club will  undertake village 
development , with the co-operation of the 
village people and encourage the people to 
help themselves . 
By early 1974 active mass support for the Peli and Seven 
Associations seems to have largely disappeared and most paua haus and 
memorial gardens had been abandoned . Patrol reports in late 1973 and 
early 1974 also reported frequent threats of violence against Peli 
officials . 
Late in 1974 Yaliwan again attracted national attention when 
there were rumours that he was to be crucified . Yaliwan denied these 
reports but said that the Seven Association would do something to 
bring about independence ; there was ,  however, no further incident . 
In 1974 the Yangoru Council introduced a Ward Development Fund 
Scheme under which half the revenue from council tax was returned to 
1 
In 1975 , however ,  Seven Association members constructed a Seven 
Association ' office ' near Maprik , at Waigakum No . 3 .  
60 
ward committees to use as they wished (other councils in the East 
Sepik are expected also to adopt the scheme} • In a few Seven and Peli 
dominated wards this meant that the money was being administered in 
effect by the Associations , and indeed Yaliwan , who earlier had 
unsuccessfully tried to persuade people to pay contributions to the 
Seven Association instead of the counci l ,  claimed credit for the 
scheme . According to Yaliwan , in the Seven Association areas money 
would be used for construction of schools and a hospital - but not for 
roads , which was ' council work ' . 
In late 1975 the government abandoned its earlier tolerance of 
the Peli and Seven Associations and two hundred komiti (but not 
including Yaliwan or Hawina) were charged variously with illegally 
collecting taxes and spreading false reports . One hundred and fifty 
were sentenced to five to six months imprisonment with hard labour and 
fi fty were fined and released . 
This notwithstanding , in August 1976 the movement organized a 
ceremony on Hurun to dedicate a memorial to Papua New Guinea ' s  
independence in September 1975 . A meeting of about five hundred 
people was addressed by Yaliwan , Hawina and Hepau , all of whom 
expressed their gratitude to the government for bringing the people 
to independence and a pig and case of beer were presented to the 
officer-in-charge of the Yangoru sub-district . 
Seven months later Yaliwan was a late nominator for his old 
Yangoru-saussia seat in the national elections . Although government 
officials regarded his candidature as something of a j oke , and 
despite the fact that he did not active ly campaign , Yaliwan came 
fourth in the seven man first-past-the-post contest,  scoring an 
1 impressive 13 per cent of the vote . Early in 1979 he announced his 
intention of contesting the forthcoming provincial election and was 
duly elected . 
1 An account of the 1977 election in Yangoru-Saussia is contained in 
Winnett and May (forthcoming) • 
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ConaZusion 
In May 1971 a senior government o fficial described the Hurun 
movement as ' one of the biggest and most potentially explosive cults 
in the Territory ' s  history • . 1 About eight months after this the 
2 Administrator,  Mr L . W. Johnson , was reported as saying that pure 
cargo cults might be dying in Papua New Guinea ;  that cults were 
changing and becoming economic development associations . He said 
he felt that East Sepik cultism was changing in nature with the 
formation of the Peli Association . 
Historically , the Administrator ' s  prediction turned out to be 
optimistic . From the start , the Hurun cult was one shade removed 
from ' pure ' cultism in its preoccupation with finding the means of 
generating wealth as opposed to expecting goods to appear in response 
to certain rituals (though this distinction was probably not made by 
all the cult ' s  supporters} . With the establishment of the Peli 
Association Yaliwan and Hawina , perhaps assisted in this by Hawari , 
were astute enough to emphasize ' rational ' obj ectives , such as 
regional economic development , while at the same time visibly drawing 
their following from people whose reasons for support were firmly 
rooted in a magico-religious world view. In this way the Association 
was able to widen its appeal to include some who had not been 
attracted to the cult . The Peli Association was spectacularly 
successful in establishing a formidable organization and in the 
relatively narrow political obj ective of electing its leader to the 
House of Assembly . It was ,  however ,  quite unsuccessful in relation 
to its objective of economic development. 
Peli ' s  failure in business was due largely to a lack of 
managerial competence among its leaders and an inability to formulate 
1 Post-Couroier 18 May 1971 . 
2 Post-CoUriier 14 January 1972 . 
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economic obj ectives in operational terms and follow them through . 
Moreover,  despite the supportive statements of senior officials quoted 
above , the Association received virtually no help from government 
field officers most of whom, understandably , felt that they could not 
lend support to Peli without losing faith with those who had co­
operated with the government in seeking development through more 
conventional channel s .  In the long run it was this failure which 
brought about the decline of the movement , though the decline was 
undoubtedly accelerated by the split between Yaliwan and Hawina , by 
Hawina ' s  imprisonment in 1972- 7 3 ,  and by the associated 
decentralization of the movement which deprived it of the vital force 
of charismatic leadership . Under these circumstances the government ' s  
early policy of ' low profile ' campaigning against the movement while 
avoiding confrontation , almost certainly helped pave the way for 
Peli ' s  decline . 
The Hurun movement is widely acknowledged to have failed . In  
the process a large number of village people lost sizeable amounts of 
money . However there has been surprisingly little bitterness over 
this . As many village people observe , they have tried other 
activities , such as cash cropping and co-operatives ,  with little 
success ; the Peli Association is j ust another unsuccessful experiment . 
It is unlikely to be the last. Over time it is  to be expected 
that such movements will  base their appeal less on magico-religious 
grounds and more on conventional western social and economic values , 
but expectations themselves are a function of development and it i s  
likely that organizers of movements whose main orientation i s  
developmental and generally modernizing will  continue t o  raise the 
expectations of their followers above their capacity to deliver . 
1 Also , the absence of expatriate plantations in the area deprived 
Peli of one form of investment open to similar movements in many 
other parts of the country . 
Chapter 3 
THE P I TENAMU SOCIETY 
R. Adams 
Though it i s  little known beyond a small group of government 
officials and Lutheran Church personnel , the Pitenamu Society of 
the Morobe Province developed during 1971- 74 as a movement of major 
dimensions and considerable significance . It represented a wide 
group of relatively disadvantaged villagers from the Morobe 
highlands and their urban kin who considered development had passed 
1 them by . In a few short years it demonstrated an extraordinary 
ability to draw together diverse groups of Morobeans motivated by 
collectivist ideals , a determination to secure greater control 
over their affairs and a drive for economic betterment . The strong 
Pindiu and Tangket cult associations have been sufficient for 
some to damn the movement as ' cargo cult ' . Examination shows it 
to signify much more . Within its complex structure there are 
clear political and socio-economic orientations , and its 
relationships with established institutions , including the Pangu 
Pati , indicate that it is far from bei ng an exclusive cult that 
has withdrawn from active association with established bodies 
and associations . 
Pindiu origins 
The origins of the Pitenamu movement can be traced to the 
area embraced by the Pindiu Local Government Council , an area 
encompassing the large Mongi river basin in the interior of the 
Huon Peninsula approximately midway between Lae and Finschhafen . 
The basin comprises three deep valleys, the Mongi in the eas t ,  the 
Kua in the centre and the Bulum in the wes t .  
1 The name Pitenamu is an acronym derived from the first two letters 
of the four areas from which support was initially obtained : Pindiu , 
Tewa± , Nawae and Mumeng . 
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Pindiu patrol post,  the administrative centre for the area ' s  
19 , 000 inhabitants , i s  located i n  the eastern Mongi valley , closest 
to Finschhafen , the district headquarters , but quite distant from 
the Kua and Bulum valleys , the area of greatest cult activity . 
The Mongi and its tributaries have cut deeply into the 
forested uplands leaving a rugged terrain that militates against 
the development of adequate systems of transport and communication . 
In common with most parts of the Morobe highlands , there is no 
road network l inking the area with the external world , despite 
intermittent road building efforts over many years . Two airstrips , 
at Mindik and Pindiu , service the area and a third at Ogeramnang , 
commenced in 1 968 , was completed in 197 5 .  Per capita yearly 
1 income is estimated at K4 , or Kl8 per adult male , coffee 
production providing the principal source of income . 
Until the 1950s , the region remained a Lutheran Church 
domain , disturbed only by an annual government patrol and the 
activities of appointed village official s .  Kate speaking 
evangelists from Finschhafen introduced the gospel to the area 
in 1911 and a central school and church were established at 
Ogeramnang in the Bulum valley in 1912 . Education ,  through the 
medium of a Kate village school , and medical services (a small 
mission hospital operates at Wagerzaring , close to Pindiu) were 
provided by the church , inter village roads were built and an 
airstrip was constructed at Mindik in 1961 . Church organized 
stores , later to be taken over by NAMASU , 2 initially accounted 
for a significant proportion of commercial activity in the area . 
The new religion and the associated institutions greatly changed 
the pattern of village organization and acceptance of the new 
order was almost total . 
l 
2 
Townsend ( 1975 : 5 ) . The Pindiu Patrol Report 1972-73 No . 3  
estimates the average adult (household) income as Kl2-15 per year . 
The Native Marketing and Supply Ltd . , formally established in 
1959 by the Lutheran Mission of New Guinea . 
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The church-sponsored changes ,  though not destroying the 
basic value and epistemological system ,  superimposed on the village 
a well organized social and religious structure which was seen to 
be efficient and satisfying , particularly where appropriate 
material progress was concerned. Material progress , however , has 
not satisfied the people . The increased intrusion of external 
world influences in the past few decades and the crises of 
confidence arising from the non achievement of desired material 
changes have meant an inevitable weakening of the position of the 
church , whose position has also been eroded by the expanded role 
and power of the government over the last two decade s .  The 
establishment of the local government system, the development of 
a secular education system, and the growth o f  the government medical 
facilities and other services have introduced new variables into 
the system .  
A series of ' roads ' to material advancement has been held 
out to villagers in the postwar period and has been eagerly 
grasped in the expectation of substantial change . 
Coffee production was posited as an answer to the problem 
of low income and limited conunercial development . Widespread 
planting began in 1949 and continued through to the 1960s but 
with a j ourney of several days to the nearest selling point , 
fluctuating pri ces , high absentee rates and an absence of trade 
store goods , achievement fell far short of expectations , with 
much of the coffee being left unpicked and trees unpruned and 
unweeded .  
The planting o f  coffee and the subsequent generation o f  some 
cash i ncome did , however ,  encourage involvement in several 
conunercial ventures ,  none of which is seen by villagers today as 
being particular ly successful . The Finschhafen Marketing and 
Development Society ( FMDS } was promoted in the 1950s by the 
government and was formally registered in 1959 to provide a 
regular shipping service and more competitive trade store outlets 
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and to market coffee and copra . NAMASU was establ ished in the same 
period to assume control over and expand the commercial activities 
then undertaken by the Lutheran Church. Duplication of effort 
and resources by the two organizations , ineffective control systems , 
staffing di fficulties and repeated defalcations , have meant low 
returns or losse s .  
Despite shortcomings much has been achieved by both NAMASU 
and FMDS in improving transport services and in providing a 
reasonable supply of trade s tore goods and marketing facilities 
at Pindiu and Mindik , the two centres established respectively · by 
government and church . However , what financial returns there have 
been to the vil lager shareholders and members have been small , 
whi le expectations have often been unrealistically high . Modest 
dividend payments on small shareholdings have prompted resentment 
and the villager l iving away from the station can see little return 
for hi s investment ,  though he is clearly affected by the high 
prices charged for the store goods , low produce prices and the 
great distance necessary to carry coffee beans for sale . 
A further hope of commercial development was held out to 
the villagers by an Hungarian entrepreneur ,  John Biro , who fol lowed 
the path of FMDS and NAMASU , establishing with the aid of village 
contributions the KZUBT company ( the initials of the early 
contributing villagers ) with s tores at Pindiu and Mindik . His 
venture made considerable impact and he was able to establish 
close personal contacts with the people .  The collapse o f  this 
enterprise with Biro ' s  departure in 1971 engendered considerable 
dismay and speculation as to the reasons for failure . The Lutheran 
Church , a former local member of parliament , Mek Singiliong , and 
the government are variously deemed to have been responsible for 
Biro ' s  departure .  For the people another promising ' road ' was 
closed . 
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Establishment of the Pindiu Council i n  1961 brought further 
hope of beneficial change , with promises of roads and improved 
health , education and other services . Bolstered by substantial 
government subsidies it has indeed made significant progress in 
some areas . However , these benefits have not been equally shared 
and areas such as the Bulum valley , furthest removed from the 
council headquarters and the administrative centre at Pindiu , 
have received least benefit from council activity . 
For the vi llagers ,  substantive benefit from processes of 
change has been slow to accrue , particularly in relation to 
development elsewhere and to villagers ' aspirations . The intrusion 
of external forces has upset the balance of traditional society 
and attainment of a new equilibrium has not been achieved . The 
long association with the Lutheran Church and the enthusiastic 
postwar support for government sponsored change has e ffected 
only marginal changes in the traditional way of l i fe .  The 
introduced ins titutions - council , church , co-operative , NAMASU 
and House of Assembly - have seemingly not been able to meet the 
vi llagers ' needs nor have they helped the vil lager satis factorily 
to adjust and adapt to the forces that impinge upon him. 
Pindiu auZts 
A pervasive system of thought and belief concerning European 
wealth and power ,  progressively supplemented and revised , has been 
inextricably interwoven with the success ive Pindiu postwar 
development efforts , intermittently giving rise to cultist forms 
of behaviour . Whilst the origins of the present day beliefs may 
be traced back beyond the second world war to experiences , 
experiments and traditional wealth myths , it is convenient to 
follow the development of the present day Tangket cult from a cargo 
cult which developed in Pindiu , and indeed in most parts of Morobe , 
in 1946-48 following the return of villagers from wartime 
activities . 
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In 1946-47 a movement known locally as the skin gu:ria 1 
( shaking of the body } broke out in the middle Bulum area , spreading 
throughout the Bulum and into other parts of the Mongi basin . 
Cheeving , Anzilong and Ipongi from the Zewitsan village and close 
kin of Nubos , the present Pitenamu leader , were the maj or 
activis ts but most centres generated their own leaders and 
today these provide links between the present Tangket cult and 
the skin guria. 2 
In comm:>n with other maj or postwar movements , followers 
of the skin guria cult were urged to support the church by regular 
prayer and attendance at morning and evening devotions . Village 
hygiene and personal cleanl iness were emphasi zed and village 
activity patterns were strictly organi zed , with villagers attending 
morning devotions from 6 to 7 a . m. then lining up to march to 
garden work and o ther vi llage duties . Pigs were killed and 
' shaking ' by the leaders and their followers occurred as a means 
to obtain contact with the spirits . ' Cargo ' was to be delivered 
by planes ( some of which were to land in small areas cleared in 
the centre of cemeterie s } , by ship and by trucks which were to 
appear from a hole in the ground which went through to America . 
Bush houses were built to receive the expected wealth , and 
symbolic cane rifle s ,  to be transformed at the appropriate time , 
were carried by groups of villagers who marched about in 
military style . The cul t ,  as with s imilar movements , brought 
strong hopes of revolutionary changes in the exis ting order . 
1 
2 
Missionary reports refer to this as the ' Mangzo (Inner Fire } 
Movement ' .  See Helbig ( 1946 } , Bergmann (19 47} , Pi lhofer ( 1963 : 184-8 ) , 
Steinbauer ( 1971 : 62-4 ) . Informants throughout the area during 1974-
75 fieldwork consistently referred to the activi ty as the skin guria. 
This is the Pidgin term and would be used in di scussion with non 
mis sionary people . Mangzo is a Kate word . 
These linkages have undoubtedly been emphasi zed to legitimate 
the various succeeding phases .  This notwithstanding , a strong 
element of continuity is evident . 
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The spread of the skin guria movement brought response 
from both mission and government .  The principal leaders were 
held in detention for a day at Ogeramnang , the site of the 
Lutheran church and school , where a special meeting was held to 
deal with this crisis . The meeting renounced the cult and the 
principal activists were struck on the arms and shoulders with 
the branches of a shrub tradi tionally used for counter-magic . 
A large stone was inscribed with details of the meeting and the 
leaders were then required to hold the stone and renounce the 
cult . The inscribed stone , together with branches of the 
exorcizing shrub , was then ' planted ' as a taboo s ign ( tcunbu} at 
the entrance to the church and small replica stones were placed 
at key points throughout the area . 
This action , carried out by an indigenous pastor , acting 
within the vi llagers ' frame of reference , had a profound effect 
and though there were sporadic local outbreaks of activity the 
main impetus of the movement was halted. Also the fact that 
the cult had attracted such ferv�nt response over a considerable 
time without securing the promised benefits inhibited active 
continuation of the cult . The cargo experience , however , persists 
and knowledge of it permeates thought and action to the present 
day . This predisposition was s trengthened by the breaking of the 
large Ogeramnang tambu s tone and the smaller replicas at various 
intervals through the 1950s , the big stone by an earth tremor , 
an event seen to be of considerable significance (villagers 
report finding small amounts of money on thi s occasion } . The 
remnants of the large stone were finally dispersed in 1 968 when 
the Ogeramnung church was resited to enable construction of 
the new Ogeramnang airstrip . 
The 1 950s , however , were primarily a period during which 
energies were directed towards more secular pursuits . Thi s was 
a time when widespread coffee planting and collection for FMDS 
and other commercial enterprises attracted great enthusiasm and 
input of phys ical and monetary resources .  Significantly , a number 
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of the principal activists in the present Tangket movement 
occupied prominent positions in these activities . Here were new 
approaches to be followed . But returns from these development 
efforts were seen to be totally inadequate . The hoped for 
transformation of village life did not occur and while pressures 
upon the village system grew with an increased outflow of migrants , 
the relative disparity in standards of development locally and 
el sewhere appeared more marked . In this situation it is perhaps 
not surpri sing that people began to resort to magico-religious 
beliefs . 
The period 1961-64 saw the beginning of the Tangket cult ,  
a movement which was to sweep the greater part of the Pindiu area . 
Col lective preoccupation with the separate elements of what was 
to develop as the Tangket cult is apparent but it remained for 
a series of dream visions by Kopa Oziong from Nomanene , beginning 
in 1962 , to articulate and validate these collective feelings and 
beliefs . The dream vision provided knowledge of the needs to 
plant the tangket shrub (CordyZine spp . ) ,  to col lect money and 
to practice hygiene work . These elements , of course , had a clear 
foundation . A series of hygiene courses for aid post orderlies 
and council lors was held at different intervals beginning in 1960 ; 
these courses provided a link with the skin guria hygiene rules .  
Pictures o f  a house surrounded by a decorative shrub fence , used 
to illustrate the concept of household cleanliness , struck a 
responsive chord in the mind s of several of the participants . 
Tangket had long been assigned special powers amongst the people 
of the Huon Peninsula1 and there appear to have been small 
amounts planted in 1946- 49 . Different varieties of tangket 
1 Stephen Lehner ( 1928)  de scribes in detail the significance of 
the red tangket which was believed to pos sess blood-soul substance . 
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occupy an important ro le in local myths and are used for garden 
magic ,  initiation and funerary rites . The money collection 
injunction clearly stems from the experience of concerted 
money collections for FMDS and other causes . 1 
Saliong , a former aid post orderly from Kotkin village , 
and Akinu from Mindik , both affinal kin of Kopa , assisted in 
propagating this new belief system and organizing money 
collections and tangket planting . However the construction of 
the Mindik airstrip in 1962-63 and council development plans , 
together with church and government action against Akinu and 
Saliong, considerably contained the movement .  Popular support 
at this juncture was far from complete and there appears to 
have been a significant degree of local resistance to the 
movement arising from secular involvements and expectations . 
A further phase occurred in 1968 and appears to have been 
associated with the final removal of the tallibu stone fragment at 
Ogeramnang and a short- lived earthquake cult in the Kua valley . 
Again , support was not complete . 1970-71, however ,  saw the 
commencement of the most widespread and intensive period of 
tangket planting and money collection .  Tangket covered the 
villages of the Mongi basin and followers , in their fervour , 
declared their intention of placing a tangket border around the 
government station at Pindiu . 2 
The expanded influence of tangket activity during this most 
recent phase stems from a number of interacting influences . 
<;:ult doctrine and ritual had by this time been fully developed 
1 
2 
The concept of an initial stock of money as the basis for 
the generation of further money was established through the 
prewar ' money magic ' movement and its successor phases . 
Although no tangket was placed around Pindiu station itself , 
the house of the officer-in-charge at Mindik is surrounded by 
tangket as is the church at Tumnang , overlooking Mindik airstrip . 
7 3  
and widely diffused through a well developed organizational system 
under the guidance of strong and competitive leadership . Continued 
resentment aris ing from perceived development failures ,  the 
removal of John Biro and the political climate of the period 
helped provide a favourable environment for its growth . Increased 
conflict between the movement ' s  members and church leaders was 
also a very significant factor . A decl ine in the pos ition of the 
church , together with increasing resistance to church injunctions 
against polygyny , had brought great tension between cul t  and 
church authority . Although villagers have not broken with the 
church and still attend services , large groups have been subj ect 
to church di scipline for long periods and widespread tension 
existed . Given the underlying search for autonomy and independence , 
conflict with authority in this situation provided an external 
enemy and so inj ected into the s ituation more fervour than might 
otherwise have been attained. 
The strength and solidarity of the movement was undoubtedly 
enhanced by encounters with external authority : a bitter struggle 
in the cas e of the church , in respect of cult practices and 
polygynous relationships , and a somewhat more subtle demonstration 
of power in regard to the government , particularly with respect 
to Pindiu Counci l . This power encounter emphasizes a fundamental 
preoccupation which has persisted in varying forms s ince the time 
of the skin guria cult.  The cargo , rifle , money and tangket 
motif have each demonstrated an underlying concern for power . 
The passage of time has brought a de-emphasis of the first twol 
and major concern with the third , a more specific goal obj ect and 
one legitimized by the FMDS collection of the 1950s . Tangket 
planting of course primarily derives from its magico-religious 
1 Though small outbreaks of marching with cane rifles occurred 
in 19 71 and , as noted above , there was a short-lived and 
localized earthquake cult in 1968 . 
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properties but it attained secondary functions as a consequence of 
the opposition its planting occasioned. Increasingly , tangket 
therefore served as a symbol of protest and of indigenous identity 
1 
and power while IOC>ney occupied both a symbolic and instrumental 
role . 
Tangket auZt r>itua.Z and beZief 
Tangket cult ritual belief , though a syncretic amalgam of 
modern and traditional , essentially represents a recourse to 
traditional magico-religious beliefs as a means of  securing 
desired goals . Drawing heavily upon traditional elements -
tangket shrub , cult house and dance feasting - it has amplified 
aspects of the skin gur>ia cult and draws upon several features 
of secular experience , IOC>St notably that of money collection . 
Membership of the movement is signified by the planting of 
a double row of tangket around village dwellings , 2 payment of the 
required j oining fees , participation in dance feasts and obedience 
1 
2 
Village informants have stressed the Papua New Guinean and 
traditional origins of tangket in contrast to the cement and steel 
fence used by the Europeans . In this pre independence period , 
it consequently assumed a political purpose not originally intended . 
It should be noted here that whilst this essay focuses sympathet­
ically upon the development of the Pitenamu Society and its 
Tangket antecedents this should not be construed as implying 
general criticism of the Lutheran Church with which the movement 
has been in conflict . As noted , the Church has been the dominant 
body in the post contact period and it has been inevitable in 
the stress situation to which the villagers have been exposed that 
the church should , in some measure , be the subject of the stress 
responses manifested by these people . The writer has not attempted 
here any direct assessment of the position and role of missionaries 
and the Lutheran Church but the valuable contribution by the 
Lutherans in exploration , linguistic work , anthropology , education , 
health and general socio-economic development is fully recognized . 
More recent plantings have taken the form of additional lines 
of tangket and impressive walkways of tangket along entrance paths 
to villages . 
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to tangket rules . The tangket shrub serves , among other things , 
as a distinctive symbol of membership and belie f .  The planting 
of tangket provides an occas ion for feasting and dancing as do 
the visits of the movement ' s leaders and other appropriate 
occasions . 
Tangket law requires burial of menstrual material beneath 
the tangket and the maintenance of cleanliness in the area 
surrounding the house , particularly the intervening space between 
the two rows of tangket.  Small amounts of money are placed 
together with the menstrual material
1 
and sweeping of the space 
is considered to help bring money - suitably multiplied - to 
the surface . Small amounts of money are reported as being found 
in the morning by women around the base of the shrubs , presumably 
following some earthly intervention . There have been allegations 
that animal blood and menstrual blood have been buried under the 
floor of ' money houses ' (moni haus ) to assist the ' work money ' . 
The emphasis upon hygiene , and against fighting and stealing , 
which characterized the skin gu:r-ia cult,  remains but in attenuated 
form. Church laws regarding monogamy have been relaxed ( though 
not proclaimed) , it is said , to help overcome fighting, problems 
of unmarried mothers and extra-marital sexual activity and to 
conform with traditional practice . 
1 
The rationale for menstrual burial is not completely certain . 
It would appear that a limited amount of experimentation relating 
to menstrual burial as a means of wealth generation occurred 
during the skin guria phase , one assumes deriving in part from 
the pre war shilling multiplication beliefs brought from Mape . 
Wagner ( 1964 : 37 ,  40) in discussing the postwar cult activity in 
the Kalasa and Kabwum areas , makes brief mention of menstrual 
blood beliefs and collected evidence points to considerable 
diffusion of cult beliefs throughout the Huon Peninsula and beyond . 
The councillor and aid post orderly courses emphasizing hygiene , 
and the associated assertions that European women have special 
methods of disposal , clearly exerted some influence in the develop­
ment of the practice though one suspects more as a rationalization 
than a major causal influence . Primarily the practice must be 
regarded as deriving from traditional fertility beliefs and 
practices particularly in association with basic concepts of 
blood as spirit essence . 
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Development of moni haus ritual directed attention away 
from the tangket as a direct producer of wealth though tangket 
ritual remains central . The procedure of money collection and 
record-keeping gravitated to the moni haus, previously the 
ancestral cult house , sited outside the village . The associations 
with traditional ancestor worship and initiation rites , though not 
articulated , are quite implicit . The traditional Lopiong1 figure 
and bullroarers have been produced in several cases , as recently 
as 1971 , but this has not been general . (These cult houses also 
figured as the houses where wealth would be received during the 
skin gur'ia movement . ) 
Collections are held periodically by the cult leader or 
his village representative . Individuals are given a number which 
is carefully recorded by the secretary outside the moni haus . 
The recording of one ' s  number is accorded considerable significance , 
ensuring one ' s  right to future benefits and conferring quasi legal 
status upon the ceremony . Support and continuity of contribution 
is maintained through villagers periodically being given night 
time glimpses of money inside the house and through the cult 
leader calling out the increased amounts of money secured for 
specified individuals .  Inability immediately to disburse the 
money is explained through the fact that the money is too hot to 
handle , an allusion to the spirit forces operating to produce 
increased wealth , or as the result of alleged breaches of tangket  
rules .  Some distribution o f  money is made to accommodate 
difficult individuals or to sustain flagging hopes . 
Village women enjoy membership of the cult , paying reduced 
fees and participating in dancing and feasting . Sexual promiscuity 
and prostitution have been alleged but apart from an increased 
number of polygamous relationships there is no evidence of 
regular or organized activity of thi s nature . 
1 The Lopiong or Lopio cult is widespread in northwest New 
Guinea . See Schmitz ( 1960) , Richert ( 1965 ) , McElhanon 
( 1969)  and Wama ( 1974)  . 
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As a consequence of some external encouragement and a clear 
desire by individual villagers , emphasis in recent years has been 
placed upon investment of money collected . A considerable number 
and variety of business proposals with associated money collections 
have appeared in the Pindiu area in recent years : Siki store , trucks , 
a soap factory , large stores in Lae , fixed trust investments and 
others , but generally they have not proceeded beyond money 
collection and a vague investment proposal . Funds collected by 
Kopa and Akinu were used to establish the Somsi Company in 1971  
for investment in dump trucks
1 
but insufficient finance was 
deposited and the money remains idle in a Lae bank account . 
Saliong ' s  line used some of their collection for cattle 
proj ects . Despite the indisputable magico-re ligious basis of the 
movement , a significant and an increasing proportion of the members 
are concerned that the money be properly invested and that effective 
controls over its collection and expenditure be instituted . This 
business-investment strand has become increasingly prominent , 
reflecting increased exposure to commercial activity and a 
determination to move beyond the limited options available in the 
village environment and gain access to business beyond the village . 
Pitenamu is the logical extension of this development . 
TarrJket Zeadership and organization 
The strength of the Ta:ngket cult and its related body , the 
Pitenamu Society , has rested to a signi ficant degree upon a 
framework of strong interpersonal ties - kin , affinal and 
business/exchange relations , a pattern developed most effectively 
by Nubos but present in all cult groupings . A flexible system of 
1 Nubos Etek initially supported the Kopa-Akinu enterprise but 
withdrew in 1971  determined to operate as an independent 
entrepreneur . It was at this time that a variety of stories 
circulated about Nubos ' s  special power and his dream relevations . 
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organization operates throughout.  Each leader has been a major 
figure within his own village , attracting around him a body of 
close supporters and ass istants . In member villages , key figures 
were won over through feasting and kinship and bus iness ties ; 
head committee members were appointed but other village figures 
might be given roles such as secretary or store manager . 
Four figures , Kopa , Saliong , Akinu and Nubos have dominated 
the Tangke t movement in the Kua and Bulum area . Each has established 
spheres of influence based upon his village of ref�rence and those 
contiguous villages where kinship and exchange ties have been close . 
Their influence has extended to other villages in proportion to 
the strength of kinship and exchange ties present , success in 
wooing leading figures in such villages , the prestige of the leader 
and the energy with which he and his lieutenants have been able 
to promote his particular variant of Tangke t activity . 
The cult leadership roles and behaviour patterns derive 
from a complex of influences and motivation : ' big man ' , power 
and status seeking on an extended scale , visionary prophetism,  
entrepreneurship , individual opportunism and varied responses 
to external influences .  The leadership positions are not discreet 
but rather embedded in the full fabric of village life . One 
cannot separate cult leadership from the total political picture 
in the region. The Tangket  movement,  particularly in the Bulum 
and Kua valleys , has been a well established and strongly supported 
aspect of vil lage life . Cult leadership is interwoven within the 
existing village power systems and for a full understanding of 
the leadership positions one would necessarily have to examine 
the constellation of leadership roles and the inter-relationship 
between the exercise of influence and power in the different 
spheres of village life . It would be quite misleading to regard 
the Tangket cult as a revolutionary movement which has swept aside 
existing systems and leaders in its quest for a radical new way 
of life . 
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Pitenanu: growth and deveZopnent 
The Pitenamu Society evolved from the Targ ket cult 
unannounced and without clear plan or intent . The emergence of 
a Province-wide grouping was occasioned by the conj unction of 
several influences .  Pitenamu first came to the attention of the 
Provincial administration in the latter part of 1972 with the 
organization of money collections from the Kumagolo settlement , 
an encampment between Bulolo and Mumeng , and the operation of a 
passenger motor vehicle incribed with the same ' Pitenamu ' . An 
exchange of memos and reports at this time suggested Pindiu as 
the origin of the movement and expressed concern in regard to 
probable cargo cult influences and obj ectives . 
PuUng Sapa-Nakes business g oais 
Pitenamu ' s  origins may be readily traced to two somewhat 
1 
minor Pindiu figures , Puling Sapa and Nakes Sauwia Marigi 
(Malengu) , who sought and gained assistance through the office 
of the then Department of Business Development in the 
establishment of a well conceived and legitimate commercial 
venture . The subsequent development of the Society was a 
consequence of the convergence and interaction of quite broad and 
diverse influences . The embryo business enterprise , particularly 
following the development of firm links with the Targ ket movement , 
served as the locus for a political and socio-economic movement. 
of major dimensions . Detail is given in the following pages of 
the direct ties and influences of Targket practice and Pindiu 
1 
Puling was born at the coastal village of Oligadu where his 
parents had moved from their natal Wamuki village near Hamoronong/ 
Ebabang . Prior to the second world war Puling worked at the 
Wau-Bulolo goldfields . Subsequently he travelled to the Sepik 
with Ben Parer and experienced two eventful escapes from Japanese 
custody during the war . Following a period of employment with 
ANGAU he extended his education at Keravat and Dregerhafen 
prior to assuming responsibility for the Tamigadu copra proj ect . 
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leadership yet any narrowly defined view of the Tangket cult and 
the Pitenamu movement must necessarily inhibit comprehension of 
the complex broader influences underlying these developments .  
Puling Sapa , stricken with partial paralysis o f  arm and 
leg, an affl iction which prevented effective continuance of his 
role as supervisor of the ten village Tamigadu Congregation copra 
proj ect , came .to Lae in 1 968 with ideas of establishing a bulk 
store trading enterprise . Puling is a man with a deep sense of 
responsibility and an earnest desire to secure an improved way of 
life for hi s fellow men. Puling ' s  chance discovery of a Development 
Bank investment booklet whilst he was idle at Oligadu inspired 
ambitious thoughts of business development .  I n  Lae , initial 
1 
residence at the Ebabang compound brought Puling into contact 
with Nakes , an affinal kin from Hamoronong . The youthful Nakes 
had intermittently worked in Lae as a painter ' s  assistant and 
prior to his alliance with Puling had attempted unsuccessfully 
to establish a store and coffee buying enterprise at hi s natal 
village . This failure did not dampen his desire for business 
involvement and on hearing of Puling ' s  business plans he quickly 
sought a partnership . The two approached the Business Development 
office in Lae and were advised that the establishment of the 
proposed bulk store and coffee marketing enterprise with branch 
outlets would require recruitment of wide support and the 
collection of considerable funds . The initial plan for an 
Ebabang/Hamoronong sponsored enterprise was broadened to encompass 
the Mindik area and the two , with assistance from Business 
Development,  opened the 1Mindik Lain Share Accoun� in November 1969 . 
Numerous meetings to discuss the business proposal were held 
in Lae ' s migrant settlement areas , particularly at the large Buko 
settlement where the two later took up residence , and Nakes 
travelled to Mindik seeking support from village people in that area . 
1 
The Ebabang compound is to be found at the edge of a large 
settlement generally known as the Siassi Compound . The Ebabang 
group come from the Hamoronong/Ebabang area of Pindui . All trace 
descent from a common ancestor . 
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Puling approached the matter of  business organization seriously , 
carefully setting out in impressive detail procedures to be 
followed in the organization of the enterprise , to be called the 
1 Hube Company . He listed requirements for each branch store , set 
out multiple examples of  various types of  business records , and 
as well as expounding upon appropriate commercial practice gave 
short bible talks and other instructions on the approach of a 
' good life ' . 
Although the enterprise initially was perceived narrowly 
in terms of the Mindik Lain Account , and subsequently the Hube 
Company , support was drawn from an increasingly wider area . It 
was quickly recognized that sufficient capital would not be 
obtained from the Mindik-Ebabang area and the Lae meetings 
progressively attracted interest and support from other groups . 
Puling sought assistance from the Pangu Pati. komiti established 
by Tony voutas (Voutas 197 0)  and the younger Nakes made rural 
patrols and established links with a widening c ircle of Morobeans .  
Until 1971 there was little to distinguish the activities and 
bus iness proposals of Puling and Nakes from the miscellany of 
2 
investment schemes current at the time . Both had some 
1 
2 
No company was ever registered though initial organization 
was in terms of a company structure with member contributions 
obtained in multiples of KlO and the issued receipts spoken 
of as share certificates . 
Then as now , different groups and individuals generated 
a variety of investment proposals . Unless articulated with the 
assistance of an external agency such as the Department of 
Business Development , these were commonly little more than vague 
suggestions of generalized desires . Business Development 
endeavoured to assist several business ventures in the Pindiu 
area , arranging incorporation of the Somsi Company , the Kopa/Akinu 
sponsored enterprise which aimed at investment in heavy duty trucks ,  
and negotiating the planned establishment o f  the Oboramia Soap 
Packaging Factory , a proposal that obtained support from the 
Mongi valley area close to Pindiu station . There appears to have 
been no direct Tangket connection in this second case though 
informants allege that the principals promised supporters 
expatriate style houses . Neither proposal came to fruition . 
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exposure to the Tangket cult through contacts with Pindiu people 
visiting Lae and periodic visits to their home villages
1 
but 
neither could or did claim particular Tangket knowledge or power .  
Puling i s  regarded a s  having spirit influence a s  a consequence of 
his partial paralysis but this should not be accorded particular 
. ' f ' 2 signi icance . 
A multi-dimensional movement 
It is possible at this time , however,  to note an increasing 
coalescence of the separate forces and influences that gave rise 
to the development of Pitenamu as a Province-wide movement .  The 
two principals and their company provided the opportunity during 
1971-73 for a fortuitous conjunction of disparate groups and 
influences that together constitute a significant aspect of the 
process of political and socio-economic change during the 
decolinization period . 
The period 1971- 72  saw a rapid expansion of the enterprise . 
Support from residents in the Buko settlement and other migrant 
compounds in Lae grew rapidly at this time , as reflected in a 
substantial increase in bank deposi ts .  Residence in the Buko 
settlement and meetings at Buko and 2/7th 3 brought Nakes and 
Puling into close contact with other ethnic groups . A groundswell 
1 
2 
3 
Settlers from the Kotkin and Hamoronong/Ebabang area have 
established a small number of Tangke� hamlets , generally with 
cattle projects , in the lower foothills near Bukaua and Oligadu . 
Saliong of Kotkin has exercised considerable influence in this 
locale . 
A Lutheran report (Tingasa n . d . )  paints Puling as the 
principal Pitenamu villain yet the writer has found no evidence 
to support such a conclusion . It would appear that many supporters 
interpreted Puling ' s  strictures according to their own frames of 
reference but whilst Puling gave tacit support to the 1971-73 
Tangket involvement there is no evidence to implicate him as a 
Tangket activist . 
' 2/7th ' is a small migrant settlement , comprised largely of 
Nabak people . 
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of support developed and a coterie of supporters from the different 
ethnic communities was attracted to the embryonic movement , each 
recruit providing a link with his area community and drawing 
village support through letters , visits , and contact with visitors 
to Lae . Particularly strong support came from communal groups 
originating in the Nawae Council area north of Lae , which shares 
a common boundary with the Pindiu region . The organizational 
structure that evolved conforms to the model successfully developed 
by the Pangu Pati in the Morobe Province and by the Vitiaz Society , 
an urban welfare body : a loose coalition of ethnic groups and 
communal sub-groups , each with a vaguely defined hierarchy of 
komiti and , where appropriate , an acknowledged ' big man ' or major 
communal figure as president with nominal responsibility for his 
particular region . In addition , a constellation of younger and 
better educated individuals serve as secretaries , recording money 
collections and fulfilling a symbolic role as persons with 
cognizance of western ways , particularly as pertaining to business . 
The structure is clearly one that maximized recruitment and 
support .  
Wosae Magnukae , principal secretary to Nubos in 1973-75 , 
was recruited by Nakes to help control and account for the collection 
of money . Wosae , previously a clerk with the Tewai Council , is 
from the Dudua Census Division and gained familiarity with the 
Mindik area through a period of residence there with his father , 
Pastor Magnukae . As well as bringing Tewai support to the growing 
movement , he is a fluent speaker of the main Pindiu group of 
languages and through his father had some knowledge of Tangket 
beliefs . To some degree he assumed the secular guidance role 
initially performed by Puling Sapa . 
Tangket ties 
The movement came under the direct influence of the Tangket 
cult following a trip by Nakes to Hamoronong in 197 1 .  During this 
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visit he met Kapa , Saliong and Nubos Etek , leading Tangket figures ,  
and gave money to all three . At Nawong , a subsidiary Hamoronong 
hamlet , Saliong and Nubos each established a Tangket  cult moni ha.us 
and Nakes appears to have given full support to the cult , telling 
Puling on his return that he was following an approach that would 
secure more members and enable the enterprise to develop successfully . 
One may posit a number of reasons for this development . Puling , 
by virtue of age and infirmity , was unable to exercise effective 
control over his younger colleague and , despite his secular training 
and inclination , was not unsympathetic to the Tangket beliefs ; 
Nakes being relatively young and s trongly influenced by village 
ties appears to have readily accepted the authority of the Tangket 
leaders , particularly that of Nubos .  Moreover ,  a t  thi s s tage the 
enterprise had developed a momentum of its own and an orientation 
quite receptive to magico-religious techniques as an aid to securing 
desired change . 
Underlying political and socio-economic forces 
The movement also attached itself to the coat tails of the 
emergent Pangu Pati and was caught up in the political and socio­
economic forces related to the Pangu phenomenon . Puling told 
people that it was not satisfactory that Morobe Province was not 
being developed and that a company must be established to find 
a means of obtaining money . He appealed to the need for 
development ,  unity , help for the people and indigenous business 
development . Puling sought support from Pangu komiti, speaking 
of Pangu as a prospective government and a means of securing 
self -government and of Pitenamu as a means of establishing 
bus iness activities to help the people .  The developing Pitenamu 
Society was seen as growing alongside the Pangu Pat i ,  the two 
together as vehicles to help the people .  Several of the Pangu 
komiti and activists from Nawae were quite early attracted to 
the Puling-Nakes venture , providing further links to their own 
village conununities and other areas . Close examination of the 
background of other Pintenamu komiti reveals that many campaigned 
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and collected for the Pangu Pati and most were strong Pangu 
supporters . On reflection , such ties are not unexpected : Pangu 
obtained mass support as a movement of change , a party that 
challenged the existing order and promised a better life to its 
supporters ; Pitenamu developed at approximately the same time 
with a similar appeal . Pitenamu komiti who campaigned and 
collected for Pangu , though quick to emphasize the separation of 
the two groups , obviously were influenced by the Pangu ideals 
and aspiration and it is doubtful if any clear cognitive 
distinction existed . Several Pitenamu komiti at one juncture 
were simultaneously collecting KlO membership share subscriptions 
and Pangu 4 0t membership fees . Puling , in speaking of the need 
to develop Morobe and to join together in establishing business 
as a means of securing a new and happy l i fe ,  received a ready 
response from supporters . Pitenamu members in speaking of 
their Society and its goals have used terms such as sanap iong 
Mor>0be Provins ( strengthen Morobe Province ) and bungim wanwan pipe i 
(unite as one people ) .  Pangu ' s  1971-7 2 campaign appeals and 
rhetoric ,  centring upon economic development ,  unity , and self­
government and independence , together with the visible evidence 
of change and the associated expectations , certainly influenced 
broad sections of the Morobe population including those attracted 
to Pitenamu . It is difficult if not impossible to disentangle and 
accurately assess the different motives and perceptions of the 
komiti and supporters drawn to Pitenamu at this time given the 
vague generalized statements of method and intent, the continuing 
concern to reaffirm the group ' s  bona fides in the face of external 
pressures and criticisms , and , amongst individual members , an 
absence of clear comprehension ( the promise of money increase 
aside ) of the nature of the work of the movement . It is possible , 
however ,  to distinguish a sense of moral purpose , corporate 
solidarity and consciousness of common endeavour that transcends 
simple money magic or cargo fantasy and manoeuvre and manipulation 
for individual purpose . 
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There has been an obvious readiness to give credence to the 
magico-religious powers of the Pindiu work and its efficacy in 
assisting the Pitenamu enterprises . Nakes ,  and later Nubos , 
encouraged this and NUbos quite deliberately used the moni haus 
practice with great effect . No doubt this greatly effected the 
prevailing mood and the nature of commitment to the cause . 
Nonetheless the phenomenon is more than this and given the 
underlying temper of the times and the changes in levels of 
political consciousness it is IOC>re appropriate to speak of an 
ongoing mood or animus and a frame of thought and action derivative 
of the interacting forces present in which Pitenamu developed . 
Membership was attracted primarily from the more disadvantaged 
Morobe regions : Pindiu , Nawae , Tewai , Watut , Wantoat and the 
upper Markham. A common pattern prevails : low levels o f  
infrastructure and institutional development ; low income and 
literacy levels ; prolonged contact, with stimulated but unsatis fied 
expectations , and the apparent absence of effective channels 
through which desired changes might be effected . The Bulum valley , 
the source of the Tangket cult ,  provides the archetypal area , 
a region of frustration and unfulfilled promise . 
The individual member drawn from these areas and from the 
settlements and compounds of Lae might be characterized as lacking 
marketable skills , of limited formal education and still strongly 
tied to traditional subsistence life styles or drawn from the urban 
low income sector or the urban unemployed .  It may be inappropriate 
to speak of these people in terms of ' marginality ' or as a depressed 
underclass or an urban and rural proletariat , but they can be 
broadly identified as a stratum of underprivileged 1 drawn from 
distinctive spatial zones of ' underdevelopment ' .  For some , 
1 The concept of relative deprivation as introduced by Aberle 
( 1962)  and refined by Gurr ( 1970)  provides a most per�inent 
conceptual framework from which one may analyse the Pitenamu 
phenomenon . The relevant hypotheses advanced by Gurr will be 
examined in a separate study . 
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infrastructure improvements , improved access and communication , 
and di ffusion of innovations , may encourage more realistic 
expectations and enable greater exploitation of available 
resources . Howeve r ,  it would be unrealistic to expect the position 
of many disadvantaged areas and underprivileged groups to improve 
signi ficantly , and the position of some will deteriorate in 
relative terms . From this perspective the Pitenamu phenomenon 
might be viewed in part as a response to the frustrations , tensions 
and disintegrating influences arising from the colonial ' development ' 
experience . 
It might be further suggested that the development movement , 
with its strong business/cargo associations , provided for some 
Pangu supporters a more tangible and materialistic mode of expression 
and involvement than that provided by Pangu . In these terms support 
for the Society could be conceived as a low level position in a 
continuum of support patterns ranging from that elicited from 
simple subsistence villagers still strongly influenced by magico­
religious beliefs to support drawn from the sophisticated urban 
dweller . Pitenamu and Pangu developing at similar times and 
generating a comparable mass movement momentum, tapped similar 
sources of frustration, perceived deprivation and authority rej ection . 
One may draw the distinction that Pangu is unmistakably a secular 
political organization with definite political aims and policies 
whilst Pitenamu is of a more primordial nature with a definite 
quasi millenarian component and leaders who were ready to use the 
pervasive belie fs in magic and the supernatural as a medium of 
expression and a means of attracting support . But it is doubtful 
whether many supporters at this time saw the distinction ; rather , 
support for one merged into support for the other . It is foolish 
to expect the same sets of values , norms , goal expectations and 
behaviour patterns in respect of the introduced institutions , such 
as political parties , as one finds in the countries from which 
such institutions derived. 1 Supporters of the Pangu Pati were 
1 See Zolberg ( 196 8 : 71-72 ) . 
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and are influenced by the norms , values and structures of the 
traditional system and it will be some time before new values 
are internalized and appropriately modified behaviour patterns 
and expectations are established . 
New directions and assemb ly at Kwnago lo 
The group , now ' formally ' designated as the Pitenamu Society , 
could fairly claim to have attracted wide support from the major 
areas of the Morobe Province with the exception of Kabwum , the 
coastal lowlands and the lower and mid Markham valley area . It 
is remarkable that this following could be secured from such a 
wide geographical area within a space of several years . The 
formation and growth of the Society , whilst obviously deriving 
in part from the initial leadership of Nakes and Puling , aided 
by the energy and organization of the komiti activists attracted 
to the new enterprise , must be seen in part as a concomitant of 
the political and socio-economic forces of  the 1971-73  period . 
Exercise of control by Puling Sapa progressively diminished 
during 1971 and the original conception of a bulk store enterprise 
was eclipsed to some degree by the compound of generalized desires 
produced by the political and socio-economic developments of this 
period and the magico-religious beliefs developed as a consequence 
of the direct Tangket  cult involvement . Evolution did not flow 
from any clearly articulated objectives or a purposive plan of 
action during the period 1971-73 but rather reflected a considerable 
element of spontaneity and an absence of effective organizational 
control and sense of direction. 
Following the death of Nakes in June 1973 the group ' s  bank 
account signatures were changed , deleting Sapa ' s  name and thus 
removing him from any position of formal authority in the organization . 
wosae Magnukae was acknowleged as the principal secretary , formally 
displacing Puling, though assumption of this role must have been 
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progressively effected prior to this . The extraordinary 
development of the movement during the period 1971-73 , the establish­
ment of direct ties with the Tangket movement and the dependent 
position of Nakes in the Tangket system into which he had been 
drawn , resulted in increasing influence by Nubos and his associates 
upon Pitenarnu and finally the assumption of visible and direct 
leadership in the latter part of 197 3 . 
The nature of the struggle for influence and control leading 
to Nubos ' s  emergence as the leading figure in the Pitenarnu Society 
remains somewhat blurred .  Nakes ' s  failing health , his dependence 
upon others for a consi stent and persuasive doctrine and his 
subordinate role within the Tangket movement ,  together with his 
failure to demonstrate progress towards goal attainment , enabled 
others to move into positions of power within the organization . 
Pitenamu komiti at this time became increasingly critical of the 
absence of demonstrable progress and criticisms were made of 
Nakes ' s  alleged diversion of money to private purposes . Various 
delegations visited Nubos at his Harnoronong-Nawong retreat in 
late 1972 and 1973 and transferred support to him. Within the 
Pindiu area Nubos had gained a maj or following and his accession 
to formal leadership clearly appeared to offer enticing prospects , 
particularly in view of the depleted bank balance and the faltering 
momentum of the movement . 
Following Nakes ' s  death a series of meetings formally 
confirmed Nubos's position as the new leader of the movement. 1 
His assumption of leadership brought new strength and vigour to 
1 
Nubos was ' marked ' initially as the manager and nameZ man 
(middle man) of Pitenamu . At this time Wakeong from Zewitsan , 
Nubos 's own village , held the position of ' Lae Tangket President ' 
and Yaeng , in recognition of the strong Mumeng and Watut support , 
held the position of president of the Mumeng branch , though he 
was spoken of at times as president of the Society .  There is 
of course no fixed hierarchy of positions in the western mode but 
Nubos indisputably was the dominant figure from 1973 . 
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the movement . Tangket belief had been considerably di ffused prior 
to Nubos ' s  appearance in Lae but as a major Tangket figure and 
a ' manage r '  of great repute Nubos brought to the Society great 
ritual authority together with considerable drive and organizational 
capacity . This gave a more explicit and purposeful approach to 
the process of wealth generation , both secular and non secular . 
In Lae a moni haus collection centre was established at the 
Yalu Plantation , a 250 acre holding located some 25 kilometres 
along the Highlands Highway from Lae . A semi permanent material 
house was constructed there together with four bush material 
sleeping houses . Following the destruction of these facilities 
(see pp . 9 6-9 7 )  a second moni haus was built at the Nawae settlement 
at Busu river . Increased support was attracted from urban and 
peri-urban residents who brought their contributions to Yalu and 
later Busu , and komiti encouraged a further flow of money and 
support from rural villages . 
A bush material moni haus was established by residents 
of the Kumagolo settlement , 15 kilometres north of Bulolo ,
1 
in 1972 
and a permanent material structure erected following Nubos ' s  
arrival at the end of 197 3 . 2 The extraordinary gathering at the 
Kumagolo settlement of disparate groups of Morobeans provided 
visible evidence of the expansion of support at this time . 
Indigenous miners have long worked in this area , some 
since before the second world war . Katuma , a Nawae activist 
associated with the area as a gold miner and then as a Pangu 
1 
2 
The settlement is strategically located midway between the 
Mumeng and Bulolo townships , near the j unction of the Bulo 
and Watut rivers . The Watut valley provides access to the 
sizeable mid Watut and Aseki-Menyamya populations . 
Tangket was planted at both Busu and Kumagolo though none 
was planted at Yalu in deference to the views of the 
plantation manager . 
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komiti, was drawn t o  the movement through Nawae associates recruited 
from the Lae migrant settlements . He provided a strong link with 
local inhabitants who expressed considerable interest in the new 
activity . Christan , the president of the Pangu Pati branch in 
Bulolo , who had campaigned with Katuma , became a firm supporter 
of the Society ,  apparently being attracted by its quasi mil lenarian 
aspects . From Dangal village , a group that lays claim to the 
Kumagolo ground , he brought large numbers of supporters . Wami , 
an Upper Watut leader working the adj acent Widubosh claim ,  was 
attracted by the advantages of access to the Society ' s  PMV and 
brought considerable support from the Upper Watut and Aseki areas . 
Pastor Wain, a leading Mumeng figure , and his son Yaetang Yaeng , 
now president of the Morobe PMV Association , were also drawn to 
the movement , again bringing members and support from their 
areas of influence . Mumeng and mid Watut support was also 
bolstered through marriage exchange (Nubos gaining another wife) 
and through the agency of Yaeng of the Dangal area , who had 
earlier joined with Nakes in Lae and now as nominal president of 
the Society helped rally support at Kumagolo . This pattern recurs 
again and again . Initial links were provided through Pindiu , 
Nawae and other ethnic groups in the area and through Lae 
komiti and the movement developed a momentum of its own , attracting 
local komiti and leaders to the enterprise . The backing of key 
local leaders and their supporters was secured through alliances 
of mutual benefit in which the local figures gained ritual status , 
a sense of higher level participation and increased status through 
prestation and material assistance in local areas in return for 
mobilization of support. 
Nakes held two meetings at Kumagolo in 1972 and small 
areas of tangket were planted . The operation of the Society ' s  
PMV , together with several private vehicles , facilitated the growth 
of support but it was not until Nubos ' s  energetic drive for support 
that Kumagolo developed as a centre of great size and significance . 
The settlement achieved maximum size during the latter part of 1973 
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following Nubos ' s  assumption o f  direct control , attaining a 
resident population variously estimated at between 6000 and 
8500 people . The settlement at this time presented an impressive 
sight . The bush material houses , neatly laid out on a hillside 
overlooking the river and the Bulolo road , accommodated quite 
harmoniously Society members drawn from many parts of the Province . 
The greatest number was from the immediate areas - Watut,  Mumeng 
and the mining , timber mill and peri-urban settlements of the 
Bulolo area . There were , however , komiti and delegates drawn 
from the most distant parts of the Morobe Province . 
I t  is difficult to disentangle and assess the influence 
that led to the assemblage of such a large , diverse grouping of 
people . Undoubtedly the growth of the movement and the associated 
expansion of Kumagolo provided a momentum of its own and a feeling 
of potency and satisfying security against the strictures of church 
and council . Komiti stated that they saw themselves as representing 
their supporters and that it was better that they came together to 
monitor and discuss the progress of the Society rather than rely 
upon communications from town to village . Nubos as leader appears 
to have generated an air of excitement and expectation . Komiti 
informants when questioned spoke of Nubos as fixing the problems 
so that Pitenamu would prosper again producing beneficial change 
seen from a magico-religious framework; generally there appears 
to have been optimism but uncertainty as to the nature and mechanism 
of the changes that Nubos might achieve ( 'Nubos bai em i wokim wanem 
kain kain rot '  - ' Nubos will find a way ' ) .  Nubos himself not 
unexpectedly anticipated major advance towards greater wellbeing. 
Many or all of the constituent groups had contributed over many 
years to a wide range of ventures and one expects that many saw 
Pitenamu as the successful climax after the failures of the past . 
Although the Society leadership was particularly anxious to refute 
' cargo ' assertions and associations it is quite evident that the 
Pindiu magico-religious influence , particularly in association with 
Nubos ' s  leadership , proved a major attraction for supporters . There 
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was a deliberate attempt to draw upon the Tangket model a s  a means 
of inducing desired change and Nubos quite deliberately manipulated 
these beliefs to advantage and maintained an aura of uncertainty 
and expectation as to his powers and methods of operation . 
At the same time , however , there was a firm, purposive 
attempt to secure investment of the collected monies , a healthy 
scepticism by some towards money magic processes , and a very pragmatic 
desire to see that the collected money was appropri ately invested . 
Society leaders of their own volition chose to approach the senior 
community development officer at Lae (Werner Knoll ) to secure 
assistance with the investment of collected monies . Very considerable 
concern , arising from the dissipation of collected monies by Nakes , 
and an earnest desire to attain business obj ectives so long articulated , 
prompted Society representatives to follow Knoll to Port Moresby 
in an effort to secure a meeting with prime minister Somare , 
Morobe regional member , Boyamo Sali , and other government ministers . 
This pressure was strengthened by the growth of the Kumagolo 
settlement,  the persistent criticisms of Nakes for having ' consumed ' 
previously collected money , and by a secular drive by the Pitenamu 
leadership towards commercial investment . Some of the settlers , 
exasperated by the long delays experienced in regard to organization 
of bus iness and frustrated by and resentful of the ' development ' 
experience , asserted they would settle in Lae where facilities 
long sought for their home villages were available . 
The growth of the Kumagolo settlement occasioned some concern , 
particularly on the part of the Department of Social Development 
and Home Affairs . It was felt that continuance of the settlement 
would weaken the fabric of vil lage societies through loss of the 
more able adult males , and there were insufficient means of 
sustenance at the Kumagolo settlement to sustain such a large 
population and services were entirely lacking . Eventually , 
continued persuasion and progress in negotiations for investment 
with Pagini-Brambles Transport Pty Ltd . , a Lae based transport 
company , resulted in a gradual exodus of all but a small number 
back to their home villages . 
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Action and reaction 
Growing support for the movement in the rural villages of 
Morobe and the reality of the group ' s presence at Kumagolo brought 
mixed reactions . Government response broadly conformed with the 
neutral stance reconunended by official policy in relation to 
suspected cultists .
1 
The most notable example of what might be 
construed as overt opposition arose from conflict over the payment 
of taxes to the Mumeng Council . Representatives of the Kumagolo 
settlers were rebuffed by council officials when they attempted 
to pay taxes en b Zoc during 1974 ; a lump sum of KSO O  brought in 
a bag was refused and the insistence that members must pay their 
taxes individually brought an angry exchange of words between 
settlers and officials . As a consequence of the tax issue the 
encampment area was visited on two occasions by representatives 
of the council and government, including , on one occasion , the 
deputy provincial conunissioner and a police inspector.  The first 
visiting party was unable to reach the settlement because an 
access bridge had been wash ed away and the second found the 
encampment deserted . It may be argued that the Kumagolo 
settlers were given rather special treatment ,  especially since 
there is no explicit requirement in the local government ordinance 
that taxes be paid individually and non payment of head tax was 
by no means peculiar to the Pitenamu settlers . However ,  the matter 
did not develop further as efforts by officers of the Department 
of S�cial Development and Home Affairs and a visit by Boyamo Sali 
1 
This neutral stance concealed a wide continuum of individual 
attitudes .  Some implicitly regarded the movement as being 
influenced by the paranoid state s manifested by Pindiu cultists . 
Others ,  most notably Social Development and Home Affairs per­
sonnel ,  sought to emphasize and encourage the very positive 
aspects of the movement . The Department of Business Development , 
which had previously sought to assist groups from the area , 
actively assisted the Puling-Nakes venture . However , the fail­
ure of the Hube Company , the Oboramia soap packaging enterprise 
and the Somsi Company to develop as ongoing conunercial enter­
prises was undoubtedly discouraging and correspondence from 
Provincial headquarters suggesting that Business Development 
was encouraging cargo expectations discouraged support for these 
activities , and a change in Business Development staff provided 
the opportunity for a break with the Pitenamu group . 
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succeeded in persuading the main body of settlers to return to 
their villages . 
Much more definite opposition to the movement was articulated 
by sections of the Lutheran Church. The principal source of this 
antagonism was the long established church opposition to cults 
embracing traditional magico-religious belief s .  Belief i n  contact 
wi th ancestral spirits and recourse to magical assistance to gain 
access to wealth and improved wellbeing has traditionally been 
considered synonymous with the influence of Satan and therefore 
1 
to be firmly opposed . The history of the Lutheran and other 
churches in Papua New Guinea is replete with periods of bitter 
struggles and distressing divisions occasioned by cargo cult 
movements . 
Puling Sapa was brought before Lutheran Church officials 
and later called before a circuit meeting and questioned and 
criticized before the congregation . Despite protestations to the 
contrary he was considered a true cargo cultist.  A report by 
the president and secretary of the Lae District of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of New Guinea (ELCONG }
2 sununarized these views 
together with the findings of an investigative committee (Tingasa n .d . } . 
Province and circuit church meetings during 1973 and 1974 brought 
from some of the movement ' s more vocal critics accusations of 
prostitution , blood sacrifices and a disregard for the proper 
development channels and institutions .  Despite these severe 
criticisms there is within ELC-PNG a body of opinion far more 
1 
2 
A traditional church attitude is illustrated by the declaration 
of faith endorsed by the 1964 Synod of the Lutheran Church (Janssen 
1974)  which refers to ' praying to the dead and making preparation 
for expected goods in cemeteries • • •  or any other places ' as 
' ab j ect perversities ' and proponents of such activities as ' victims 
of satanic deception ' .  However , this should not be taken as 
uniformly representative of Lutheran understanding and policy ; 
a number of sensitive and sophisticated studies of the cult 
phenomenon have been undertaken by field missionaries and senior 
members of ELCONG ( see for example J . F .  Wagne r ( 19 64 ) , H. Wagner 
( 1963 } and articles cited in Point 1 ,  1974) . 
Since renamed Evangelical Lutheran Church in Papua New Guinea 
(ELC-PNG} • 
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favourably disposed to Pitenamu , which recognizes the complex of 
influences that lie behind such movements , the presence of soundly 
based thinking and constructive goal orientated behaviour in the 
movement , and the need for positive response .  However the 
possibility of a flexible response is lessened by the loss of 
some of the church ' s  more experienced personnel and by the fact 
that in a time of rapid change most organizations in the Province 
are struggling to maintain their present structure and activities 
and consequently are unlikely to take major new initiatives . 
Sympathetic reaction by some individuals notwithstanding , behind 
the ideological conflict between Pitenamu and its critics is an 
implicit struggle for power and influence . Having demonstrated 
its capacity to mobilize support and surmount existing divisions , 
the movement has been perceived by some as a threat to established 
positions of authority and influence . The virulent denunciations 
and cargo cul t  assertions that underlie such perceptions have 
caused great resentment amongst Pitenamu members . 
Although business is emphasized as the Society ' s  principal 
goal , its appeal encompasses political , social , religious and 
economic spheres of activity and clearly impinges upon church and 
council domains . In such c ircumstances it is perhaps not surprising 
that some feel threatened by its development . A number of the 
Papua New Guinean pastors have expressed unequivocal opposition 
to the movement and the writer was a little taken aback by the 
clear enmity shown towards Pitenamu by one pastor who insisted 
that Pitenamu collectors be prevented from making further 
collections . Similarly a number of local government councillors 
have been adamantly opposed to the movement . 
The most direct manifestation o f  this opposition occurred 
at the end of 1973 with a physical attack upon the Yalu Plantation 
money collection centre . The activity of the Nawae/Nabak komiti 
operating out of the 2/7th settlement and their meetings and 
collections of money at the Yalu Plantation aroused the enmity 
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of sections o f  the Nabak community including an assistant pastor 
with the Lutheran Church. Late one evening two truckloads of 
anti cultists from the 2/7th and Taraka settlements visited the 
plantation and after some argument kerosene and firebrands were 
produced . The moni haus and four bush sleeping houses were all 
burned to the ground . A quantity of IOC>ney variously estimated at 
between K4 000 and K7 000 was reported lost in the blaze . A court 
action followed and one of the persons identified as having lit 
the fire was given a goal sentence but no indemnification for the 
loss of the money occurred . One of the principals in explaining 
his opposition to Pitenamu stated that he and others were concerned 
about the effect of the involvement of the Nabak people upon the 
conunercial success of the Nabak plantation and about the ' unnatural ' 
aspects of the society ' s  activities ( ' the society does not accept 
the authority of the church or government and members do not pay 
council tax ' } . The Pitenamu members living at 2/7th were also 
forced to move to the small Busu settlement further along the 
river near the site of the former city tip site . Overt opposition 
diminished somewhat following this confrontation and as a consequence 
of the strenuous efforts by Pitenamu leaders to counter criticisms 
of the movement . Pitenamu members and their leaders have protested 
bitterly at what they consider untruths , fabrications and 
distortions and the constant accusation of cargo cultism , the 
universal term of reprobation in such situations . Repeatedly they 
have sought to stress their Christianity and their willingness to 
co-operate with local government councils . Representatives attended 
several Lutheran c ircuit and district meetings in an attempt to 
counter criticism and in August 1974 attended an Area Authority 
meeting to explain their activities . Responses were varied but 
the meeting accepted a motion that ' the Society should talk on 
Radio Morobe and circularize councils and other bodies on the work 
of the Society' .1 Although it cannot be said that members of the 
1 Morobe District Area Authority Sixth General Meeting , 
August 1974 , p . 3 .  
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Society have been fervent supporters of  the local government system, 
there has been no evidence of consistent opposition to councils 
per se and members have publicly sought to dispel arguments of 
anti council bias . Similarly though there has been a bitter 
struggle with church authori ty ,  there has been no rej ection of 
Christianity and it would be quite misleading to use the terms 
' nativistic '  or ' revivalistic ' as indicators of a desire to 
return to the old ways . 
Although the movement has been in clear conflict with church 
and state at higher levels of organization , an examination of 
Tangket cult influence at village level indicates a considerable 
capacity to achieve accommodation with the established institutions . 
Tangket cult activity in some Pindiu villages has in the past been 
virtually unchallenged and within the Bulum valley widely supported , 
particularly in response to church attacks . 1 It is at higher 
levels of organization and activity that opposition is most 
strongly manifested . 
Money and business 
Though it is evident that the Pitenamu l eaders have been 
influenced by a variety of motives ,  for the general body of members 
the contribution of money and its return suitably increased has 
been from the beginning a central concern . The mechanics of 
commercial activity and basic investment concepts are most 
inadequately comprehended both by leaders 2 and the general 
body of supporters , a situation facilitating magico-religious 
1 
2 
In villages where conflict between supporters and oppGnents 
of the cult occurred , the cult group generally moved to a new 
village or hamlet . 
Nubos when questioned by the writer as to possible rates of 
return on investment suggested a KlOO profit from a K40 
subscription . 
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explanation and manipulations of member support . However , whilst 
leaders have lacked the necessary comprehension of business 
realities , and the credulity of members has clearly been exploited 
as a means of securing support , there has been present from the 
very beginning a consistent bus iness/investment orientation and 
close attention has been given to the proper recording of income 
and expenditure . The success of Nubos as an entrepreneur in the 
Pindiu area was seen as a most desirable prerequisite for 
leadership of the Society .  Undoubtedly his purported spiritual 
powers were a central factor but supporters do not cognitively 
separate business and magico-religious beliefs and one should not 
lose sight of the fact that within the Pindiu area Nubos appeared 
to be a successful entrepreneur in the field of commercial 
endeavour and had demonstrated appropriate ' big man '  values in 
assisting a number of groups in the establishment of coffee 
and trade store activities .  
No substantive move towards the establishment o f  the proposed 
Hube Company bulk store enterprise occurred in the formative period 
of the Society but in 197 2 the embryonic Pitenamu Society purchased 
a PMV truck to carry people between Lae and Wau-Bulolo . Though 
providing transport for members and a conspicuous investment symbol 
this expenditure secured no financial return for the group ; indeed 
it incurred substantial expenses for repair and maintenance and 
occasioned considerable organization and control problems . Control 
of the vehicle alternated between the various ethnic groups and 
this gave rise to disputes as to driving and transport rights and 
questions of responsibility for fuel and repair costs . The 
vehicle was finally abandoned in 1974 following smash damages 
and mechanical breakdown . Several other PMVs have been operated 
ostensibly as private vehicles but in part financed by Society 
funds . Nubos operated a small Mazda utility wholly financed by 
the Society for transport of himself , komiti, ' big men ' and 
supporters . 
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Following the renewal of  IIK)ney collection under Nubos ' s  
guidance there was a strong drive for an appropriate business 
involvement.  Contact was made with the Lae office of the Department 
of Social Development and Home Affairs and Werner Knoll endeavoured 
to assist the group in securing sound investment of collected funds . 
One may explain the contact with Knoll and the strong desire for 
investment of the collected IIK)ney in a number of ways . There was 
a strong and increas ing awareness of thenecessity of utilizing the 
collected money and being involved in business as part of the 
process of wealth generation. Contributions have been carefully 
recorded . Members have been particularly sensitive to the problem 
of control of collected money especially since there was general 
acceptance that Nakes had ' consumed ' previously collected money . 
Nubos himself was determined to secure a satisfactory business 
involvement and related to this the growth of the Kumagolo 
settlement;  the concomitant pressures so generated reinforced 
this investment drive . 
Further , the achievement of an impressive bus iness 
investment was seen as a means of legitimating the activities of 
the Society to both followers and critics and of course as a means 
of attracting further support . Those less kindly disposed might 
suggest that the business investment was intended primarily as a 
cover for ' cargo ' activities and individual self-seeking 
opportunism. This element is not entirely absent but observation 
of the continuing concern of members and head komiti for proper 
investment of the money , demonstrated by regular contact with 
Knoll and clo se checks of the records , indicates a very worldly 
and pragmatic concern for proper investment . 
After some delay an acceptable proposal was negotiated 
through the Community Development Office whereby the Society agreed 
to purchase a parcel of shares in the Pagini-Brambles Transport Pty Ltd . , 
a major transport and heavy equipment enterprise with headquarters 
in Lae . A formal share application for 7000 Kl shares at a 
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premium of K0 . 42 ,  a total subscription of K9 940 , was submitted 
in October 1974 , and a use thus found for a proportion of the 
group ' s  funds . Though one may question the premium imposed by 
Pagini-Brambles ,  purchase of the equity shareholding was 
a significant achievement marking the group ' s  entry into the 
world of legitimate commerce . The tangible evidence of this 
commercial involvement, and the publicity given to it,  helped 
moderate criticisms of the group ' s  activities and bolster the 
Society ' s  image , boosting follower morale and buttressing the 
position of Pitenamu ' s  leaders . In retrospect thi s period 
probably marks the zenith of Pitenamu fortunes . The Pagini-Brambles 
share purchase was to be the forerunner of more substantial 
investments . 
A metal drum cleaning and repair business valued at 
KS0 , 000 was brought forward for consideration and the Society 
was encouraged to think in terms of directing profit from business 
investments back to rural villages for pro j ect work in co-operation 
wi th the relevant local government councils . However the long 
delay in effecting investment , the considerable dissipation of 
money capital , the limited short term cash flow that can be 
expected from the equity shareholding in Pagini-Brambles and 
inflated expectations of returns , placed very considerable pressure 
upon the organization and on Nubos as the centre man . 
The years 197 5  and 1976 now appear as a period of decline , 
or in a more optimistic vein a period of reorganization . The drum 
container business proposal was allowed to lapse and no further 
money has been brought forward for investment by the group . The 
difficulty of exercising control over the collection of money by 
komiti and bogus collectors has continued to be a problem though 
with the lapse of support this is no longer critica l .  The position 
of Nubos is now quite tenuous and accusations similar to those made 
against Nakes have been made with increasing frequency . The 
organization is unable to generate a cash flow sufficient to meet 
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demands of the general membership for monetary return or to 
demonstrate evidence of progress towards that goal . Representatives 
of constituent groups have become increasingly insistent in their 
demands for explanation and less willing to participate in the 
affairs of the Society .  Nubos has regularly varied his place o f  
residence and o n  one occasion the tyres o f  his vehicle were 
deflated when he preferred to travel to Bulolo rather than explain 
to a group of Markham people the status of the Society ' s  affairs . 
Wosae Magnukae has attempted to assume leadership of the movement 
but has not received full support and the Society has been 
reorganized with separate regional and sub-regional groupings , 
each concerning itself with local commercial and economic 
development activities with Pitenamu envisaged as an umbrella 
co-ordinating structure and a channel for larger commercial 
investments . 
I f  it were possible to leave aside the other goals and 
influences and attempt j udgement according to established commercial 
criteria,  one would not be able at this j uncture to express any 
great confidence in the economic future of the enterprise . 
Examination of the Society ' s  records of income and expenditure 
and bank statements indicates that the group probably collected , 
on a conservative estimate , between K3 0 , 000 and K4 0 , 000 between 
1969 and 197 5 .  Recorded expenditure shows money allocated to 
vehicle purchase and repair , gifts to village groups and leaders , 
building construction at Kumagolo and Busu , contributions for 
the erection and stocking of a number of village trade stores , 
a helicopter charter for Nubos to Zewitsan at Kl8 0 ,  some K6000 
claimed to have been burned in the Yalu fire , an uncertain amount 
of money expended on feastings and prestations , the Kl0 , 000 
Pagini-Br.ambles share purchase and various sums disbursed for 
air fares and sundry expenses .  A not inconsiderable amount was 
also expended whilst the six thousand or more people were encamped 
at Kumagolo during late 1973 and the early part of 1974 , as little 
food was available from gardens to feed the settlers . Of this 
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amount only the Kl 0 , 000 Pagini-Brambles share purchase can be 
considered as an investment able to generate future revenue . 
When one considers the large number of people with claims to such 
revenue , the ability of the group to generate monetary payoffs to 
meet the inflated expectations of members is very limited . 
Of course consumption of money capital is not a phenomenon 
unique to quasi cult groups ; some would regard this as the norm 
for a great proportion of business ventures .  It is possible to 
write at length upon the financial failings of councils , co-operatives , 
and private and group ventures and upon the financial misdemeanours 
of principals in these groups . Many of these have failed despite 
strong support from government agenc ies . Pitenamu has received 
minimal support and has been able to provide considerable non­
monetary payoffs to members ; hence one should not be too hasty 
in condemnation of the group ' s  economic failings . Nonetheless it 
is apparent that the group is unable to continue as an ongoing 
commercial enterprise without further collections of money , which 
do not appear to be forthcoming, and quite unable to meet the 
inflated expectations of  contributors . Whilst some credit should 
be accorded to Nubos for his pursuit of economic investment it is 
necessary to recognize as a corollary the problem of stimulating 
inflated expectations and dissipation of money capital in the 
process of support recruitment , investment of such money capital 
of course being essential for system growth and maintenance . In 
the absence of a facility to generate adequate money from 
commercial investment or an investment of other resources 
sufficient to produce material returns , the system cannot be 
sustained for any length of time . The sati sfactions obtained 
from autonomous collective activity ,  cult ritual , dancing , feasting 
and other diversions , and the satisfactions gained from the 
Pagini-Brambles investment could not continue to satisfy member 
demands , particularly after the symbolic attainment of political 
power values through the Pangu Pati victory in the 1972 elections , 
self-government and independence , and a degree of accommodation 
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with church and state . Tangible material returns remain the 
predominant goal yet in its present form and without external 
assistance the structure will have difficulty in meeting these 
expectations . 
Power and polities 
While economic values are most salient , collective and 
individual power seeking appears to be a fundamental motivating 
force in the development of the Tangket cult and the Pitenamu 
Society ,  as it was in the 1946-48 skin gupia movement . Although 
the cargo-rifle syndrorre persists in an attenuated form ,  it has 
been largely displaced by money and a mix of magico-religious 
and secular-instrumental techniques for its multiplication . 
Power , however , is the common denominator.  Money , as with 
cargo-rifles , serves as a symbol of desired power,  providing 
a pathway to equality ,  access to autonomy and independence , 
re-establishment of integrity , removal of tension , the termination 
of the ascendancy of alien institutions and influences , and an end 
to the impotence of villagers . Parallel with political and 
socio-economic change the nature of the response has altered . 
Today , though continuity with the past remains , one finds resort 
to collectivist movements , a search for unity through wider 
structures and institutions , a greater willingness to challenge 
established authority ,  and greater resort to secular involvement . 
Pitenamu must be seen , in this context , as a movement with 
clear political connotations , a significant aspect of populist, 
collectivist J.OC>Vement for change which gained its most tangible 
expression in the emergence and widespread support for the 
Pangu Pati . It is then possible more readily to identify the 
links with the past and the political evolution from the earlier 
cargo cult phases . Support for this view can readily be found in 
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the examination of the studies of similar change movements in 
response to the colonial experience in other parts of the world .1 
No political aims have been publicly proclaimed by Pitenamu 
and the Society has refrained from presenting itself as a political 
body with activities likely to disturb established structures .  The 
popular concern with broad change and improvements in the position 
and material status of supporters , partly formulated in a magico­
religious framework , has inhibited clear statement of purpose . So 
too has an inability to conceptualize and articulate broad political 
and socio-economic obj ectives and means of securing them. The · 
generalized desire for autonomy and for greater wellbeing and 
improved position has not been matched by knowledge or understanding 
of modern secular processes and the experience with established 
institutions has entailed frustration and disillusionment .  
Whilst the ItK>vement signifies i n  part a movement o f  protest , 
a groundswell grassroots ItK>vement seeking to redefine its 
relationships with established structures and institutions and 
re-establish communal power and control , the Pitenamu phenomenon 
at the same time represents an autonomous move towards newer 
institutions and values , a searching for new responses , for 
self-initiated and controlled means of advancement, a progression 
to a ItK>re selective , adaptive and secular mode of response and 
a further phase in the process of political and socio-economic 
change . 
The geographic spread of the movement , whil st enabling 
a wider tributary base and greater power for the leadership , 
expanded the power base of the ItK>Vement and helped provide a 
1 See Wilson ( 1973 ) and Rotberg and Mazrui ( 1970)  and the 
detailed bibliographies in these monographs .  
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countervailing force to that of the Province-wide church and 
government structures . l Opposition from these sources has 
shaped Pitenamu ' s public posture . The Society has sought to avoid 
direct conflict or confrontation , endeavouring to dispel cargo 
cult allegations and emphasizing its commercial objectives and 
its support for Christian values .  As noted , Pitenamu representatives 
have argued the Soci ety ' s case at church circuit and council 
meetings and have presented an outline of their activities to 
a meeting of the Morobe Province Area Authority .  Further , they 
have demonstrated an increasing willingness to use the local 
radio station to publicize their activities and the formal signing 
of share parcel application and the receipt of the Pagini-Brarnbles 
share certificates provided the opportunity for a half page 
newspaper cover and presentations to the provincial conunissioner 
and the prime minister.  
Although the movement has been anxious to secure public 
recognition and respectability ,  particularly in the face of some 
strong opposition , one could anticipate more overt political 
activity and a more direct relationship with the formal political 
institutions if the movement consolidated its position and 
secured a more experienced l eadership . 
Finally , transferring attention to the plans of individual 
motivation and behaviour,  a perspective that enables greater 
understanding of the activities of Pitenamu and its related 
groups is one that focus ses upon the interpersonal competitive 
struggle for power , status and influence in the Morobe Province . 
1 The movement must be seen in part as an alternative power 
system and it is instructive to note that one of the criticisms 
directed against Pitenamu by a church report was that it did not 
follow established channels in relation to local government 
councils and the central government .  Similarly , several 
government officers have commented that support for the movement 
must mean loss of support for councils . 
107 
For Nubos , it can be seen that involvement in the Tangket cult 
and access ion to leadership of Pitenamu has provided a route to 
a position of power , wealth and prestige in no way possible 
within the established institutions . The struggle for power and 
influence between Nubos and Akinu , the conflict with church 
leadership , and the uneasy relationship with Pindiu Council 
demonstates the limitation of any analysis centred upon a narrow 
cargo explanation or one that views the movement solely on the 
level of the collective . Nubos has skil fully manipulated 
traditional magico-religious beliefs grafted to a schema of 
secular economic endeavour in his struggle for power and status . 
To this must be added the successful use of kin , descent , marriage 
and exhange in traditional ' big man ' style to mobilize support 
from an extraordinarily wide area . The Tangket/moni haus ide ology 
and ritual combined with a bus iness-development theme presented 
in differing combinations according to the audience , has provided 
the medium within which the various actors , Nubos ,  Akinu and 
lesser figures , have played the ir game . The real prize for the 
principal actors has not been cargo but power , prestige and, 
perhaps for those operating in an urban environment , personal 
wealth . The same game of course is played in other arenas with 
different rituals but for a similar prize and with greater 
emphasis on personal gain . 
Organization and leadership 
Organization of the Tangket movement ,  as noted above , rests 
upon a framework of strong interpersonal ties - kin , affinal and 
economic - focussing upon several leading figures each with his 
respective sphere of influence . Beyond Pindiu , ethnic divisions -
as with the Pangu Pati model - provide the l:asis for the 
Province-wide Society organization , each distinctive ethnic 
group having a president or het komiti, komiti and secretary 
{often several ) and close supporters occupying ill defined 
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positions of authority and statu s .  In each of these separate 
ethnic divisions the system of close interpersonal ties is  
repeated to a considerable degree . Nubos occupied the central 
leadership position on the basis of his acknowledged ability and 
power but he was the managing organizer and ' centre man ' rather 
than a person who stood above and separate from his peers . 
Decision making is very much a group process along traditional 
lines rather than a situation of dominance by one man. Though 
leadership by Nubos was accepted ,  separate autonomy was retained 
and representatives of the constituent groups consistently 
exhibited a cautious attitude towards the handling and disposition 
of money contributions . 
However Nubos , until 1976 , was able to exert a most 
powerful influence over group leaders and the general membership . 
He is an extraordinary individual , an entrepreneur in the 
broadest meaning of the word and a somewhat ruthless graduate of 
the Pindiu cult-business environment . He is a person considered 
to possess undefined powers and was acknowledged as having 
demonstrated major bus iness ability and power in the Pindiu area . 
Whi lst pursuing secular involvement he quite deliberately exploited 
the widespread belief in his special powers and sought to strengthen 
his position in the manner of the traditional ' big man ' , purposively 
manipulating traditional social beliefs , values and practices to 
advantage . A considerable proportion of col lected money was 
disbursed thro-ugh public distribution in the traditional manner 
with modern variations - ceremonial feasting and beer parties 
organized through the agency of village notables , collective tax 
payments , marriage exchange, money and material gifts and assistance 
in the establishment and restocking of village stores . The Society ' s  
financial records clearly reveal this pattern of disbursement.  
Marriage exchanges facilitated inter- communal linkages and Nubos 
recruited new allies and strengthened support by acquisition of 
additional wives and contribution of women to support groups . 
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The mobilization of support through the use of traditional 
methods , however, is at once a weakness as well as a strength . 
Expectations were raised to unrealistic levels and support had to 
be secured and maintained , in the absence of financial returns , 
through the consumption of capital . Though reasonable records 
have been maintained by the secretaries of the movement ,  this 
has not been sufficient to inhibit dissipation of investment 
capital , an inevitable process ( some would argue ) given the 
multi- functional nature of the Tangket and Pitenamu response 
and in particular the magico-religious associations and the aura 
of power and authority that surrounded Nubos . The flexible 
organizational structure indeed faci litated mobilization , 
fulfilled status demands and enabled appropriate payoffs to be 
sustained for a limited period . At the same time this system 
created control problems in respect to economic obj ectives . 
consideration of the varied motivations and limited experience 
of the leadership and the total environment within which they 
have operated helps provide a better understanding of the barriers 
inhibiting successful achievement of an ongoing Province-wide 
socio-economic system able to generate appropriate material 
benefits to members . The mobilization phase has now passed and 
it is unfair to focus upon economic viability criteria alone as 
measures of organizational e ffectiveness .  The structure that 
evolved was one deve loped in response to varied needs and goals 
and it was symptomatic of the forces and influences present at 
the time . In the present ( 19 80 ) post mobilization phase attempts 
have been made , with limited success , to reorganize the Society 
into functionally separate and largely autonomous subgroups . The 
future of the movement , however , is uncertain . 
ConeZusion 
Assessment of the achievements and significance of Pitenamu 
is difficult.  It is the product of complex influences and individual 
motivations , and evaluation of these is unavoidably influenced 
by the particular frames of reference chosen by the observer . 
110 
In broad terms the movement may be seen as a genuine 
grassroots movement which has developed at this period of the 
country ' s  development quite spontaneously without external 
support or guidance . It represents a broad move towards integration , 
a demand for recognition and autonomy and for social and economic 
advance based upon traditional collectivism and leadership patterns 
and drawing upon the inter-ethnic links created by the colonial 
order and the partly assimilated commercial values of the new 
order. It is a populist mass movement , a movement of change and 
protest and a movement that seeks , through a mixture of old and 
new, the combination of traditional magico-religious beliefs and 
modern economic processes , to regain for people control over their 
own affairs . In these respects it may be seen as utopian and 
futile , yet it represents a clear desire for change , a demand for 
freedom and autonomy and a response to the colonial system and 
the processes of peasantization induced by the intrusion of the 
capitalist market system. Though more sophisticated movements 
attract greater attention and support ,  movements like Pitenamu 
deserve far wider recognition as groups striving for control and 
self betterment rather than as eccentric magico-religious 
associations . A sympathetic understanding of the motivation of 
movements such as this and the environment in which they operate 
would shed greater light upon the patterns and problems of 
political and socio-economic developments in areas such as Pindi u .  
If  such movements can b e  aided through the establishment of 
machinery to utilize effectively the resources which they can 
mobilize , and used to promote new ideologies of change and 
development ,  the impact could be considerable . 
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LOCAL P ROTE ST MOVEMENTS 

Chapter 4 
NAP IDAKOE NAV I TU 
James Griffin 
Napidakoe Navitu derived i ts name from an anagram of the initials 
of  the di fferent ethni c groups in the vicinity of Kieta
1 
(Middlemiss 1970 : 
100 )  together with the Nasioi word (navi t u )  for a united people or 
association . Though predominantly an organization of Nasioi-speaking 
people - the largest language group in the North Solomons ( formerly 
Bougainville ) Province - the association was not parochial . Its membership 
included members from the contiguous Torau , Eivo and Nagovisi groups (plus 
a few from Buin and Siwai ) ; i ts ' charismatic patron ' , Paul Lapun , was from 
the Banoni language group , and its explicit aims were directed at 
' Bougainville as a whole ' (ibi d . ) .  
The movement sprang to li fe as a result of the Australian Admini stra­
tion ' s attempt in 1969 to resume both indigenous and expatriate held land 
at Arawa and Rorovana in order to provide a town and port servi ce s  for the 
Bougainville coppe r mine . However ,  the gestation of Navitu can be traced 
back to at least 1964 and it was nurtured within the ethos which ultimately 
produced the Province-wide secession movement of 19 74-1976 . 
The colonial experience did little to create in Bougainvilleans a 
sense of a common destiny with other Papua New Guineans . Bougainvilleans 
perceived themse lve s  as being set apart by their geographical insularity , 
their traditional relations with the Solomon Islands , their di stinctive 
skin colour , and their hi storical experiences ,  which included a convi ction 
of being ' neglected' and ' exploited'  by Australia for the bene fit of other 
Papua New Guineans (Hannett 19 75 ) . 
1 Na - Nasioi ; Pi - Pirung ( coastal group) ; Da - Daru; Ko - Koromira ; 
E - Eivo .  
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Figure 4 . 1  South Bougainville , linguistic divisions 
115 
At the beginning of the Japanese invasion of Papua New Guinea in 
January 1942 there was a particularly ignominious flight by a number o f  
Australian o ffi cials and planters from Kieta .  Partly a s  a result , many 
local villages collaborated with the Japanese , although it is reasonable 
to infer that deep-seated antagonism towards Australians already exi sted 
( Gri ffin 19 78 : 140-141) . No part of Papua New Guinea suffered more 
devastation and starvation than central and southern Bougainville suffered 
in the following three years . After the war attempts to develop indigenous 
industries were frustrated unti l  the 1960s and cargoism was ri fe in the 
area ( Gri ffin 19 78 : 16 1-2 ) . In 1962 a United Nations visiting mission was 
asked by a meeting of over one thousand people in Kieta to take the mandate 
away from Australia , who had treated the people ' like dogs ' .  It urged 
that the USA should take over deve lopment ,  which Australia had neglected. 
Australia was also accused of ignoring promises of non-segregation made 
. 1 during the war . Race relations were reckoned to be as bad in Kieta as 
anywhere in Papua New Guinea and few Bougainvilleans were prepared to work 
on expatriate plantations (Ogan 19 71 : 138) . In the 1964 national election 
villagers re fused to vote for any of the European candidates in the New 
Guinea I slands Special Electorate (ibid . : 140 ) . The ' rebellion ' of the 
Hahali s Wel fare Society on Buka I sland against the imposition of a local 
government council and head tax (Rimoldi 19 7 1) was followed with interest 
further south and there was almost certainly some direct influence from 
Buka of the ' new ways ' originated by Anton Kearei and developed by the 
Hahalis Wel fare Society . Patrol officers recorded an unexpected appearance 
of cargoism in the area in the early 1960s and court action was taken 
. 2 against leaders . 
With good reason , Ki eta was one of the last areas on Bougainville in 
whi ch local government was imposed ( 1964)  and , although this was not 
accompanied by violence , as on Buka ,  there was a polari zation o f  opinion 
such that ,  after six years , only two thirds of the e ligible population were 
covered.  'Ihe earliest Nasioi proponents of the council were almost 
1 
Kieta Patrol Report 1961-62 No . 3 .  
2 
Kieta Special Report 1960-61 No . 1-2 . 
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exclusive ly Seventh Day Adventists and Methodi sts ( together about 20 
per cent of the local population) ,  groups which had been ' loyalist ' during 
the war and were generally non cargoi s t .  Administration offi cials saw 
councils as a solvent for cults and disaffe ction and encouraged grandiose 
ideas of what councils could achieve : ' Sapos mipela ga t Kaunsil ,  mipela 
stap olsem ol wai tman ' ( ' Once we get counci ls , we will be the same as the 
whitemen ' ) . Thi s absurdity only inflamed council opponents , some of whom 
resisted Administration encouragement to plant cash crops because they saw 
it as a ruse to draw people into the council ( Ogan 19 72 ) . That there were 
not more dis sidents was probably due to what Eugene Ogan characterizes as 
the ' charismatic ' leadership of Paul Lapun , an advocate of councils and 
the founder and first patron of Napidakoe Navitu ( Ogan 197 1 ,  19 7 4 ) . As 
wi ll  be seen Navitu was not , like the Hahalis Wel fare Society or the 
Mataungan Associ ation , directly opposed to a parti cular counci l .  In fact 
the rise in membership of the Kieta Council from 9699 in 19 70 to 11 , 734 in 
19 72 may have been due to Navitu ' s  permeation of that body . Howeve r ,  the 
fact that the abolition of counci ls became a major priority once provincial 
government was instituted in 19 74 indicates how basically unacceptable 
they always were ( Connell 19 77) . 
Ogan , the foremost authority on the Nasioi in the late colonial 
period , be lieved that although Navitu had 
an infrastructure . . .  I think the momentum,  the thrust , 
skill comes from the personality , the character ,  as 
understood by Bougainvilleans , of this remarkable man , 
Paul Lapun ( Harries et al . 19 7 3 : 44 ) . 
It is therefore essential to outline Lapun ' s  career . Born in 192 3  at Mabis 
in the Banoni language are a ,  he was selected by the Catholic mission in 
the mid 19 30s for its first seminarian training programme . Lapun spent 
the war ( as did Anton Kearei and Aloysius Noga , mentioned below) in Rabaul , 
but , unlike Kearei , subsequently left the seminary still a pious Catholic 
and in good odour with his church . He became a mis sion teacher and in 
1960 was noted by the kiap as owning ' over 400 trees . . .  employing labour 
to further his plantings . His groves . . .  are an example of correct 
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proce ure to t ose in t e vicinity . Although the kiap had seen him in 
1960 as only ' a  front man ' for some traditional leade r ,  he was subsequently 
• d I 1 • h • ff h • 2 appraise as cease ess  in is e orts to develop is area ' . He showed 
his awareness of Provincial political realities in 1962 when he re jected the 
idea of an ' official ' rural progress society but collected money for an 
independent cooperative society , although there was no real di ffe rence 
between the two . The people , said the kiap , would not have ' an RPS or 
h . . . 3 anyt ing similar ' . In 1962 , after a political education tour of Australia ,  
he became an advocate o f  counci ls and the Bana (Banoni-Nagovis i )  Local 
Gove rnment Counci l  was formed in his area without incident in 1965 . His 
influence , howeve r ,  in the recalci trant area o f  Kieta proved to be even 
greate r .  Lapun spoke Nasioi and Nagovisi fluently a s  well a s  his own 
Austronesian vernacular and a little o f  the Buin and Siwai languages .  
His reputation for ' special knowledge ' seemed to grow with distance .
4 
The cultic Nasioi in the Guava census division would appear not to have been 
opposed to local government as such but wanted to j oin ' Lapun ' s  Counci l ' , 
Bana . 5 In the 1964 election for the House of Assembly Lapun received twice 
the vote of Severinus Ampaoi , the firs t  pre sident of the Kieta Counci l ,  in 
the Aropa Valley (Nasioi ) and won overwhelmingly in Ampaoi ' s  home base at 
Guava (Ogan 1965 ) . Like Kearei on Buka in the 1950s , Lapun was thought by 
cultists to have divined the essential cargo message during his seminary 
days . Both understood the need to mobi lize rather than disperse cultic 
sy�athies as well  as to speak in ' rational secular ' terms to non cultists . 
However ,  unlike Kearei , Lapun did not alienate the paramount Catholic 
mission and he upheld the authority of traditional elders . He strongly 
condemned the sexual ' immorality ' of the Hahalis Wel fare Society; he was 
a fierce opponent of sorcery; and hi s easy collaboration in later years with 
the Moral Rearmament Associ ation ( Hastings 1969a , 1969b ; Beazley 19 70 ) 
shows a tolerance of Chri stians other than Catholics . Without identi fying 
1 Banoni Patrol Report 1959-60 No . 3 .  
2 
Boku Patrol Report 1959-60 No . 3 .  
3 Boku Patrol Report 1965-66 No . 7 .  
4 I .  Namake , personal communication . 
5 
Kie ta Patrol Reports 196 3-64 No . 9 ,  1964-65 No . 6 .  
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himself with the administration , as Kearei ultimately did ( serving for 
seven years as president of Buka Counci l )  , Lapun gave the impression of 
moving confidently and being acknowledged in the whiteman ' s  world. News 
of his immediate appointment in parliament as under-secretary for Forests 
would have confirmed thi s .  To cultists he would yield up his secrets in 
his own good time , but he was also worthy of support by those with no 
supernatural hopes . 
What a young Rorovana graduate cal led the ' merci less intrusion ' 
( Dove et al . 1974 : 181)  of the transnational copper company in 1964 brought 
profound psychological shock to the Kieta are a ,  involving as it did massive 
technology denuding forest and plantation , an influx of thousands of white 
and brown workers ( ' redskins ' to black Bougainvi lleans) , demands on land 
for development and the use of police to ensure compli ance . The rate of 
change can be illustrated by the following data : 
• . •  the number of persons licensed at Kieta to drive a motor 
vehicle increased from 45 in 1966 to 3 , 95 3  in 19 70 ; cargo 
tonnages at the port of Kieta increased from 35 , 000 in 1968 
to 460 , 000 in 197 1 ;  and the urban population increased from 
around 750 in 1966 to over 14 , 000 in 19 71  - the peak of the 
construction phase (Mamak and Bedford 19 74 : 3 ) . 
There was also the shock of learning ( in 1966 from the mini ster for terri­
tories himself) that , of the astronomical riches in the ground, nothing 
would go directly to the owners except standard occupation fees of $A4 . 95 
per hectare plus compensati.on for specific damage to 1i velihood and property . 
Cargoists scheduled the end-of-the-world at Guava for Apri l  1967 ; related 
belie fs survived that non-event .  A number o f  Catholic missionaries ,  notably 
Americans who did not acknowledge the Briti sh right of eminent domain in a 
trust territory , encouraged villagers to stand out for greater compensation . 
Around the same time other grievances arose in relation to attempts by a 
Japanese company to fell timber at Tonelei near Buin , and by the Administra­
tion to mine road metal at Malabita , also near Buin ( Tsibim 1967 ;  Fingle ton 
1970 ) . 
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Lapun , in spite o f  his offi cial pos t ,  retained his independence of 
the Administration . In 1966 he succeeded in modi fying mining policy in 
Papua New Guinea by persuading the House of Assembly that landowners 
should receive 5 per cent of the 1 . 25 per cent mining royalties , 
where previously all was to go to the government ; he failed, however ,  in 
hi s attempt to have 40 per cent allocated to the development of his 
Province . He became known in the house as ' King Paul the Black 1 1 and hi s 
reputation spread to other parts of Papua New Guinea ( see Kiki 1968 : 19 5 ) . 2 
He was careful to emphasize , howeve r ,  that his people were not opposed to 
mining as such but to the lack of consultation and their lack of direct 
gains . In fact , the attitude of villagers would appear to have been less  
ambivalent than that .  I n  Bougainville , the 5 per cent in itse l f  was 
regarded by the people as a negligible monetary concession ; nevertheless 
it enhanced Lapun ' s  reputation for special access . 
In 19 76 Lapun re s igned his offi cial post to become deputy leader o f  
Pangu Pati , although he had already opened up discussions with a Solomon 
Islands leader on the possibility of a ' re union ' of the Solomons archipe lago 
(Hannett 1969 ) and must have been contemplating mobilization of the 
burgeoning sentiment for secession which developed naturally with political 
devolution (Geertz 196 3 )  and was fostered by the advent of mining. In the 
1 
2 
HAD I I  ( 3 ) : 62 7 ,  2 1  November 1968 . 
Kiki writes of his unsuccess ful campaign as a Pangu Pati candidate in 
Baimuru ( Gulf Province ) during the 1968 e le ctions : 
Only in one area of Baimuru did Pangu Pati enj oy some unexpected 
popularity . Everybody here was talking about Paul Lapun , our 
member for Bougainville . He was very popular in the area because 
he had fought for and gained mining royalties for the people of 
Bougainville . In Baimuru the Phillips oil company was then 
looking for oil and the people were anxiously wondering who 
would help them to get money for the oil on their land . This 
was the only genuine political issue the people raised in that 
whole area (Kiki 1968 : 175 ) . 
As stated below , Lapun ' s  popularity and personal friendships in 
Pangu circles and his wide repute in Papua New Guinea were factors 
in weaning him away from secessioni sm to an integrative position 
for Bougainville . 
12 1  
196 8  e lections he won the South Bougainville Open ele ction with 8 2  per 
cent of the vote and success fully rolled out supporters for Joseph Lue 
who stood against strong expatriate candidates in the regional e lectorate 
(Ogan 19 71)  . Secession was also being mooted by a group of radi cal 
Bougainvilleans at Holy Trinity seminary , Madang. In 1966 , they published 
their own mimeographed j ournal , Dialogue , the first ' intellectual ' j ournal 
produced by indigenes .  A number o f  them, in particular Leo Hannett , sub­
sequently le ft the seminary and became ardent Bougainvil le patriots . 
In September 1968 Hannett and Lapun led the call for a re ferendum on 
secession by twenty-five Bougainvi lleans living in Port Moresby (Hannett 
1969 ) . Thi s signalled the founding of the Mungkas Society , a self-styled 
' pressure group ' of Bougainvilleans then living outside the Province , 
which was formed to promote , at the very least , provincial autonomy 
(Griffin 19 73c) . The personal ambivalence of Lapun on secession even at 
this stage can be seen in his unsuccess ful sponsorship of a motion in the 
1 
House of Assembly to have Niugini adopted as the national name . He was 
profoundly influenced by hi s friendships within Pangu Pati and the respect 
with which he was regarded by other Papua New Guineans . His attitude to 
the mining operation was similar : i t  could continue but only on satis­
factory terms , namely a general renegotiation of the copper agreement and 
more gains for Bougainvilleans . 
The September 1968 meeting also mooted the formation of a Bougain­
ville Landowners ' Association , as it was becoming increasingly clear that 
substantial areas were needed for a townsite and port faci lities for the 
mine . Although other site s  were ini tially pre ferred by the mining company ,
2 
1 
2 
HAD II (2 ) : 25 9 1  30 August i96 8 .  
Although ultimately the area manager for C RA ,  Colin Bi shop , was 
reported as stating that Arawa plantation was ' the only suitable 
place for a copper proj ect townsite ' (Post-Courier 7 Apri l 1969 ) , 
this was not so . The best journalistic account of the issues is  
McCarthy ( 1970 : 190-2 2 1) . It tallies substantially with thi s 
writer ' s  independent research of 1969 . 
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the Australian Administration thought to forestall the serious opposition 
it would encounter if it alienated indigenous-occupied land by resuming 
instead the rich one thousand acre expatriate-owned McK.illop plantation 
at Arawa together with smaller portions of land belonging to the villages 
of Arawa and Rorovana . Far from appeasing the vil lagers , the administra­
tion found that they did not concede its right to McK.i llop ' s  land any more 
than their own . The Arawa people saw McKillop as owning only ' the skin o f  
the land ' ( tree s , bui ldings , etc. ) ,  not the ancestral substance ( Gri ffin 
19 70 ) . In the face of a flagrantly propagandi st campaign by the Admini­
stration , through patrols and radio , and attempts at intimidation , a 
mee ting of 1200 people from twenty- five villages , chaired by Lapun , took 
place in Ki eta on 27 April 1969 . It voted almost unanimously against the 
resumption of Arawa land and demanded that CRA leave Bougainvi lle i f  a 
. . 1 favourable gove rnment reply were not received in two weeks . It asked that 
a fully representative conference be convened to discuss land problems and 
alternative site s  for the new town , at l east one of which had been pre­
ferred by CRA. The conference was to include Paul Lapun , representatives 
of the landowners and the Kieta Council , traditional leaders , and a repre­
sentative of the company and of the Administration (Middlemiss 19 70 : 10 0 ) . 
The Administration not only did not agree to the proposal but s tepped up 
its radio campaign (McKay 19 76 ; Jackson n . d . ) which was in the hands of 
the ( then) district commissione r ,  an ex naval petty o fficer who had almost 
certainly been chosen for the position because of his authoritarian s tyle . 
News was di storted and an unsuccess ful attempt was made by an assistant 
administrator to bully Lapun into a humiliating public apology for critical 
statements he had made .
2 
Some further meetings were held , culminating on 
6 July in the founding of Nasioi Navi tu ,  the name of which was changed in 
August to Napidakoe Navi tu . At the first o fficial meeting 1500 members 
signed up from twenty- five village s , only four of which were in the Kie ta 
Counci l .  Lapun was e lected patron and president of the executive committee ; 
1 South Pacific Post 30 Apri l 1969 ; Australi an 3 May 1969 . 
2 Post-Courier 18 June 1969 . 
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Barry Middlemiss , a twenty-nine year old Australian overseer on McKillop ' s  
plantation , became secretary , and Raphael Bele , a Rorovana leade r ,  
treasurer .  The �oinin� fee was $ 2 . 40 per annum ( later raised to $4 per 
annum) . By the end of August seventy-two vil lages had joined (Middlemiss 
19 70 ) ; by November there were 116 villages and over 5000 members .
1 
By 
Apri l 19 70 Middlemiss ( 19 70 : 10 1 )  was claiming over 6000 members in the 
Kieta di strict : 
Thus in a very short space of time the Napidakoe Navitu had 
achieved the unity of Kieta people - something the Administration 
had been trying to do for some time . The Administration had 
failed to gain the confidence of the people . On the other hand , 
Napidakoe Navitu had united Catholics , Methodists , Seventh Day 
Adventists , cargo cultists , people within and outside the 
councils . 
In the first stage the explicit aims of Navitu were : 
( 1) To further the social , political and economic 
development of Bougainville . This has to be stressed . 
We looked to the development of Bougainvi lle , not just 
the Nasioi or the Kieta area o f  South Bougainville , but 
Bougainvil le as a whole . 
( 2 )  To promote political autonomy . 
( 3 ) Better education for the people of Bougainville through 
church and Administration schools ( ibi d . ) .  
While The Australian could report ( 12 August 1969)  that ' Secession i s  now 
becoming a key facto r '  on Bougainville and both Middlemiss and Bele talked 
openly about secession ,
2 
it was not explicitly mentioned when Navitu ' s  
3 
constitution was adopted in October and released to the press . Thi s was 
a gesture towards the small minority in the Kieta area (including 
Methodists and Seventh Day Adventist�, who up till  that time had expressed 
loyalty to the Australian conception of Papua New Guine a ,  as we ll as to 
those leaders , particularly in the Buka and Teop-Tinputz council areas of 
North Bougainville , who expressed opposition to secession ( Gri ffin 19 72 ) . 
1 Canberra Times 25 November 1969 ; Sydney Dai l y  Telegraph 26 November 1969 . 
2 
Be le , personal communi cation ; Post-Courier 22 August 1969 . 
3 
Post-Courier 2 October 1969 . 
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Perhaps more important was the emphasis placed on traditional culture and 
customs as we ll as advancement in the modern secto r .  Navitu ' s  obj ects 
were : 
(a )  To encourage and foster economic , social and political 
development on the i sland of Bougainvi l le and to unite 
the Bougainville people as one economi c ,  social and 
political community . 
(b)  To restore , maintain , fos ter and encourage among the 
people of Bougainvi lle an understanding and appreciation 
of their traditional culture and customs . 
( c )  To maintain a respect and appreciation for marriage and 
family tie s  and to encourage respect for and obedience 
to traditional customary marriage laws and to safeguard 
the stability of family groups . 
( d) To create and endow scholarships for s chool children 
to assist in thei r  advancement and education and to 
provide financial as sistance for universi ty students 
seeking to study such courses as the association may 
from time to time decide upon .  
( e )  To nominate candidates for election to the House of 
Assembly of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea to the 
parliament for the time being under whatever name . 
( f) To unite all racial groups and political and re ligious 
bodies on the is land of Bougainvi lle . 
( g) To endeavour to encourage and seek early domestic 
internal sel f-government for the Territory of Papua and 
New Guinea while depending upon Australia for financial 
assistance and guidance and control for external affairs 
(Bougainville News 1 ( 1) ) .  
In contrast to the western-imposed system of ' democratic '  elections 
used for the Kieta Counci l ,  Navitu assembly members were elected by con­
sensus and from them the seventeen executive members were e lected by secret 
ballot . Clan leaders were thus given traditional respect (Paia 19 7 7 : 7 3- 7 4 )  
in contrast to  the atti tude to counci llors , some of whom were chosen for 
rather cynical reasons . John Dove ( 19 7 7 : 82 )  cited one man who was elected 
to the Kieta Council as a punishment . He also reported that in Koromira , 
south of Kieta , the e lection process was subve rted and it was agreed that 
' Election i no s tap long cus tom bi long mipela . Mipela makim man mipela 
i laikim'  ( ' Elections are not part of our tradition . We appoint the man 
Police grapp le with protesters at Rorovan a ,  1969 ( see p .  12 5 ) . 
( Photo courtesy The Sydney Morning Herald) 
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we like ) . The enthusiasm with which Navitu was supported in 1969 
re flected the l ack of substantial expe ctations from the counci l .  It is 
signi fi cant that its headquarters were in Kuka , a non counci l vi llage . 
In the immediate term there can be no doubt that Navitu sti ffened 
the sinews o f  the Rorovana people in their spectacular confrontation (non 
violent resistance on their part) with a riot squad equipped with gas masks 
and cani ste rs , visors , shie lds and batons , and led by a di strict commis­
sioner carrying a ho lstered revolve r .  Funds were raised to send 
Lapun and Bele to Australia , where they gave wi tne s s  to oppre ssion and 
consul ted parliamentary , church and citi zen groups . The international 
publi city given to photographs of police grappling with bare-breasted 
women over survey pegs - ' Aus trali a ' s Shame : This Is How the World Will 
See Us ' was the headline in the tabloi d Sydney Sun - ensured that the 
mining company wo uld pre ssure the Australian government into al lowing 
it a more immediate hand in the land negotiations . Although prepared 
ori ginal ly to ge t land on the che ap , the company di d not want the con­
tinued hostility of the local people and real ized that de lays in bringing 
on production would be more expensive than more generous compensation 
( Gri ffin 19 70 ) . Vi llagers agree d that land negotiations would take place 
only through Navitu ,
1 
which hired i ts own Aus tralian lawyers for the 
purpose . The amount o f  land sought from vil lagers was reduced ,  cash 
compensations were considerably augmente d ,  share options were made 
available ,  rents payable increased ,  and lease renewal or reversion ri ghts 
. 2 . more generously de fine d .  Lapun also went to Australia to support a 
1 
2 
Post-Courier 15 August 1969 . 
The main items in the agreement between the Administration , CRA (or , 
more preci sely by this time , Bougai nvi lle Copper Pty Ltd) and the 
Rorovana people were : 
. A lease over 140 acres to be granted for 42 years . ( This was a 
substantial reduction on amounts previously sought . )  
. The mining company would pay $ 30 , 00 0  cash as compensation for 
displacement (although only three houses were invo lved) and for 
the loss of 12 0 acre s of coconut producing land over a period 
of 10 years ( the approximate time it would take to bring the land 
into production) . 
The Rorovanas were to have an option of taking up 7000 shares 
at issue price in Bougainvi lle Mining Ltd , when this company 
floated.  
( Continued on page 12 6 )  
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staunch Navitu vi llager ( and counci llor) , Teori Tau , who in 1968 had been 
convicted o f  pushing a CRA surveyor into a rive r  and who in 1969 was to 
challenge unsucce ss ful ly New Guinea ' s  mining ordinance s in the Aus tralian 
. 1 Hi gh Court . 
Navitu di d not succee d in spreading signi fi cantly beyond the Nasioi , 
Torau and Eivo areas . Pos sibly Lapun , who worked through s trength o f  
personality rather than organizational technique , saw no immediate need 
for it even in his home area . There was little to dis turb local ine rti a :  
in Banoni there was no likelihood o f  land alienation , n o  influx o f  whites 
and ' redskins ' ,  while indi re ct bene fits ( s uch as remittances from workers)  
came from the mine . Nor was culti c activity notable in the south . In the 
Siwai and Buin areas , where no perceptive observe r would have fai led to 
dis cern the secessioni st feel ing and the sentimental links with the 
western Solomon Islands , there was little understanding of how rapidly 
politi cal devolution would occur even after the Whitlam forays into Papua 
New Guinea in 1969- 19 7 1 .  
I n  late 19 72 , e i ght months after Somare and a few weeks afte r  Whitlam 
had come to power , Aloysius Noga , the fluent Engli sh-speaking president 
of the Buin Counci l , tol d this write r that whi le sel f-government might come 
within a few ye ars , independence was fifteen years o f f .  Bougainville had 
no need of sece ssion movements at the moment as there was plenty of time 
1 
. $ 7000 annual rent was to be pai d ,  the rate being reviewed 
every seven years on the bas is of 5 per cent of the unimproved 
capital value or $ 7000 cash , whichever is the highest • 
. New houses on the land be ing leased were to be built to 
European standard . 
. The company agreed that , i f  at the end o f  the 42 year pe riod 
it wished to renew the lease , a further compensatory payment 
of $ 30 , 000 would be made . It also agreed that , at the end o f  
the lease , the land would revert to the Rorovanas with all 
improvements , including buildings , roads , e tc . at no cost 
( CRA Gazet te 12 September 1969 ) . 
Post-Courier 25 Novembe r 1969 ; Age 10 De cember 1969 . 
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to de fine its destiny . He had been assured of this by members o f  
M r  Barnes ' troupe from the Department o f  External Territories and by 
kiaps . He seemed incredulous that it coul d be otherwi se . Noga was forty­
four and had been one of the first three New Guineans to be ordained to 
the Catholi c prie sthood. Favoured by the Admini stration for his pro­
Administration stance , he had represented Papua New Guinea at the United 
Nations in 19 70 and been a member of the Commi ssion of Inquiry into 
Alcoholi c Drink in 19 71 . He believed that Bougainvi l le should cooperate 
with Australia and the rest of Papua New Guinea . In the north the very 
name , Napidakoe Navitu , rooted the movement among the Nasioi . The Buka 
islanders were used to leading rather than fol lowing . Both Buka and Teop­
Tinputz councils were dominated by Administration supporte rs and were 
under white plan te r  tutelage , the two unsucce ss ful white candidates for 
the regional seat in 196 8  being dominant in the two northern bodie s 
( Ogan 19 7 1) . Indigenous plantations were yielding reasonable pro fits 
during the cocoa boom of the 1960s and they too o ften re lied on ' redskin '  
labour . Thi s , they were told , would come to an end in the event o f  
secession . Sentiment for a ' reunion ' with the Solomons was also more 
attenuated and links with Rabaul more common ( Gri f fin 19 72 ) . Only some 
perce ived pos itive threat , otherwise the rapid onset of independence 
without p rovision of provincial autonomy would have caused a linking up 
with the organization whi ch had arisen out o f  the Kie ta area ' s  problems . 
There was also the problem o f  the personality of Navitu ' s  secretary .  
When the land cris i s  occurre d ,  Barry Middlemi ss (born 19 38)  was simply an 
abrasive young overseer on McKi llop ' s  plantation . Hi s intere st in 
McKillop ' s  problem rapidly developed into an opportunity to become a 
spokesman and negotiator for the Rorovana and Arawa people and a trusty 
ally of Paul Lapun . Attempts made by the Papua New Guinea administrator , 
the district commi s s ione r ,  and other functionaries to blame the vi llagers ' 
I • • 1 resistance to land acqui sition on white stirre rs ' only enhanced 
Middlemi ss ' s standing , as had his preparedness to stand with the vi llagers 
in the face of the riot squad . He then doggedly he lped to bring the land 
negotiations to a succes s ful conclusion , bui lding up a re serve of goodwi ll 
1 
For example see Age 2 August 1969 . 
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which survived a number o f  callow and ineffectual actions and an attitude 
towards local people which was often as domineering as that of the kiap 
whom he denounced. He took imaginative initiatives which , however ,  lacked 
systematic and informed execution . As Radio Bougainvi l le was used to try 
to undermine Navitu and radio time was refused to him to explain Navitu 
poli cy (McKay 19 76 : 6 3-6 7 ;  Jackson n . d . ) , he founded in 1970 a monthly news­
paper , Bougainvi l l e  News (average copy s ize , twenty-four pages } ;  this 
disappeared in 19 72 after some eighteen issues . Indi fferently educated 
and with a very shallow grasp of pub l i c  affairs , Middlemis s  lacked the 
abi lity to turn out substantive copy , even resorting to plagiarism on 
occasion . Issues were padded out with photographs . He wrote fleering 
criticisms of the Administration , the dis trict commis sioner and Radio 
Bougainvi l le , he personally pushed the secessionist argument rather than 
merely urging a referendum , and he did not baulk at anti ' redskin ' remarks . 
He was careful , whi le a Methodist himsel f , to give space to the Catholic 
mission ' s  activi ties and , whi le baiting the mining company over the need 
for renegotiation of the agreement and the need for a greater share of 
the profits for Bougainvi lle , he nevertheless accepted mining as the price 
of material progress and took pride in the magnitude of the operation . 
' CRA is the best thing that ever happened here ' , he told the Melbourne 
Age ( 2 3  August 1969 ) . The company patronised Bougainville News with 
advertisements and i ts press releases were sometimes published verbatim . 1 
He wanted early self-government but regarded Whitlam ' s design for indepen­
dence by 19 7 5  as a ' disas ter ' .  He showed his essential conservatism with 
1 It is an interesting reflection on attitudes to the mining company 
that , partly under the influence of Middlemi s s , the Kieta counci l 
inve s ted in it when one mi llion 50 cent shares were offered to 
res i dents of Papua New Guinea at the $ 1 . 55 issue price . However ,  
the s ame Navitu supporters who were repres ented i n  the council 
did not use their compensation to take up what was explaine d  to 
them as being lucrative pickings . They felt that 
it was another white man ' s  trick to make them accept 
the loss of thei r  land . And further ,  they considered 
that the act of buying shares would indicate to the 
copper company that it had reciprocal rights to their 
lands (Review 29 January 19 72 ) . 
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a souvenir i s s ue for the Duke o f  Edinburgh ' s  vi sit in March 1971 . Such 
attitudes were tolerated , even approved ,  by many inarti culate indigenes .  
Where , howeve r ,  Middlemiss overs tepped Melanesian de corum was in hi s 
public abuse , both verbally and in print , o f  s uch figure s as Joseph Lue 
(MHA, Bougainvi l le Regiona l )  , Donatus Mola (MHA ,  North Bougainvi lle Open)  , 
Aloysius Noga , Jock Lee (Buka planter)  and other notable s . This reached 
a pi tch when he was e le cted to the Kieta Counci l in 19 70 , aggressive ly 
dominated its proceedings , rapidly became its vi ce president and had 
hims e l f  ele cted as the Ki eta Council representative to the Bougainvi lle 
Combined Councils ' Conference together with Teori Tau . Any chance that 
Navitu would reach beyond the Kieta District was destroyed by behaviour 
whi ch Middlemi ss was later to regret .  1 
When the Adminis tration ignored Navitu ' s  call for a re ferendum on 
Bougainvi l le ' s  future status , Middlemiss printed his own ballot pape r .  
Following the lead given a t  the mee ting i n  Port Moresby i n  September 196 8 ,  
h e  asked people t o  state , fi rst , whether they wi shed t o  remain with Papua 
New Guinea or not and , secondly , whe ther they wished to remai n alone , 
j oin with the re st o f  the Solomon I slands or j oin with the New Gui nea 
i slands . Thi s  last option had been put forward by the abortive Rabaul­
based Melanesian Independence Front in October 1968 ( Gri ffin et al . 
19 79 : 154) . In March 19 70 Middlemi ss claimed that more than 16 , 000 voting 
papers had been distributed and that about 1 1 , 000 of these had been 
returned showing ' overwhelming s upport for the complete break with Papua 
New Guine a '  . 2 In fact , the circulation of the ballot papers was chaoti c .  
Many Navitu supporters were alleged to have fi l led i n  multiple forms when 
voting papers were l e ft indi scriminately at trade stores . In Buin 
Aloysius Noga indi gnantly burnt thousands of them and aske d for the removal 
of Middlemi ss from Bougainville . 3 This demand was taken up in the House 
1 
Middlemi s s , personal communi cation , 1974 . 
2 
Post-Courier 11 March 19 70 . 
3 Pos t-Courier 15 May 19 70 . 
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o f  Assembly by Lue and Mo la (both now assistant mini sterial members ) , 
where they deplored ' the way in whi ch Mr Middlemi s s  has tried to make 
himse l f  the spokesman for the people of Bougainvil le and taken over the 
role of the e lected repre sentative s  of the distri ct ' .  They called ' on 
the Government to investigate the status of Mr Middlemi s s  in the Territory 
with a view to deporting him to hi s country of ori gin ' 
1 
Where the 
Post-Courier ' s editorial ( 15 May 19 70)  had applauded Noga for denouncing 
Middlemi ss , it drew the line at the ' martyrdom of a man . • •  ( the House ) 
wi shes t o  forget ' . 2 The motion was adj ourned and lapsed in 19 7 1 .  Aside 
from the democrati c p rinciple involve d ,  Administration o ffi cials had come 
to tolerate Middlemi ss . Where a CRA lawyer could sti l l  be lieve in January 
1970 that Middlemi s s  had been an obj ect of gun running during the Rorovana 
cri sis 3 and others had seen him as a crypto-communist ( Gri f fin 19 7 2 : 2 7 2 ) , 
di stri ct o ffi cials realized that Middlemi s s  was not a se curi ty threat , 
that he could be a use ful i f  irritating mediator with recalcitrant Navitu 
vil lage rs , and that , as long as he was identi fied with secess ioni sm , it 
could be di scredi ted in the eye s of influential Bougainvi l leans in other 
parts of the Province . They also pre fe rred to believe that sece s s ioni sm 
was caused by avidity and that se ttlement of the land que stion had 
e f fe ctually dampened it . 
In 19 7 1  Lapun made a final attempt to involve the House of Assembly 
in secess ion . Claiming to be ' tired of thi s  talk about secession ' he 
moved that the Adminis trator appoint a committee to tour the Bougainvi lle 
Province to determine whether or not to have a re ferendum. I f  the 
majority did not want it , that would put a stop to the i ssue , he sai d .  
The commi ttee was t o  consist o f  three MHAs chosen b y  the House o f  Assembly , 
the three Bougainvi l le MHAs ( Lapun , Mola , Lue ) as obse rvers , three public 
servants chosen by the House from a list submitted by the Administrator , 
and three Bougainvi lle people , two to be chosen at the forthcoming combined 
Bougainvi lle local government counci l s  conference and one from non counci l 
1 Post-Courier 8 June 1970 . 
2 Pos t-Courier 12 June 1970 . 
3 
P .  Opas , personal communication , 19 70 . 
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are as . The i ssue was t o  b e  regarded a s  a matter of urgency and the 
conunittee was to report back be fore the end of 19 71 . The motion was 
de feated by fi fty-seven votes to fourteen with the United Party and 
People ' s  Progress Party fi rmly against and a few o f  Lapun ' s  Pangu friends 
(including Pi ta Lus and Tony Voutas ) tolerantly in favour . The Mataungan 
leade r ,  Oscar Tarmnur , and the Manus leader Paliau Maloat , were also in 
favour whi le the chairman of the Con s ti tutional Select Cormnittee , Paulus 
Arek , voted ye s wi th the intention that the whole eme rging nation , not 
j ust Bougainvi lle , would be the ele ctorate in the event of a re ferendum. 
Lue and Mola did not vote ; nor did Michae l Somare . However hal f-hearted 
Lapun may have appeared in the House - Tore Lokoloko accused him of being 
led on thi s  issue by Middlemi ss - he could te ll Navitu supporters he had 
done his be st . 
1 
By the end of 1971  it was clear that Lapun wanted a form 
of ' s tatehood '  for Bougainvi l le , not secession . 2 
Navitu Enterpri ses had been set up as the economic arm of Napidakoe 
Navitu with Middlemi s s  as manager-secretary . Some eight vehi cles ,  
including air condi tioned buses ,  were purchased from funds rai se Q ,  including 
m::>ney handed ove r by Lapun from co llections prior to 1969 . Although given 
privi leged acce ss to routes and licences by the administration , whi ch from 
19 70 di d not want to see thi s indigenous business fai l (with further local 
di sgruntlement) , and although a senior mining o fficial could credibly 
claim (personal communication ) that the company had bought the buses twice 
over - Navitu was gratuitously gi ven the Panguna mail run 3 - the busine ss 
collapse d ,  principally through poor management . Navitu Enterpri ses also 
took over a garage in Arawa and tried to trade in local arti facts . 
Middlemi s s  himself lacked experience but he was prepared to s tate publicly 
to the Bougainvi lle tertiary students ' poli ti cal seminar in December 19 72 
that the root o f  Navitu ' s  problem was the wantok system ( free taxi rides , 
etc . ) :  
1 HAD II ( l3 )  : 4028-4029 , 16 March 19 7 1 .  
2 Lapun , personal communication , 19 71 . 
3 Post-Courier 25 November 19 70 . 
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It is a sad truth that people here have no t had suffi cient 
dis cipline or education to withstand "The System " . We have 
seen the rise and fall of perhaps the bi ggest co-op in the 
Terri tory on Bougainville , Busiba . In my opinion the fai lure 
of Busiba was a htunan fa ilure . The largest contributing 
factor to the fai lure . . .  is the obligations that are endemic 
in tradi tional native society . . .  In my opinion the only way 
"work bi sini s " on Bougainvi lle wi ll flourish is for people in 
charge to humble themse lves and accept advice from 
experienced businessmen (Middlemi ss 19 72 ) . 
Some li steners smi led at thi s audacity ;  a new , less hostile district 
commi s s ioner fe lt that Navitu Enterpri se s should have made conside rable 
pro fits . 
1 
Its first balance sheet at the end of 19 71 showed a loss o f  
$ 180 0 ;  by 1974 it had slumpe d  into liquidation and there was general 
unease at the lack of accountabi lity for money rai sed and inve sted . 
Middlemiss by thi s time had withdrawn from pol itics to run his own news­
agency in Arawa . 
It seems clear that in early 19 7 1 ,  in line with i ts obj e c tive o f  
nominating candidates for the 1972 parliame ntary ele ctions , the Navitu 
exe cutive canvassed a s late for all four electorates in the Province . A 
problem had arisen with the carving out of the Central Bougainvi l le Open 
from the former North and South Bougainvi l le Open electorates . Paul 
Lapun ( South) was now living in a di ffe rent electorate from the Nasioi 
( Central ) , most of whom had re fused to vote in the 1968 regional election 
or had voted invali dly for Lapun ( Ogan 19 7 1) . Moreove r ,  Joseph Lue had , 
in Bougainvi lle eyes , identi fied hims e l f  with the Admini stration by taking 
an as sistant mi ni sterial post , supporting CRA in 1969 and opposing 
separati st aspi rations . The selection o f  candidates and their endorsement 
by Lapun were to be crucial . Middlemi ss was eager to s tand but he con­
tinued to rile many people by hi s domineering manner and he was , a fte r al l ,  
a white man . Although he re cei ved endorsement from Kie ta Council i n  July 
19 7 1 , Bougainvi lle univers ity students announced hi s intended 
candi dature as se l f-serving and opportunisti c . 2 Lapun maintained a 
1 
2 
W .  Brown , pe rsonal communication , December 19 7 2 . 
See , for example , Pos t-Courier 28 Septembe r ,  1 3  October ,  1 3  December 
19 7 1 .  
1 3 3  
di s creet loyalty t o  a n  o l d  ' comrade-in-arms ' but it was clear to this 
wri ter that he sought a better option . At meetings of the Navitu execu­
tive in De cembe r 19 7 1  Bele was nominated in spite of his. lack of education 
( Anis et al . 19 76 ) . As a Pangu membe r ,  Lapun (personal communi cation , 
December 19 7 1 ) accepted that se l f-government might be imminent , parti cu­
larly after the Australian e le ctions sche duled for December 19 72 , and 
without spe ci fi cally endorsing any candidate , emphasized those qualities 
whi ch were most desi rable (Anis et al . 19 76 ) . Navitu committee men 
carried the news to their vi llagers . 
Having settled hi s own views on se ces sion in favour of an unde fined 
' fede ral ' solution , Lapun sought a candidate for the regional seat who 
would match his own realism. He passed over Leo Hannett because Hannett 
had become too closely identi fied with the University ' s  Black Power Move­
ment , had been too scathingly critical of the church , and appeare d out 
of touch with Provincial atti tudes . For obve rse reasons , Lue was 
unsuitable as having be come ' pikinini bilong kiap ' ( ' a  chi ld of the 
Administration ' ) . Lapun ' s  nomination fe ll on John Momis , a young out­
spoken Catholic priest who was known throughout the Province , had 
fiercely anti-establi shment views , advocated indigenous rights , se l f-­
reli ance and sel f-determination , was vehemently opposed to the mining 
company ( see Momi s and Ogan 19 7 2 )  but ,  like Lapun , would seek solutions 
to Bougainvi lle ' s  problems by means other than seces sion . Momi s was also 
deeply respe cted for his personal integrity and sense o f  vocation . In 
orde r to assist Lapun to explain to the expatriate bi shop why Bougain­
vil leans wanted Momis released from hi s sacerdotal duties to participate 
in politi cs , Navitu paid this write r ' s fare from Port Moresby to Buka in 
De cember 19 7 1 .  The bi shop a t  first demurre d o n  the grounds o f  the needs 
of his diocese but finally l e ft the decision to his indi genous prie sts . 
The ele ctions showed Navitu ' s  strength in the Kieta area . In the 
regional electorate Momi s gained 90 per cent of the Nasioi vote , more 
even than he gained in his home base in the south or in the north . In the 
Guava census area , where villagers in 1968 had given Lapun more than 
99 per cent o f  the vote and had made almost the same percentage of in formal/ 
1 34 
invalid votes in the regional election , Momis in 19 72 gained 9 7  per cent . 
In the Central Open electorate Bele gained 55 per cent of Nasioi first 
preferences and Middlemiss slightly more than 13 per cent ( though 31 per 
cent in Guava ) . As one was a Torau speaker and the other white and as 
the two most s uccess ful of the other three candidates , who were all 
Nasioi , at times claimed sympathy with Navitu , Lapun and Navitu clearly 
rolled out the vote . Middlemiss did particularly well in the more remote 
areas of Eivo , Rotokas , and Aita and together he and Bele pulled 465 7  out 
of 6894 formal votes . After preferences were allocated Bele de feated 
Middlemiss 3641 to 19 17 (Anis et al . 19 76 ) . 
With the unexpected formation of a coalition government by 
Michael Somare in 19 72 , Lapun became minister for Mines and Energy , Momis 
deputy speaker and later deputy chairman ( actually de facto chairman ) o f  
the Constitutional Planning Committee , and Donatus Mola , ministe r  for 
Business Development . Bele , whose secessionis t  ardour had been tempora­
rily dampened by a Moral Rearmament-sponsored visit to Northern Ire land 
( for a cautionary lesson on civi l war) , to Switzerland ( for a cautionary 
solution to s eparatism) and to Rome ( for overawing moral upli ft )  , sat 
quietly supporting his leaders . Bougainville now appeared to be firmly 
entrenched within the polity . Lapun was confident that , with Momis ' s  
support , he could bring about a renegotiation o f  the copper agreement , 
more royalties for Bougainvi lle and a s atis factory degree of Provincial 
1 
autonomy . Superficially , it also appeared that Lapun was able to control 
less accommodating persons at the village leve l .  An anti National Day 
demonstration was planned by Navitu s upporters for 11 September 197 2 . 
The national flag was to be pulled down f rom the Kieta Counci l chamber .  
After Lapun condemned the proposed gesture , the Navitu executive committee 
met and called the demonstration o f f .  A t  Arawa o n  National Day t o  an 
assemblage of 3000 people Lapun s aid , 
l 
We in Bougainville are separated from the res t  o f  
Papua New Guinea b y  a b i g  sea , but we are part of 
thi s  one nation . A nation is not one skin colour . 
It is the people of one country , under one government . 
Unity wi ll not be easy , but we must try . 
Lapun , personal communication , April 19 7 2 . 
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' Could the worm have turned? ' asked a normally perceptive Pacific Islands 
Monthl y correspondent , who also thought that,  ' despi te teething troub les ' ,  
• I 1 • • .  Navitu Enterprises had ' a  rosy future before i t  . Mining company 
officials who thought highly of their own interethni c  integration poli cies , 
Administration official s , and Paci fic I sland Regiment leaders who had been 
on civi c patrols in Bougainvi lle all thought sece s s ionism was over .
2 
At best the Navi tu ' s  advocacy of secession could be said to 
be lukewarm rhetoric . At worst ,  it could be said to be a 
po litical ploy to keep the attention of Papua New Guinea 
firmly directed on Bougainville . 3 
Cultic activi ty , however , continued . In September 19 7 2  the Kie ta 
Counci l condemned vil lagers who were digging up bones in cemeteries , 
dancing naked and behaving promiscuously . As they claimed they were acting 
under instructions from Lapun , the latter with Bele was accused by members 
of the council of encouraging them. Though Lapun denied the charge , 
it is interesting that some councillors would find it credible . What the 
inciden t sugge sts is that Lapun was more a manipulator than a moulder of 
the underground politi cal will and that attention would be focussed on 
him only as long as he met his supporters ' aspirations . These did not 
include integration with ' redskins ' ,  as future events made clear . 
Meanwhile , at another leve l an initiative was being taken by the 
student-led Mungkas Society to keep the sece ssion option al ive . In 
December 19 72 a Poli ti ca l  Awareness seminar was organized at which both 
Hahalis and Navitu representatives ( including Lapun) were present and at 
which Momi s was obliged to affirm that Bougainvi lleans had ' an absolute 
right to self-de termination ' ( Gri ffin 19 7 3 c) .  Wi thin a fortnight the 
ki lling of two Bougainvi l lean civi l servants after a motor accident at 
Goroka ( for which one of them was culpable ) roused the whole Province 
against other Papua New Guineans , particu larly highlanders . As the 
Paci fi c Islands Monthl y correspondent then said : ' The o ld split between 
1 Pacific Islands Monthl y ,  November 19 7 2 , 5 1 .  p .  
2 
Personal communications , November-De cember 19 72 . 
3 Paci fi c Islands Monthl y ,  November 19 72 , p .  5 1 .  
136 
the southern secessioni sts and the northern anti-sece ssioni sts disappeared 
overnight ' (Pacific Islands Monthl y February 19 7 3 : 3 ) . Navitu now tried 
to get a proposed vi sit by Somare to the Province cance lle d .  Once again 
Lapun intervened in favour of the vi sit and Navitu acceded. Howeve r ,  
the first serious criticisms of Lapun , a s  having compromised h i s  cause , 
were voi ced by students who dubbed him a ' traitor ' and a ' puppet '  of 
Somare . The return o f  Leo Hanne tt to Bougainvi l le eventually to as sume 
leadership of an autonomi st canpai gn which in 1975 became openly seces­
sioni s t ,  has been sketched elsewhere (Gri ffin et al . 19 79 ) . Lapun 
gradually lost hi s ascendancy . Almost coincidental ly , in June 19 74 he 
accepted the first Papua New Gui nea knighthood ,  making him an establish­
ment figure . The limitations of his education also became more evi dent 
as younger leaders emerged.  The ini tiative in success fully gaining in 
19 74 the renegotiation of the Bougainvi lle Copper Agreement for Papua 
New Guinea and the full one and a quarter per cent royalties for the 
North Solomons Provincial Government pas sed to others . Navitu be came 
dis sociated from its ' charismatic ' patron , casting doubt on the e fficacy 
of that epi the t in a culture which so readily di scards leaders . 
Navi tu had i ts own momentum. In De cember 19 73 one Kieta counci l lor 
tendered his res ignation because , he sai d ,  when he rang the be ll for a 
vi l lage meeting no one took any noti ce of him; howeve r ,  everyone turned 
up for the Navitu commi ttee man - the re fore let a Navitu man become 
counci l lor ! The council heard him sympathe ti cally but urged him to stay . 
Peter Teena , once vehemently anti council and president o f  Navitu from 
19 71 to 1974 , who had , within a year of j oining the counci l ,  become vice 
president , de clared that the council and Navitu were really ' wankain 
tupela man ' ( ' two o f  the same ' )  ( Counci l Minutes , 6 December 19 7 3 ) . By 
19 74 Navi tu ' s president was Arawa-born , Raphae l Ninik u ,  who had been 
pre sident o f  Ki eta Council from 1966 to 1972 and , as such , was wi dely 
thought to be pro Administration . In fact he had been prominent in 
denouncing Australia be fore a United Nations Mi ssion in 196 2  and at the 
combined counci l s  con ference in September 1968 he had s upported the move 
1 towards secession , taken in Port More sby . During his unsucce s s ful e le ction 
1 South Paci fi c Post 2 3  October 1968 . 
1 3 7  
campaign in 19 7 2  h e  had s aid that h e  was a Navitu sympathizer (Anis e t  
al . 19 76 : 460) . One could almost s ay that Navitu ultimately assimilated 
the Kieta Counci l and paved the way for its ul timate dis so lution . All 
government councils began to lapse in Bougainvi l le with the advent o f  
interim provincial government i n  19 7 4 ;  vil lage governments began to take 
their place and these were formally recogni zed by the P apua New Guinea 
government in 19 76 ( Co nne l l  19 7 7 )  • 
Navitu was in its turn ass imi lated by the Bougainvi l le Special 
Politi cal Committee (BSPC) set up by Leo Hannett in 19 7 3  to negotiate 
the future s tatus of the Province within Papua New Guinea and the subse­
quent autonomist movement which uni laterally declared independence in 
19 75 ( Gri ffin et al . 1979 : 209 - 2 17 ) . Hannett reconciled all coun ci l  and 
non counci l areas so that the Hahalis , Navi tu , Pikei (Bai tsi ) , Toiapingal 
(Nissan )  societies and the outer atolls ( Ki l inai lu , Nuguria , Tauu , 
Nukumanu) were merged with the former combined councils conference group 
in one ethnonational entity . 
After being in the van of the secession flare-up fol lowing the 
killings of Rovin and Moini , it would seem from passages in the BSPC pro­
ceedings that Raphae l Bele attempted to assert a leadership role for 
Navitu (Mamak and Bedford 19 7 4 ) . Thi s ,  granted the virtual defection o f  
Lapun and the lack o f  sophisticated leadership , was impossib le .  Particu­
larly with its economic arm defunct yet with access to prosperity ( the 
mine began production in 19 7 2  and crop pri ce s  were generally high )  , 
Navitu ' s  aspirations were taken over by the new Provincial le adership . 
In 19 7 5  it was des cribed by a former local government officer as ' dormant 
but able to ri se l ike a phoenix in the event of a crisis • . 1 This proved 
to be true . Th e Navitu ne twork was enlivened during the secession crisis 
of 19 7 5 - 19 76 ,  it urged Bele ' s  res ignation from the National Parl iament in 
19 75 and , following reconciliation and the granting o f  provincial govern­
ment , ensured his reele ction in both l9 7 7  and 1982 , in spite of his 
ine ffe c tuality in Port Moresby . I ts younger leaders unsuccess fully 
supported Hannett rather than Momis in the regional electorate in 1977 , 
and in 1980 preferred Hannett to the inaugural Premier , Alexis S are i 
( 19 76- 80) . Hannett had been more uncompromis ing than either rival during 
the secession cri si s ,  was more conci liatory towards cu ltists and seemed 
1 D . J .  Duggan , personal communication , 19 75 . 
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more committed to exclus ively North Solomonese goals . Be fore the 19 82 
e lections Navitu s taged a protest march in Kie ta for the repatriation o f  
mainland ' squatters ' and helped B e l e  t o  an increased majori ty , particu­
larly as several highlanders had the gal l  to conte s t  Central Bougainvil le . 
Me lanesian Alliance was clearly the ethnic party . 
The ob j ectives o f  Napidakoe Navitu can be said to have been achieved 
in 19 74-1976 , although it would no t be true to say that the asso ciation i t­
self achieved them all . The land disputes o f  19 69 and o ther compens atory 
issues were adequately settled ; a moral vi ctory was scored over the co lonial 
Administration ; the mining agreement was drastically renegotiated to the 
chagrin o f  the intrusive transnational company ( another moral vic tory) ; 
the ful l one and a quarter per cent royal ties were paid to the provincial 
government ; the North Solomons was uni ted under a provincial government 
with real powers ; local government councils were abo lished and traditional 
authority sanctioned through vil lage government ; attempts were being made 
to foster traditional culture in schools and through provincial agencies ; 
education came under substantial provincial control and North Solomonese 
maintained a high leve l  of access to posi tions throughout Papua New Guinea 
in tertiary institutions , public service , church and business , and privi­
leged acce ss in the North Solomons itsel f ;  the e l ections of 19 7 7  and 19 82 
saw Mola and Lapun e liminated and all four MPs committed to the one party , 
the radical Melanesian Al liance , led by John Momis . Whatever limi tations 
were initially imposed on Navitu by intraprovincial rivalries and by the 
lack of suave and conciliatory leadership , it was not an introvertedly 
parochial asso ciation but one which correctly divined where , in the short 
term at least , the ' terminal loyalty ' of the geographically insulated P ro­
vince as a whole would lie . And it took purpos ive steps to this end within 
i ts own district , which did not assert merely sectional interests or pre­
c lude blending i ts aspirations with those of o ther North So lomonese . This 
1 
enab led most Navitu supporters eventually to accept a pragmatic approach 
to association with Papua New Guinea which appeared more ideologi cal ly 
suited to the northern areas of the Province and provided the sounde s t  
bas i s  for any eventual integration . For thi s  reason the term micronationalist 
has never seemed to this writer appropriate to Navitu . Ethnona tional , for 
all its problems , seems bette r .  
1 Some cultists in the Koromira-Kongara hinterland sti l l  urge secess ion , 
re fuse to join provincial government and even have a private government 
which levies tax . 
Chapte r  5 
NATIONALISM AND MICRONATIONALISM : THE TOLAI CASE 
Ian Grosart 
The Mataungan Association emerged in the Gazelle Beninsula of East 
New Britain in 1969 . I ts membership was e ssentially con fined to Tolai 
speakers , who in 1969 probably numbered less than 65 , 000 , about 2 . 4  per 
cent of the total population of Papua New Guine a .  However , although 
Mataungani sm as an ideology qui ckly attained intelle ctual hegemony over 
most Tolai , the Mataungan Association as an organization could usual ly 
count on opposi tion from at least one third o f  the Tolai population . 
In fact on the two occas ions when an independent count was conducted -
the 19 72 elections and the special Tolai politi cal cens us eighteen months 
later - the number of adherents was in round figures 15 , 00 0 , some 55 per 
cent of the adult population . Finally , although Tolai are and for a long 
time have been widely di spersed beyond their home land , Mataunganism as 
an activi ty ( excluding student events ) was con fined to the Gaze lle 
Peninsula , a well-roade d ,  fe rtile terrain within some fi fty ki lometre s 
of Rabaul . 
Offi cial reaction to the Mataungan As sociation was to confront the 
long-neglected Tolai with a s udden abundance o f  carrots and sticks : 
on the one hand , a S upreme Court j udge sitting continuously in Rabaul 
for three months to clear up outstanding land cases and the s udden 
avai labi lity of land for repurchase and resettlement ; on the other ,  the 
flying in of more than a thousand police , including the riot squad ( the 
commitment , in other words , o f  more than a third of the total poli ce 
strength in Papua New Guinea) , the establishment o f  police camps , the 
appearance o f  he licopters , even naval patro l  boats in Tolai space , and 
the hastily enacted Publ i c  Order Ordinance of 19 70 . 
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In the following pages we will attempt to answer two maj or questions : 
firs t ,  why was the Mataungan Association able to unite the number it did ;  
secondly , di d the Austra lian Administration mi sj udge the s igni fi cance o f  
the Mataungan Association? Both o f  the se are obviously relevant t o  the 
wider i s s ue o f  whether the Mataungan Association was an ethni c ,  micro­
nationalist movement or a nationalist movemen t ,  tou t  court , or neithe r .  
In a brie f chronologi cal overview, i t  can b e  taken for granted that 
the Mataungan Association had ante cedents and was a response to problems 
which wi ll be touched on later ; for the moment it should be noted that on 
16 May 1969 there was an impressively wel l  attended and orderly march o f  
Tolai through the stree ts o f  Rabaul in protest against the conversion o f  
the Gazelle Pe ninsula Local Government Counci l into a multi-racial council , 
that is one which would have j urisdi ction for the first time ove r non 
Tolai , but in which non Tolai would be eligible to hold o ffice . For the 
next six months the dis si dents , who began in mid year to style themselve s  
Mataungans , still appeared t o  b e  concerned exclusively with the counci l ,  
although the correspondent o f  The Austral ian had begun , by 1 7  November ,  
to talk o f  ' New Guinean Nationali sm ' and The Advertiser noted on 16 De cem­
ber that , while not one yet ,  the Mataungan Association was in ' the process 
o f  be coming an independence movement ' .  
Was this premature ? Such new ini tiatives as the closure o f  the 
council offi ces by publicly ' stealing ' the keys , the abortive takeove r 
of the Rabaul market ,  and a more aggressive decrying of the Tolai Cocoa 
Pro j e ct were all directly aime d at the counci l and its activitie s .  The 
clue lay in the Mataungan Association ' s  insistence that it was not against 
multi- raci al councils in principle , on ly this one , at this time . As 
Damien Kereku ,  president of the Association , put it in October ,  such a 
change should not have occurred unti l sel f-go ve rnment ; Tolai would then 
have made the ne cessary decisions in fact as we l l  as in form ( TPNG 
1969 ) . The dispute , in other words , was over the e xercise of power 
(Nelson 1972 } .  To take another example , in those days , as Oscar Tanunur , 
1 patron of the Associ ation , would point out in the House of Assembly , no 
1 HAD I I (8) : 2 20 7 , 9 January 19 70 . 
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systematic provi sions e xi s ted to ensure that members actua lly understood 
the legi slation for which they were legally responsible , even though it 
was couched in le gal language and few members were fluent in co lloquial 
Australian . 
Here , then , we have the e s sential dynami c o f  Mataunganism' s popular 
appeal and indeed the signi ficance of its name , s ince ma taungan me ans 
' be ale rt , watchful , prepared . . .  ' .  I t  does not take a very close reading 
of the parli amentary debate s for November 1969 to see that several members , 
particularly the pro multi-racial counci l members from nei ghbouring West 
New Bri tain , John Maneke and Koriam Urekit , had clearly grasped both the 
essence of Mataunganism and the e xtent o f  i ts s upport which Maneke , 
against the weight of o ffi cial pronouncements, put at 50 per cent o f  the 
Tolai popul ation . Nor did it seem to them that Mataunganism was an 
unreasonable attitude for Tol ais . I t  was necessary for Mataungans to be 
alert , because they be lieved that no one e lse , not even the Adminis tration , 
was looking after the ir inte rests . To be a Mataungan was , as Oscar Tammur 
had said in another context in 196 7 ,  to s tand on one ' s  own two legs in 
front o f  Europe ans and to decide for one se l f  whether to say ' Ye s ' and 
then , whether to add ' Sir ' . 
The se cond thing to which the Mataungans s ai d  ' No '  was the new and 
somewhat frenzied o fficial attempt to respond to the land pre ssure p re­
vai ling on the Gazel le . Hence the confrontation at Vunapaladi g in mid 
19 70 . Neverthe less , it was not till e i ghteen months had e lapsed that the 
Mataungan Association moved , in late 19 70 and early 19 7 1 ,  into a new 
phase by establi shing its ' own ' council - the Warkurai Nigunan - together 
with i ts own New Guinea Deve lopment Corpo ration . This change occurre d at 
the very time (which prompted whi ch? )  that the Administration finally 
abandoned the mul ti-raci al council and was concerned to launch the New 
Guinea Is lands P roduce Company as successor to the Tolai Cocoa Pro j e c t .  
In this way , 19 7 1  saw a series o f  increasingly violent clashe s . These 
centred on former Tolai Cocoa Pro j e ct cocoa fermentaries , included the 
so-cal led ' Battle of Matupi t ' , which originated in the non payment o f  
o fficial counci l tax and temporari ly closed Rabaul ai rpo rt , and ended 
with the murde r of the district conuni ssioner in August .  
Riot po lice advance on Mataungan demons t rators at Ngatur cocoa ferrnentary , 19 71 
( Photo courtesy The Sydney Morning Herald) 
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The re was then an uneasy entr' acte until the e le ctions early in 
19 72 when three out of four Mataungan As soci ation candidates won comfor­
tably , but with closer to hal f than two thirds of the total Tolai vote . 
The size of this non Mataungan vote i s  important ,  but so is the fact that 
none of the non Mataungan candidates polle d  we l l .  As a result of these 
elections and the new Mataungan As sociation members becoming part of the 
governing coalition , the relationship between Mataungans and non 
Mataungans vis-a-vis the authori tie s was reve rsed. Neverthe le ss , 
although violent confrontation cease d ,  re lations remained uneasy while 
the central authorities sought to succeed where the colonial masters had 
fai le d .  The Mataungans were poli te and seemingly co-operative , but no 
progres s  was made unti l 1976 with the reluctant introduction of provincial 
government . Since then overt Mataungan activity has sought to secure 
control of the new provincial insti tutions . 
At the national leve l ,  howeve r ,  united Mataungan Association 
support for the Somare government finally ruptured during the consti­
tutional debates of 19 75 . The divergent tendencies which then be came 
apparent had in fact e xisted within the Mataungan Association since at 
least the se cond hal f  of 1969 ; it was the i r  coalition which had made the 
Mataungan Association the e ffecti ve organi zation it became . How far 
di ffe rence s of ideologi cal commitment , as opposed to personal rivalries 
and tactical di ffe rence s within the leadership , were responsible for 
this split at the national leve l  remains to be seen . 
Putting a thousand people onto the street in a dis ciplined 
demonstration is no easy task and some Mataungan marches were in the 
orde r of ten thousand . The marche rs were Tolai who according to all 
re cent commentators are the be st educate d ,  wealthiest and most advanced 
of the peoples of Papua New Guinea - not , at first sight , rent-a- crowd 
material . Thi s  was the flaw in offi cial claims that the marches were all 
the work of ' sti rrers ' ,  and more spe ci fi cally that Oscar Tammur was 
seeking to ensure his re-ele ction in 19 72 . So , why were the Tolai 
' avai lable ' for Mataungan activity? Much of the es senti al ground has 
previously been canvassed from various pe rspe ctive s  ( see , for example , 
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A. L .  Epstein 1969 , 19 70 , 19 7 1 ;  T . S .  Epstein 1969-70 , 19 7 2 ; Salisbury 19 70 , 
19 7 1 ,  19 76 ; Grosart and McColl 19 76 ; Schutte n . d . and Bishop 19 72 ) , so no 
extended treatment will be o ffered here . Howeve r ,  at some ri sk of being 
over s chemati c ,  three problem areas can be dis tingui shed initially : 
Old Grievances ,  The Development Push , and The Arena Prob lem. 
The oldest grievances conce rned land and power .  Very early o n  the 
Tolai learne d ,  as a res ult of punitive e xpedi tions in the late nineteenth 
century { led amongst others by the famous botanist Parkinson and the even 
more famous mi ss ionary George Brown ) , that it was no longer for them to 
decide who should l i ve amongst them nor on what terms ; nor was it for them 
to exploit as they saw fi t the new opportunities opened up , for e xample 
by the possession o f  fi rearms . Under Australian rule they were even 
sporadical ly discouraged from wearing the European clothes to whi ch they 
had been introduced by the Germans and the ir prede ce ssors . The re i s  no 
evidence that the Tolai were in a constant state o f  unrest , continually 
trying to rid themselve s  of an i rksome yoke ; nonetheless it is clear that 
a number of e fforts were made . Amongs t the post World War II attempts 
the be tter known include those of Enos Teve , Manoa , and the Raluana 
Collective or ki vung. The re were also s undry cargo cults which persisted 
into the 1960s and a remarkable e nthusi asm for co-ope rative and savings 
and loan societie s . Nor should deve lopments within the mis sions be ignored .  
For various reasons a l l  o f  these activi ties were o n  too small a s cale for 
their political dimensions to pose a serious threat to the coloni al 
authoritie s . Neverthe les s  they provided e xpe rience in organization , 
experience in the search for an e xplanation of why To lai lacked the 
power o f  the Europeans and also an accumulation of symbol s  for subsequent 
use . One Mataungan Association banner in 19 72 reminded Tolai of the 
Navuneram Incident of 195 8  in which two of Manoa ' s  young men had been 
killed by pol ice ri fle fi re, and Enos Teve became the fi rst vice president 
o f  the Mataungan Association . 
By 19 14 some 40 per cent of the Tolai land area had been alienated 
for p lantations and other European purposes . The e ffe c ts of thi s  were 
aggravated after the second world war by three new developments : a Tolai 
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population explosion ; the only s lightly les s  explosive demand for land 
for the new tree crop , cocoa ; and the mal functioning of the school system, 
which by 19 70 was producing two and a hal f p rimary school leavers for 
eve ry available high school place . The· fact that the last was a better 
ratio than exi sted e lsewhere in the country was no consolation to the two 
thirds ' pushed out ' , o r  for thei r  parents . Whether offi cial practi ce 
duri ng the 1960s of recogni zing the Tolai land ' p roblem ' by holding a 
series of special hearings and inquiri es which had little
.
impact actually 
exacerbated the situation or not is hard to s ay ,  but it certainly di d not 
exorcise i t .  The drop-out , or push-out , problem was a consequence of the 
deve lopment push unleashed on P apua New Guinea by Canbe rra and Port 
Moresby in the 1960s and from which the Tolai on East New Britain re ceived 
new di sadvantages and few advantages .  These i ssue s  however were inextri­
cably interwoven with the arena problem, for both formal and informal 
channe ls of communi cation between the Administration and the Tolai were 
thoroughly clogged by the late 1960s . Since the se grievances were 
ancient , it now seems reasonable to see the eme rgence of the Mataungan 
Association as much more a consequence of these clogged channels and the 
development push , although at the s ame time most observers gave primacy 
to the land issue .  Perhaps thi s re flected official wishful thinking , for 
the Admini stration be lieved that should i t  be ne cessary , it could do 
something about the land problem. 
The drive to establish a Papua New Guine a e conomy was unsettling 
for many , since i ts very purpose was to pri se people out of old ways and 
into new.  But while ' unintended consequences '  can be accepted by the 
his torian in much the same way as acts of God , can the s ame treatment be 
accorded to ' i ll-considered consequences ' ?  In Papua New Guine a there was 
a large number of ' il l-conside red consequences ' , as sociated with the 
pursuit of development . 
In the se respects ' the Kremlin ' - as the recently completed 
administrative headquarters of  the East New Britain Province were 
popularly known - symbolize s  the development of the 1960s . In terms of 
e fficiency , civi lized working conditions and the like , this two-storey , 
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air-conditione d . bui lding was a totally di ffe rent p roposi tion from the 
open-side d ,  tin-roo fed , wartime-tenporary single storey buildi ng which 
had been the Distri ct Offi ce ,  Rabaul . However ,  in the old bui lding , or 
rather from the outsi de of the old bui ldin g ,  lurking Tolai or even ITK)re 
digni fied figures who j ust chanced to be admi ring the view , could catch 
the eye of a fami liar fi gure and so be guided to the person wi th whom 
the bureaucratic rules actually requi red them to do business . The new 
building , with i ts air locks at both ends and narrow hostile corri dors 
of frosted gl as s , e f fe cti vely cocooned publi c se rvants from such uninvi ted 
and irregular contacts with the ir publi c .  Inte restingly , the e rection o f  
this bui lding coincided with the localization of middle to senior posi tions 
in the provincial hie rarchy ; Sali sbury ' s work on the pre ferred language 
in o ffi ces ( S alisbury 1976 : 3 76)  is thus also relevant to the i ssue o f  
opportunitie s  for and channe l s  of informal communi cation . 
Another instance of i ll-conside red consequences fer re lations 
be tween rulers and ruled conce rns the growing occupational di ffe rentiation 
within both the Admini stration and Tolai socie ty .  Such di fferentiation was 
in i tse lf an intended consequence of development , but although it was 
rehearsed with pride on numerous public occasions no one seems to have 
care fully conside red the impl ications . It was a long time s ince the 
More sby stereotype of life in the village s  had had any validity on the 
Gazelle . Part of the problem , whi ch exploded at Raluana in 195 3  on the 
occasion of the fi rs t maj or di spute over local government , was due to the 
fact that a lone kiap , representing in hims e l f  all the agencies o f  
government ,  had not been dea] ing with dis cre te vil lage groups wi thin 
which a singular and customary value system prevailed . Instead there 
were kiaps locked in bureaucratic combat wi th pol i ce and nati ve authority 
( local government)  offi ce rs , with agri cultural and coope rative o f fi ce rs 
al ready in the wings , while many Tolai vil lage s  had thei r  own di rect line 
to Rabaul o f fi cialdom through commuting poli ce NCOs and with other 
vi llages through Tolai clergy and government teachers ( Fenbury 19 7 8 ) . 
By the late 1960 s fragmentation of the pastoral stereotype had reached an 
advance d stage on both sides . On paper thi s was not a problem, for the 
lone kiap conducting his village meetings had bee n replaced by local 
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government counci l s  and parli amentary representative s . In fact , howeve r ,  
by the mi d 1960 s everyone o n  the Gaze lle knew that councils were dead and 
Tolai expe rience with the House of Assembly had not been encouraging. The 
faroous ' land bill ' o f  Matthias Toliman , who was firs t elected in 1964 , 
had got nowhere and when the newly e lected Oscar Tanunur claimed to ' spe ak 
for his people ' he was o ften sub j e cted to systemati c rubbishing . 
What then o f  the famed Gazelle Counc i l , with i ts speaker ' s chair 
from the New South Wales Legi s lative Assembly? In what way was it dead? 
Summari zing points made elsewhere , it can be said that the Gazelle Council ,  
an amalgamation o f  five earlier native local gove rnment counci ls , was unable 
to provide a Tolai forum or arena of Tolai politi cs because it did not 
embrace all Tolai and it could not encompass many of the matters about 
which Tolai fe lt roo st deeply . The bulk of the people of Raluana and 
Navuneram , later known as the Warbete , had re fused to j oin the counci l 
system from the start . Catholics had been forbidden or discouraged from 
parti cipating for a decade and were then required to promote counci l ai d 
to parochial s chools . The young were increasingly alienated by the fact 
that the council conducted its bus ines s  in Pidgin for the convenience o f  
the o ffi cial advi se r ,  who spoke n o  Tolai , and o f  their elde rs who were 
reluctant to speak Engli sh in publi c .  Although :initi ally promoted as a 
form of liklik gavmen , the council system had be come from the late 1950s 
large ly an arm o f  the Administration , taking over many o f  the agency 
functions forme rly performe d  by the ki aps . Despite the growing problems 
of social control , councillors were not finally granted the power to hold 
courts as they had been led to expect . By the 1960s counci l s  could no 
longer appoint such key local functionaries as constab les , cocoa inspec­
tors or teachers . Above all , perhaps , the council system exercised no 
control over Rabaul which repre sented one o f  the few development s uccess 
stories o f  the 1960 s , but a s uccess which was enjoyed almost exclusively 
by European and Chinese ( resident and touri st} and created new problems 
for the surrounding Tolai . 
Given all thi s ,  and the truly Australi an low leve l  turnout in the 
previous counci l e lection , how was it that a further alte ration to the 
council sys tem should have provided the catalytic i s s ue which would play 
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midwi fe to the Mataungan Association? There was certainly an element o f  
' now they are stealing our counci l ' , aroused by the proposal to include 
all races and not j ust Tolai in the new council which would however s ti l l  
have n o  j urisdiction ove r  Rabaul { Gros art 19 70 : 2 85 ff) . But what really 
stimulated the better i n formed was the discovery of the very extensive 
powers which appeared to have been bestowed on the council under the 
196 3  o rdinance now that Europeans and Chinese were to be admitte d .  
Discovery o f  the fact , fo r example , that the multi-racial councils had 
' powe rs ' over the airport was more than enough for the Matupits . In short 
the Australian endeavour to prepare Papua New Guinea for independence 
without consultation with Papua New Guineans finally came to gri e f  on 
the Gaze lle . Through the Mataungan Association o ffici als were forced to 
hear counter proposals , while other Papuans and New Guineans were 
encouraged to formulate them. 
Thus the si tuation on the Gaze lle was not merely one of unsettling 
changes compounding the 40 per ce nt land alienation , the Tolai population 
explosion and the lack of j obs for e arly s chool leavers or ' push-outs ' .  
There was also a problem o f  lack o f  opportunity for Tolai to communi cate 
verbally with the Administration by asking que s tions , rais ing obj e ctions 
or proposing alte rnati ve s . This was resented . Even Matthias Toliman , 
member o f  the Administrator ' s  Executive Counci l , a pi llar o f  church and 
state , was affronted by the manner in which changes to the House o f  
Assembly were o ffi cial ly ' expl ained ' in 19 7 2  through a series o f  pamphlets . 
The o fficial attitude was that the Tolai could read and therefore the 
ci rculation o f  pamphlets was the most e f fi ci ent means o f  ' politi cal 
education ' .  ' I t i s  not our way ' , Toliman snapped .  
I t  needs to be said { although with due caution) that i t  was fortunate 
for o fficials that they could not ' he ar '  any Tolai contribution , for they 
were in no position to offe r  reasoned replies or engage in any kind o f  
inte lligent dis cuss ion . Two policies above a l l  were non negotiable ; they 
were the cherubim upholding the ark of the covenant of development . And 
these two - the Australianization of Papua New Guinea and the equal develop­
ment of all groups of Papua New Guineans - were precisely the two whi ch 
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provoked most Tolai unease and discontent . It should not be imagined 
that the Tolai , who were becoming fragmented along new lines , e conomically , 
socially and even politically , reacted in a single homogenous way to each 
official policy . What is being argued is that sooner or later most Tolai 
living in East New Britain were s ufficiently disenchanted by enough 
official poli cies and reactions for them to withdraw even tacit support 
from the Administration in general . When 1969 opened ,  Tolai had reached 
the stage of being highly sceptical about the Administration , its works 
and intentions . The interest of a wide range of Tolai notables in the 
Melanesian Independence Front ( a  proposed separatist movement embracing 
the New Guinea Islands) was a harbinger of the future ; but as yet the 
majority o f  Tolai living in East New Britain were still ' available ' ,  
lacking e ffective organizational identity , leaders , an alternative 
ideology to the o fficial development strategy , and , above all , lacking a 
catalytic issue . By the later months of that year the multi-racial council 
issue had gone a long way to providing all of  these for Tolai living in 
East New Britain . 
Elaborating on that last phrase : when Tolai- or English-speakers 
refer to East New Britain they usually think of the Gazelle Peninsula , a 
small area north of the Kerevat and Warangoi rivers within a radius of 
approximately fi fty kilometres from Rabaul ; this area , the homeland of 
the Tolai , amounts to only a small fraction of the land area of  the pro­
vince of East New Britain but contains the bulk of the population and the 
developed resources .  This was the milieu of the Mataungan Association 
and the Mataungan Association was a Tolai movement . However ,  as its 
leaders sometimes stressed , and as people in other Provinces occasionally 
recognized, there was an e lement in Mataunganism which was relevant to 
all Papua New Guineans . This is the central paradox of the Mataungan 
Association : an aggressive ly local , even ethnic movement flaunting the 
tubuan figure as its symbol but nevertheless recognized as having meaning 
for other Papua New Guineans who had no knowledge of the tubuan . Here 
lies an i�ortant part of the case for regarding the Mataungan Association 
as a nationalist movement , of a kind which takes seriously the notion of 
unity in diversity .  However what was involved was something more than a 
150 
general principle and i ts local mani festation , for there were two foci 
within the Mataungan Associ ation itsel f  which reflected one of the 
important lines of cleavage which had developed within Tolai society by 
the last third of the twentieth century . Describing a s imi l ar divi sion 
between the achieving society and the de fensive community , Christopher 
Harvie ( 19 7 7 : 17 )  has used the terms red and black in an attempt to avoid 
the irresi stible iropetus o f  p re j udgment associated with s uch terms as 
cosmopoli tan and provincial or parochial . 
That the Tolai were the best educate d ,  the wealthiest , and the most 
soci ally advanced o f  all the peoples o f  Papua New Guinea was , on the 
macro leve l ,  all totally true . Tolai students accounted for one third o f  
a l l  the students i n  the fi rst year o f  the Universi ty o f  Papua New Guinea 
( Salisbury 19 76 ) , and so on . In the present context the important question 
is where these paragons were actually located . The answer i s  that the 
achievers ( in the sense of be ing western e ducated and ' socially advanced ' ) 
were large ly achieving outside of East New B ri tain in the wider arenas 
created by the Australian Admini stration . The rest of the wea l thy cash­
croppers and busine ssmen were also achieving in Aus tral i an-cre ated 
structures and arenas , but the ir horizons were more strictly confined to 
the Gazel le as were those o f  the large numbers of Tolai who were not wel l  
educated , nor wealthy , nor socially advanced.  Thi s cleavage between the 
red and the black Tolai i s  the most important for a European seeking to 
make sense o f  the Mataungan Association saga . But also of politi cal 
signi fi cance are the persisting and apparently pre European rivalry 
be tween the people of Matupit and those of Kinigunan or Vunamami ; the 
consequences of the admini strati ve division o f  the Gazelle into two 
distri cts centred on Rabaul and Kokopo ; and the extent to which the 
mis s ionary division between Methodi sts and Catholics has produced separate 
subcultures among the Tolai . Final ly , however odd it may seem to 
Europeans , there is an important divi s ion between the coast and the bush . 
It was the tenporary bridging or conflation o f  these cle avages whi ch 
underpinned many o f  the succe s ses and fai lure s of the Mataungan le adership . 
Al though Tolai had been since 19 14 in almost continuous dispute with 
the Australian Administration over control of the Tolai homeland , they -
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or rather the red Tolai - had been allies and accomplices in the extension 
of Australian control over the rest of Papua New Guinea ,  both extensively 
as police and teachers in the central highlands and intensive ly as a strong 
e lement in the technocracy which began to emerge in Port Moresby during 
the last years of Australian rule . It would be a gross oversimpli fi cation 
to think of the red Tolai as loyal to the Australian Adminis tration and 
the black as disa ffecte d ,  or even to assume that an individual Tolai must 
eithe r be red or black in some total or permanent sense . Nevertheless it 
needs to be remembered that the bl ack Tolai had had a long time to ponder 
their situation . For them the multi -racial community i ssue was not a 
bolt from the blue and it did not fall on virgin soi l . 
Apart from a temporary check to locali zation immediately after the 
se cond world war , the red Tolai had fewer grievances to ponder . Even the 
decision in 1964 to introduce separate salary scales for local and ex­
patriate publi c se rvants was for the ma j ority partly obliterated by the 
speed of subsequent locali zation and consequent promotion . By the late 
1960 s the leading posi tion in Papua New Guinea of the red Tolai was based 
on the European notions of e f fi ciency as the primary requirement o f  
administration , and o f  bureaucracy a s  the means o f  achieving e f ficient 
admini stration . They were therefore particularly sensi tive and resistant 
to suggestions that the Administration should be made more ' representative ' 
in the sense o f  re flecting regional origins or that the Admini stration 
should in some other way be more po liti cize d .  Cabinet ,  and i ts predecessor 
the Admini strator ' s  Executive Counci l , have always been re flective of the 
regional divi sions of Papua New Guinea , as has parliament . But whi le the 
Australians deserve credi t for thi s , they were re sistant to any such 
' politi cal ' restructuring of the publi c  service until a very late stage . 
Although the mili tary authorities gave some degree of recognition to 
district origins in the mid 1960s i t  was not until the mid 19 70s that 
regional pre ssures became i rresistible , following the 19 76 ' leaking ' of 
the hitherto restricted stati sti cs on the Di stricts or Provinces o f  birth 
of the higher publi c  servants . Thus at the time when the Mataungan 
Association first emerge d ,  the red Tolai had every reason to feel as they 
sat in the classrooms of the Universi ty of Papua New Guinea or the 
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accelerated exe cutive training courses o f  the Admini strative College , 
that they were about to enter into the i r  inheritance . 
In contrast , the resen tments and problems of the black Tolai , like 
those of the groups around Lae and Port Moresby , had been intens i fied 
and exacerbated by the very same developmental thrust which was promoting 
the emergence of Tolai technocrats . In the first place land dispute s , 
mainly concerning land alienated before 19 14 , were sti l l  unre so lved 
( TPNG 196 9 )  despite a sequence of inqui ries and seemingly promi sing 
initi ative s  on the part o f  the Adminis tration . At the same time , avenues 
which had always exi sted but were unknown to the Tolai , appeared to be 
closing firmly and with mali ce as soon as they were di scovered and attempts 
made to exploit them ( notably in the Japlik and Varzin land case s , and 
the amendments to land claims legis lated in 1968 ( Grosart and McColl 19 76 ) ) .  
Thus even be fore the Local Government (Declaration of Validi ty) Ordinance 
of 19 70 , which plugged a ' loophole ' di scovered by the Mataungans ,  Tolai 
had come to suspect that Europeans only insisted on the rule of law when 
the law was on their side ,  and that when it was not they changed it . 
Eithe r way , the Tolai los t .  
Secondly , o n  the 40 per cent o f  the Gazel le which had been alienated 
there were approximately 10 , 000 plantation labourers , mos tly from the 
highlands ( Sali sbury 19 76 : 36 9 ) . Between these ' woks ' as they were con­
temptuously cal le d ,  and surrounding Tolai vi llagers there was a long 
hi story of confl i ct , but partly under the influence of the emerging 
pol iti cal s ituation and partly due to the achievements of the Administra­
tion ' s  developmental policie s , both compounded by the opening of the 
Kokopo Tavern , ' racial incidents ' were increasing in frequency and 
intensity as the 1960s drew to a c lose . 
Thirdly , there was persistent Administration pressure on the Tolai 
to make more land avai lable in the interests of ' development ' .  This might 
have had more succe s s  had a reasonable proportion of the frui ts of past 
development ended up in Tolai hands . As it was , the fact that the much 
publici zed biscuit factory at Ulapia employed ' woks ' ( Chowning et al . 1971) 
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and the explosive emergence of a European-staffed servi ce sector in 
Rabaul during the 1960 s  ( Sali sbury 19 76 ) seemed merely new variations on 
an old s tory . Thus o f fi cial aspirations to extend and ' upgrade ' Rabaul 
airport or even to shi ft it bodi ly to the Kokopo area remained aspirations , 
although the re levant fi les , which dated from the late 19 30s ( A . L .  Epstein 
1969 ) , grew thicker ; and the proposal to develop a largely res idential 
' satellite ' town at Kurakakaul , which could only have been put to paper 
in the Moresby stratosphe re , ultimately died through Tolai opposition 
(Jack son 19 76 ) . 
An important e lement in the s ituation by the late 1960s was that 
there were other airports to be upgraded in Papua New Guinea and other 
sate l lite towns to be built . East New Britain moreover was now a low 
priority area on two counts . S ince it , or at least the Gaze lle , was one 
of the most developed areas in Papua New Guinea ( it contained six high 
s chools , for example )  there was massive offi cial support in Canberra and 
Port Moresby for the notion o f  a freeze on East New Bri tain while other 
areas , notably the high lands , ' caught up ' .  Furthe r ,  it was no longer 
regarded as an e conomic growth area . Both these factors weakened the 
o fficial resolve to persevere with pro j ects once the by-now-predi ctable 
Tolai re sistance (bloody-mindedne ss in o ffi cial parlance ) mani fested 
i tse l f .  Had the Administration really needed a new ai rport , for example , 
it would ultimately have had to enter into negoti ations with the Tolai . 
As it was , a series o f  announcements , most of which were not seriously 
followed up , me re ly exacerbated the si tuation without bringing it to a 
head unti l the multi -raci al council i s sue emerge d .  But the final straw 
which made the inadequacy of the channe ls of communi cation so momentous 
was the class i c  taxation and representation i s sue .  In 1968 there was a 
substantial increase in the council tax to $ 16 from $ 10 ;  at the same time 
it was announced that in future there would be charges for a whole range 
of heal th and other services whi ch had previously been free . Also the 
1968 budget implemented the financial freeze on East New Britain .  No 
wonder that in December 1968 the Melanes ian Independence Front seemed so 
attractive to so many Tolai of otherwi se di ffe ring views ( Grosart and 
Mccol l  19 76) . And no wonder that Catholics began to scrutini ze the 
counci l with close attention . 
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Harvie ( 19 7 7 )  applie s his red and bl ack te rminology to the Scottish 
intelligentsi a .  In the Tolai case , there i s  a split within the inte l li­
gentsia but the red Tolai are also divi de d .  For both practical reasons 
in a parliamentary system, and ideologi cal reasons , the radi cal red Tolai 
need the s upport of ' enough ' bl ack Tolai ; at the present time thi s  means 
not merely from the masses but also from a signi fi cant number of Tolai 
big men . Thus while seeking to rai se the cons ciousnes s  of the masses , 
they must still appeal to them large ly in terms o f  black Tolai value s . 
For these re asons alone it would be premature to read into ' radical ' 
( as in radi cal red To lai ) any socialist or le ft-wing substance . The 
Mataungan Association was and is radi cal be cause it wants decisions to 
be made by Tolai people , but thi s  may or may not mean the Tolai people . 
I f  the black Tolai had had some e i ghty or nine ty years to think 
about their powe rle ssne ss vis-a-vis Europeans ,  the radical red Tolai 
also had their period of inte lle ctual preparation . I t  seems fai rly clear 
that the introduction of separate salary scales in 1964 was the fi rst 
shock serving to loosen the radi cals-to-be from the main body o f  red 
Tolai . This was followed by the debate on the first national five year 
plan , which was conducted in the high noon of the black civi l rights 
novement , of the S tudents for a Denocrati c Society and the spin-offs from 
the anti Vietnam war crusade , of the apogee of the cult of Tanzania after 
Arusha , and in the fi rst flush o f  les ev�nemen ts du mai . At the time o f  
the introduction o f  the two salary scales John Kaputin ,  for e xample , 
was sti l l  a public servant and he was to take a prominent part in the 
debate over the five year plan . Thus the problem o f  the Mataungan 
Association was not to find an i deological framework in which to locate 
the struggle on which they had embarked .  It was rather to reconcile 
two di f fering frameworks , the radi cal red and the black .  It i s  the 
extent to which a symbioti c  relationship was evolved between the two 
which accounts for the importance and continued e xistence o f  the 
Mataungan Associ ation . 
What o f  the non Mataungans ?  In an important sense there were none . 
It had not been by oversight that the president of the Gaze l le Peninsula 
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Local Government Council had become the president o f  the Me lanesian 
Independence Fron t ,  which in i ts short l i fe provoked such offi cial 
disple asure . Thinking Tolai were already uneasy about blithe 
o fficial assurance s that e ve rything really was for the best and that 
Tolai problems , while of course regrettable , should be seen as due to 
bad luck , someone ' s  personal failure , or simply teething problems . 
Mataungan leaders were the refore quickly able to undermine the remaining 
credibi li ty of the widely p ropagated official ideology of preparation 
and development by helping rather than persuading Tolai to believe that 
their problems were a consequence of the working of the system rather 
than its mal functioning . Many Tolai , including some strong Mataungans , 
sti l l  conceded ' good intentions ' to individual Australians and even to 
Australi a ,  but no mo re than that . Closing one ' s  eye s during 19 72 it was 
o ften impos sible to tel l  whether one was li stening to a Mataungan leader 
or one of his political opponents . The Mataungan Association was almost 
totally success ful in finally discrediting amongst Tolai the Australian 
claim to know be s t .  It was l e s s  success ful i n  establishing i t s  own 
ideological he gemony . The popularity of the Mataungan ' s  initial stance 
on the mul ti-racial council i s s ue can be seen from the fact that less 
than 7000 de fied the i r  boycott on the multi-racial council e lection in 
mid 1969 whereas there were j ust under 14 , 000 non Mataungan votes in the 
19 72 House o f  Assembly elections . Both figures include some non Tolai 
votes , but the 19 7 3  Tolai politi cal census recorded some 10 , 000 as ' pro 
counci l '  and some 3000 as ' Warbete ' ( that i s , anti council but not 
Mataungan ) . 
So far little distinction has been made between mas ses and activi sts . 
However , it goes without s aying that m:)Vements like Mataungan Association 
are not solely dependent on three or four leaders . Nor do the leaders o f  
such movements have exclusive access to the masses . Between them, 
mediating as we l l  as organi zing , on all but the major occasions are the 
activi sts . One o f  the surpri singly neglected questions o f  politics i s  
where do political activists come from and why? In the Tolai case until 
quite re ce ntly the poli tical pattern had been one of a multitude of big 
men or dominant male s , each with a relative ly small following . Pre ci se ly 
156 
how ' open ' it had been and how contact with Europeans had affected thi s  
are not o f  immediate consequence since immediate ly after World War I I  
there had s ti l l  been a lul uai and tul tul i n  each vi llage o r  important 
vi llage section , and the achieving moti f was sti l l  dominant in oral 
tradition and song during the 1960s . Offici al development practices in 
the 1960s , by contrast , distrus ted individuals - parti cularly entre­
preneurs . I ts trust lay rather with control of the individual , centrali zed 
de ci sion making , hie rarchy . Inevitably the applic ation o f  these principles 
to the Gazelle produced a large crop of politi cians manque , many o f  whom 
were to become members of the Mataungan exe cuti ve or other Mataungan 
As sociation bodies . 
From the end o f  the se cond world war Tolai society was subj ected to 
inte rnal hie rarchi alization and to the notion o f  office in a variety o f  
ways . I n  the re ligious sphere the locali zation o f  the missions meant 
much more super- and sub-ordination between To lai clergy , but also a 
di sappearance o f  the re lative autonomy enjoyed by the individual white 
mis sionary since hi s Tolai ' replacement ' was a much more constrained 
church [ and not mi s sion ] functionary . On the se cular side , there were 
in 195 3 wel l  in e xcess of a hundred local government counci llors and 
five council presidents but by 1969 there were thi rty-eight council lors 
and one president . That these trends were being pushed by the Administra­
tion in advance of popular culture can be seen from the spontaneous 
emergence of the ward commi ttee system ( s ubsequently aboli shed by o fficial 
action ) . In e ffe ct thi s introduced a new tier of government as vi llage s 
los t  the ri ght to the i r  own counci l lor . By the late 1960s not only were 
counci l  offi ces fewer but the senior positions appeared to be monopolized 
by a small group o f  simi lar age and ori gin ( Salisbury 19 76 ) . Howeve r ,  
the position was even more unstable than this suggests . I t  was not 
mere ly that there was a l arge pool of aspirants to office who could 
convincingly mutter that s uch monopoli zation was contrary to ' Tolai custom' ; 
this cleavage was exacerbated by the reli gious one . S ince the head of the 
Sacred Heart Mission in East New Bri tain had until the e arly 1960s 
regularly denounced councils as Mau-Mau in embryo , thi s  i s  scarcely s ur­
pri sing . 
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Both factors would have mattered less had the counci l system been 
no re succe s s ful . There were three principal reasons for the lack o f  
succe s s , all di re ctly associated with Australi a ' s development thrust . 
First was the bureaucrati c conunitment to compartmentali zation and a naive 
conception o f  the division of powers in the so-cal led Westminster model 
which cloaked the deci sion not to give magi ste rial or even native­
magiste rial powers to counci l lors . Secondly , it was further decided 
counci ls were to become agents o f  the Adminis tration and subsidi zed or 
pres s ured into implementing central government policies be fore the i r  own . 
Technocrati c and other arguments were also employed to deprive them o f  
the ir power t o  appoint constables and cocoa inspectors . Thirdly , to 
survive these di sappointments and to cope with the process o f  amalgamation 
(which was to culminate in the single Gaze l le Peninsula Council and with 
the vastly increased powe rs embodied in the new ( 196 3 )  ordinance pro­
claimed in 1965 ) the support of young and bette r  educated Tolai , at the 
very least , was requi red .  But thi s  was not available to the counci l .  
Apart from the widening prospe cts o f fe red by ' locali zation ' the Administra­
tion , by i ts procras tination over the p roposed local government servi ce ,  
had steadi ly reduced the attractivene ss o f  a once prestigious occupation . 
Of conside rably less signi fi cance , but adding to the problem o f  ' ins ' 
versus ' outs ' , the leading councillors (Nason Tokiala , Vin ToBaining , 
Stanley ToMarita and othe rs ) were all from the Kokopo rather than the 
Rabaul Distri ct and ,  i f  s carce ly from the bush , were ce rtainly rural 
in their ori entation . 
Since it is being implied that Mataungan Associ ation activists 
initially compri sed a grand alliance o f  heterogeneous opponents o f  the 
s tatus quo , the would be ' s  and the di sappointe d ,  it i s  reasonable to ask : 
how was the Mataungan As sociation so immediate ly s uccess ful in organiza­
tional terms? Put like thi s , the que s tion might seem to s uggest that 
Tolai were culturally incapable of organi zing or something of the sort . 
Whe ther they could have responded with the speed and flexibi lity requi red ,  
howeve r ,  must remain an open question , since an organizational cadre was 
already in exi stence : the Catholi c  Teachers Association ( CTA) . It has 
been emphasized earlier that Catholic notab les found it di ffucult to play 
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a prominent role in local government counci l s . The fact that Catholics 
were being required to support their own s chool s  and taxed ' so that ' the 
council could contribute to the well-being of government s chools was an 
important ingredient in the explosive oppos ition to the substantial 
council tax increase o f  1968 which was offi cially attributed to the needs 
of education . Thus the Catholic population , one hal f o f  all Tol ai s , could 
not be regarded as more than tenuous ly committed to the council system. 
Neverthele ss , in one o f fi ci ally sponsored politi cal activity Catholics did 
exce l .  The election o f  Matthias Toliman to the House o f  Assembly i n  196 4  
was the first maj o r  achievement o f  the CTA, o f  which h e  had been the 
foundation secretary . With a seminary at Ulapi a ,  a p re s ti gious hi gh s chool 
at Vuvu , and annual workshops being conducted by the Melbourne-based 
Insti tute for Social Order , the CTA on the Gazel le was not short of 
inte llectual stimulus ; while , as a political machine , it s carcely seems 
coincidental that two out of the three Tolai members in 196 8 and three 
out of the four returned in 19 72 had been Catholic teache rs , or that in 
both cases i t  was the e le ctorate centred on Rabaul itse l f  which e l uded 
them. And to Oscar Tammur , at leas t ,  it was no coincidence that the 
Administration appointed a Prote stant rather than a Catholic Tolai 
churchman to its 1969 Co;:nmi ssion o f  Inqui ry . 
1 
Nevertheless , though 
members of the CTA and thei r  associate s played a vi tal role in the early 
days , not all Mataungans were Catholics and other organi zational devi ces 
e�lwd owr time . 
This new politi cal s aliency of Catholics called for i deological 
exorcism ; mo re generally , in order to bridge the various extant 
cleavages , including those of e conomi c s trati fi cation stre s sed by 
T . S .  Epste in ( 1968),  it was almost inevi table that conside rable emphasi s  
would be placed o n  being a Tolai and o n  the s uperiori ty o f  Tol ai customs . 
Thus the consti tuency of the black Tolai was largely secured (although 
there was conside rable unease and prolonged dis cuss ion ove r the use , and 
hence exposure to public gaze , of the tubuan figure as the principal 
symbol of Tolaine s s ) . The radi cal red Tolai , some of whom actual ly hoped 
that s uch cus toms as the tubuan cult would di sappear in the shortest 
pos sible time , could see the instrumental power o f  this Tolai-nationalism 
1 
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as a means o f  prosecuting the i r  opposi tion to the Administration and 
its deve lopment strategy . The consequences o f  this were that so long as 
there remained an Australian governmental presence on the Gazelle the 
alliance between red radi cal and black Tolai could be maintained with 
minimal fri ction . Further ,  the Mataungan As sociation ' s  positive pro­
posals for the government o f  East New Britain amounted to a counci l system 
which incorporated eve ry re j ected Tolai initiative in some form or another .  
Put a t  i ts s i�lest , Mataungan Association ideology s tre ssed Tolai 
nationalism in the classic terms of ' hurrah for us and boo to them ' , 
' them ' of course be ing the Australian Administration , which when not 
des cribed as evi l was derided as unco�rehending of the needs of Tolai . 
The Tolai opposi tion was handled in essentially two ways : prospective 
conve rts were des cribed as having been brainwashed by the Administration , 
whi le i rreconci lable foe s or potential rivals were at best described as 
creatures of the Admini stration , dependent on it for their livelihood .  
Two further points nee d to be emphasized . First , the Mataungan 
Association was not a wonder-machine ; i ts leaders were able but were not 
miracle workers . Se condly , a certain dis tance continued to exist between 
the rival nodes of Matupit and Vunamami ; more gene rally the Rabaul-Kokopo 
divi sion was rare ly dormant , and it was s carce ly coincidental that only 
one of the four principal Mataungans in the public eye should have been 
a Methodis t .  Having made these points , it is important not to overstress 
them, for the fact remains that the Mataungan Association did induce a 
remarkable degree o f  unity aIOC>ng very large numbers of Tolai and although 
on occasions condi tions close to civi l  war prevail e d ,  their opponents , 
the so-called council supporters , were serious ly i�eded by their accep­
tance , at least in principle , of the ideological hegemony of the 
Mataungan As soci ation . Being forced thus to contest with the Mataungan 
Association in terms of speci fi cs rathe r than principle , the council 
s upporters were continually at a di sadvantage . Also , it should be noted 
that Tolai custom is a much IOC>re slippery concept than might at first 
appear . In practice , any changes in behaviour were bound to be sele ctive ; 
thus , although individuals may have wished to return to the ' old ways ' 
because o f  the stresses o f  moderni zation , there was no guarantee that the 
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movement ' s  support for such a ' return ' would not end up introducing 
something quite new . There was in fact no histori cal precedent for the 
pan-Tolai Warkurai Nigunan , which was put forward as the sort o f  forum 
or arena which the Gaze lle Council had not provided,  and through which in 
the 19 70s Tolai could come to terms with the forces of moderni zation . 
The picture which eme rges with the bene fit of hindsight is one in 
which what is o f  primary importance is the ide a ,  the vision or the concept 
of Tolais making decisions . Second in importance is the fact of collective 
action in the name of Mataungani sm. Other conside rations seem to be a 
long way behind these two . Mataungani sm was thus a much sharper version 
of the Melanesian Way . It was not me re ly that there was a more comfortable 
alternative to the Australian way ; the Australi an way , ' the system ' , was 
morally wrong .  Like the Melanesian Way , Mataunganism was an open-ended 
idea , seemingly available to sel f-interested entrepreneurs . However ,  
Mataunganism seems to have been far less s uccess fully exploited i n  this 
context than the Me lanesian Way . The mos t  plausible explanation i s  that 
a degree of social control existed or was exerted amongst the Tolai which 
was lacking aIOC>ngst Papuans and New Guineans at large . But how , and by 
whom or what? The answer to the first que s tion is probably : by me ans of 
the most appropriate form of pressure . Essential to answering the second 
question is the exi stence of the Mataungan executive , comprising a 
representative from every s i gni ficant Mataungan village . 
The Warkurai Nigunan (which merely means the government of the 
people ) ,  was the Mataungan Association ' s  counter to the Australian­
sponsored local government counci l system. The president and vice presi­
dent were e lected annually by secret ballot , directly by all adult members . 
Each quasi-village grouping elected one magistrate to the pool of 
magistrates ( that i s , where villages had recognized ' sections ' each would 
e lect its own magistrate) ;  the concern was to represent actual groups 
rather than to create new groups by allocating one office to an aggregation 
of existing , discrete units . Thus there was to be no predetermined number 
of area counci ls ; the number of these was to re flect demographic trends 
and the contemporary pattern of communal identity , the area council being 
� l  
a conunon council o r  mass meeting rather than a meeting o f  representatives . 
The common concerns of the Tolai as a whole were to be handled by the 
Warkurai Nigunan provincial asserrbly , which consisted of the president , 
vi ce president , speaker and the chai rman of each of the area counci ls , 
together with two popularly e lected representatives of each area council 
who were e lected afresh for each of the quarterly sessions . Clearly the 
warkurai assembly never functioned as intende d ,  that is as the assembly 
for a Tolai Province . Nonetheless in some place s  area councils did 
( and still  do ) function most e ffectively as enabling and implementing 
bodies , deciding how thei r  parti cular community would respond to actual 
legislation . Their intended second function of debating , thrashing out 
and preparing new legi slation was clearly inhibited by the Warkurai ' s  
failure to embrace all o f  the Tolai and to secure statutory recognition . 
The spirit of the Warkurai has clearly been influential , on East New 
Britain and beyond , in the current statutory approaches to community 
government and vi llage courts . 
The New Guinea Deve lopment Corporation (NGDC) is indelibly associated 
with John Kap1ltin ,  of whom one who knew him well in the early 1960s has 
sai d ,  ' He could never make up his mind between business and politics ' .  
Kaputin ' s  enemies might add that he never has , but by 1969 he himsel f  
would no longer s e e  these a s  alternative s . H e  had reached h i s  position 
on the radical le ft via a sojourn at the Administrati ve College in the 
euphoric days o f  the Bully Bee f Club ,  a venture i nto busine ss in which 
he be lieved himsel f  the victim of racial discrimination , a period in 
Hawaii studying business administration and politi cal science , and a 
term as an interpreter for the House of Assembly , before becoming 
manager o f  the Gazelle League o f  Savings and Loan Societies in the 
middle of 1969 . It was in this last j ob that he conceived the idea of 
aggregating Tolai savings into a single investment fund. Only in this 
way , he believe d ,  would it be possible for the Tolai to compete economi­
cally with foreigners , Europeans and Chinese , and so achieve real freedom , 
whether or not legal independence had been secure d .  Offi cial thinking 
at thi s  time was in terms of establishing ' mini banks ' by amalgamating 
likely groups of savings and loan societi es .  However the entrepreneurial 
streak joined with the nationalist in Kaputin to lead him to the notion 
of aggregation for equity investment rather than merely making bigger 
loans . But , as Kaputin has freely admitted , the establi shment of the 
NGOC was not a one-man operation and it took some thirty months , from 
June 19 70 to November 19 72 , be fore business operations began . Thi s was 
partly due to the fact that other things were happening at the time , 
partly to a lack of o fficial sympathy in many relevant quarters , but 
mostly the result of a deliberate policy decision to make the whole 
operation as familiar and in accordance with custom for Tolai villagers 
as circumstances would permi t ;  time was required both to explore the new 
terrain and to win the support of the villagers . 
The question was there fore al lowed to emerge as a recurring topic 
at the talk fests which characterized Mataungan mass mobilization during 
1969 and 19 70 . The idea of a development corporation became associated 
with the whole package or alternative road . In the second half of 1970 
a systematic educational campaign was launched , working through proven 
leaders (eight of whom had been Gazelle councillors)  but making virtually 
no attempt to approach non Mataungan groups ( Kaputin 197 7 ) . In the new 
year the collection of KS shares began together with a large symbolic , 
but nonetheless important , collection of three coconuts per head . 
Finally , in August 1972 the NGOC was registered as a company after 
raising Kl00 , 000 cash in hand from share subscriptions and another 
K25 , 000 from a voluntary labour tax or ' communal activity ' . In all , some 
10 , 000 persons were recorded as having contributed . 
The NGOC ' s initial problems concerned the law and Tolai custom : 
how to comply with the former while incorporating elements of the latter , 
for both symbolic and instrumental reasons . Later there were to be the 
usual problems associated with maintaining morale while keeping hands out 
of the till . Of all the Mataungan Association enterprises the NGOC has 
had the most consistently bad press , yet it easily bears comparison with 
its rival , the New Guinea Islands Produce Company (NGIPC ) , and this is  
perhaps the most obj ective criterion to employ . Because it was designed 
for a more aggressive role than the NGIPC , as an engine for capital 
� 3  
accumulation and an instrument o f  investment policy ,  the NGDC did not pay 
dividends , giving rise to the gibe that it was merely another cargo cul t .  
After the initial flurry , which rai sed Kl00 , 000 in the two years 19 70-19 72 ,  
not too much was heard o f  money but in 19 77  a balance sheet emerged just 
before the e lections and thi s showed a profit for the three years 19 73-
1976 of Kl2 8 , 509 . Basically the problems have been to find the right sort 
of management structure and managers ( Kaputin 19 7 7 )  . But there is also 
the problem of how to accumulate fast enough and in an acceptable way . 
Thus a move out of plantations into town real estate and a tavern has 
increased profits though possibly not at a rate sufficient to compensate 
for the loss of symbolic upli ft .  In thi s respect the overt corrpeti tion 
between NGDC and NGIPC has not always been advantageous to either enter­
prise . Although it has twice been suggested that John Kaputin ' s  duty lay 
with the corporation , in both 1972 and 19 77  he was ultimately success ful 
in securing the sole Mataungan Association endorsement for the seat of 
Rabaul Open . 
To a considerable degree the Warkurai Nigunan and the NGDC operated 
as separate organizations with an overlapping membership . Together with 
the Mataungan Association i tself they formed a troika or trinity o f  
identities , distinguishable but nonetheless appearing to move in the same 
direction . Of the three , the Warkurai has been the most neglected by 
commentators , perhaps because it was the most exclusive ly Tolai and the 
province of the bl ack Tolai . With three such aspects Mataungani sm was 
able to maximize i ts support and survive for more than a decade . Amongst 
other contributory bene fits , this arrangement limited problems of hierarchy 
alTK)ngst the leaders . As an organi zation , the Mataungan Association was 
the political arm of Mataunganism formed to oppose first the multi-racial 
council and then the Administration and al l i ts works . In East New Britain 
it was thus able to suspend its operations and even formally to dissolve 
itse l f  in 19 76 in the interests of Tolai unity and a new form o f  area 
government for the Gazelle . Outside of East New Britain the situation 
was more di ffi cult for it was here that the links between the radical red 
and black Tolai were at their most tenuous , when not non existent . 
Discounting for ambition ( recognizing that thi s is not necessarily ignoble 
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since only with o ffi ce can politi cians achieve for good or ill ) , this 
cleavage can be observed emerging more clearly over time amongst the 
Mataungan MPs , with Oscar Tammur the most prone to adopt a black perspec­
tive , Damien Kereku most like ly to end up on re flection as a radical red , 
and John Kaputin as the most consistent exponent of radi cal red Tolai 
positions . 
Thus despite the persistence of coalition politics the Mataungan 
Association bargaining strength was not always maintained .  With a maximum 
of three parliamentary votes in approximately one hundred it was always a 
gambler ' s hand, vulnerable to chance . As long as parliament in its 
present form survives , dependable allies are essential for the security 
and promotion of Mataungan Association interests . Such an alliance can 
best be grounded on ideology or region . John Kaputin has osci llated 
between the two . This is less opportunisti c  than it sounds . In the 
present context , the primary problem has been to find and maintain the 
balance point between the perceived interests of the radical red and the 
black , between conviction and the need for s upport . Thi s has not been 
easy and i f  the link has not yet broken completely it is because it has 
been recognized that John Kaputin personally represents the Tolai ' s  best 
claim to high ministerial offi ce and not merely a condui t to cabinet . 
Whether ,  now that he has attained such o ffi ce , he wi ll slough his radical 
red commitments remains to be seen , but in the pre sent parliament at least 
it seems unlikely that the Mataungan Association has any further role to 
play . 
Thus on the national scene the Mataungan Association has experienced 
two phases . In the first it was the yeast , the activist minori ty , the 
cutting edge of a Papua New Guinea nationalist movement which , largely 
owing to the poor state of physical communi cations in Papua New Guinea ,  
never attained an organizational existence . The second phase has been far 
less  successful . Attempts to subsume the Mataungan As sociation under a 
large r ,  equally disciplined and permanent parliamentary body have so far 
fai led and the unity of the three Mataungan Association members has been 
virtually destroyed . Even i f  in i g si John Kaputin held the third most 
important port folio in the government ,  it was, a posi tion which could be 
lost overnight on the wheels of coalition politi cs . 
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On East New Britain , however , there have been three separate 
phases :  first the all-out e ffort against the Australians , which was 
followed by the desultory skirmi shing which surrounded negotiations to 
establish some form of participatory government for the Tolai ; finally , 
with the formal inauguration of provincial gove rnment in East New Britain , 
a relatively new cast was able to revive the Mataungan Association and 
once again it took to the streets of Rabaul . The enemy ih this phase has 
been red Tolai who have returned home seeking to implement the sort of 
development proj ects and strategies for modernization which had initially 
given rise to the Mataungan Association under Aus tralian rule . 
Quite early and be fore John Kaputin ' s  name was indissolubly linked 
with the Mataungan Association , the correspondent of the West Austral ian 
( 2 4  September 1969)  remarked on ' the striking fact ' that the Mataungan 
Association leaders were young , we ll educated , and the sort one would 
expect to assume the leadership in Papua New Guinea . It was a good point , 
given the prevailing assumptions among E uropeans at that time . However,  
Mataungan Association spokesmen would later claim that their leaders had 
in fact been providing leadership for Papua New Guinea in mid 1969 and 
and thi s  was an integral part of the multi-racial council story - that 
this leadership was of a di fferent , New Guinean style . Thi s claim was 
undoubtedly true , but the crucial question is whether this was from choice 
or necessity ,  commitment or opportunism. 
Why , it may be asked,  would an opportunist be a nationalist in the 
circumstances which prevailed? First one did not need to be very firmly 
plugged in to vil lage society ( and most o f  the Mataungan leadership was 
very firmly plugged in ) to realize that Australian policies were 
generating a great deal of resentment and that too close an association 
with them , at least in thei r  present form, might not be the most certain 
route to a secure old age . For those prepared to challenge the Australians 
in such circumstances , whether opportuni sts or idealists , nationalism was 
the weapon which had virtually been preordained for their use . With a 
(micro- ) nationalist movement largely constructed from local materials it 
was possible : ( a) to win the sympathy of Australian voters through 
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peaceful demonstrations and other such media events ; (b ) to signal to 
Port Moresby and Canberra by means of controlled acts o f  violence that in 
terms o f  costs-bene fits it might indeed be wiser to go sooner rather than 
late r ;  and ( c ) in the last resort , to reveal to the Australian voters , by 
a war of liberation , the costs of staying . Of course things did not 
reach this last stage in East New Britain , but these were the dimensions 
of the nationalist weapon available to the Mataungan Association and 
denied to the Australians , with their allies among the red Tolai . 
Theory apart , against the Administration which in one week was to 
fly into Rabaul over 800 police and was free to redeploy helicopters and 
large numbers of government vehi cles - what resources could the Mataungan 
Association exploi t? The Mataungan Association leadership was in the 
business of consciousness raising or mobili zation , and their principal 
weapon was numbers . The early years of the Mataungan Association were 
characterized by mass meetings and rallies , which tended to be liturgical 
celebrations of solidarity , and by innumerable , lengthy vi llage meetings , 
including the Friday executive meetings to which every sympatheti c vi llage 
or hamlet sent de legates .  I t  was also a time when the leaders o ften had 
�o abandon public positions and rei ssue statements because the executive 
had had further thoughts on the matter ; indeed the leaders o ften stressed 
that they were not leaders in the western sense but merely spokesmen of 
their people . 
It has o ften been suggested that the Mataungan Association was 
mere ly an electoral machine . In a sense , of course , it was . It was early 
put about - and it was a view taken up by the Connolly inqui ry (TPNG 196 9 )  -
that Oscar Tammur had devised the whole anti Counci l  operation and destroyed the 
Gazelle Council to assist his e lectoral chances in 19 72 . Two others annng 
the publi cly exalted leaders also stood success fully for elections as 
Mataungan Association candidates in 19 72 . Further ,  the revival of the 
Mataungan Association in 1977 antedated the 19 77 e lections by only a few 
nnnths . But did the machine mere ly work for the bene fit of these three 
men , Damien Kereku ( Regional) , Oscar Tammur ( Kokopo Open) and John Kaputin 
( Rabaul Open ) ? Did they then seek to edge towards the position of a 
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Burkean ' representati ve ' o r  seek to borrow the authority of the government 
as others did? These are complex questions . In their separate ways these 
three are amongst the most human of men ;  but , on the whole , in the period 
under review they did not dissociate themselves from the old Mataungan 
Association discipline , primarily because the Mataungan Association 
executive was composed largely of men who were notables in their own right 
- pastors or catechists and big men .  
Perhaps one o f  the key phrases for understanding the Mataungan 
Association and its basic strategy was arti culated by John Kaputin .  There 
are , he sai d ,  those who get sucked into the system and those who don ' t . 
It was vital for the Association in its struggle with the Administration 
to avoid getting sucked in to avoid (in the terms of Bailey 196 9 : 5 )  
playing according to the normative rules laid down by their opponents , the 
Australians . At the same time it was initially vital to the Mataungan 
Association strategy that they should secure and maintain the hearts and 
minds of Australian media consumers , particularly TV watchers . Hence the 
exaggerated emphasis on their inability to trust officials to act fairly , 
which j usti fied the pre sentation of bizarre counterproposals when the 
Administration appeared to be acting reasonably .  For example , rather than 
accept a secret ballot , Mataungan leade rs proposed,  with straight faces , 
that people should publicly line up behind e ither Stanley ToMarita , 
president of the new and contentious multi-racial counci l , or Oscar Tanunur , 
patron of the Mataungan Association , in some public place such as Elizabeth 
Park in the centre of Ra.haul . 
Until the de facto advent of sel f-government , the Mataungan Associa­
tion were in a strong posi tion . Their greatest strength was an abi lity to 
exploit imaginatively the appetites o f  the media and hence to influence 
Australian voters and decision makers . There seem no good grounds for 
disputing Mataungan Association claims to have played a determining role 
in the timing of self-government ; it acted as the activist group within 
an independence or freedom movement which in Papua New Guinea had no 
organizational existence . (Amongst the less canvassed reasons for this 
last fact,  considerable weight should be given to the state of physical 
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communications since it i s  clear that road networks and ease o f  access 
to institutionalized gatherings such as markets and church festivities 
pl ayed a maj or part in the spread of the CPP and TANU in Africa (Austin 
19 70 ; Gould 19 70 ) and on the Gaze lle the famed road network faci li tated 
the Mataungan Association ' s  achievement of mobilization on a scale unpre­
cedented elsewhere in Papua New Guinea . )  However , in 1969-19 72 the 
Mataungan network was confined to the Gazelle and scarcely penetrated 
into the Bainings , let alone the rest of East New Britain or the s ister 
Province of West New Britain . This  e ffectively set limits to the expansion 
of the Mataungan Association . The cost of servicing non Gazelle branches 
was too great , particularly so for an ' alternative ' type of organization 
and one in which red and black were intertwined in symbiosis  and contra­
di ction . Nevertheless the Mataungan Association did inspi re other local 
groups , while yet others claimed that they had no need of branches in 
East New Bri tain because the Mataungan Association was pursuing the same ends 
(Anis et al . 19 76 ) . Thus when John Kaputin reached parliament he found there 
a few like minds , who have sometimes been described as na tionalists or 
radi cals . At exactly thi s point in time , however ,  the Mataungan Associ ation 
lost i ts primary as set ,  the Australian Administration . 
After 1972 The Mataungan Association was a media non event ; in fact 
there was no clearcut enemy against whom mobilization could be directed 
unti l the advent of provincial government in 19 7 7 .  This does not mean 
that there was a total cessation of activi ty between these two dates . An 
operation of that s cale needs time to unwind, time for lesser leaders and 
followers to realize , for example , that rallies have lost their point . 
But there were also the Warkurai and the NGDC which quite obviously had 
not lost the ir raison d ' etre with self-government , or for that matter 
independence itse l f .  Although the Warkurai and NGDC had e ach retained a 
certain dynamism, so that acrimony was always liable to flare as the 
result of innovative moves , over time each tended to become gene rally 
recognized as an integral part of the Tolai scene , in short to become 
institutionali zed . Both worked ,  after some initial hassles , in an acceptable 
if unexciting way . In addi tion , following the Mataungan Association imbroglios , 
from 1969 the central authorities had shown a much greater sense of urgency 
about Tolai land matters and in particular had facilitated the return o f  
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plantation land to claimant or simply nei ghbouring groups . I t  may be 
purely coincidental that 19 71 was the worst postwar year for cocoa prices , 
but it seems clear that the subsequent rise and then s tartling escalation 
in pri ces , linked as it was with the de fusing, however temporary, of land 
pres sures , contributed to the general euphoria of the independence era . 
So the bl ack . Tolai were not unhappy and the red Tolai were for the 
most part moving rapidly towards the levers of public service and corporate 
powe r .  But the Mataungan Association element amongst the red Tolai , the 
radical red Tolai , were looking to the wider arena but wishing to change 
it as well  as participate in i t ,  and they had to contend with the fact 
that the Tolai amounted to less than 70 , 000 in a total population o f  
nearly three million . For the moment i t  was possible t o  play coalition 
politics with some success . Over the longer run something more was 
required .  Hence the involvement of John Kaputin in a series of abortive 
party making activi tie s . These were of two kinds . One was the attempt 
to organize on the basis of radical-nationalist ideology , from the 
Nationalist Pressure Group to the Melanesian Action Front . The other 
{ and it should be stre ssed that in the special circumstances of Papua 
New Guinea the osci l lation was not as extreme as the terms suggest) , was 
a series of attempts to put together a regional New Guinea I slands blo c .  
To pursue either of these strategies ,  it was necessary t o  remain i n  
parliament which meant securing black Tolai votes i n  competition with 
such mainstream red Tolai as might choose to stand. There were ,  therefore , 
pressures on the Mataungan Association members to play the parliamentary 
game . Of the three members John Kaputin has probably been the most 
resistant to pressures , most aware of the dangers of such a strategy , and 
most aware of the dangers of getting sucked into the system. Oscar Tammur 
has been perhaps the least aware ; his personal project , the Ulagunan 
S chool , unlike the NGDC , has become largely dependent on central government 
assistance and of course requires official recognition . 
Without spe culating further ,  it is worth posing the question , what 
would have happened to the Mataungan Association had the expected occurred 
and Toliman been in government after 19 72 , perhaps even as chief minis ter? 
170 
The caucusing after the 19 72 elections unexpectedly produced a Pangu led 
coalition supported by the three Mataungan Association members . This 
should have been the end of the story according to African precedents , 
and for the media i t  was . (Whi ch raises the question : did the Afri can 
grassroots movements really disappear after independence or merely cease 
to be newsworthy? )  On the other hand it should not be assumed that it is 
always worthwhi le to engage in political activity at maximum intensity . 
There are clearly times and tides and some times are more appropriate than 
others . For the Warkurai and even for the NGOC the years after 1972 were 
a time of enforced waiting . What they required was statutory recognition 
of ' customary ' practices which had not previously been included in either 
the local government ordinance or the commercial code . The new government 
said it was sympathetic ,  but as the months went by it seemed no better 
able to deliver quick decisions than the Australians . However the chie f 
minister became a frequent visi tor , land was made available , cocoa prices 
began fortuitously to climb , and the Warkurai was given a degree of 
statutory recogni tion as a body empowered to raise taxes and to act for the 
general wel fare . This enraged the Gazelle Town Council stalwarts but was 
rather taken for granted by the Mataungan Association . Until the death 
of Taliman late in 19 73 his followers could hope that a turn of the 
coali tion whee l  would find them hosting their own chie f  minister in 
Eli zabeth Park ; but even after 19 7 3  stalemate continued. Gazelle politics , 
in fact , were largely concerned with maintaining the stalemate while the 
real struggle went on in the Consti tutional Planning Committee ( CPC) . 
The final rej ection of the CPC proposals , whi ch would have provided 
inter alia for substantial local autonomy for the Tolai , appeared to leave 
the Mataungan Associ ation finally weaponless . Indeed this was the case , 
and both the government and the Mataungan Association knew i t .  But 
Bougainville did have a weapon and it was Bougainvil le which forced a 
reluctant government finally to embark on provincial government.  As in 
the United Kingdom and in Italy the central politicians and bureaucrats 
proved most resistant to any devolution of power from the centre , whatever 
their protestations to the contrary . Simultaneously the pressures for a 
politici zed publi c servi ce were increased by the leaking of the document 
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which revealed the extent of Tolai ' overrepre sentation ' in the more worth­
whi le public service pos itions ( see Standish pp . 378- 379 be low ) . These two 
developments forced some o f  the younger red Tolai to reconside r  their 
si tuation : i f  there was going to be provincial government and i f  the old 
values were no longe r to be beyond criti cism at the centre , pe rhaps it was 
thei r  duty to ensure that provincial government was ' p roperly ' establi shed 
back home in East New Britain . 
In De cembe r 19 75 East New Britain acquired its fi rst Tolai provin­
cial conunis sione r ,  who made it hi s task to prepare for the establishment 
of an Interim Tolai Government ( ITG) . Both the planning conunittee and 
the ITG ,  which was inaugurated in September 19 76 , were remarkable on two 
counts : first , the small part played by Mataungan Associ ation notables and ,  
secondly , the dominant parts played b y  Stanley ToMari ta , who had been 
president of the multi-raci al council , and Ereman ToBaining , another 
council identity . Also , it was during thi s  period be fore the elections 
that the leading posi tions in the policy secre tariat were fille d .  What 
is one to make o f  these events (which occurre d ,  incidentally , wi th the 
ble ssing o f  Oscar Tammur , then minister for decentralisation , and Damien 
Kereku - both of whom publi cly agreed that ' the parties '  should dissolve 
their respective organizations in the interes ts of Tolai unity in the 
future ) ?  The most probable explanation is that eve ryone expe cted the 
Mataungan Association to win the elections . In that event the red Tolai 
were confident that they were in a position , in fact that it was their 
duty , to control and educate the politici ans in their functions and 
responsibilities . The Mataungan Association second string leadership , for 
thei r  part , seem to have had a touching faith that e le cted executive 
politi cians had ' the powe r ' . The first s urprise was that the Mataungan 
Association did not win a majority of Tolai seats , let alone a maj ority of 
seats in the provincial assembly , which repre sented all the peoples o f  
East New Britain . Despi te the fact that they had only three vo t e s  in an 
assembly o f  eightee n ,  Mataungan Association activi sts re fused to accept 
the assembly ' s  ele ction of two ' counci l '  figures as premie r and deputy 
speaker ;  they c laimed that the total number o f  Mataungan Associ ation votes 
entitled them to the premiership , s ince on this occasion they had broken 
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with previous practice and permitted multiple endorsements . On 15 May 
they ' marched ' on Elizabeth Park , disrupting the o fficial inauguration 
by the governor general . The crisis raged for days , the governor general 
being first persuaded to extend his visit and then allowed to leave 
unattended and unfarewe lled .  Almost a week later a new premier ' emerged ' :  
he was Koniel Alar , then vice president of the Mataungan Association . The 
deputy. speakership was taken by a second Mataungan Association member ,  
Hosea Biu.  
Thus , for the first time the Mataungan Association had at i ts dispo­
sal some of the power of the state , although it lacked a disciplined 
maj ority in the assembly . The public servants had been ' inheri ted ' and 
were still subj ect to the national government in many important respects , 
and the policy secretariat (which had been intended to ease the tensions 
in such situations ) had also been inherited and had already acquired the 
habit of issuing press releases on the government ' s  intentions . It would 
be an exaggeration to see the next two years as characterized by a struggle 
between the red Tolai dominated public service and secretariat on the one 
hand and the premier and his deputy speaker backed by the Mataungan 
Association on the other .  But there were recurring allegations that the 
premier was seeking to convert the statutori ly provided institutions for 
provincial and community government into some closer approximation to the 
Warkurai ; that the public servants were plotting against the premier;  that 
the premier was plotting against the public servants , and so on . On 
certain important issues there was total agreement . For example , on the 
Tolai right to decide who should have the right to live among them j oint 
action led to alte rations to the national government ' s  new citizenship 
procedures .  But with the secretariat announcing p lans to deal with modern 
problems like prosti tution , which was s ti ll an unmentionable topic for 
nost bl ack Tolai , and expressing concern over cocoa productivity , which 
implied a tenderness towards plantations , and with the premier seeking 
to use his power and gui le to implement Mataungan Associ ation obj ective s , 
it was a wonder that the si tuation lasted for so long. 
In May 19 79 it ended with the arrest and conviction o f  the premier .  
There i s  a certain coincidence i n  the dates o f  the arrests o f  the East New 
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Britain premier and o f  the national ministers for j ustice and for economic 
planning which suggests a possible common origin . In each case the crime 
was a cavalier attitude towards inherited laws , which had not been 
individually considered by Papua New Guineans . In all three cases the 
punishments were astonishingly severe . The premier ' s  crime was that he 
had condoned the organi zing of ' Mataungan police ' , though they had operated 
on and off on the Gazelle for a decade with only occasional protest or 
harassment from the authorities . The new factor was that the Mataungan 
Association were talking openly of their police being given some form of 
o fficial recognition and salary and the premier was j ust the man to do it . 
The authorities having suddenly discovered the existence of the Mataungan 
Association police , the premier and deputy speaker were each given twelve 
ItK>nths with hard labour. 
It would be wrong to conclude that a failure to take to the streets 
in thi s  case means that the Mataungan Association is finally defunct . 
There are other signs that this i s  far from the case , for example in the 
struggle for control of the women ' s  ItK>vement . But some e xplanation does 
seem called for and it is possible that part of the answer lies in the ex 
premier ' s personality .  H e  had been a second string leade r .  H e  tried 
sincere ly to implement Mataungan Association policies and was gaoled for 
his attempts . But he had developed a Queensland style .  Perhaps in compe­
tition with his provincial secretary he was always in the headlines - but 
rarely with a well  considere d  statement or one that had been previously 
considered and approved by Mataungan Association notables . And then there 
was the big ,  black government car which he had been unable to resist and 
which was the source of much unfavourable comment . Finally he had clashed 
on several occasions with Mataungan Association functionaries . In short , 
there seem grounds for be lieving that despite his many merits , the diffi ­
cult task o f  moving from opposition to a position of power called for 
quali ties he did not possess , beset as he was with public servants and 
policy advisers who he was convinced wished him no good . More generally , 
some of these points can be rephrased to emphasize the fact that the 
Mataungan Association was not in a state of mobilization . With their own 
premier in office but no obvious enemy to stand solid in the face o f ,  there 
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was ample opportunity for the surfacing of old and new cleavages within 
the ranks . Premier Alar ' s style may have been an attempt to maintain the 
initi ative as much over Mataungan Association factions as in competition 
with his secretariat . Neverthe less  within fourteen months a third ( and 
by this time sole ) Mataungan Association member had attained the premier­
ship . 
The suggestion so far has been that all red Tolai were Papua New 
Guinea nationalists and that bl ack Tolai were Tolai nationalists . 
Mataungani sm as an alliance between the radical red conceptualizers and 
black politi cal resource was therefore both a nationalist and a micro­
nationalist movement . In this it is probably not unique . The independence 
movements of the former European colonies in the decades after World War II  
make more sense when seen in this context as coalitions of micronationalist 
movements put together by nationalists than they do in a context derived 
from nineteenth century liberal-romanti c notions of nationalism.  And 
after searing experiences with the Third World ,  there appears to be a 
growing movement o f  academic opinion in thi s direction . Thus in a brie f 
and seminal book Gerald Reeger ( 19 74 ) has stressed the role of leaders in 
nationalist movements and has argued that nationalism is  their construc t ,  
hence i ts otherwise baffling chame leon qualities .  In this he was pardo­
nably reacting against the earlier mainstream view that nationalism i s  an 
emotive response to the stresses of modernization . The Tolai expe rience 
suggests that he was right in hi s enphasis but that such stresses do 
exist and are an important factor which enables leaders or political 
entrepreneurs seeking leadership to fabricate nationali st movements . 
Hence the importance on the Gazelle of the clogged communi cations and the 
failure o f  the council system . As the Mataungan Association talkfe sts 
were to reveal , there was a massive pent up desire to discuss a whole 
range o f  problems only some of whi ch have been identi fied above . And the 
growing recognition that this needed to be done on a pan Tolai scale had 
been a factor in favour of the original Gazelle Council . By Deutsch ' s  
( 19 5 3 )  reckoning such characteristics put the Tolai on the verge o f  being 
a nation . But as Tilly ( 19 75 )  and others have recently emphasi ze d ,  nations 
and states both have to be made . Such emphasis on political activi ty and 
l �  
o n  the internal politics o f  nationalist movements help to exorcise the 
problem o f  the large non Mataungan vote . 
Once we accept that Mataunganism was about power ,  but power between 
Tolais as well  as between the Tolai and the Australian Administration , we 
are freed from the necessity of having to explain why an ethnic or 
nationalist movement does not have the 100 per cent support o f  its ethnie 
or nation . We can then turn to a variety of familiar concepts and 
theoretical formulations . Thus the fact that the Mataungan Association 
was big enough to win according to the prevai ling majoritarian norms , but 
not so big that there was little point in being on the ' winning ' side , 
suggests that something like Riker ' s  theory of coalitions may have been 
operating ( Riker 196 2 )  . The role of Catholics on the Gazelle gibes nicely 
with the advantage s  which Gerschenkron has suggested may accrue to the 
seemingly least fit or those least well adapted to the exi sting system 
( Gerschenkron 196 2 ) . Not least interesting , and sti l l  in the zero-sum 
m:>de , there is  the recent fascination of poli tical anthropologists 
( notably Bailey 1969 ) with factions and the older notion o f  the ' dual 
organization ' - thei r  side and ours . The Tolai do operate a moiety system 
and have for long managed to live with an almost even split between 
Catholic and Uniting Church adherents . 
Finally it is clear that there is now , as a result of Mataunganism, 
a widespread and heightened sense of being a Tolai , although the problems 
of giving this some institutional expression remain unresolved.  Tolai 
secessioni sm, however , is coniined to the least educated.  For them 
external governme nt is an unnecessary imposition , compli cating and delay­
ing strai ghtforward i ssues and deci s ions ; and in their situation this is  
often a perfectly rational position . However the more aware , the proposers 
and initiators of policies for the Tolai as a whole , are clearly reluctant 
to go it alone . The important point in the present context is the clear 
evidence of thei r  strictly instrumental attitude to Papua New Guinea ,  
although from the Melanesian Independence Front to the present day they 
have been conscious of the advantages of separatism on a New Guinea Island 
basi s .  This further emphasi zes the need to give due recognition to the 
role of elites in the construction o f  (micro- ) nationalisms . As Cavour is 
supposed to have said,  ' We have made I taly , now we must make I talians ' .  
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Chapter 6 
LAND , GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS : 
THE NEMEA LANDOWNERS ' ASSOCIATION * 
R . J .  May 
The Nemea Landowners ' Association was formed in 1970 
among a group of people occupying several vil lages inland from 
Cloudy Bay , about 200 kilometres east of Port Moresby in the Central 
Province . The Association took its name from the language group 
of six of the villages1 which provided the core of its support . 
Accounts by European visitors to the Cloudy Bay area in 
the late nineteenth century refer to the ferocity of the local 
inhabitants . Bevan ( 1890 : 37 )  recorded that 
• • •  the inhabitants of that part of the coast,  
especially on the mainland in Cloudy Bay , have 
always borne a bad name even in the estimation 
of other native s ,  as barbarous skull-hunters , 
murderers and , in some instances , cannibals .  
Early patrol reports , too , record difficulties i n  establi shing 
administrative control . In 1912 people from the villages of Barn 
and Baisabaga (now part o f  Doma) attacked a police patrol killing 
a constable and wounding two others and in 1915 four policemen were 
killed by the Darava (now Darava 2) people while searching for an 
escapee . Shortly after this Darava and Oio people attacked the 
Robinson River plantation wounding the manager and burning buildings ; 
during subsequent police action a village constable was shot and 
three men were later hanged for murder .  Annual reports for Papua 
between 1912 and 1936 contain numerous references to murder raids 
between villages in the area , am:>ngst whom homicide formed an integral 
* 
1 
This paper has drawn on newspaper reports , personal interviews 
and official file s .  I am particularly indebted to David Marsh 
who has been most generous in sharing his extensive knowledge 
and understanding of the Nemea people (without , of course , 
necessarily agreeing with my j udgement ) . 
Apaeva , Barn, Darava 2 ,  Doma , Oio and Segi li . Dutton (197 3 )  refers 
to the language group as  Binahari . It  is part of the Mailuan 
language family . 
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part of traditional social life (Williams 19 35- 36) . One result 
of this was a heavy outflow of adult males to gaol in Port More sby . 
Government agents were established in the area in the late 
nineteenth century , mainly to assist gold miners who were prospecting 
in the ranges behind Cloudy Bay , and a station was opened at Abau 
in 1911 . Land alienation began in 1892  and in the early years o f  
this century there was substantial alienation of  land , much of  which 
1 remained undeveloped .  The first plantations , employing mostly 
labour from outside the region , were established in 190 7 .  The largest 
plantation in Papua New Guinea , Burns Philp ' s Robinson River 
plantation , is in the heart of Nemea territory . 
After the second world war attempts were made to establish 
marketing facilities for copra and shell , trade stores were estab­
lished , an Abau co-operative was formed , and there was a regular 
shipping service between Margarida and Port Moresby . But none of 
these attempts to get business going was successful . 
From 1 941 to 1 950 ( except for a brief interval during the 
war) Abau was the headquarter s of the East Central Division but with 
the establishment of Central District in 1 950 Abau was rel egated to 
(what was then) sub-distr ict status . In late 1964 Abau station was 
closed and sub-district headquarter s shifted to Kupiano , about 65 
kilometres to the west . 2 With this went medical ,  educational , 
police and postal services and the Abau market was closed . 
The Cloudy Bay Local Government Council was established in 
1960 . It was the first council in the Abau District but it suffered 
, from having a small and isolated population (about 3500). with little 
cash income . Advisers ' reports in the 1960s continually referred 
1 
2 
In 1972 there were about 196, 000 hectares of crown land in the 
Abau District , about 96 per cent of which remained undeveloped . 
Following the emergence of the Nemea Association Abau was 
reopened in June 1971 as a base camp and upgraded in November 
1971 to a patrol post , with radio , postal and banking facilities . 
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to non completion of projects and general lack of intere s t .  In 1967  
the Cloudy Bay Council re jected a proposal that it be disbanded but 
in 1969 it was , and the villages were absorbed into the Amazon Bay 
and Marshall Lagoon Local Government Councils . 
The closure of Abau station and the disbanding of the Cloudy 
Bay Council caused a good deal of resentment in the immediate area 
and undoubtedly contributed to the dissatisfaction which lay behind 
the establishment of the Nemea Association . 1 
The Assoaiation 
The Nemea Landowners ' Association appears to have been formed 
at a meeting in Port Moresby in mid 19 70 . This  followed a vis it to 
the area by Pangu Pati official Albert Maori Kiki (now Sir Maori 
Kiki) and in its early days the Association saw itself as being 
closely linked to Pangu - in fact the same collection of people 
initially referred to themse lves both as the Nemea Landowners ' 
Association and as the Nemea branch of the Pangu Pati . It seems 
also that Kiki helped organize the group and accompanied i t ,  as 
the Nemea Association , in a delegation to the Administrator in 
early 1971 . 
The Nemea Association gave as its principal obj ective the 
survey and registration , in the name of the Association , of all 
customary land in an area of about 50 sq km from the coast to the 
Owen Stanley range . It was emphatic that this should be achieved 
before self-government and independence ; in other areas , Nemea 
leaders said , squatting by outsiders had caused problems and they 
did not want this to happen to them after independence . Once 
registered , the land was to be subdivided and allocated to tradit­
ional landowning clans with some areas being retained for develop­
ment by the Association . It was proposed to raise capital by a 
levy of K2 per year on each adult male . The issue of land 
registration soon became tied up with demands for autonomous local 
government and economic development but it remained central to the 
concerns of the Association . 
1 
See , for example , Post-Courier 6 September 1972 ( letter by Ani 
Torehai )  . 
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The inaugural meeting e lected as officers Budo (or Boodor) 
Agabu of Doma village , president ; Moses Anai of Segili , vice 
president ; Philernon Hua of Segili , treasurer ,  and two other committee 
members , David Boida and Bagau Lapu, from Nemea villages . Later the 
number of executive members was increased . Headquarters were 
subsequently established at Segili and there appears to have been 
a ' branch ' in Port Moresby . 
Both Agabu and Anai were men of limited education and some 
local influence . Anai appears to have been selected by Kiki in the 
1960s (when Kiki was president of the Papua New Guinea Workers ' 
Association) to undergo training as a union leader and he be came 
industrial officer to the Port Moresby Workers ' Association . He 
re turned to the Abau area to work for the Nemea Association after 
a lengthy stay in Port Moresby . Both Agabu and Anai display a 
tendency to become quickly emotional and to lapse into biblical 
allusions ; both claim divine guidance . 
A split in the leadership , between Agabu on the one hand and 
Anai and Hua on the other , developed early in 19 7 3 .  The basis of 
their differences seems to have been largely one of approach to 
local economic development , though much of the division may have 
been simply a struggle for control of the Association . Specifically , 
Agabu opposed moves by Anai and Hua to buy and resell copra and 
coffee , to impose increased levies on timber extractio� and to press 
claims against crown land ; more generally he seems to have been 
opposed to any economic development before the Association achieved 
registration . During 19 74 Agabu wrote numerous letters denouncing 
Anai and Hua and claiming that they spent all their time in Port 
Morseby and did not have the support of the membership . In October 
19 74 there were reports that at an Association meeting at Abau , 
Agabu had been voted out of the presidency and replaced by Anai ; 
in four years , it was said , Agabu had not started any projects . 
However ,  in 19 7 7  Agabu s till claimed that he was president . Anai ' s  
support seems to have been centred on Segili and Apaeva villages 
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and Agabu ' s  on the other Nemea speaking villages , but for the most 
part members do not appear to have taken sides and most of the 
Association ' s  activities s ince 19 74 seem to have been initiated 
by Anai and Hua . 
Initially the Nemea Association drew the bulk of its support 
from within the six Nemea speaking villages but its influence soon 
spread to a number of surrounding villages . 1 In 19 72 a field report 
estimated that 75 per cent of the people in the Abau area supported 
the Association and listed seventeen villages as Nemea supporters . 
In the same year Nemea leaders undertook extensive patrols from 
Segili  and subsequently claimed support from as far afield as the 
Milne Bay Province in the eas t ,  the Rigo District in the west and 
the northern slopes of the Owen S tanley range in the Northern Province . 
There was even talk of establishing a branch at Kwikila in the Rigo 
District . Thus although the Association had a distinct ethnic base 
it made no attempt to remain exclusively ethnic ;  indeed i t  actively 
sought outside membership . 2 A good deal of this membership seems to 
have come from older and less educated village people . Support for 
the Association probably reached a peak in 1972 . Early in 197 3  the 
Association claimed a membership of 6000 but this was almost certainly 
a substantial exaggeration ; 3 moreove r ,  by that time supporters in 
several non Nemea speaking villages were demanding back money they had 
paid to the Association . In any case the number of members firmly 
committed to the obj ectives of the Association was probably consider­
ably less than the number which gave their loose support to the 
1 
2 
3 
These included the Morawa (Mailu an language family ) vi llages of  
Badubadu and Si ' ini , and the non-Mailuan villages of Ianu , Bonua 
and Maiagolo . Within Ianu there was also some opposition to the 
Nemea Association . 
The Association ' s  constitution,  drafted in 1973 , actually lists as 
the first two obj ects of the Association : • (a )  to work in a truly 
Christian way to improve the welfare of and promote harmony 
between members regardless of their race , language or c lan 
affiliation ; (b} to encourage members to work for national unity 
within Papua New Guinea ' .  
Post-Courier 22 November 1974 quotes a figure of 500 . 
appears to have been supplied by the government . 
Thi s  figure 
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Association for its refusal to pay council tax . 
While the Nemea Association undoubtedly generated a good 
deal of support it also provoked some specific reaction . About 
the same time Nemea was set up some villagers around Arnau , 1 as to 
the northwest of the Nemea area , on the initiative of a local 
Anglican pastor , formed the Wake Landowners ' Association . This 
group had s imilar aims to the Nemea Association but claimed to be 
pro Administration and anti Nemea (on one occasion Wake supporters 
actually chased members of the Nemea executive from Arnau village) • 
There was also , briefly , an association in the Morawa speaking 
village of Ganai which in 1972 was complaining that when the 
government station was reopened at Abau in 19 71 Nemea Association 
supporters refused to supply labour or materials but were now 
receiving all the government ' s  attention . 
The Association ' s  early link with the Pangu Pati has been 
referred to above . In an early deputation to the Administration 
in 1970 Nemea leaders argued in support of their demands for land 
registration that when the Pangu Pati came to government in 1972 
( as it did)  Nemea Association members , as Pangu supporters , would 
have their land returned to them .
2 Howeve r ,  late in 19 71 , 
following complaints that Pangu was being misrepresented in the 
3 
area, the then president of the Pangu Pati , Michae l Somare , wrote 
to the Nemea executive disassociating the Pati from the Association 
and asking it not to use the Pati ' s  name . Nemea leaders were 
angered by this and continued to use the Pangu label until wel l  
into 19 72 . 
1 
2 
3 
Arnau village comprises several tribal groups from around the 
present site s  of Arnau ,  Mori and Ianu villages and from the 
Keveri valley on the northern slopes of the Owen Stanley 
range . These groups were brought together by the Kwato mission 
at the request of Governor Murray in 19 36 . 
The Nemea Association did not put up candidates in the 1972 
general election and the Rigo-Abau e le ctorate returned a Pangu 
candidate , Dr Reuben Taureka . Taureka , a foundation member of 
Pangu , became a minister in the coalition government . 
For example , see HAD II ( 14) : 1 3 32 , 10 June 19 71 . 
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Nemea leaders frequently compared their activities with those 
of the Mataungan Association and when in 1974 Mataungan leader John 
Kaputin was dismissed from cabinet Nemea Association leaders condemned 
the government and expressed support for Kaputin whom they described 
as the leader of ' Associations ' in Papua New Guinea . 
In 1973 there were meetings between Nemea Association leaders 
and Josephine Abaijah and subsequent representations to the government 
suggest that Nemea members absorbed a good deal of Papua Besena 
philosophy , 1 though there were reservations about Abai j ah ' s  personal 
leadership . 2 In 1974 the Nemea Association joined Abai j ah in 
supporting the Koiari people , from the north of Port Moresby , in 
their representations to the Papua New Guinea Electricity Commission 
for compensation for alienated land . 
The Zand issue 
The Nemea Association ' s  first and primary concern was over land . 
Initially its demand was simply for the demarcation and registration 
of customary land in the name of the Nemea Landowners ' Association , 
though there were already in 1969 a number of applications before the 
Land Titles Commission which challenged the government ' s  title to 
large portions of alienated land in the area . The chief commissioner 
of the Land Titles Commission informed the Association that land could 
not be registered under a group name 3 but that decisions could be 
given in favour of lineages and this seemed to be acceptable to the 
Association . In mid 1971 the provincial commissioner authorized the 
1 
2 
3 
See chapter 11 .  In one representation Agabu opposed a proposed 
land survey on the grounds that the investigating officer might 
bring ' two rules ' to their area : ' The names of the rules are 
Australian colonial rule and New Guinea colonial rule ' .  In another , 
Agabu argued that Papuans ' should control their own land, law ,  
police and life styles ' .  
These reservations seem to have been on the part of Agabu rather 
than Anai and Hua . Agabu seems to have been opposed to Papuan 
separatism . 
The reference , presumably , was to sections 4 and 15 of the Land 
Titles Commission Act . 
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clearing and survey of land with a view to supporting an application 
to the Land Title s Commission . However the Association did not 
proceed with a formal application to the Commission and subsequently 
the area to which the Association laid claim was substantially 
increased . 
From an area of about 50 sq km the Association gradually 
expanded its demands until in mid 1972 it claimed all the land from 
the eastern extremity of Marshall Lagoon to the Bailebo river 
( adj acent to Margarida patrol post) and from an indeterminate northern 
boundary somewhere near Saf ia in the Northern Province to 48 km south 
of the Papuan coastline - an area of about 150 , 000 sq km. And from 
an initially professed non involvement in crown land the Association 
moved to active participation in claims against the government -
notably in supporting the Ianu and Merani people in claims which 
affected land developed by the government in the early 1960s for 
the Mori-Bomguina (Cape Rodney) land settlement scheme . In 1974 
Nemea executive member Mudio Dinu of Ianu was threatening violence 
against foreign blockholders if they cleared more bush or planted 
more rubber trees and a government proposal to expand development at 
Cape Rodney was shelved because of fears of resistance by Nemea 
supporters . Moreover , from as early as September 1971 the Association 
was saying that until its land was registered , Association members 
would not pay council taxes or allow prospecting or timber development 
in the area . 
In the subsequent dealings between the government and the 
Association and others , three main areas of land were involved : 
( i )  a n  area of 40 , 500 hectares ,  described in Deeds of Attestation 684 
( DA 684) ; ( ii )  an area of 9 8 , 415 hectares , DA 662/66 3 ;  ( iii )  an area 
of about 2 8 , 750 hectares comprising a number of portions1 on and 
around the Robinson River plantation . 
1 
Description of the land is confused by duplicated and overlapping 
purchases but the total area is  described by four deeds of 
attestation : 758 (which includes 9 5 7 , which in turn includes 762 
and 763) ; 759 (originally purchased as 245 and including 9 49 )  ; 
670 ( including 950) and 761 ( including 951) . DAs 949 , 950 and 951 
comprise the Robinson River plantation . 
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DA 684 was acquired by the crown in 1906 following proclamation 
of the land as ' waste and vacant ' ,  though it is clear that no real 
attempt was made to establish whether in fact the land was traditionally 
occupied or used and the description of boundaries was imprecise . 
DA 662/663 was purchased , twice in the same year , 1 from traditional 
landowners but again the boundaries were not clearly defined , the 
purchases being transacted from the deck of a government vessel anchored 
at Kapari .  
In 1911 the government secretary expressed the belie f that because 
of the irregularities under which the land had been acquired , the crown 
had ' not the s lightest legal claim ' to the area covered by DA 684 and 
DA 662/663 and in 19 37 /38 (when the Kwato mission purchased land from 
traditional landowners at Arnau) the commissioner for lands stated that 
the government laid no claim to the land , but the deed of attestation 
was never cancelled . 
The third main area consisted largely of undeveloped portions of 
the Burns Philp Robinson River plantation and adj oining crown land which 
had been purchased (more than once ) mostly between 1907 and 1911 . The 
area included several traditional villages as well  as a good deal of land 
unsuitable for agriculture . 
As early as 1971 Provincial officials had recommended that the 
bulk of this land revert to customary title . In response to this , and 
to the representations of the Nemea Association and of the Wake 
Association and other village s ,  in May 1972 the minister for lands (Kiki) 
recommended to the Administrator ' s  Executive Council (AEC) that a 
1 
In the first transaction a single landowner was paid two dozen knives , 
a dozen half axes , 5 belts , 2 lbs beads , a dozen mirrors , 3 pouches 
and 2 yards of ' turkey red ' ; in the second transaction nine land­
owners were paid , collectively , 18 half axes , 27 knives , 9 pouches ,  
18 yards o f  turkey twill , 1 8  mirrors and 36 lbs o f  tobacco . In 1974 
officials involved in the investigation of the land question 
reckoned this at about eight toea per 1000 hectares .  
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commission of inquiry be set up to investigate certain claims and 
alleged inj ustices against the government ' s  ownership and polic ies 
in relation to the lands in the Cloudy Bay-Alotau area . No such 
commission was set up but the Administrator , on the advice of the 
AEC , did direct that efforts be made to have the claims within DA 
684 and DA 662/663 resolved as quickly as possible . Shortly afte r ,  
two field reports o n  the Cloudy Bay situation recommended the reversion 
to customary title of all undeveloped crown land in the area ; this 
recommendation was supported by the provincial commissioner and some 
progress appears to have been made in surveying the land . 
Meanwhile the Nemea Association continued to press for land 
registration before independence and to demand the return of  
alienated land . Following the announcement that the Nemea Association 
had established its own government { see p .  19 1) Agabu issued a number 
of ' certificate s ' { 44 by September 19 72)  to clan landowners and there 
was talk of recording clan histories in a published book . The 
Association also showed increasing concern over the presence of 
' foreigners ' within the area claimed by the Association . 
There appears to have been no real progress on the land question 
until in mid 197 3 the Office of the Chief Minister appointed a senior 
field officer , David Marsh , 1 to investigate and recommend on the 
activities of the Nemea Association . Marsh saw the situation as 
involving more than land but considered that the issue of  land 
alienation was of central importance in any attempt to reconcile 
the Nemea Association and the government . Following a brie f but 
thorough review of the position and discussions with village people 
Marsh proposed as a first step to arrange for the reversion to 
customary ownership of the 40 , 500 hectares of waste and vacant land 
comprising DA 684 less a small area {portion 390) occupied by the 
Kwato mission . Following surveys of the land , meetings were held 
1 
Marsh , a former district commissione r ,  had extensive experience 
in the area , having first come to it before the second world war 
as a prospector . He was assisted by a local officer . 
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at Arnau in July and August 19 7 3  and boundarie s agreed between the 
clans - all non Nemea Association groups - who claimed traditional 
land rights . Marsh ' s  recommendation,  supported by the evidence that 
the crown had no valid title to the land , was accepted and in January 
1974 the area was declared customary land . Seven months later it was 
finally registered in the names of the traditional clan landowners . 
At the same time Provincial staff from all departments were urged to 
assist landowners to plan social and economic development and several 
meetings with local leaders were organize d .  Late in 1974 a timber 
road was put through to Ganai and several cattle projects have since 
been established in the Ganai area . 
This accomplished , Marsh turned to the more difficult problem 
of dealing with DA 662/663 . As with DA 6 84 ,  review of the evidence 
confirmed the invalidity of the government ' s  claim to the land ; 
howeve r ,  the return of DA 662/663  was a more difficult exercise on 
two accounts . For one , the area included a core of strong supporters 
of the Nemea Association and the success of the government ' s  handling 
of DA 684 , obviously intended to provide a demonstration to Association 
supporters , had in fact increased hostility to the government on the 
part of Nemea Association leaders , who all along had claimed that the 
government was tricking the people in order to steal more of their 
land and who now appeared to suffer some loss  of face . In April 1974 
Agabu wrote to the provincial commissioner saying that the Association 
did not want Marsh to register Nemea land and subsequently refused 
to talk with him .  Secondly , the area covered by DA 662/663 included 
several pieces of land developed by the government . These included 
two subdivis ions of the Mori-Bomguina land settlement scheme , some 
other surveyed but undeveloped blocks , an agricultural reserve , an 
airstrip and roads , altogether comprising 6556 hectares .  The area 
also included a timber rights permit area which , however , was 
subsequently surrendered . As before , the land was surveyed and 
discussions held with traditional landowners . Despite early tension 
between Nemea Association leaders and the investigators , which 
included threats of violence , agreement was reached on clan boundaries 
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and on the government ' s  claims on developed land and in April 1974 
the Office of the Chief Minister recommended to the director of the 
Department of Lands , Surveys and Mines that the crown title to 
DA 662/663 be cancelled and the land , with the agreed exceptions , 
revert to customary title ; recommendations were also made concerning 
compensation for land retained ( though the people did not demand this )  • 
Due to indecision within the Lands Department , where there was a 
proposal to delay the reversion and , surprisingly , to undertake 
further development of land , the transfer was not accomplished 
until November 1974 . In December clan boundaries were settled for all 
but one clan ( the Buneabura clan of Ianu village , led by Mudio Dinu) 
and recorded by the Land Titles Commission , and the government commenced 
compensation payments . Compensation , which totalled about K9000 -
between Kl . 20 and Kl . SO per hectare - was intended to reflect the 
original price paid , the value of improvements and infrastructure 
provided by government, and the abundance of land . As before , 
discussions were held with the local people about possible future 
development . 
The third area , that surrounding the Robinson River plantation , 
was in the very heart of Nemea territory . Attempts to negotiate the 
return of undeveloped land on the plantation and surrounding crown land 
commenced around mid 1974 . Around the same time the Department of 
Lands secured the agreement of Burns Philp to surrender unused land 
in about twenty properties and this included 1 405 hectares of the 
Robinson River plantation . In August 1974 the Office of the Chief 
Minister recommended that all land outside DA 949 , 950 and 951 , and 
excluding 957 ( see footnote 1 ,  page 184 ) revert to customary title 
and that unplanted areas of the plantation also be handed back to 
customary landholders . Surveys were attempted in late 1974 and early 
1975 but due to strong local opposition were abandoned .  Consequently 
the reversion of the land to customary title has not been affected . 
LocaZ govePYlll'lent 
Having enunciated its claims with respect to customary land , 
the Nemea Association ' s  next s tep was to seek to establish its 
control over this land . 
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Early in 1971 Nemea officials presented a petition to the 
provincial commissioner . As well  as pressing for registration of 
what they claimed to be Nemea Association land , with subsequent 
application of customary law within this area , the officials demanded 
a separate local government council and self-government in 1972 . 
The proposed customary law included provisions for all plantations to 
revert to the Nemea Association after self-government , for penalties 
( six months gaol or KlOO fine ) against unauthorized entry to Nemea 
Association land and for payments by non Association members 
constructing a house or cutting a canoe on Association land ; it 
also required all participating clans to plant coconut , coffee or 
cocoa on their land . 
Subsequently , however , Nemea leaders took a stand more 
specifically against the local government structure and made it 
clear to the government that they would not accept any form of 
government other than that of the Nemea Association ( though there 
was obviously a good deal of confusion among members as to what this 
involved) . Members were advised not to pay 1970 /71 council taxes . 
Commenting in September 1971 on the Association ' s  demands , the 
provincial commissioner at the time observed that the government 
had two alternatives : to oppose the movement , which would mean 
pressing with prosecutions for non payment of council taxes in an 
area where the performance of councils had been less than satisfactory , 
or to go along with it . He favoured the latter course and recommended 
that for a two year trial period the Nemea Association be recognized 
as the governing body for the Nemea Association villages , which should 
be excluded from the Amazon Bay and Marshall Lagoon Local Government 
Councils ; the Association should have a constitution , should levy 
an annual fee or tax , should be subj ect to audit and should maintain 
regular communication with the government but , he recommended , 
should be allowed to operate outside the Local Government Ordinance . 
The Administrator appears to have been receptive to this 
suggestion but it was , predictably , opposed by the Office of Local 
Government which ,  already concerned by the opposition to councils 
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expressed by several other groups , feared that such action would 
set a precedent which could undermine the entire local government 
system. The suggestion was not taken up and the question remained 
unsettled . 
In 1971 the Marshall Lagoon Local Government Council instigated 
prosecutions for non payment of council taxes by Nemea Association 
supporters .  Almost two hundred summonses were served ; about fifty 
people paid fines and warrants were issued against ninety people . 
Thirty-nire men were subsequently gaoled . However patrols frequently 
met with what was described as ' strong village resistance ' and after 
an initial show of force both councils appear to have abandoned this 
approach , though they indicated that they would withdraw council 
services in Nemea Association areas until taxes had been paid . 1 
Various demands for a separate Nemea government continued 
throughout 1972 and the central government was informed that no 
school ,  aid post ,  road or other form of development would be allowed 
in the area without the Nemea Association ' s  permission ; the 
Association did decide , however ,  to let the government remain on 
Abau I sland as long as it took account of the wishes of the Assocation . 
In July 1972 a meeting of the Nemea Association , attended by Taureka , 
resolved to establ ish a system of Zuluai and tultuZ2 and then to move 
towards the establishment of a monoracial council (as was being 
demanded by the Mataungan Association in the Gazelle Peninsula) to 
which 1971/72 taxes would be paid . It requested the government to 
send council notebooks but made it clear that it did not want 
council advisers , who it believed would ' trick ' them , and it seems 
clear that despite Taureka ' s  advice that a council could not have 
1 This denial of council service s was repeated in 1974 (Post-Courier 
22 November 1974 ) despite a request from the chief minister that 
the councils give this decision their ' most serious consideration ' .  
2 Lu luai and tu ltul  were village officials appointed by government . 
The positions were introduced by the German colonial administration ' 
and retained by the Australian dministration in New Guinea before 
the establishment of the local government council system . The 
Zu luai-tuZtuZ system did not exist in Papua , though government­
appointed village constables filled much the same role . 
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legislative or executive powers unless properly formulated under the 
Local Government Ordinance , Nemea supporters saw their proposed 
council operating outside the ordinance . In a letter to the minister 
for local government , Taureka supported what he interpreted as the 
demand for a monoracial Nemea Local Government Council and the 
minister promised a full investigation . Subsequent talks between the 
central government and the Association , howeve r ,  failed to produce 
a settlement . 1 
Shortly after the July meeting Nemea leaders announced that the 
Association would have its own government with powers , including a 
cabinet and public service , similar to those of the coalition govern­
ment ; the Nemea government would be beneath but complementary to 
the central government and would have complete control in the Nemea 
Association area . Subsequently the Association appointed an executive 
committee with a president and ' ministers ' with responsibilities 
corresponding to those of the ministries in the Somare government ;  
there were even proposals for a Nemea army , navy and police force . 
Later , each of the ministries was allocated a budget of K56 .  Nemea 
leaders informed the Amazon Bay and Marshall Lagoon Local Government 
Councils that the Association did not recognize their authority and 
asked Provincial officials to cancel local government council 
elections in Nemea wards . 
During 1972 Provincial officials conducted a survey of 
villages in the area to ascertain their views about local government . 
The survey reported that ten villages favoured a separate monoracial 
council ,  six wished to remain with existing councils , and two were in 
favour of ' central government ' in the area . 
Towards the end of 1972 Provincial officials again considered 
the arguments for and against recognizing Nemea Association authority 
and recommended accommodating the Association ' s  demands for local 
autonomy . There were also requests for a clear departmental policy 
1 
See Post-Courier 21 August 19 72 . 
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approach to the Nemea situation which could be submitted for 
approval to the AEC . The Office of Local Government , however , 
maintained its opposition to any scheme which operated outside the 
Local Government Ordinance , fearing that thi s  would foster secess­
ionist tendencies and undermine the local government system generally , 
and urged that if the Association did not , within a set time l imit , 
make up its mind ' on the establishment of a separate council under 
the ordinance , the government should make it up for them . A 
submission went to the AEC in January 1973 requesting it to 
formulate policy with respect to the Nemea Association,  with 
particular reference to the future of local government and land 
ownership and utilization , but no directive seems to have emerged . 
In October 1972 , at a Provincial conference , the Nemea 
Association apparently agreed to establish a council and a draft 
proclamation under the Local Government Ordinance of the Nemea Land­
owners ' Association was prepared . But this did not eventuate . 
Meanwhile the Association ' s  leaders drew up a constitution1 and 
announced that an Association ' tax ' would come into effect from 
2 
February 197 3 .  
Further discussions were held between the commissioner 
for local government , Nemea leaders and Marsh in August 1973 . The 
commiss ioner expre ssed his willingness to help set up a small 
council , within the ordinance but not necessarily using the term 
' council ' ,  and to investigate the possibility of financial 
assistance from the central government . The Association was 
1 
2 
The constitution of the Nemea Landowners ' Association Incorporated , 
drawn up after consultation with the Public Solicitor ' s  Office , was 
submitted to the registrar general in early 19 7 3 . Certain provisions 
of the constitution were not acceptable to the registrar general 
who referred it back to the Association for revision . At the end 
of 1976 the constitution had sti ll not been resubmitted . 
Tax rates were initially set at K3 for men ,  Kl for women and SOt 
for old men and inland people ; ' really old people ' were exempted .  
There was also to be a levy o f  K30 on new members and there was 
talk of a ' plantation labour tax ' of 12t per fortnight . The 19 75 
tax rate was Kll for men ;  K2 for women and , again , lower rates 
for e lderly and disabled ,  and inland people . 
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advised , howeve r ,  that it had no authority to levy tax . Nothing 
seems to have come of this but in effect the government gave 
covert acceptance to the Association ' s  claims to autonomy by not 
taking further action against Nemea supporters for non payment of 
council taxes and not taking action against the Association for 
what amounted to illegal collection of taxes . 
In each year from 1973 the Association prepared a budget 
showing the allocation of its ' tax ' revenue between projects . The 
bulk of revenue (which in 19 75 amounted to K2 5 2 5 )  went o n  church 
schools and miss ions , and roads ; other amounts were spent on · 
fishing nets , water supply , copra and coffee purchases and a truck . 
Early in 1974 Anai and Hua approached the central government for 
a loan of K9 . 5 million to establish the ' Nemea government ' .  The 
loan was to cover salaries of teachers , aid post orderlies and 
agricultural extension workers , to pay for roads , a high school 
and a health centre , and to meet the wages of plantation workers 
(presumably after the Association had taken over local plantations) . 
dl th . . 1 1 Nee ess  to say is request was not taken serious y ;  nor was 
a request in 1976 for a grant of Kl . 5  million for Nemea government . 
When in September 1976 the Central Provincial Government 
was established Hua complained that the Nemea Association was not 
2 repre sented and that the Abau District would form its own government . 
While the question of the form of local government was being 
debated , the Nemea leaders took more direct steps to establish 
control over the area they claimed as Association territory . This 
brought the Association into some conflict with other groups in 
the area . 
One such conflict was that between Nemea supporters , 
particularly the coastal Badubadu people , and the non Association 
l 
2 
The central government ' s  total expenditure for 1974/75  was 
K400 million . 
Post-Courier 22 September 19 76 . The twenty-two man Interim Provincial 
Government in fact included three representatives from the Amazon 
Bay and Marshall Lagoon Local Government Councils and one member 
representing associations . 
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people of Kapari-Viriolo . Unlike the Nemea villagers , the people 
of Kapari-Viriolo were traditionally fishermen but their rights 
to fish in Cloudy Bay were disputed by the Nemea supporters . This  
conflict sharpened following the installation of  a free zer at 
Abau ( see page 196 ) ; the Nemea Association claimed authority over 
the free zer and attempted , with little success , to exclude non 
Association m2Inbers from using it . 
Another source of.  friction was the encroachment of plantation 
workers on Nemea land . There were frequent complaints against 
plantation labourers stealing betel and coconuts from Nemea land , 
making gardens and cutting timber outside the plantations , poaching 
crocodiles ,  using shotguns illegally , and molesting women . At one 
stage in 1973 Agabu wrote to the minister for labour calling on him 
to stop plantation labourers from cutting timber on Nemea land and 
later that year , when Association members apprehended three boys 
allegedly sent by the manager of Robinson River plantation to steal 
betelnut , the Association fined the manager K2 and when he refused 
to pay wrote to the provincial commissioner and the manager of 
Burns Philp asking that he be gaoled and then repatriated out of 
the area . Another plantation manager was threatened with a K30 fine 
for cutting timber outside his plantation and a local trade store 
manager was threatened with a fine or gaol at Segili for offending 
Association members . In May 19 75 a Nemea spokesman told the 
government that the Association did not want any more New Guineans 
settling in the area and said that if New Guineans did not return 
to their homes there might be ' serious trouble ' • 1 There were 
also confrontations with timber and mining companies operating 
in the area and occasional threats that outsiders would be shot . 
Business 
Behind the dissatis faction from which the Nemea Association 
drew its support was a sense of grievance that the people in the 
1 Post-Cou:r>ier 2 May 1975 . 
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area had been left behind in the process of development . At the 
basis  of the demand for land registration was a desire for economic 
improvement . 
This was reflected in the provision of the Nemea customary 
law that participating clans plant cash crops , and in early 
representations to the government Nemea leaders asked for assistance 
in establishing ' business ' ,  specifically mentioning cattle and fishing 
industries .  In 1972 the Association approached the government , 
unsuccessfully , for K40 , 000 ' supply ' to assist the Association to 
buy coffee and copra , pay for sea transport and establish a sawmill , 
and in mid 19 72 approached the Papua New Guinea Development Bank , 
again unsuccessfully , for finance to purchase a plantation and a 
cattle project . About this time , also , the Association entered 
negotiations with the Seventh Day Adventist mission over the 
purchase of a coastal trading vessel to carry passengers and cargo 
between Cloudy Bay and Port Moresby . Subsequently it held talks 
with Macair Charters Co . Pty .  Ltd . with a view to becoming the 
local Macair agent and having fresh vegetable s  flown to market in 
Port Moresby . Then in December 19 72 , after an initial approach to 
the Department of Finance , the Association presented the Development 
Bank with a request for a loan of K400 , 000 . The loan was to be used 
to provide working capital for the purchase of copra and coffee ; to 
purchase a boat ; to e stablish a sawmill and a goldmine ; to buy 
trucks ; and to pay for road building , aid post orderlies and 
agricultural fieldworkers . The same month another request was made 
for finance for a freezer and a cattle proj ect . The Bank told 
Association leaders that it would be willing to lend for selected 
proje cts if the Association could show evidence of its ability to 
manage them ; in the event no loan was granted . 
In June 1972 a meeting of what was then the Central District 
Co-ordinating Committee gave special consideration to the 
possibilities for development in the Abau area . The ( then) 
Department of Agriculture , Stock and Fisheries ( DASF) representative 
reported that his department had shown Anai and Agabu around some 
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cattle projects and had arranged for some Nemea supporters to 
attend courses but that there seemed to be little enthusiasm for 
cattle and though there was plenty of land suitable for cattle it 
remained unfenced . The Department of Forests reported that there 
was not enough timber close to the river to j ustify a locally 
operated sawmill . The Department of Lands , Surveys and Mines 
representative said that his department was willing to send an 
officer to the area (which subsequently it did) but noted that the 
Association was opposed to prospecting . A suggestion that the 
Association be registered as a co-operative was opposed by the then 
Department of Business Development whose representative reported 
that the registrar of co-operatives cons idered that the Association 
would not meet the legal requirements for registration . Early 
in 197 3 ,  however , DASF established a freezer at Abau to promote 
the marketing of fish . The Nemea Association claimed the credit 
for this and sought to establish its authority over the use of 
the freeze r ,  a move which brought it into conflict with the 
Kapari-Viriolo people ( see above ) . But although Nemea member-
ship included a couple of coastal villages the Nemea supporters 
were not traditionally fishermen and after an initial burst of 
enthusiasm made little use o f  the facility . 
The Nemea Association ' s  approach to development also brought 
it into conflict with mining and timber companie s  operating in the 
area . As early as August 19 70 the Association approached the 
District Office , through the Land Titles Commission , asking that 
' gold mine s people ' be prevented from entering land belonging to 
the Association and later that year Agabu wrote to the A .O . G .  
Exploration company saying that he did not recognize its prospecting 
authority in the area and had removed marking pegs used by the 
company in sampling beach sands at Table Bay . This opposition 
was repeated at a meeting between Nemea leaders , government 
officials and representatives of the company in 19 71 and in several 
later representations to the government . Early in 19 7 2 ,  however ,  
Anai vis ited the Bougainville copper mine , a t  the government ' s  
� 7  
expense , and o n  his return he seemed more favourably disposed to 
mining though he believed that if  mining was possible the mine 
should be owned by the Nemea Association (he proposed borrowing 
from the World Bank for this purpose)  and operated by an outside 
company under the Association ' s  control . Subsequently there seems 
to have been some inconsistency in the Association ' s  attitude to 
foreign mining companies but there remained a general suspicion of 
prospecting before land had been registered in the name of the 
Association and this undoubtedly prej udiced exploration . 
The Association ' s  position in relation to timber development 
was somewhat more ambiguous . In the 1960s the Department of Forests 
had granted several per.mits and licences for timber exploitation 
in the Abau area,  the majority of them to Pacific Island Timbers Ltd . 
Nemea leaders had themselves tried unsuccessfully to initiate small 
scale timber development in the area and they were generally opposed 
to the presence of foreign owned timber companie s , at least until 
Nemea land had been registered . There were several tense confront­
ations between Pacific Island Timbers and Nemea supporters who 
accused the company of ' tricking ' them . On the other hand such 
companies offered immediate cash1 and they constructed roads . Both 
the Provincial Office and the Department of Forests saw the 
expansion of the timber industry , with some form of local involvement , 
as a possible means of alleviating dissatisfaction over the lack of 
economic development in the area . Early in 197 3  the Association was 
reported to have entered negotiations - apparently on its own 
initiative but with the concurrence of the minister for forests -
with an overseas company for the sale of substantial quantities of 
timber from around the Robinson River plantation but the company 
eventually withdrew . Timber thus provided a small source of income 
but there has been no large scale development . 
1 At one stage Pacific I sland Timbers had an informal arrangement 
with villagers to pay for logs at a rate of lOt per 100 super 
feet .  In 1974 Nemea leaders were talking of raising the 
payment from lOt to K3 . 
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With the prospect o f  a land settlement in sight and with 
an apparent stalemate on the issue of an autonomous government , 
towards the end of 1973 the Association seems to have become 
increasingly concerned with questions of economic development . Sometime 
in late 1973 or early 1974 the Association produced a ' development 
plan ' for the Abau area ( the first of several ' plans ' )  which listed as , 
obj ectives : ' ( i )  copra marketing board , ( i i )  timber industry , ( iii)  
national park , ( iv)  copper mining , (v)  fishing industries , '  (vi ) rubber· 
J 
factory ' .  I t  appears that a further approach was made to the 
Development Bank at this time , but again without succe s s .  Nemea 
leaders accused the central government of blocking the loan they 
expected to get . About the same time there was talk of establishing 
an Abau development bank , with funds to come from the Cloudy Bay 
Savings Club , 1 virtually defunct co-operatives in the area and the 
bank accounts of the Nemea Association and the Nemea Branch of the 
Pangu Pati . It seems to have been intended that the bank ' s  funds be 
used to finance the marketing of copra and coffee . The Association 
also intensified its demand for roads , particularly a road from Doma 
village to the Robinson River wharf . Subsequently Anai and Hua began 
buying copra and coffee from Nemea supporters for resale in Port 
Moresby , using funds from ' tax ' revenue and the savings club; towards 
the end of 1974 Hua claimed to have bought nine tons of produce , of 
which four tons had already been shipped to Port Moresby . 
Late in 1974 Provincial officials discussed with Nemea 
supporters the possible development of a road from DOina to Robinson 
2 River and recommended the purchase of a tractor . If the people 
bought a tractor or two , it was suggested , government funds 
1 Savings clubs are normally regarded as a preliminary step towards 
the establishment of savings and loan societies - credit union type 
organizations which have been promoted through the central bank . 
�he Cloudy Bay Savings Club was established in 1968 but did not 
receive the support necessary to j ustify its registration as a 
savings and loan society and soon became moribund . In 1973-74 
there was a good deal of talk about having the club registered but 
at the end of 1976 it was still a savings club . 
2 see Post-Courier 22 November 1974 . 
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and technical assistance would be provided to help construct the 
road . In 1975 Rural Improvement Programme funds were provided for 
this purpose and the following year a tractor and trailer were 
purchased with the assistance of a grant from the Village Economic 
1 Development Fund and a loan from the Development Bank . 
Relations with goverrunent 
As with many micronationalist movements , the Nemea Assoc­
iation ' s  attitude towards the government has been complex . At 
the outset the Association sought to achieve its objectives largely 
through the existing bureaucratic structure as it understood it . 
Its leaders made frequent representations , personally and by lette r ,  
to District and Provincial officials , directly to relevant depart­
ments in Port Moresby , and in 1971 to the Administrator himself . 
After the Pangu-led coalition came to power early in 1972  the 
Association (whose leaders , it will be remembered , also described 
themselves as the Nemea Branch of the Pangu Pati ) supplemented 
this by frequent direct approaches to politicians , particularly 
2 the local member ,  Taureka . 
Even at this early stage , however ,  there were elements of 
hostility to the government . In August 19 70 Nemea leaders 
complained that government officers had cut grass from land near 
Segili to use in the construciton of a school and they demanded 
compensation of Kl000 ; 3 ' Many , many years ' ,  they said , ' the 
government has done the wrong thing to us . They have stolen our 
1 
2 
3 
This fund was established by the central government in 1974 to 
provide financial assistance to village groups . 
Association members clearly expected a return from their member­
ship . An early field report , in fact , speaks of ' an undercurrent 
of a Cargo Cult • • .  in as much as the people have come to believe 
that if and when Pangu Party come to power • • •  then all the benefits 
they hope to achieve will flow from this source ' .  
An investigation revealed that the landowner had donated the grass 
to the school and no compensation was paid . 
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timber and our land ' . General opposition to local government was 
in evidence as early as 19 71 and early in 19 72 there were reports 
of lack of co-operation with expatriate field officers . A field 
report in 19 72 expressed concern at a ' racist trend ' in Nemea ' s  
activities ,  re flected in hostility to expatriate field officers and 
complaints that there were too many whites in the area . 
Due largely to mounting frustration over what it considered 
to be a conscious ignoring of its demands and due partly to clashes 
over the non payment of council taxes , from the early months of 19 72 
the Association progressively adopted a more aggressive stance . In 
April Anai stopped contractors from collecting mangrove timber for 
a proposed school building and in May he informed the government 
that though the Association would accept the offer of a freezer it 
would accept no other government services . In the same month the 
Association sent a petition to the U .N .  cal ling for land registration , 
autonomous government and social and economic development . Three 
months later Agabu threatened violence against a land titles 
commissioner who had handed down a decision against a Nemea supported 
claimant and about this time Nemea supporters spoke with apparent 
approval of the recent murder of East New Britain provincial commiss­
ioner Jack Emmanuel by Mataungan Association supporters . On several 
occasions riot police were sent to the area to ensure that trouble 
did not occur in connection with land matters and timber milling 
operations . 
Relations deteriorated during 197 3 .  I n  January the Association 
protested to the Australian minister for external territories that 
the government in general and Taureka in particular had continually 
ignored its representations and it also took its protests to the 
Post-CoUPier1 and the National Broadcasting Commission . Particular 
resentment was felt against Taureka , who was accused of ' breaking the 
law '  by failing to help the people as he had been e lected to do , and 
1 See Post-CoUI'ier 12 and 22 January 197 3  and Taureka ' s  counter 
attack , 16 January 19 73 . 
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it was said that the Association would get rid of him; more 
generally there was a feel ing that the Association had been betrayed 
by Pangu leaders . Shortly after this the Association boycotted a 
visit by representatives of the Commission of Inquiry into Land 
Matters 1 and refused to take part in the activities of a discus­
sion group set up in Abau (as in other parts of the country) to 
discuss material be ing circulated by the Constitutional Planning 
Committee . During the negotiations which preceded the reversion 
of land to customary title Nemea supporters were generally 
unco-operative , and sometimes hostile to the point that investigating 
officers reported threats to their lives . In 1974 Anai and Hua 
threatened to ' go on to the plantations ' in February 19 75 if the 
Association had not received recognition from the government . 
On its part , the attitude of the central government towards 
the Nemea Association was fairly consistently sympathetic . Early 
field reports saw the Association as having emerged from a justi­
fiable sense of frustration and urged a conciliatory approach to the 
question of land , local government and economic development . The 
Association was seen as ' not a hostile group ' ,  but with the potential 
to become one ; its leaders were acknowledged to be ' difficult ' but 
it was believed that they meant we ll . As late as mid 1972 the 
Central District Co-ordinating Committee agreed that the only 
possible action was to mee t  people ' s  needs where this was feasible 
and to explain the difficulties where it was not . A field report 
about this time spoke of ' a  massive misconception of Government in 
any form ' but political education efforts in the area were 
described by officials as ' low key and not well received ' .  
In November 1971 , at a meeting at Kupiano attended by 
government officers , members of the House of Assembly ( including 
1 
Post-Courier 15 March 19 7 3 .  
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Somare , and representatives of the Nemea Association , the 
Amazon Bay and Marshall Lagoon Local Government Councils and 
A .O . G .  Exploration , an attempt was made to rationalize the 
Association ' s  demands and resolve them amicably . However this 
achieved little other than to emphasize the incoherence of 
these demands except at a very abstract leve l . 
Subsequently government officers tended to take the 
initiative in formulating proposals intended to accord with the 
wishes of  the Association . On the question of land , there was 
from the start a general sympathy with the Association ' s  demands 
and although the existing legislation precluded the particular 
solution sought by the Association , the decision to return the 
land to customary title marked a maj or breakthrough in government 
policy with respect to alienated land . 1 On the question of local 
government , early support for recognition of the Association as 
the governing authority for the Nemea villages , outside the Local 
Government Ordinance , was in marked contrast to the government ' s  
earlie r responses to similar movements and though this view did 
not prevail , the government ' s  approach to the issue ( notwith­
standing the early intransigence of the Office of Local Government 
and the moderately hard line taken on the question of council 
taxe s )  was generally conciliatory ; the failure to reach a 
settlement was due more than anything else to confusion on the 
part of the Association members as to what they actually wanted . 
In the area of economic development more assistance might have 
been provided by government departments though some earnest 
e fforts by individual field officers in the early 19 70s were 
frustrated by a lack of commitment on the part of Nemea supporters . 
1 A government circular to all provincial commissioners , dated 
June 19 74 , spoke of the ' considerable success ' achieved in recent 
dealings with land demarcation and disputes over boundaries of 
clan land in the Central Province ( the reference was clearly to 
the Cloudy Bay-Abau negotiations ) and detailed the approach taken , 
recommending the techniques to commissioners . The approach 
outlined emphasized discussion aimed at obtaining general 
agreement on boundaries de fined by natural feature s .  
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At the political level , the Association executive continued 
to enjoy easy access to ministers until well  into 1972 and ministers , 
particularly Taureka , made some effort to accommodate their demands . 
Between then and the beginning of 197 3 , however , relations appear 
to have deteriorated . Replying to criticisms by the Association in 
1 January 19 7 3  Taureka was reported as saying that meetings with the 
Association had ' proved fruitless  because of a complete lack of 
understanding by the Association executive of both government and 
local government ' and that ' as the situation stood , there was no 
way in which central Government could help the people in an orderly 
fashion ' . Shortly afte r ,  the acting chief minister ( John Guise)  
said that the government would not tolerate the sovereignty claims 
of the Nemea Association ; 
the better • . 2 
' The sooner they come to their senses 
About this time also a change in provincial commis ioner 
brought a less conciliatory attitude to the Provincial Office and 
growing fears of intimidation of non Nemea members in the area and 
of violence against government officers led to suggestions that the 
police detachment in the area be strengthened . 
Notwithstanding this ,  the government maintained a general 
policy of non confrontation and the decision to appoint a special 
investigating officer to look at the Nemea situation was essentially 
conciliatory . Moreover , the appointment of Marsh assured that 
the Association ' s  demands , though lacking in clarity , would be 
dealt with sympathetically . 
The government ' s  recognition of the Nemea Association , as 
some warned it would , perhaps added weight to the Association ' s  
leadership and helped promote i t ,  sometimes to the dismay of 
1 
2 
Post-Courier 16 January 197 3 .  
Post-Cou.YJieP 1 6  April 197 3 .  
204 
pro government neighbours .  However the success o f  this strategy 
seems to have been re flected in the avoidance of violent confront­
ation and the successful handover of aliented land . 
Conclusion 
The e stablishment of the Nemea Landowners ' Association was 
the result of a feel ing of frustration among a group of people who 
felt themse lves to have been robbed of their land , neglected by 
the government , exploited by foreign companies ,  generally passed by 
in the process of economic development and on the verge of being 
invaded by squatters . 
In a quite fundamental sense the basic ambition of the Nemea 
Association was to withdraw from the larger political system , to 
secure its own boundarie s ,  and to establish its authority within 
that area , and to do all this before independence . 
In its formation and subsequent activities the Nemea 
Association was clearly influenced by the experience of other 
regionally based dissident groups , particularly the Mataungan 
Association and to a lesser extent Papua Besena , and it actively 
sought to extend its membership beyond the initial narrow scope of 
the Nemea village s ;  nevertheless it remained essentially a parochial 
movement drawing strength from its local , largely ethnic base . By 
1978 it seems to have faded out of existence . 
Paradoxically , its attempts to withdraw in fact brought the 
movement into closer contact with the central government . Its 
position in relation to the government , to which ,  despite its 
ideological isolationism, it looked for financial and other 
developmental assistance was initially ambivalent . But inevitably 
as its demands were not fulfilled the movement became increasingly 
hostile towards the government and increasingly inward looking . 
The demands which the Association made , and the expectations it 
apparently held , were often incoherent and irrational , and at 
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times the Association displayed a detachment from reality which 
bordered on cargo cultism . 1 However there is little evidence 
that failure to achieve these demands was seen by Nemea followers 
as a failure on the part of the Association : the achievement 
of stated obj ectives seems to have been less important to the 
bulk of its members than the sense of identity which the 
Association created . 
1 
Apart from demands listed above , such as the request for a 
grant of K9 . 5  million , and the claim made to local ' central ' 
government , there was a rumour in the area at one stage that 
the Association had received several thousand dollars from 
U . S . President Nixon . 
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Chapter 7 
CITY AND VILLAGE : THE AHI RESPONSE* 
R. Adams 
The urban presence 
The five peri -urban villages of Butibam , Ahi-Hengali , Kamkumun , Yanga 
and Wagan adjoin the city of Lae a little beyond the Bumbu rive r ,  a 
boundary purporting to divide village from town . Butibam (with a popula­
tion in 19 70 of 824) 1 and Kamkumun ( 282)  both lie close to the eastern 
banks of the Bumbu , some two to three kilometres from the centre of the 
city , while Wagen ( 2 72 ) and Yanga ( 2 14 )  are located several kilometres 
further to the e ast . These Lae , or Ahi ,  villages , are closely bound by 
tie s  of kinship and common culture . They are of recent origin , being 
peopled first by the numeri cal ly preponderant Kawa from Bakaua , some fifty 
ki lometres along the coast east from Lae , and towards the end of the 19th 
century by migrants from the middle and lower Markham valley who sought 
re fuge with the Kawa settlers from the depredations of the warlike 
Laewombas . These recent migrants called themselve s  the Ahi ( Lahe as 
rendered in Jabim and Kawa) , and although they were a minority the term 
Lahe or Lae was used by Europeans to de scribe the collection of hamlets 
in the area of the pre sent vi llage settlements . 2 
Establishment of a European presence brought to the villagers , 
in the past as in the present , mixed blessings . The presence of a 
* 
1 
An earlier draft of this paper was prepared during a sojourn at the 
IDS Sussex Uni versity and the author expre sses appreciation to the 
IDS for the use of facilities .  Acknowledgement is due also to 
John Ballard for bene ficial comment and encouragement . 
Population figures are from a village census conducted by the ( then) 
Lae sub-distri ct offi ce in August 1970 . 
2 The history of the Ahi vi llages is recorded in detail in Wi llis (19 74 ) . 
See also articles by various authors in the Morobe Historical Society 
Journals . 
208 
Lutheran mission station in 19 12 brought protection from the warring 
Laewombas and favoured access to education , employment and positions 
in the mission structure . However a cost of European contact was 
the resultant loss of land : some was made freely available to the 
mission for its Ampo station and Malahang plantation and some -
1 1 , 400 acres between the lower Markham and Bumbu river , much of  
which is now occupied by the city of  Lae - was appropriated by the 
German Neu Guinea Kompagnie . The emergence of Lae in the period 
after the second world war as a fast growing industrial and 
. 1 commercial centre and Papua New Guinea ' s  second largest city , 
brought an increasingly obtrusive presence , a presence that 
revealed to the villagers the costs as well  as the benefits of the 
external influence . 
Despite the remarkable change s which have taken place in 
recent years Lae still possesses to a noteworthy degree the 
characteristics of most colonial towns : a clear division between 
expatriate and indigene and marked inequalities of wealth and 
status . Village interests , along with those of the migrant labour 
drawn to the town , have ( in the past) been clearly subordinated 
to the intere sts of the colonizers and their administrative and 
soc io-economic systems . In earlier years the foreign presence was 
less pervasive and villagers were able to minimi ze its impact 
through co-operation with the foreign authorities and manipulation 
of the imposed systems to their own advantage . The rapidly 
expanding postwar urban presence and influence , however , brought 
severe pressures upon the traditionally oriented village systems , 
presenting a clear physical threat to the survival of village 
identity and autonomy . In response to these pressures the Ahi 
Association emerged as one of the most sophisticated and assertive 
political groups in Papua New Guinea . 
Physical intrusion by the urban system has been most evident 
1 Lae gained c ity status in December 1972 . 
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in the growth of migrant settlements upon village land. Butibam 
and Kamkumun villages being closest to the city have been least 
insulated from the impact of the rapidly growing city and have most 
visibly been affected by the intrusion . Growth of migrant settle­
ments upon both government and village land has in the past tended 
to occur in an opportunistic manner without plan , direction or 
effective control . Settlement upon village land has taken place 
where permission has been gained from the relevant papa biZong graun 
( the pidgin term for the person in whom authority over traditional 
land rights is vested) or where minimal opposition from such a 
person was manifested.  Traditional hospitality convention s ,  
particularly where a marriage , exchange , church o r  work relation­
ship existed,  and the attraction of regular rental income allowed 
footholds to be established on the edges of village land . Where a 
given site is favourably located in relation to employment and 
service facilities a continuing influx of further settlers may 
readily occur unless close supervision and control is exercised. 
This has been the e xperience of the Ahi villagers in regard to 
several such settlements and having lost a considerable proportion 
of their land as a consequence of early European contact ,  and 
subj ect to internal population pressures and widening commercial 
involvements , the Ahi felt themselves faced with the threat of 
further land loss to the migrant settlers .  
The largest o f  these settlements and the greate st source of 
contention is the Buko1 settlement on the banks of the Bumbu river , 
wedged between Butibam village and the sea . Prior to 1963 the 
settlement was quite small . However a large number of migrants 
living across the river at ' Chinatown ' were evicted at this time 
and being unable to meet town building regulations many moved 
across the river to Buko . From the migrants ' viewpoint this has 
been a familiar experience .  Though providing a large proportion 
of Lae ' s  unskilled and semi skilled labour their accommodation 
1 Buko is a Butibam word meaning ' red water ' (Willis 1974 : 48 ) . 
The designation ' Bumbu Settlement ' is perhaps more common . 
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problem has been recognized only by a few and the ' squatter settle­
ments ' generally s een as a refuge for undesirables and unemployed 
vagrants . 
Proximity to the town centre and the main industrial area 
stimulated Buko ' s  rapid growth despite overcrowding , poor drainage 
and absence of service s .  Though unmistakably Butibam land, there 
has been some disagreement as to its control and this has allowed 
settlers to consolidate and the situation to develop to almost 
unmanageable proportions .  Gaiya Nomgul , a former Huon councillor , 
l ive s  on the land, apart from the village , and as leader of the 
Tumata clan he claims authority in regard to the disposition of the 
land and has collected regular rentals from the settlers . 
Butibam Progress Association - village and Administration 
The Butibam Progress Association , the forerunner of the Ahi 
Association , was e stablished in 1964 through the efforts of Stephen 
Ahi and Muttu Gware against a background of growing concern with 
these urban influences .  Its e stablishment approximately coincided 
with the rapid industrial development of Lae which accompanied the 
construction of the Highlands Highway in the early 1960s . 1 Ahi , 
who had been posted to the Butibam Primary ' T '  School (he now 
works as a sales representative in Lae} , and Gware , formerly the 
Post-Courier 's advertising officer in Lae , conceived the idea of 
a village association as a means of strengthening village 
o rganization and solidarity and facilitating socio-economic develop­
ment , particularly in view of the disintegrative influences of town 
l i fe .  These two represented the emergence of a new generation of 
aspiring village leaders , relatively well educated ,  anxious to use 
modern structures and practices to advantage but somewhat disdainful 
of the colonial institutions which had shaped relationships between 
preceding generations and the Administration . Broadly they sought 
1 Lae ' s  total indigenous population in 1961 was e stimated at 
between 7000 and 8000 but had grown to 19 , 664 in 1970 and 
64 , 000 in 1975 . Population of Buko was estimated as 400 in 1965 
whilst in 1974 it exceeded 5000 . ( Rofe 1965 ; Lae City Council 
Annual Report 1974-75 ; W. Knoll , personal communication ; and 
official sources . }  
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to develop structures and initiatives at the village leve l , 
facilitate e ffective adaptation to internal and external pressures 
and enable positive responses to the new circumstances with which 
they were faced .  Assisted by their respective brothers they gained 
the support of village elders . 
The Butibam Association structure follows establ ished l ines 
of formal organi zation : president , vice president , secretary , 
treasurer and a general committee of twelve members which draws 
two representatives from each of the six village clans . The 
structuring of the general committee in this manner provides a 
l ink between traditional and roodern , a link which is reinforced 
by the procedure of separate clan meetings prior to the full  
Assoc iation meeting each Thursday night . General village meetings 
are also held , usually each Sunday . Special subcommittees have 
been formed for local government, market and cultural centre , 
health , club , water reticulation and land,  and official village 
spokesmen are appointed to provide formal contact with church and 
government . During the early years of the Association ' s  operation 
( as indicated by the choice of local government as the first 
specialist subcommittee ) the Association actively co-operated 
with the Huon Council ; 1 indeed several Butibam villagers have at 
different times served as Council president . Relative to other 
villagers the Butibam people have been well  served in their relation­
ship with the Council and the central government . Benefits they 
have received include a health clinic , primary school and vocational 
school all located adjacent to the village ; a copra drier , street 
lighting and a KlOOO Council contribution towards the Butibam 
market . Current e fforts are directe d  towards the e stablishment , 
1 The Huon Council , which encompassed the narrow coastal lowlands 
on either side of Lae and the lower half of the Markham valley , 
was suspended in July 1974 because of financial and administrative 
problems and widespread loss of support . Currently the Council 
is in the process of reconstitution . Efforts were made in 1976 
to establish two smaller counci ls , for Salamaua and Bukaua , and 
a Wompar Development Corporation , to assume resp cnsibilities for 
the suspended Huon Counci l .  The boundaries of the Lae City 
Council were drawn so as to exclude a large migrant settlement 
and the Ahi villages . 
2 U  
with central government assistance , o f  a Morobe cultural centre on 
village land adjacent to the Butibam marke t .  O n  balance the 
villagers have been generous in making land available for these 
facilities which are widely used by other groups , and the Council 
benefited considerably from an earlier gravel lease arrangement 
with the Butibam people . 
Bene fits notwithstanding , relations between Council and 
Administration and the Butibam Progress Association progressively 
deteriorated.  Land has been of paramount concern to the villagers 
and the greate st cause of friction . A land claim which villagers 
had persistently and peacefully pursued over a period of  fifty 
years , with no evident sign of success ( see Willis 197 2 ) , 
increasingly became a source of resentment and an issue around 
which the villagers could unite in opposition to external influences . 
Absence of progress in the matter of the land claim was 
paralleled by the increased incursion of settlers upon village 
land and the inability of the Administration or Council to control 
this movement . The failure of the Huon Council to take the part of 
the villages in these issues was no surprise to younger Butibam 
people such as Muttu Gware and Stephen Ahi who saw the Council as 
an appendage of  the colonial Administration , but the alleged 
attempt by the kiap to influence councillors and village elders 
against the younger village activists and the village bodies they 
now promoted caused anger and frustration . The rift was emphasised 
and further widened by disagreements with Administration staff and 
the Council concerning the siting of  the Butibam health clinic and 
1 the terms of the Bumbu river gravel lease . The Butibam people 
subsequently withdrew the gravel lease from Council control and a 
valuable source of income for the Council was lost , further 
1 An earlier agreement gave the Council authority in respect to 
extraction of gravel from the Bumbu river adj acent to Butibam 
village . Disagreement over revenue sharing agreements between 
village and Council , and the increased friction between Butibam 
Association leaders and the Administration , led to cancellation 
of this agreem�nt and the negotiation of a lease with Barclay 
Bros . 
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exacerbating the relationships . 
Relations were allowed to deteriorate further with the 
preparation and publication in December 1971 , without effective 
consultation with villagers ,  of the Lae Urban Development Study 
( Russell D. Taylor and Partners 1971) . The proposals broadly 
argued that future urban growth should take place between the Busu 
and Bumbu rivers , despite earlier alleged Administration assurances 
1 to the contrary . Such conclusions , however ,  were large ly un-
avoidable . Future expansion of the town inevitably must occur 
principally in this direction as the Markham swamp and the Adzera 
range to the we st leave only a very narrow corridor for expansion . 
Nevertheles s ,  detailed and appropriately illustrated maps of the 
suggeste d  land use format for the area , displayed at th€ time of 
the plan release , were seen to some understandably suspicious 
village minds as a clear blueprint for further land seizures since 
much of the proposed development concerned village land held under 
customary tenure . Vil lage feelings were exacerbated by the proposal 
that an exchange of government land and the mission land at Malahang 
should take place to facilitate development plans . This was a 
further indication to the villagers of government machination , 
since this land - originally made available so that the mis s ion 
could e stablish a plantation and thus prevent the loss of village 
labour to distant plantations - is considered rightfully theirs and 
to be returned .  
Although the study was prepared b y  a private firm with l imited 
knowledge of Lae pol itics the consultants were not unaware of the 
village land situation and it seems incredible that thi s  fundamental 
1 
Villagers state that they were given assurances by Administrator 
Hay that future development of Lae would be west towards the 
Markham and thus not involve village land . (Muttu Gware , 
personal communication 4 March 1972 . ) 
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issue was not given more attention .
1 The Administration 
demonstrated a remarkable lack of sensitivity and forethought in 
not arranging proper discussions with the villagers and effectively 
involving villagers in the planning process . However ,  in view of 
the political circumstances and the accompanying tension prior to 
the 1972 e lections , particularly the antipathy of several 
Administration officials towards ' radical ' groups such as the Pangu 
Pati and the Ahi Association , this neglect may not have been so 
much an oversight as an absence of e ffective communication and an 
unwillingness to demonstrate unnecessary goodwill . 
Anticipating problems with respect to village land the 
planners provided three alternative growth strategie s as a short 
term solution to the customary land problem . However, this  
strategem served principally to allow deferral of the issue . The 
response reflects to some degree the subordinate role assigned to 
the villages in the town ' s development and the influence of a 
s chool of thought during this period which held that the passage of 
time would bring governments more willing to move against urban 
landowners who frustrated deve lopment plans and a breakdown of 
organized village opposition to such plans . There is some logic , 
if little morality , in this view but it was e ssentially a 
negative approach and one which eschewed the very pos itive 
initiative s  which were required in the s ituation . 
1 
Motives aside , the presentation of the Urban Development 
Chapter 7 of the Study Report dis cusses the problem of customary 
land tenure but the problem is not given the emphasis one would 
expect given that the success of the plan depended upon the co­
operation of the Ahi villagers . Nor do there appear to have been 
significant efforts to explain the situation to villagers before 
the release of the plan . No reflection whatsoever is intended 
here upon the integrity of the planning team which operated 
according to its brief and in an environment beyond i ts control . 
It should be realized that ,  with the emergence of the Pangu and 
Butibam political movements , divisions within the Lae Town Council 
and the approach of the 19 72 elections , the s ituation prevailing 
in Lae was one of considerable tension . 
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Study provided major support for two closely related developments 
that precede d  the public release of the plans : Stephen Ahi had 
determined to stand as a candidate for the Lae Open e le ctorate 
in the 1972 national general election and the Ahi Association 
was formally established in November 1971 as a representative body 
embracing all the Ahi vil lage s . It is difficult to disentangle 
the processes of cause and e ffect here . Political candidacy and 
the creation of an inter village association were mutually 
supportive and the land and planning issue certainly provided the 
maj or rallying call to action . The Ahi Association ' s  establishment 
had been preceded by some six weeks of discussion between the 
village s  but the Butibam people had knowledge of the planning 
study wel l  before the public release through their own very 
effective intelligence system and limited contact with the 
planning team ( the villagers were most indignant and considered 
this limited contact unsatisfactory but were unable to arrange a 
meeting between the planners and village leaders ) . Stephen Ahi ' s  
candidacy appears to have been motivated to a degree by personal 
ambition but there was a clear consensus favouring accelerated 
movement in thi s  direction and he received full support for his 
nomination from the village congregation . 
Fo'PT1'1G.tion of the Ahi Association 
The Ahi Association was a logical extension of the Butibam 
Progress Association and broadly represented a widening of the 
Butibam response - a recognition that a combined effort was 
necessary in the pursuit of pol itical power and public support 
and in the struggle against the continuing encroachment of the 
migrant settlers , and a recognition of a need for stronger and 
more direct action . The land claim being pressed through the 
Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia certainly required 
closer inter village cooperation and the Lae Urban Study had 
clearly demonstrated the need for unity in the fight against 
any Administration-imposed urban development .  Reflecting the 
pres sure of events , the Association was stated as having two 
2 �  
specific aims : ' firstly to press the present land c laim through 
to a successful conclusion and secondly , to prevent the imposition 
of any of the town plan proposals which are contrary to the 
interests of the villages and likely to lead to further land 
alienation ' (Stephen Ahi , personal communication February 28 
1972)  . The formation of the Ahi Association unmi stakably marked 
a move towards confrontation and away from co-operation with 
institutions such as the Huon Council . 
It should be emphas ized that the Ahi Association , as 
formed and in its operations to date , primarily represents the 
collective interests of the five Ahi village s ,  acting on their 
behalf in matters of common concern and publicly promoting these 
common interests . It has co- ordinating functions but does not in 
itself possess great power or have command over s ignificant 
resources of its own . The Association is primarily a growth from 
the Butibam Progress Association and is considerably dominated by 
the Butibam people as a consequence of their initiative and 
organization , their greater initial concern in these matters and 
their c lear numerical dominance . Muttu Gware and Samson Ahi of 
Yanga initially were appointed president and vice president of 
the Association , with Stephen Ahi patron , and Butibam people 
occupied the maj ority of the remaining executive positions . 
Modest subscription fees are paid by the five vil lages for whom 
the Assoc iation acts as an umbrella organization . Meetings are 
generally held each month but may be held more frequently during 
periods of intense political activity . 
E lection to the House of Assembly of an Ahi Association 
candidate was expected to provide direct access to the machinery 
of government and access to the forums of the House of Assembly 
as a means of influencing public opinion in regard to the land 
c laim and the associated problems of migrant settlement . It is  
a measure of village concern and the strength of sophistication 
of their response that a broad programme of direct political 
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participation , skilful use of the media and pressures upon 
Administration and settlers has been pursued .  
The Lae Open e Zeation aampaign , 19 72 
Stephen Ahi ' s  candidacy for the Lae Open electorate added 
a further element to what became a most extraordinary campaign , 
a campaign characterized by manoeuvres and manipulations by 
sections of the business community and a small section of the 
Administration to ensure e lection of an acceptable candidate and 
in particular to prevent election of Pangu candidate Toni Ila . 1 
Stephen Ahi conducted a well organized campaign second in 
terms of organization and e ffort only to that of Pangu. He had 
a number of factors operating in his advantage - he was a 
Morobean ( Ila was from Papua , a fact emphas ized by some of his 
opponents ) ;  he had extremely strong village support in his own 
area , though - as returns later indicated - by no means complete 
support from the smaller Ahi village s ;  his position was improved 
by the strong campaign against I la ,  and he was able to pre sent a 
favourable image to the general public as an ex-teacher , 
insurance representative and member of Apex,  the District 
Education Board and the Papua New Guinea Central Banking Advisory 
Committee of the Reserve Bank of Australia . 
As against this Stephen Ahi was campaigning against a very 
industrious and skilful organizer representing the Pangu Pati in 
1 Eki Vaki, a Papuan school teacher, was the most ' favoured ' 
candidate receiving strong Public Service Association support 
and firm assistance from the business community . Brian Bogagu, 
a Pangu Pati defector , was given similar support though on a 
lesser scale . The Administration's neutrality was rather 
stretched by the behaviour of several officers ; Butibam and 
Kamkumun villagers were asked by a senior Administration 
official to stand against nominated candidates ;  Boyamo Sali 
( standing for the regional seat) was pressured to stand as a 
United Party candidate , and Pangu polling booth scrutineers 
were continually excluded from the main polling booth . It is  
noteworthy that one of the early moves of the Pangu Pati upon 
gaining power concerned the removal of the incumbent Morobe 
provincial commissione r .  
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the very heart of the strongest Pangu area of the country . 
1 
Although Ila had developed a strong personal following , primarily 
he was able to identify his name with the Pangu Pati and organize 
a considerable turnout of people voting for a party and the 
changes and the values it represented to them. Pangu was 
unquestionably the predominant political movement in Lae and 
other parts of the Province , and expatriate opposition served to 
strengthen its influence . To a very great extent low income 
migrant settlers living in no covenant or low covenant areas 
constituted the core of Pangu strength in the city and a c lear 
majority of the urban population . Stephen Ahi was operating from 
a much smaller base , essentially that of the minority village 
landowners , and his appeal did not reach sufficiently far to 
seriously challenge Toni I la .  
The e lection marked a firm split between Pangu and the Ahi 
Association and left a division that continues to mar Lae politics . 
Relations prior to the e lection had been reasonably close and the 
party had made some effort to maintain c lose links with the Ahi 
villagers . Muttu Gware in fact had served as a secretary to the 
party and was one of four candidates nominated in the Pangu pre­
selection for the Lae seat , which went to a vote of the branch ' s  
members . He effectively withdrew when it became clear that Toni 
Ila would win the vote and moves for an independent Ahi candidate 
were in motion . Despite common ground and Pangu ' s  strong land 
rights policy there was a basic division between the assertive 
Ahi Association leadership , pursuing business development and 
seeking strict control over migrant settlers , and Pangu ' s natural 
alliance with its migrant settler supporters . 
1 Tony Voutas , the previous Morobe Regional member and a major 
figure in the development of the Pati , was based in Lae until 
1972 , encouraging the establishment of a major grass roots 
movement throughout the Province . All but one of the nine 
Morobe seats were won by Pangu candidates . Toni Ila to some 
degree took over Voutas ' mantle though his maj or concern with 
Worker ' s  Association affairs and his Papuan origins have served 
to limit the spread of his influence beyond Lae . 
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Pre e lection disputes and friction engendered by the 
e lection campaign itself added to this division . Stephen Ahi , 
though a splendid ' strong man ' in many ways , alienated some by 
his agressive manner and it is alleged that the large Catholic 
Sepik community at Buko were threatened with removal if they did 
not support the Ahi candidate . The Ahi Association leaders for 
their part attest that Pangu promised to support settlers against 
the Association . There is no evidence of explicit promises in 
this direction by Toni I la himself but general assistance was 
naturally promised and it is quite probable that people gave 
their own interpretations to these promises . 
The formation of the Ahi Association , signalling as it did 
a much more assertive stance by the villagers , drew a negative 
response from sections of the Administration and the Huon Council . 
The Ahi Association was seen by some as a Mataungan-style 
organization operating as an alternative and competitive body to 
the Huon Council and therefore to be opposed. There was a wide 
gap between the values and assumptions underlying the new wave 
of political behaviour and those of the Administration officers 
and the traditional councillors helping to uphold the established 
orde r .  Some of these councillors , including some from the Ahi 
village s ,  were persuaded that the Ahi Association was dangerous 
and its leaders irresponsible . The absence of meaningful 
communication between leaders and external authority during the 
early period of the Association ' s  life exacerbated these 
differences and discouraged mutually beneficial co-operation . 
Huon Council lost further support due to its inability to 
perform a positive role in these matters and to the extent to 
which the councillors and Council president were cast in the 
role of critics of the Ahi Association and apologists for the 
Administration . Despite shortcomings in other directions , the 
Council was placed at this j uncture in a formidable pos ition , 
quite beyond its capabilitie s ,  as a consequence of the impasse in 
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regard to Buko migrant settlers and the inability of the govern­
ment e ffectively to come to terms with the new political movement . 
Migrant settlement 
A maj or source of friction between the Pangu Pati and 
Stephen Ahi and his supporters during the Lae Open e lection had 
been the extent to which Pangu had encouraged support from the 
settlers . In the post election period this problem was to assume 
more serious proportions and add to the difficulties of the Huon 
Council . The Ahi Association , having failed in its bid to gain 
political representation and obtaining no satisfaction through 
the courts in its land claim, 1 now sought to exert pressure through 
the migrant settlers . A determined effort was mounted to remove 
unwelcome settlers ; many migrants were served notices to quit and 
a number of gardens was destroyed . 
The problem during this period had become increasingly 
difficult . An Administration survey of the migrant settlement 
situation2 indicated a total of 4090 migrant settlers on Butibam 
and Kamkumun land in 1966 , and 12 , 826 in January 1973 . Almost 
half of these were located at Buko , which constituted by far the 
most intractable problem .  Many of the settlers had made regular 
rental payments to Gaiya Nomgul , the Butibam papa bi long graun , 
and many had erected quite substantial dwellings and were long 
e stablished residents of the area . This notwithstanding ,  thP.y 
were subj ect to pre ssures from two directions : pressure from Huon 
council arising from non payment of personal tax , and the threats 
of eviction continually made against them by Butibam 
representative s of the Ahi Assoc iation . S ince Butibam approval 
could not be obtained for any improvements to the settlement 
their principal return from past Council taxes had been a rough 
1 
2 
A Supreme Court ruling in 1971 acknowledged the villagers ' 
claims to land ownership but awarded compensation on the basis 
of values operating at the time of appropriation by the 
Australian Administration in 192 7 ,  a sum of K7200 . 
By J .  Bradbury , Lae District Office , 16 April 1973 . 
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access road yet they were being continually sununonsed b y  the 
Council for non payment of taxes as the Council feared that 
exemption would encourage further non payment of taxes in the 
rural wards . 
Butibam and Ahi Association opposition to the settlement 
stems from a number of interrelated developments . The emergence 
of the Butibam Progress Association coincided with the rapid 
growth of Buko adj acent to Butibam village . The Assoc iation was 
aggrieved by the loss of rental income from migrants and anxious 
to secure orderly deve lopment of the land under Progress 
Association control . 1 Complaints of molestation of village women 
2 in their gardens and repeated incidents between Buko settlers 
and Butibam villagers following drinking sessions at the nearby 
' native ' Returned Servicemen ' s  League further heightened tension . 
The e stablishment of a strong Roman Catholic presence , drawing 
support principally from the Sepik settlers and physically 
demonstrated by the construction of a church hall in the centre 
of the settlement , greatly inflamed Butibam Lutheran 
sensitivitie s .  The close alliance between the migrant settlers 
and Pangu during the 1972 House of Assembly ele ction campaign 
and the failure of the Ahi candidate served to harden the views 
of some villagers against the settlers and the Pangu Pati . 
Increased pressure upon the settlers during the second 
quarter of 1972 brought a response in the House of Assembly from 
Toni I la ,  the member for Lae Open , who asked the minister for 
lands , ' Is it a fact that people from Butibam, Karnkumun , Wagan 
and Yanga village s  are constantly chasing squatters from their 
land and have now threatened to remove these squatters within 
six weeks? I s  it also a fact that the villagers have destroyed 
1 
2 
It was proposed that part of the area be developed as an 
industrial estate . 
See Post-Courier 2 June 1972 . 
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any food grown by these squatters on their land? 1
1 
Muttu Gware , 
pre senting the village case earlier , had state d ,  ' The Association 
was not trying to e j ect the squatters who had legitimate j obs . 
We want to get rid of the ones who come to town , find they can ' t  
get work and end up getting into trouble 1 • 2 In pursuing this 
approach a l ist of 200 unemployed settlers was presented to the 
District Office for police action but no action resulted . 
Considering the explosive nature of the situation this inaction 
was not unwise . 
Against a background of increasing friction a special 
visit to the area was made by Chief Minister Michael Somare , who 
was accompanied by Messrs . Kik i ,  Sali and I la ,  on 8 July 1972 . 
Meetings were held at Buko , Butibam and Kamkumun . At the Buko 
settlement the general sentiment of the settlers was against 
moving but the problem of some ' irresponsible troublemakers ' was 
acknowledged .  At Butibam, Stephen Ahi spoke strongly of the 
problems experienced by the villagers and townspeople from the 
unemployed settlers and stressed the value to the country of 
the commercial developments planned by the villagers and the need 
to support indigenous business development . Although no 
significant agreement came from these meetings they did enable 
an exchange of viewpoints , provide government members with a 
greater insight into the problem and enable some respite for the 
settlers from the pressure that was being applied to them. 
A further development occurred with a meeting on 2 3  August 
1972 of Huon Council representatives ,  District officials , Buko 
residents and representatives from Butibam village to consider 
the resistance of the Buko residents to the payment of tax , 
complaints over the lack of service and the call for access  roads 
through the Buko settlement . The Buko residents angrily complained 
that they had paid personal tax for more than three years but the 
1 
2 
HAD 3 ( 4 )  : 31 1 ,  26-27 June 1972 . 
Post-Cou:roier 2 June 1972 . 
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only benefit provided by the Counci l  had been a very rough access 
road worth no more than K300 . Additional complaints were made 
regarding the contaminated Bumbu river water supply , the poor 
drainage and the lack of suitable access  road in case of emergency . 
Muttu Gware in response stressed the difficulty of gaining 
permission for the construction of improved access  roads since 
there are many claiming traditional land rights . Stephen Ahi 
was far less sympathetic , adamantly stressing that villagers must 
pay Council tax and accept the authority of the landowners (the 
Ahi Association ) . Approval in this instance , he stressed , would 
depend upon the plan being drawn up by the Ahi Association for 
the development of the area . Geibob Masawa , the Council 
pre sident , and some o f  the Butibam elders adopted a somewhat more 
conciliatory line and indicated that thi s problem was beyond the 
means of the Council and must be solved by the government . 
Considerable tension prevailed at the meeting and to avoid further 
conflict the Counc il and government officials indicated at the 
end of the meeting that personal tax prosecutions would not be 
pursued while the Buko leaders for the ir part agreed to restrain 
their people from violence . A further meeting was held at which 
a somewhat less rigid attitude was expressed by the Butibam 
leaders but again no re solution of the conflict was achieved . 
1973  brought more positive signs of progress in relation 
to the problem of migrant settlement .  Development o f  new no 
convenant and low convenant areas was undertaken at Three Mile , 
Taraka and Boundary Road and discussion initiated in the early 
part of the year concerning the possible establishment of a mini 
council or some �lternative structure to assume responsibility 
for the village and migrant settlement areas between the Busu 
and Bumbu rivers .  For the Huon Council the proposed excision of 
the peri-urban areas provided the possibility of e scape from its 
dilemma - pressure from the settlers for improvements which the 
Butibam people would not approve and migrant settler unwillingness 
to pay Council tax in the absence of improvements . For the 
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Provincial officials the proposed new structure promised possible 
relief from pressures for solution of a seemingly insoluble 
problem. 
Positive moves towards the organization of a new 
administrative and political structure for the four Huon Council 
wards between the Busu and Bumbu rivers began in January 1973 . 
E fforts were made to ascertain the attitude of the Council ' s  
constituent wards towards the exc ision of the four wards and 
following separation the villagers and migrant settlers in the 
excised area were presented with four alternative proposal s :  
1 .  the establishment o f  a new council to assume 
respons ibility for the four wards , to be called 
Busu-Bumbu or some s imilar name ; 
2 .  the Ahi Assoc iation to operate under the local 
government ordinances and obtain power and 
responsibility for undertaking the work of local 
government in these four wards ; 
3 .  the four wards to merge with Lae City Council ; 
4 .  the e stablishment o f  an urban development 
corporation to undertake responsibility for 
this area and the work of local government . l 
Although these moves were far too late to reverse the 
deterioriation in the Huon Counc il ' s position they did represent 
a j udicious and constructive approach to the migrant settlement 
problem and the broader problems of the peri-urban area . The 
Busu-Bumbu min i  council proposal , the most favoured alternative ,
2 
as a small organizational structure and political body offered 
the means through which the problems of the area might be 
approached effe ctively. Settlers would have an accessible 
pol itical forum as would the Ahi villagers and the numerical 
superiority of the settlers would be balanced by the power resting 
1 
2 
Tok Save Bilong Huon Council I Laik Rausim Pope la Ward Insait Long 
Erfa Bi long Council� Mimeo 1973 . Lae sub-district office . 
The mini council was considered to provide an intermediate step 
to incorporation with the Lae City Council . 
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with the Ahi Association as representatives of the landowners 
and a body directly concerned with the development of the area . 
For the government the suggested mini council offered the 
prospect of a pol itical body able to concern itself with the 
exceedingly trouble some problems of the area and a channel of 
communication through which two way communication , so deficient 
in the past , might be obtained.  Compromise would be the essence 
of such an arrangement and , whilst clear differences of interest 
were present , a community of interest also existed and an 
institutional arrangement favouring compromi se could do much to 
narrow the divisions and allow the impasse to be broken . However 
some might consider that the conflict is too deep seate d ,  
reflecting emerging patterns of class conflict and divisions 
which will widen rather than diminish ;  the Buko settlement 
provide s a convenient focus for such divisions . 
However the proposed mini council did not meet with 
universal approval .  Some of the settlers were fearful of the Ahi 
Association involvement , some attracted by the freedom from 
personal tax which membership of Lae City Council provided , and 
some were simply confused about the implications of the proposal . 
The Pangu Pati ' s  Lae branch in particular , firmly opposed the 
mini council proposal . Considerable antipathy existed between 
Pangu and the Butibam people { see above ) and there were some fears 
that the suggested arrangement would serve principally to 
strengthen the Ahi Association ' s  hand against the settlers . 
Additionally , from the very beginning of the Lae City Counc il , 
Pangu policy favoured an enlarged urban council area ; membership 
of the wider body would strengthen the p arty ' s position while 
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protecting settler interest and aiding the ir w�lfare . 1 
Ila sought to introduce a motion in the Lae City Council 
proposing inclusion of  the migrant settlement areas in the c ity 
area , arguing that those settlers who worked in the c ity should 
share the city service s , 2 and I la and other Pangu supporters 
strongly opposed the concept of the mini council at the July 1973 
meeting of the steering committee formed to consider the e stablish­
ment of the new council . The meeting produced no firm 
recommendations and the strong opposition from its critics ( Ila 
walked out of the meeting) effectively negated moves towards the 
council ' s  formation . 
Achievement 
Despite difficultie s and defeats incurred in their 
political struggle s the Ahi Association and its constituent 
village bodies have achieved a quite disproportionate level o f  
political influence and have been instrumental i n  effecting 
considerable social and economic improvement for the benefit of 
the Ahi village s . 
Although there has been no dramatic change in the migrant 
settlement situation the separate village groups have gained an 
awarene ss of the implications of uncontrolled settlement and the 
strong reaction by the village bodies to the encroachment of 
settlers and to the Urban Development Study proposals has brought 
1 
2 
Pressures by the business community and sections of the 
Administration had resulted in a quite unrealistic demarcation 
of the town ' s  boundaries prior to the e stablishment of the Lae 
City Council . The inclusion of populous migrant settlements 
would obviously have favoured Pangu in the new council . (For 
further discuss ion see Adams 1973 . )  Pangu ' s  concern for the 
migrant settlers extends beyond voting support , as indicated by 
Toni !la ' s effort to gain the lease of the Jensen property on 
the western boundary of the town for migrant worker housing , 
but again there has been conflict with the Butibam people who 
sought this and other leases as a part of the land compensation 
parcel .  
Post-Courier 30 April 1973 . 
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village opposition t o  these developments firmly t o  the notice of 
authorities and public . 
A significant step in the protracted land dispute was made 
with the announcement in January 1974 that the Ahi Association 
had accepted Kl60 , 000  from the minister for lands , Thomas Kavali , 
as compensation for the longstanding claim. 1 The compensation 
followed the guidelines set down by the Commission of Inquiry 
into Land Matters and was coupled with an undertaking to acquire 
the pastoral properties on the western fringes of the town for 
2 resettlement of squatter s .  The amount provided was less than · 
that sought but substantially better than previous response s .  
Although the government ' s  offer was said t o  b e  unequivocally 
' the full and final settlement ' , the Ahi Association temporized 
claiming that the compensation was separate from the question of 
some 9000 acres of agricultural leases and non developed reserves 
on the boundaries of the town . 
In the absence of an improved offer the Ahi Association 
sought to halt construction work on a high voltage power l ine for 
the Electricity Commission carrying power from the Ramu Hydro­
electric Scheme to the city ,  the Association insisting that work 
must cease on land subj ect to ownership c laim .  Mr Kaval i  next 
was the principal obj ect of Ahi Association spleen . Stephen Ahi 
was particularly bitter , accusing the minister of ' avoiding his 
responsibilitie s , lying , cheating and interfering with democratic 
government ' and in February and March Post-Courier headlines 
reported these accusations . 3 Despite this rhetoric , or perhaps 
1 
2 
3 
The initial offer by the minister was KlS0 , 000 but he accepted 
a counter offer by the villages of Kl60 , 000 . 
See Post-Courier 21 January 1974 , Lae Trading Post 23 January 
1974 and Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters (1973 : 70 ) . 
See Post-Courier 18 February 1974 , 29 March 1974 . 
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because of it , some progress was made towards the final settle­
ment . The government indicated that it would resume , on behalf 
of the villagers , an area of undeveloped agricultural leases on the 
eastern outskirts of the city . Though the Ahi leaders again 
indicated that this was not enough , it now appears that the land 
dispute has been resolved after some f i fty years of endeavour , 
a remarkable feat of perseverance by the villagers given the 
difficultie s encountered . 1 
Although the Ahi Association has not received substantially 
more from its land claim than the Land Commission inquiry 
recommended , the vil lagers have obtained a measure of success in 
this matter and have been able to keep the issue very much alive 
despite rebuffs and defeats . In addition quite a number of 
intangible secondary benefits have accrued in their fight aga inst 
qovernment intransigence . Allied to this struggle the villagers 
have forced the government to recognize that the Urban Development 
Study plans cannot be imposed against the wishes of the village s ,  
demonstrating a capability and determination to exercise a ro4j or 
control over the development of their land . 
Some fifteen months after the government ' s  release of the 
Lae urban plan in December 1971 , the Butibam Progress Association , 
with a suitable show of secrecy , produced their own plans for 
the deve lopment of the area of land they now control . The plan , 
drawn by a Queensland planner , i s  in some regards an improvement 
1 The villagers received the Kl60 , 000 cheque and were additionally 
offered two parce ls of land each with frontage on the two sides 
of the highlands highway near the Three Mile agricultural 
station . The land offer was rej e cted as being ' too small and 
only useless , swampy land ' . (Muttu Gware , personal 
communication 5 September 1975. ) More recently the Ahi 
Association has refused to accept a government offer of 1410 
hectares of undeveloped land with the Kl60 , 000 compensation 
(Post-Courier 16 February 1977) . It is unders�ood that the 
original cheque held by the Butibam people was cancelled and a 
second cheque mislaid somewhere in the pipeline between the 
central government and the villagers . 
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upon the relevant sections of the Russell D .  Taylor plan . 
Unque stionably the Butibam plan demonstrates commendable 
initiative and determination and capacity to produce a sophisticated 
plan for the development of village controlled land � nonetheless it 
has resulted in the ludicrous situation where the constituent 
village bodies are now moving to a position where they will each 
have their own separate development plans and to date there has 
been l ittle effective effort to reconcile the Urban Development 
Study plan and the intended developments by the separate village 
bodies ,  and no e ffective mechanism for reconciling public and 
private interest has been effected . 
Ahi Association political battles have attracted most head­
line s and engendered the strongest emotions ,  yet the past five 
years have seen substantial social and economic progress through 
the efforts o f  the Assoc iation and the constituent Progress 
Association . The Butibam Progress Association as the oldest and 
largest group has been the most successful of the individual 
associations . Favoured by income from the gravel lease and 
members with knowledge of procedures necessary to secure 
assistance through the local government system and other 
agencies , 1 the Association has been able to undertake a wide 
spectrum of social and economic activity aimed at advanc ing village 
welfare . 
A most lucrative involvement has been that arising from a 
partnership e stablished with Barclay Bros . (NG) Ltd in 1971 
following cancellation of the Huon Council lease arrangement for 
the extraction of gravel from the Bumbu gravel beds . Royalty 
payments from this source have been in the order of KSOOO per 
annum and have provided a most useful cash flow for the further 
1 A number of Butibam villagers hold positions with government 
departments and agencie s ,  including Bogen Ahi , Stephen ' s  brother , 
employed with what in 1976 was the Division of Development 
Administration within the Prime Minister ' s  Department . 
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activities of the Association . The relationship with Barclay 
Bro s .  culminated in the formation in October 1974 of a new company 
known as P . N . G .  Contractors Pty Ltd , with a paid up capital of 
K91 , 000 . The Butibam and Kamkumun Progress Associations jointly 
hold 45 per cent equity in the company and provision has been 
made for later inclusion of the remaining village bodie s .  Aided 
by a Kl OOO grant from the Huon Council and royalty payments 
from the gravel beds , the Butibam Society also has developed a 
modern market valued at an estimated Kl2 , 000 on village land 
between the village and the Buko settlement . The enclosed area 
comprises a large produce sale area and an adjoining block of 
five rooms to be rented as commercial outlets . Support for the 
market has gradually built up and although much smaller than the 
main c ity market it is now well e stablished as a s ignificant 
component of the city ' s fre sh food marketing system . Stephen Ahi 
operates a general store in one of the market rooms and tenants 
have progressively filled the remain ing blocks .  
Following the initial ' settlement '  o f  the land issue with 
the payment of Kl60 , 000 in 1975 the Butibam Association 
was able successfully to negotiate the purchase of a large building 
complex in Lae ' s  commerc ial centre , comprising offices and 
commercial premises .  Muttu Gware left the Post-Courier and 
became the managing director , with a 25 per cent shareholding , of 
I sland Carvings , one of the nation ' s  largest artifact dealers , 
whose shop is located in the building complex purchased by the 
Association . 
Social development and the provision of a high level of 
community services and facilities through the efforts and 
initiative of the Progress Association has given the Butibam 
people a standard of l iving equalled by few village communities 
in the country. As noted above ( see p . 22 9 )  the Butibam leaders 
have over a period been able to profit from their relationship 
with the Huon Counc il and from their own resources they have 
installed a Kl6 , 000 water reticulation scheme , a small community 
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clubhouse , a basketball court and an office for the Association . 
The Association has encouraged a wide range of social and sporting 
activitie s particularly for the younger generation and the 
Butibam people field a number of basketball and Australian Rules 
football teams and dances are held fairly regularly ;  community 
consciousness undoubtedly has been strengthened by these 
activities .  Conflict between the younger and the older generation 
in the village has also demonstrated the value of the Association 
as a mechanism through which group and individual disputes may be 
settled .  A current project concerns the development of a cultural 
centre to be sited alongside the Butibam market . The venture has 
attracted a K20 , 000 government grant and plans envisage a large 
central amphitheatre for performance of traditional dances , a 
large multipurpose community hall , a traditional style hostel to 
accommodate visitors and a small village for traditional crafts­
men . 
Progress by other individual Ahi village Associations has 
been at a lower level than that of Butibam, partly as a 
consequence of their much shorter period of operation . They have 
been slow in forming and have not had to the same degree the 
benefit of driving , educated leadership , and they have not 
experienced the same extent of social and economic change . None­
theless the Butibam model has provided a demonstration effect 
and the migrant-land crises have provided some encouragement for 
the acceleration of their development . 
Kamkumun village has suffered more c learly from the 
disintegrative e ffects of urban influence than her small sister 
village s , particular ly as evidenced by fission attending individual 
e conomic activities . However ,  since about mid 1973 the Kamkumun 
Progress Association has undertaken firm action aimed at arresting 
loss  of corporate identity and securing organi zed communal develop­
ment . An ambitious development plan is being implemented with a 
multi-purpose market/community centre facility being developed near 
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Tia ' s Omil i  Store (a clan concern ) . The planned development 
includes a market ,  general purpose connnunity centre , ceremonial 
ground and recreational area . An associated pro j ect involves 
the installation of a water pump and reticulation system. The 
overall development is being undertaken with assistance from the 
University of Technology and includes a survey of village land to 
allow allocation of individual blocks and demarcation of land 
for development under the auspices of the Progress Association . 
The Kamkumun people have of course benefited from the land claim 
settlement and gravel is now being extracted from their section 
of the Bumbu river providing valuable cash flows with which to 
f inance these new developments . 
Insulate d  to a significant degree by distance from the main­
stream of urban life and attendant physical intrusion , the Wagan 
and Yanga village response has not been as forceful as that 
evinced by Butibam. Yanga , being furthest removed ,  is least 
urban orientated and still retains strong kin and communal ties 
and communal co-operation is  still highly valued.  The newly 
formed Progress Association has taken responsibility for the 
village copra plantation and is now planning to undertake a group 
cattle project . Their principal commercial interest at thi s  
j uncture derives from a joint shareholding with Watkins (Oversea s )  
Co . in the Busu Theatre and a small but increasing income is  
obtained from migrant settler rentals . Wagan also has experienced 
a lower level of social and economic change and has been spared 
the more obvious physical pressures experienced by Butibam and 
Kamkumun ; activity is correspondingly attenuated .  The principal 
' development ' has been a public beach area , developed with assist­
ance from Lae service clubs , the Wagan people having the dubious 
honour of possessing Lae ' s  principal bathing area , with access 
through the main village . 
De spite continued problems and the inexorable spread of 
urban growth and influence the Ahi villagers have demonstrated 
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considerable success i n  retarding the breakdown of village 
institutions and loss of corporate identity . Clearly it is not 
possible , nor perhaps desirable given the situation in which 
the villagers find themselves ,  to maintain without substantial 
modifications traditional values and institutions but it is still 
pos s ible to maintain the collective structure and sense of 
identity sufficient to allow the villagers to adj ust and adapt 
to the forces that impinge upon them. The Butibam people , though 
strongly affected by these change processes , have been able , 
through skilful and forceful leadership operating within the newly 
established institutions , to mitigate the more adverse effects 
of change . Corporate identity and group and individual sense of 
worth and integrity have been considerably enhanced and there has 
been a wide realization of the benefits of communal self help 
and co-operative effort in their relations with the external 
world and in the improvement of their own welfare . Institutions 
such as the Progress Association have been e ffectively incorporated 
into the village system and now provide a vehicle to promote 
village welfare and protect village interest . 
Substantial material and significant social progress has 
c learly been achieved as a consequence of the initiatives and 
efforts of the Ahi Association and the individual Progress 
Associations , yet an e ffective political and administrative 
structure remains to be developed for the Busu-Bumbu area and 
a constructive relationship with external systems remains to be 
forged. The collapse of plans for a structure to replace the 
excised council wards not only meant the loss of an opportunity 
to devise such a structure but opened a further chapter in the 
history of political struggle .  The most immediate outcome of the 
abortive mini council proposals was the establ ishment of a new 
political group , the Morobe District People ' s  Association (MODIPE ) . 
MODIPE 
MODIPE emerged from an October 1973 meeting held at Butibam 
market and presided over by Bogen Ahi ,  Stephen ' s  brother . The 
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meeting elected a steering conunittee and Bogen Ahi , in a press 
release , emphasized the group ' s obj ectives of ' stopping 
candidates who come from other districts becoming MHAs for the 
Morobe District • • •  to preserve Lae as a good and orderly city 
to see inter district permits introduced • • •  and to encourage the 
people outside of Lae to develop their village , to do something 
within the village instead of looking for wages in Lae • . 1 
These aims reflect the Ahi Association leaders '  pre­
occupation with law and order issue s and restrictions against the 
influx of migrants ,  but above all the move represented a calculated 
attack upon Toni Ila ( the only non Morobean House of Assembly 
member in the Province )  and the Lae branch of the Pangu Pat i .  
Support for the new association came from a small number 
of Morobe settlers closely associated with the Butibam people 
and from several of the young emerging Morobe e lite anxious to 
exercise a significant influence in Morobe affairs . The partial 
vacuum created by the withdrawal of direct expatriate 
participation in political activity and the failure of Pangu to 
develop an ongoing system within which the emergent elite could 
advance , 2 encouraged the emergence of a new generation of 
political aspirants with whom the Butibam people could form 
alliance . In addition , the widening influence exercised by 
Toni I la as the de facto successor to Voutas ,  and the power 
derived from ! la ' s trade union base , have not been universally 
accepted.  Some saw MODIPE as a possible counter to this power 
and influence . 
1 
2 
Post-Courier 16 October 197 3 ,  Lae Extra Supplement . 
The reasons for Pangu ' s failure to attract younger and more 
articulate Morobeans is not clear . There has been some e ffort 
made by the party to attract the better educated younger 
Morobeans but success to date has not been encouraging. The 
University of Technology Politics Club was very much a Pangu 
club until 1972/73 though the Morobe students did not play a 
major role due to their limited numbers at this time . 
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The issue developed as something of a aause ae Zebre as a 
result of the involvement of Bonihi S ima , former provincial 
secretary to Boyamo Sali (member for the Morobe Regional 
electorate and minister in the 1972- 7 7  coalition government) .  
Sima , one of Sali ' s  Bugandi High School colleague s ,  had left his 
employment with the Department of Forests to staff Sali ' s  Lae 
office . Residence at the ' Garaina compound ' , which is on Butibam 
land, and the l ink through Sali to the government in Port Moresby 
brought S ima into c lose association with the Butibam people . 
Otherwise , however ,  the office position proved to be a sinecure 
and Sima found he was unable to participate directly in or 
influence the direction of Morobe affairs . The new political 
body promoted by the Butibam people therefore offered a strong 
attraction for S ima . Sali , for his part , though providing no 
overt support for S ima or for the formation of MODIPE , appeared 
not to be opposed to the development at this j uncture .
1 
Reactions by I la and the Pangu Pati in Lae were predictably 
bitter . Bogen Ahi was accused of ' laying stepping stones for 
disunity • 2 and the City Council lord mayor and assistant 
secretary of the Pangu Pati in Lae , John Rodger , successfully 
moved a motion at the Council ' s  November general meeting 
condemning the pol itical group and asking that a letter be sent 
to Sali to ascertain his views regarding MODIPE . The counter 
attack culminated in S ima ' s expulsion from the Pangu Pati at the 
annual meeting of the Lae branch and following ! la ' s unopposed 
re-election as party president , I la declared that some members 
of the House were ' losing their touch 1 • 3 MODIPE responded with 
1 
2 
3 
The revival of MODIPE in late 1974 by student activists critical 
of Sali ' s  alleged failings as the Regional member resulted in 
strong opposition by Sali to the group . Sima left Sali ' s  
employment in December 197 4 .  
Post-Courier 1 9  October 197 3 . 
Post-Courier 13 December 197 3 .  
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an accusation that the Pangu e lections in Lae were ' just a 
farce ' and that ' Ila had elected himself and his personal friends 
to the executive ' .
1 
However , this was the final exchange in the 
newspaper war as efforts towards reconciliation undertaken by Moi 
Ave i ,  the Pangu Pati national president , and Tom Moi , the 
national secretary , during a hurried vi sit in December ,  achieved 
agreement between the dissident factions . 
S ima was readmitted to the Pangu Pati and Nathan Tali , 
MODIPE ' s  president , expressed support for Pangu pol icy on national 
unity . In a j oint press release the two groups pledged to work 
together for the development of the Province . The healing of the 
Pangu split and firm moves towards a settlement of the Ahi land 
claim ( the initial offer of KlS0 , 000 was made some three weeks 
later) removed the main impetus for MODIPE ' s  continued operation 
and following an extended period of inactivity the group was 
publicly disbanded in September 1974 . 
This was not the complete eclipse of MODIPE , however .  Some 
twelve months after its creation MODIPE re-emerged to further 
enliven Lae politics . Student action in this instance provided 
the necessary stimulus for its revival and occasioned further 
Butibam involvement in Lae and Morobe politics . Morobe students 
from the two universities combined with the Ahi Association to 
hold a ' Morobe Peoples '  Seminar ' in early December 1974 to consider 
political and socio-economic development in the Province .  Stephen 
Ahi ,  as chairman of the fund raising committee , was able to 
attract sufficient financial support from the business community
2 
1 
2 
Post-Courier 18 December 197 3 . 
It was suggested at the time that Stephen Ahi would be the 
People ' s  Progress Party candidate for the House of Assembly 
elections in 1977 . The party had been conducting a well  
organised drive for new recruits and received support from 
expatriate business interests in Lae which previously sought to 
promote the interests of the United Party. 
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to allow the transport to and accommodation at the seminar of a 
fair cross section of the Province ' s  village leaders , many of them 
strong Pangu supporters . About 200 people attended. The 
combination of Ahi and student mil itancy produced an abundance of 
explosive rhetoric . The Ahi Association , and most particularly 
Stephen Ahi ,  contributed a strong leavening of anti Pangu senti­
ment and strong Morobean ethnocentrism.  The student leaders , 
most notably Utula Samana , who produced a strong anti colonial 
supporting paper for the seminar , brought a level of radicalism 
to the Province ' s  politics that , ironically , had only been 
equalled in the past by Toni I l a .  MODIPE provided the perfect 
vessel for the mix of anti Pangu spleen and Morobean mil itancy , 
and was seized upon as the vehicle for this new political align­
ment.  Uncompromising Morobean political power drawing upon grass 
roots village action groups was broadly seen by the seminar 
organi zers as the mean s of mobilizing and transforming the 
pattern of development in the Province . 
I t  is too early to ascertain the permanence or likely 
consequence of this new alignment in Morobe affairs though the 
seminar illustrates a continuing Butibam political preoccupation 
with issues extending well beyond local village interests . Also , 
though difficult to disentangle the web of individual and group 
ideals ,  interests and motivations from the broad scheme of Morobe 
ethnic consciousness and radical challenge to the establ ished 
orde r ,  it is clear that the alignment has greatly altered the 
pattern of politics operating in the Province . The emergent 
e lite has c learly aligned itself with regional micronationalist 
groups espousing anti colonial and anti central government senti­
ments and vigorously promoting regional ethnic loyalties against 
these external ' enemie s ' .  
ConaZusion 
Whether j udged in terms of i ts challenge to the colonial 
system, its success in drawing together member vi llagers against 
external threat , its assertive political posturing or its achieve-
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ment of positive social and economic progress , the Ahi Association 
has emerged as one of the most politically significant village 
groupings in Papua New Guinea . Rapid urban growth of recent 
years has tele scoped pressures generated by exogenous forces , the 
impact of which reaches back to the turn of the century , 
generating at this time of rapid political and socio-economic 
change a response characteri�ed by distinctive departure from 
the hitherto establ ished pattern of Morobe village politics . 
The forceful and capable leadership provided by Muttu 
Gware and Stephen Ahi has been central to the development and 
organization of the Butibam and Ahi Associations . These leaders 
and their associate s are the product of the new experiences ,  
skills  and education that members of the younger generation have 
gained from close association with the modernizing sector of the 
colonial system. Experience and connections forged from their 
modern sector ties have enabled them to demonstrate considerable 
skills in the introduction of new organizational structures and 
practice s and in the manipulation of media , external organizations 
and associated persons . As well as being innovators in approaches 
to politics , institutional organization and socio-economic 
activity the Ahi Association leaders have been mediators between 
traditional and modern . 1 Though supplanting the traditional 
patterns of leadership and co-operative involvement with colonial 
institutions ,  continuity has been maintained . They have benefited 
from favourable pos itions in the village order and have taken 
care to gain nece ssary support from the traditional big men and 
elders in promoting change , using the village councils to this 
end with marked e ffect . 
1 For convenience the terminological dichotomy between ' modern ' 
and ' traditional '  is maintained but the writer is cognizant of 
the over-simplification this involves and of the very 
considerable changes that have already occurred in the Ahi 
village system. The writer explicitly rej ects the concept of a 
unilinear continuum between traditional and modern which occurs 
in much development literature , with the stated or implicit 
assumptions o f  evolutionary change to higher levels of western 
modernity .  
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External threat provided the necessary environment in 
which this leadership could mobil i ze support and operate 
effectively.  The continued lack of success and resultant 
frustration in regard to the land claim , the crisis engendered 
by the presentation of the Lae Urban Development Study and the 
continued encroachment of migrant settlers served to unify the 
villagers in the search for new responses and new directions . 
Recognition of the threats to village identity and viability 
from these forces brought strength of purpose and resolve . The 
leve l of village political activity during the period of these 
developments has been quite extraordinary , demonstrating the 
concern and seriousne ss of purpose e licited by events . 
Given the nature of colonial development , the interests of 
the peri-urban villagers have in the past been subordinated to 
the needs o f  an expanding urban presence , a s ituation redressed 
in some measure by a capacity for collaboration with the foreign 
power and more recently by a capacity for countervailing communal 
mobilization and determined political action . The Administration ' s  
failure to take early and pos itive action to resolve the matters 
of greatest concern to the villagers encouraged an increasingly 
aggressive village movement , compounding in some ways the 
problems of the present situation . The land i ssue was left un­
resolved despite persistent petition and patient negotiation . 
The situation was exacerbated by the absence until recent times 
of positive policies and effective procedures in respect to migrant 
settlement . Further ,  the slow development of integrative 
mechanisms and responsive , representative political institutions , 
through which the newly emergent political interests could be 
articulated and perhaps accommodated , encouraged and strengthened 
the cleavages now apparent . 
The twin spectres of uncompensated land loss and migrant 
engulfment , the product of the colonial experience and rapid post 
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war urban development , galvani zed the aggressive Ahi response . 
Location on the urban fringe has given greater awareness of 
political changes and procedures followed elsewhere and provided 
the Ahi Association with greater scope for the manipulation of 
political processes than that available to rural villages . 
Manifesting , as it has , strong nationalist sentiments and 
assertive postures ,  the Ahi response encountered an Administration 
unaccustomed and in some regards opposed to such movements . A 
few del iberately sought to oppose and suppress and there was an 
attitude of mind which held that the Pangu Pati and groups such 
as the Ahi Assoc iation are inimical to e ffective and orderly 
development .  Some made quite sincere e fforts t o  insulate 
institutions from political involvement and so encourage ' orderly 
development ' . These attitudes account , to some extent , for the 
frailty of institutions such as the local government councils and 
the pressures for their overthrow. Not unnaturally in such 
c ircumstances ,  e ffective two way communication between political 
activists and those identifying with and concerned with up­
holding the e stablished order has been severely constrained . 
More sympathetic attitudes have been manifested in recent years 
but ritualistic denunciations by some of the more outspoken 
political figures ,  manipulation of political antipathies for 
private purpose s ,  and continued recalcitrance by a few 
out of sympathy with the nature and pace of change has retarded 
the establishment of more positive relationships . The process 
of decolonization in Morobe as elsewhere has not preceded without 
dislocation and discontinuity . 
Processes observable in the Ahi experience reflect ,  albeit 
much magnified , significant aspects of the colonial relationship 
and the decolonization process , with the associated difficulty 
of establishing new relationships and the struggle for power and 
influence following the external power ' s  withdrawal from direct 
participation in the political process . The legacy of the long 
fe stering land dispute ; urban migration encouraged by rural-
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urban discontinuities ; the Huon Counci l ' s inabi lity to deal with 
the Ahi-migrant issue ;  the Lae City Counci l wracked by divisions 
between Pangu and the expatriate business block and constrained 
by an unrealistic boundary dividing town from village ; and a 
government accustomed to closely controlled ' development ' and 
conditioned in the past to react negatively to deviant indigenous 
initiatives , and , more recently , the emergence of regional 
consciousness and antipathy towards the centre encouraged by 
tensions implicit in the ordering of new power relationships and 
perceived central government insensitivities and centrist pre­
occupations - all have provided the framework within which the 
imbroglio developed . With such a framework , and in response 
to the partial power void that has prevailed since 1972 and the 
associated fai lure to e ffect visible ' development progress ' , new 
political power patterns have begun to emerge . The Ahi 
Association , in this si tuation , has bee n ,  to use Geertz ' s  term, 
as ' a  pole around which parapolitical vorti ces tend to form' 
( Geertz 196 3 : 126) . 
Di fficulties facing the village organizations , particularly 
in the case of Butibam, which is now faced with major structural 
changes ,  must be given due weight in any assessment of future 
prospects . Despite detOC>nstrated success in organi zing the 
village structures and protOC>ting village interests the path from 
crisis management and tOC>bili zation of collective energies to the 
control of ongoing large scale commercial and conununal enterprises 
is beset with many pitfalls , as past records indicate . Fai lure to 
evolve satis factory organi zational structures suited to the scale 
of deve lopment may pre j udice the commerci al success of current and 
future activities despite present achievements . 
These difficulties underline some of the fundamental 
issues now confronting the villages . Traditional patterns of 
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subsistence shi fting cultivation and associated institutions are 
increasingly di fficult to maintain given the pre ssures upon land 
for settlement and commercial development . Land has been and 
wi ll continue to be lost to the city in one form or another .  
Success ful organi zation o f  village institutions and investment 
of monies secured from land compensation , leases , sale , and 
rentals necessarily involve signi ficant structural and value 
changes with greater social and economic di fferentiation and 
pressures towards incorporation of some e lements of the vil lage 
society into the politi cal and socio-economic systems of the city . 
The city , as a creation of external politico-economic force s ,  is 
structured to a very considerable degree according to the western , 
individualistic , capitalist model and successful adaptation 
appears to require duplication , at least in part , of its patterns 
and values and concomitant erosion of traditional communalistic 
value s . Changes in this direction have already occurred . 
Adaptation has generated and will generate internal stresses 
arising from resultant di fferentiation and reordering of 
relationships and values . One inq:>ortant division that has 
developed within and between villages is that which separates 
the older generation , which is reluctant to relinquish power and 
status , and the younger villagers , with their di ffering views on 
the nature of vil lage society and its relationships with the 
external world . Further conflict with non-village members , 
particularly migrant settlers whose interests appear opposed to 
village needs , also appears likely in view of the pressures the 
Butibam village system is generating . 
It would be an excessive ly sinq:>listic view that saw the 
pressures of urbani zation to which the Ahi vil lage s  are now so 
strongly exposed giving ri se to familiar western models . 
Persisting , deep seated socio-cultural values and practices and 
the pluralism of Lae , with i ts marked economic divisions and 
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associated physi cal separation o f  races , have enabled retention 
in an urban environment of many aspects of rural village li fe .  
However ,  it would be equally shortsighted to i gnore the far 
reaching socio-economic influences now affecting the Ahi vi llages , 
particularly Butibam. Continued collective socio-economic 
progres s  and communal unity engendered by the present struggles 
will  serve to maintain cohesiveness but the clear processes of 
individuali zation and di fferenti ation , wi�h pressures upon leading 
elements from the village society to identi fy with an emerging 
elite strata and urban economic interests , represent new 
pressures upon the village system. Within the Morobe Province 
the Ahi vi llagers , and in particular the people of Butibam, are 
an elite , possessing political power and educational , occupational 
and economic advantages in greater meas ure than any other group 
in the Province . It remains to be seen to what extent the 
Butibam people are able to resist incorporation into the urban 
merchantilist system and to what extent they become a community 
of rentiers , entrepreneurs and public servants , assimilating 
associated bourgeois values . 
Final ly , where does the Ahi Association lie in the spectrum 
o f  micronationalist 100vements that emerged in the period prior 
to political independence and what has been the nature and level 
o f  its power and influence in a national context? The Association 
and its constituent societies have operated primarily as a 
pressure group concerned with the pursuit of individual i nterests 
rather than as a broad politi cal movement . Circumstance has 
required firm organization based upon vil lage membership and strong 
action di rected towards amelioration of vi llage wel fare and 
resistance to e xternal forces .  Howeve r ,  despite past and pre sent 
preoccupations with local village issue s , the Ahi response is  very 
much a product of the colonial experience and the reordering of 
power relationships which i s  now occurring . The Ahi Association 
must be seen in the context of the emergence of micronationalis t  
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movements throughout the country , a response to comIOC>n experiences ,  
prompted by s imilar aspirations and each gaining strength from the 
example of others . 
The Ahi Association ' s  influence upon poli ti cal groups and 
institutions has until recently been indirect and therefore di ffi cult 
to measure . The Association has provided an alternative model to 
the institutions of the colonial administration ; i ts successful 
challenge to the power of the government and substantial success in 
communal organization and self-help activi ty has undoubtedly 
provided a demonstration e ffect observed by di fferent vil lage 
bodies and political groups now appearing in the Province . 
It remains for the future to determine the nature and extent 
of direct Ahi Association influence upon Morobe politics . Vocal 
leadership , growing economic power and strategic location at the 
Provincial centre provide the Association wi th a base from which 
to articulate Morobe nationalism and exert a decisive influence 
· upon the Province ' s  affairs . Butibam leaders have now experienced 
a widening of their hori zons as demonstrated by their involvement 
in the Morobe Peoples ' Seminar , and conflict with church, council 
and central government has engendered an assertive criti cal outlook 
consonant with the poiitical pressures now present . 
However , the e xceedingly rapid change o f  the last few years 
presents a situation quite di ffe rent to that prevailing earlier and 
it remains to be seen how selectively and j udiciously the Ahi 
Association and other politi cal groups respond to the new situation 
and to what extent private interest and elitist preoccupation 
coincide with the broader needs of the Province and its various 
communities . I t  may well be that conflict generated by current 
poli tical developments will help lay the foundations for a stronger , 
more representative , more responsive and more firmly based politi cal 
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orde r .  There i s  mquestionably a number o f  yomger educated 
Morobeans who hold firmly to nationalistic and egalitarian values 
and now seek radical trans formation of the existing orde r .  The 
appeal to regional identity promoted by MODIPE has elicited a 
synpathetic response , particularly among educated Morobeans , and 
the current debate appears to be encouraging a greater politici­
zation of the Province ' s  various institutions and village groupings 
and may well generate far reaching future changes . 
The current political situation is dynami c and one might 
expect shi fts in alignment between the various groups and 
individuals according to perceived interes·t and the forces o f  
change . The Butibam people , toge the r with the young educated 
Morobeans , have become the focus of present political change 
processes . The very considerable political power and skill which 
they exercise , thei r  growing economic power and thei r firm 
identi fication with Morobean culture and ethnic identity give 
them a very s igni ficant influence on the affairs of the Province 
and the nation . Central to the Ahi vil lages ' future and to the 
nature of their future poli tical influence are the questions o f  
migrant se ttlement and the ellpanding urban presence . At one 
extreme , developments may engender a bitter and divi sive response 
with present village bodies serving principally as a vehicle for 
a vi llage e lite identi fied increasingly with the emerging 
indigenous business and bureaucratic strata and incorporated into 
a neo colonialist system close ly identi fying with external interests ; 
alternatively the Butibam people and the educated elite may provide 
the catalytic influence necessary to achieve a new consensus , a 
mobi lization of rural s upport and a widely supported programme 
of politi cal and socio-economi c change . 
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Chapter 8 
SOCIO-HISTORICAL CONFLICT AND 
THE KABISAWALI MOVEMENT IN 
THE TROBRIAND ISLANDS 
Jerry W .  Leach 
This paper has three goals : to give a brie f account of the 
socio-historical factors underlying the present political divis ions 
in the Trobriand I slands ; to present a short overview of the 
Kabisawali Movement and its opposition in those islands ; and to 
discuss the controversial problem o f  how to interpret the leadership 
of that movement . 
The data are drawn from s ixteen months fieldwork and five 
months archival research between 1969 and 19 74 when the author was 
resident in Port Moresby . The period focussed on in this paper is  
January 19 72 to September 1974 , that is  from the beginning of 
Kabisawali activities through to the end of the fieldwork period . 
The movement continued,  however ,  as this arti cle was being written . 
Antecedent conditions 
Historical factors 
The roots of the recent deep political division in Trobriand 
society go back to the beginning of the colonial era in the islands 
( taken here to mean the decades between 1890 and 19 10 , though there 
was undoubtedly trading contact long before that period1) , and 
possibly even beyond . 
In those early decades , the incoming colonial control lers and 
providers were primarily pearl traders , missionaries , and government 
officials . In all three cases they were faced with the same problem : 
how to have the mos t  advantageous access to the internal resources 
they were after , be they pearls or people , and simultaneously have easy 
access to the outside world . The solutions , virtually the same for all 
1 
The earliest known record of trading contact indicates the trading 
of yams for iron hooping and can be found in Na utical Mag azine 
8 : 37-9 ( 1839) . 
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parties ,  were dictated b y  the ecology of the Trobriand atoll and the 
distribution of population over i t .  First,  the mai n  island , Kiriwina , 
contained the bulk of the inhabitants . Secondly , the atoll ' s  lagoon 
provided the only (nearly )  all-weather harbour facilities for European 
vessel s .  Thirdly , pearls were found only in the lagoon . These factors 
largely determined the location of early colonial insti tutions . 
Primary establi shments in the foundation period , as shown in 
the map on page 2 5 0 ,  were (1) trading centre , ( 2 )  mission headquarters , 
school , harbour ; ( 3 )  government station , hospital , harbour ; { 4 )  trading 
and pearling centre ; { 5 )  trading and pearling centre . 
These new establishments became and have remained , with the 
exception of trading centre no . 5 in the south , valued sour ce s  of non­
tradi tional services to the islanders . Through these centres have 
flowed money , employment,  new consumer goods , medical benefits , new 
knowledge , entertainment, and the like . At the same time , Europeans 
acx:ruired their pearls ,  converts , land , labour and supporters from 
among those receiving the greatest flow of these benefi ts . The 
character of the new colonial relationships was not therefore extractive 
but transactional
1 
- at least among the primary beneficiaries , from 
whom no significant protest at the basic changes o ccurring in their 
lives can be found in the historical records or in oral historical 
accounts . 
The new establishments were largely stationary and , omitting 
trading centre no . 5 ,  which disappeared before the second world war , 
all lo cated in a very narrow zone . Seen as buildings the establi shments 
were , of course , fixed in location but , more importantly , when seen 
transactionally as deliverers of new and valued benefits , they were 
1 
The lack of severe imbalance in the input-outtake relations of the 
early colonial period can be understood in light of the low rate 
of European settlement in the islands , the relative unattractiveness 
of the Trobriands for plantations (though small ones were later 
established) , the relative lack of natural resources valued by 
Europeans , the paternally protective policies of the government , 
and the transactional-mindedness of Trobrianders . 
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centripetal in their influence . Those nearby gained the most . Despite 
patrols , most medical work was done at the mission or on the government 
station . Despite European buying expeditions , most food and copra 
were brought to the buyers . Despite trader-inspired pearling fleets , 
most pearls were brought to the new stores and houses for sale . 
Consumer goods were mostly obtained by going to get them . Early 
s chooling was on the mi ssion grounds as were the new mission festivals .
1 
Differential access to the new non-traditional benefits was 
resented from the outse t  by those di stant from these centres . Thi s  
was especially true in the heavily populated villages of northern 
Kiriwina . These villagers were close enough to hear continually what 
was happening south of them yet the physical distance to those centres 
could be many walking kilometres through potentially hostile territory . 
Outer islanders , excepting Kitava , though physically further away could 
sail without danger into the primary zone and hence were socially 
closer to the new service centres . The greatest resentment to the 
new central zone has therefore always been in northern Kiriwina . 
The lesser accessibility to the new non-traditional benefits 
of the central zone was felt as relative deprivation and seen as 
illegitimate favouri tism by those of the new periphery . The deprivation 
was relati ve because nothing had been subtracted from ' periphery ' 
villages that had not been subtracted from all vil lages alike . Primarily 
thi s was ,  of course , war-making power , which was effectively hal ted 
in 1900 . The sense of illegitimate favouritism arose for two reasons : 
because the ecological and demographic factors motivating the placing 
of new establishments was never understood , and because the pattern 
of newly-added power and benefit in society was experienced as political 
support for chiefs and villages of the northern lagoon area in their 
age-old rivalries with competitors outwards from them in other districts . 
1 Lest the contrast depicted here seem too sharp , I hasten to add in 
qualification that ( i )  minor satellite mission outposts manned by 
Polynesian missionaries were establi shed outside the central zone 
even in the foundation period , and (ii ) since the foundation period , 
schools , stores and aidposts have been established and become minor 
service centres over a much wider area . Nevertheless , the minor 
centres have never approached the central zone in the magnitude and 
significance of the non-traditional benefits available through them. 
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Northern Kiriwinan inlanders and others of the new ' periphery ' have 
signalled their resentment repeatedly since the beginning of the 
colonial period . 
I n  the 1890s when the lagoon-area chiefs were the mainstays of  
government and mission support , inland chiefs were hostile and 
recalcitrant towards the new authorities . Prior to 197 3 ,  the only 
armed Kiriwinan attack on the government was an ambush of police 
in 1899 led by a militant inland chief .  Following this unsuccessful 
venture , the lagoon villages were alive with rumours of impending war 
th . 
1 
against the area and its new institutions , though these came to no ing .  
Prior to the second world war ,  with government control firmly 
established throughout the islands , northern Kiriwinan chiefs were 
still considered administrative ' problems ' .  Their rivalries were 
thought di sruptive of peace and their relations with their followers 
sometimes oppressive . Especially difficult were the prestigious 
' paramount chiefs •
2 
of Omarakana village who , despite special favours 
and emoluments , viewed the government as having undermined their 
position. Fifty years of government records reflect ambivalent 
relations with these key figures .  
A minor index o f  the developing contrast between the greater 
and lesser receivers of the new non traditional benefits occurred through 
the treatment of the introduced game of cricket.  Begun by missionaries 
in the central zone in 190 3 ,  the game remained in that area until the 
1950s , roughly the international version of cricket . However , from 
1 
2 
For confirmation see frames 445-50 of the Pacific Manuscripts Bureau 
microfilm no . 601 , being the papers of S .B .  Fellows , first missionary 
in the Trobriands in 1894-1900 . 
The title was a conunon one in colonial records and applied inapprop­
riately in the Trobriands based on misconceptions of the political 
system. Malinowski later perpetuated the usage in his writings . 
There is no traditional Kiriwinan category to which the term 
' paramount chief ' could be considered a satisfactory translation. 
However , the English term, spelled correctly but pronounced parcunant 
sip has been partially adopted into contemporary Kiriwinan . 
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about 1910 onwards , the ' crickett  of the non-central villages 
became so culturally transformed as to be entirely incompatible with 
the original version . 1 Trobriand oral history depicts the second 
as a reaction ' against ' the first . 
In 1942 another sign of the resentment against the central zone 
occurred dramatically . Under fear of Japanese invasion , the Trobriands 
were abandoned by all European residents . This evacuation triggered 
an assault led by two militarily prominent northern villages on 
abandoned property in the central zone . There was much theft and 
damage . Lagoon villages were threatened , many inhabitants even 
fleeing southwards , though only a few people were in fact injured .  
Military admini strators , however , quickly restored order when they 
arrived . 
The events of the second world war as a whole proved a 
temporary reversal , or at least a more balanced re structuring , 
of the pattern of non traditional benefits . The northern lagoon 
area , the central zone , received a military hospital and the head­
quarters of the Trobriand military administration . Mi ssion activities 
and schooling ,  however , were all but abandoned and the lagoon 
harbour was relatively inactive . In northern Kiriwina , by contras t ,  
new roads were laid ,  camps and stores were everywhere ,  and two 
airfields were bui lt .  The military docks of the east shore and the 
northern coast dominated the in-flow of supplie s . Under these 
conditions , northern Kiriwina experienced , temporarily ,  the centripetal 
pattern of receiving the greater , rather than lesser , share of non 
traditional benefits . To thi s day , the war is the high point of 
the colonial era to northern Kiriwinans. The subj ective magnitude and 
significance of the war is clearly distinguishable in the oral 
historical accounts of the northern area , as opposed to lagoon dwellers , 
who view it as an interlude of less importance . 
Following the war , the prewar pattern of central zone and 
periphery was reestabl i shed . Military buildings and docks were 
1 Two ethnographic films , Barry A .  Powell The Trobriand Islanders 
and Jerry w .  Leach Trobriand Cricket : an ingenious response to 
co lonialism, show the two different versions of the game . 
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dismantled . The airstrips fel l  into disuse . Supplies were 
reclaimed and removed. The civil administration , traders ,  and 
missionaries returned to the lagoon area and the old services were 
restored.  In northern villages , this was experienced as a disheartening 
return to the former pattern of ill-distributed bene fits . 
Ironically , the main residual benefit of the war for the 
northern village s  - the vastly expanded road system - produced in 
the postwar period a heightened sense of deprivation . By all 
expectation , the new road system should have increased contact 
between the central zone and the northern and eastern vil lage s  which 
it reached . In fact , it did not diminish walking time at all .  The 
primary irony , however , is that government and medical patrols 
outwards from the central zone actual ly decreased despite the 
presence of roads and vehicles . Thi s decrease occurred because of 
three factors : first,  workloads at the centre increased , demanding 
more time ; secondly , the national priorities in administration 
change d ,  de-emphasizing village level contact and emphasizing 
centralized stationary services , and thirdly , officials regarded 
the road system inappropriately as a sign of the increased ease 
with whi ch villagers could have access to the centre . But for 
malaria eradication and elections , the government ' s  services at 
village level declined while service s  in the central zone considerably 
expanded in the postwar period . 1 
Another complex factor in the postwar centre-periphery 
contrast is tourism. Charter tours to the Trobriands began in 
1962 . The tourists stayed in a hotel on the lagoon shore . The 
hote l , plus a United Church store also on the lagoon , became the 
primary centres of artifact tradi ng . As a response to these businesses 
1 Malaria eradication and elections were , in any case , viewed with 
ambivalence as one diminished the lifespan of roofs through 
spraying and the other was unclear as a source of benefit. It is 
also important to note that the government had given up support 
for i ts ' native plantations ' scheme of the prewar era . 
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and the large annual flow-through of tourists ,
1 
commercial carving 
spread rapidly and widely throughout the Trobriands , especially in 
northern and eastern Kiriwina . Carving was stimulated in the central 
zone villages as well but to a much lesser degree . Their greater 
access to monetary income through employment , working relatives nearby 
or abroad ,  and selling fish no doubt helps explain their lesser 
interest in carving . Interestingly , almost no Trobriander resident 
on the government or mission stations carved, some indicating i t  was 
not commensurate with their status . 
From 1962-72 tourist carving and arti fact sales provided the 
steadiest and largest monetary income the northern and eastern 
villages had ever had.
2 
This relative shift in the economic activity 
was ,  however , not without its social costs . In the second half of 
that decade especially , yam harvests , the mainstay of subsistence 
and of ceremonial exchange in Trobriand society , declined sharply . 
That decline had several important consequences :  the social festivities 
which yam surpluses underpin diminished considerably ; the main index 
of social status which northern villagers used to counter the prestige 
claims of lagoon dwellers due to their education,  income , and 
sophistication were embarrassingly not in evidence , and the inland 
lagoon credit relationships which allowed long term reciprocities in 
exchanging fish for yams
3 
became almost entirely monetized and , as 
wel l ,  inflated by nationally rising prices and the increasing income 
of the inlanders .  Thi s transformation o f  formerly moral ties to 
short term and inflating monetary ones weakened the inland lagoon 
relationship considerably . 
1 
2 
3 
The figure reached 2100 in 1971 . See Leach ( 1973 ) . 
The gross Trobriand figure was approximately K9 per capita per 
year , though the Kiriwinan figure alone would probably be about 
Kl2 .  
See Malinowski ( 19 3 5 , vol . 1 : 4 0-8 ) for an account o f  the inland 
lagoon exchange relations . 
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Another similar change i n  central zone-periphery relations 
came with regard to the prestigious ceremonial exchange system, the 
kuZa . 1 I n  pre colonial and early colonial times many men of the 
central zone were prominent in the inland exchange system, linking 
northern and southern kuZa communities . Missionary influence , 
however ,  always strongest in the central zone , opposed the kuZa 
system as a waste of time and as conducive to immorality and dishonesty . 
Prior to the second world war , because of this · opposition and because 
of changing interests , kuZa exchanging was diminishing in the central 
zone . In  the 1970s almost no one but a few elderly inactive men 
remained ' in '  the kuZa . Age old bonds had attenuated to insignificance , 
whi le northern and southern Kiriwinans , as well as outer islanders , 
continued their active participation in the system. 
The introduction of the national system of local government 
councils i nto the Trobriands in 1966 also influenced the developing 
centre-periphery divide . Chiefs were denied any ex officio role in 
the early council . Several , nevertheless , were elected only , to 
their surprise , to be subordinate to educated councillors, especially 
the commoner and lagoon-dweller who was elected president . Numerous 
of the chie fly figures retired or were defe�ted in subsequent elections , 
departing with grievances against the fledgling i ns ti tution . 
The council grounds , temporarily located on the government 
s tation , were later moved to a permanent site j us t  north of the 
station. Permanent buildings for the new grounds took up council 
resources for three and a half years and hence expected village level 
proj ects did not get substantially underway until the fourth and 
fifth years of the council ' s  l i fe . By then , taxes had been raised 
to more than double what they had been under pre council conditions . 
Most taxpayers therefore experienced little in relation to their 
development expectations of the counci l  but ,  in their own view , saw 
their tax money disappearing into the council centre i tself - or , 
1 
See Malinowski ( 19 2 2 }  for the classic account of the kuZa and 
see Chapters 19 and 21 for information on central zone 
participation. 
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better said ,  establishing another source of services and employment 
for those of the central zone . The council , too late , began to 
distribute i ts efforts more evenly throughout the villages . 
Political factors : categorical contrast 
The previous section has briefly sketched the his torical 
development of a growing contrast in Trobriand society between a 
central zone and areas peripheral to i t .  Anthropologi sts customarily 
look for insights into significant social and political groupings 
such as these by examining the verbal categories in which such 
groupings are represented. Has the diachronic and cumulative process 
of centre-peri phery division come to be represented in Kiriwinan 
verbal categories? The answer is that it has by interesting adaptations 
of old and new vocabulary . 
In the 1890s the category Losuia re ferred to a named section 
of lagoon-front garden land owned and worked by people who lived 
about a half a kilometre north of the coast .  The land was sold to 
the government and i ts name became the name of the government station . 
In contemporary usage miLosuia , meaning ' people of Losuia ' ,  has several 
referential ambiguities . Depending on context, it may mean (1 ) all 
people of Losuia proper ; ( 2 )  all black people of Losuia , i . e .  
excluding whites ; ( 3 )  all Trobrianders of Losuia , i . e .  excluding 
whites and foreign blacks ; and ( 4 )  all Trobrianders ,  villagers or 
otherwise , who live on or in the environs of , and hence under the 
influence of , the government station . Usage ( 4 )  is alIOC>st coterminous 
with the traditional category Kulwnata , a name referring collectively 
to all the villages of the northern lagoon shore . MiLosuia and 
minaKulwnata, i . e .  people of Kuluma.ta , are o ften spoken of in contrast 
to minaKilivi la , i . e . people of Kilivi la .  Ki livila in i ts usage in 
early colonial times referred basically to a section of northern 
Kiriwina , rich in ferti le soils and yams and the home of the prestigious 
' paramount chie f '  of Omarakana village . Thi s  usage is sti l l  extant 
yet the term minaKilivila has expanded referentially and now also 
can be taken as ' all people of northern Kiriwina ' in contrast to 
miLosuia or minaKulwnata . 
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The contrast set miLosuia and minaKi livi la is particularly 
potent semantically . On the surface the categories are simply 
territoria l ,  indicating who lives where .  At thi s  level they are 
not value laden . Metaphorically ,  however ,  the categories represent 
different values resulting from changes and contradictions that have 
been emerging in Trobriand society over the last eighty years . These 
metaphorical usages can become semantic weapons in conflict situations . 
MiLosuia can represent ' education , sophistication , the monetarily 
wealthy , those housed in permanent dwellings , people with fine 
European clothes (especially shoes ) , and people socially close to 
Europeans ' .  Inverted , the same category can metaphorically say 
'people without yams or magic , people subservient to Europeans who 
live off the rubbish they throw away , bigheads , and people without 
traditional valuables ' . All these pejorative usages appear in other 
categories which northern Kiriwinans use when discussing miLosuia. 
They say miLosuia are : kauku.Ja or dogs , meaning servile animals who 
follow their masters and consume rubbish; gala kasi ' or yamless people ; 
tonanata or nothing-man ( from the Engli sh ' nought' )  meaning without 
magic or traditional valuables , and biged or bigheaded , meaning people 
arrogant over their education and acquired cultural sophistication . 
An interesting play on the ' rubbish ' theme arises from the fact that 
a small portion of the physical place Losuia is actually called 
Rabesi from the English term ' rubbish ' .  The place was formerly a 
rubbish dump where now retired or non government people have built 
semi-traditional houses of  their own . This section of Losuia is the 
brunt of many j okes and , in denigratory contexts , is made to stand 
for Losuia as a whole . 
MinaKi livi la , like i ts contrast category , can represent ' people 
of the vil lages (especially northern) ,  people of high traditional 
rank , people wi th yams and magic , people who kula , and people c lose 
to ancestral tradition ' .  Inverted,  it may become ' ignorant people , 
people of the bush , people of darkness , or people of no account ' . 
These pej orative connotations also appear when Losuians discuss non 
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Losuians as in : ( 1 )  dabasi gaZa or mindless people , 1 ( 2 ) tomanibus 
and buskanaka from Pidgin and English meaning ' uncivilized or 
backward person ' ,  and ( 3 )  toZesi dudubiZe or 'people of dark times 
before Christian enlightenment arrived ' .
2 
An example of the semantic potency of the category Losuia and 
KiZivi Za occurred at the inception of the local government council 
i n  1966.  Prior to that date government officers , in consultation 
wi th high ranking chiefs , had decided that the new organi zation would 
be called the Kilivila Local Government Council . This was duly 
established by national ordinance . However , as the council began , 
i t  quickly became apparent that the name caused considerable 
dissatis faction . Indeed , it was the main i ssue of counci l  business 
in 1966-67 . Led by lagoon dwe l lers , with support from southerners 
and outer i slanders , the name was changed to Kiriwina Local Government 
Council ,  using the anglicized form of Kilivila as a less emotive 
substi tute . The solution was not wholly sati sfactory to anyone as 
the Trobriand group had never been called Kiriwina before . Neverthe­
less the sectionally evocative symbol was avoided . At the same 
time the counci l discussions publicly vented pej orative connotations 
of Ki Zivi Za which stung northern village leaders elected as counc illors . 
The debate also generated the perception among those leaders that 
the council was dominated by non Kilivilans . 
Finally , the categorical contrast between miLosuia and minaKi Zivi Za 
primarily refers , of course , to corx::EJ.±ual and social divi sions in 
the total north zone above the lagoon . The representation of centre­
periphery distinction which sets miLosuia in opposition to all other 
Trobriand villagers resident in the islands is complex and only of 
recent prominence .  
1 
2 
Under European influence , the Kiriwinan location of mind or 
inte lligence has shi fted from the stomach and throat to the head 
and the metonym used for it is da'ba or ' forehead ' . 
The primary use of Zatuta dudubi Ze or ' dark times ' i s , however , 
to refer to all Trobrianders in pre-Chri stian times . 
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The category tomota means ' the people ' in Kiriwinan . Like the 
term ' people ' in other political vocabularies , tomota is enormously 
ambiguous . It may mean : ( 1 )  all human beings , as opposed to 
animals and all non-human things , ( 2 )  all black-skinned people , as 
opposed to whites ,  ( 3 ) all Trobrianders ,  as opposed to Europeans and 
foreign blacks , ( 4 )  all Trobriand villagers in relation to the 
government, or ( 5 )  all Trobriand villagers in relation to all non­
traditional institutions and their supporters in the islands . Usages 
( 4 )  and ( 5 )  are , of course , closely allied to one another . Usage 
(4 ) is by no means new and is found in historical records of 
discussions over taxes , medical services , government work-days and 
the like . Usage ( 5 )  is much more recent and appears in the political 
rhetoric of conflict in the late 1960s and 1970s . The newly emergent 
People ' s  Kabisawali Government of 1972- 7 3  employs the category tanota 
in usages ( 3 ) , ( 4 ) , or ( 5 )  depending on context . 
Po litical factors : chiefs over time 
This section will not review the anthropological controversy 
over how to classify and explain the traditional Trobriand system of 
political leadership . 1 In this paper , the Kiriwina category guyau 
is simply translated as ' chief ' . A ' chief'  is a village headman who 
is also the holder of  upper-level status in the ascribed social 
ranking system which divides all Trobrianders into two categories , 
privileged and connnoner . The status of such a privileged headman 
is marked by such attributes as house and yamhouse decoration , special 
personal adornment , rights to ritual deference from others , polygyny , 
and rights to certain kinds of tribute . Such headmen,  whether 
privileged or not ,  are the primary organizers of large scale collective 
activities . This means kula journeys , harvest festivities , cricket 
matche s ,  and in most cases the village gardening cycle . Formerly 
they were also the organi zers of warfare . 
1 See Malinowksi (1922 : chapter 2 )  and (19 3 5 , vol . l :  
( 1960)  and Uberoi ( 196 2 ) . 
33-40 ) ; Powell 
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Such headmen , especially the privi leged one s ,  compete vigorously 
against each other for renown . The privileged headmen or chiefs are 
loosely inter-graded amongst themselves in ascriptive prestige terms . 
This fluid scaled model of precedence is not rigi d ,  however , because 
it is conceptually interlinked with and supplemented by a second model 
of leadership based on open achievement of renown and name-building 
through prowess in gardening and ceremonial exchange , wisdom in 
decision-making and dispute-settlement , and ski ll in establishing 
alliances and political support . On these skeletal criteria there 
is a considerable number of chiefs in Trobriand society at any given 
point in time . Probably the range 10- 2 5  would quantitatively cover 
the number of such position-holders at any one moment over the last 
eighty years . 
The rivalry and competition among these key figures is very 
complex . At any given time some will be too young,  too old , or too 
uninterested to compete openly and vigorously against their counter­
parts . The more competitive , on the other hand , do not ,  or at least 
have not historically , viewed the entire set of chiefs throughout all 
the islands as challengers . They have tended to see their field of 
competitiors as those chiefs fairly close , rather than far distant . 
Northern Kiriwina has been the most concentrated arena for this kind 
of competitive orientation . 
In the colonial foundation period , the chief o f  Omarakana in 
northeastern Kiriwina was clearly in the political ascendancy . In 
the 1890s he was recorded as having thirty-one wives drawn from 
numerous northern villages . Government authorities originally 
recognized his position as that of absolute supremacy but later came 
to take a more localized view of his influence , especially after his 
humiliating military defeat at the hands of a nearby rival in 1899 . 
From that time to the present,  the colonial authorities have 
never had a clear or consistent policy vis-a-vis Trobriand chiefs . 
While always according the Omarakana chief precedence , the authorities 
have at various times viewed him as friend or oppressor , as the sole 
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spokesman of the people , as only a primus inter pares , as powerful 
or as powerless . Chiefs other than the Omarakana one have found 
themselves completely ignored or treated as important near-equals 
with the chief of precedence . The height of this inconsi stency was 
reached when all chiefs were de-recognized at the inception of the 
new local government council in 1966 - only to find the Omarakana 
incumbent resurrected two years later as a powerless figurehead for 
the council . Needless to say , this inconsistent treatment has 
exacerbated internal rivalries between chiefs and has led to resent­
ment of varying depths vis-a-vis national and local admini strations . 
From 1931-61 the Omarakanan incumbent was a forceful and 
cunning figure named Mitakata who maintained a sometime hostile and 
sometime co-operative relationship with the national government . 
During the earlier decades of his incumbency his pre-eminent prestige 
was not apparently challenged openly by rivals . In his waning years , 
however , a bitter dispute flared up among all Kiriwinan chiefs , 
focussed on the symbolic meaning of a special government medal 
awarded to Mitakata in his capacity as a village councillor . The 
dispute turned on whether the medal gave Mitakata authority over his 
rivals . In 1952 the government officer on the Trobriands skilfully 
defused the dispute by interpreting away the authority problem. 
The last decade of Mitakata ' s  period as chief of Omarakana was 
marked by vacillation over his successor . There were essentially two 
choices : Vanoi , his sister ' s  seventh child but first son , and Waibadi , 
his sister ' s  daughter ' s  son . Though in theory a generation apart , 
these two men were in fact very nearly the same age . Each had 
weaknesses as a potential successor and as Mitakata weighed the 
relative merits of the two wave after wave of rumour ran through the 
Trobriands of the 1950s that now one , now the other was the chosen 
figure . Eventually Vanoi became the successor as his birth position 
made his claim stronger and as there were charges against his rival 
over alleged involvement with Mitakata ' s  younger wives . It was ,  and 
still i s ,  disputed,  however , that Mitakata ever made a clear choice 
between them . 
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The result of thi s succession problem has been,  in the 1960s 
and 1970s , an Omarakana chiefship weakened by internal rivalry and 
a divi sion of the power base of the position . This division has 
opened up possibilities of public challenge and competition for 
renown among Trobriand chiefs which would have been difficult in an 
earlier period. 
Kabisawa.Zi Movement and opposition 
Beginnings of the movement 
In 1967 , Narabutau , chief of Yalumgwa village in northeastern 
Kiriwina , was defeated for re-election to the local government council .  
Disgruntled with the council over its functionlessness ,  he began a 
local development proj ect , the breeding and selling of imported 
Australian pigs . The initial capital for this proj ect came from 
fines imposed on those who broke his taboo on taking betelnut from 
local trees .  A sum of over KlOO was accumulated and banked at the 
nearby mission. The pigs arrived in 1969 and the pro j ect thereafter 
had a short li fe of limited success . 
In December 1969 Narabutau ' s  nephew and successor,  John 
Kasaipwalova , returned to Papua New Guinea and the Trobriands following 
six years education in Australia . Kasaipwalova ' s  five years of 
secondary schooling had been outstandingly successful . Numerous 
honours including the school captaincy came his way and his Queensland 
intermediate level exam results were very nearly perfect - a11X>ng the 
best in the state . Back home , this news created a sensation - a 
Trobriander beating Europeans at their own game ! The press cuttings 
were proudly pasted on the door of Kasaipwalova ' s  father ' s  house . 
In 1969 , however , Kasaipwalova participated so deeply in the 
New Left Movement at the University of Queensland that he failed to 
receive a scholarship to continue as a student . He returned home 
fired with ideas for radical change in the Trobriands . In early 
1970 he unsuccessfully sought to mobilize village resentment against 
the raising of high school fees . The episode ended with admonishments 
from government officials and the Omarakana chiefs . 
John Kasaipwalova addre s s ing a Kabis awali meeting , 19 7 3  
( Photo courtesy Pos t-Courier) 
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In late 1971 , during student vacation from the University of 
Papua New Guinea , Kasaipwalova demonstrated his educational assets 
before the Trobriand public . In December ,  the Omarakana chie f ' s 
successor was j ailed on charges of stealing from the Omarakana Co­
operative Store where he worked as a secretary . Trobrianders feared 
a natural disaster brought on by the powerful magic of the arrested 
man ' s  senior relatives . Indeed , it did rain 33 cm the day following 
the imprisonment, stimulating fears of worse to come . Kasaipwalova 
championed the arrested man ' s  cause and through some knowledge of 
the law , plus personal contacts with Port Moresby lawyers , had the 
man quickly out on bail and his case ultimately quashed. The strategy 
meetings surrounding this case were also the initial planning sessions 
for the movement-to-be . 
It was in these meetings that the name Kabisawali was born . The 
term means , at its simplest, ' to search ' . It also carries the further 
connotations of searching for food in a time of hunger , searching 
absent mindedly or without a systematic plan , or searching when there 
is no certainty that the obj ect of the search exists . The connotations 
of the term then are double edged . The negative connotations , 
however , came to be glossed over by the movement later and the name 
translated for outsiders as ' to search in a spirit of experimentation ' .  
In January 1972 the first political meetings under the name 
Kabisawali took place in northern Kiriwina . Kasaipwalova , Narabutau 
and Kasaipwalova ' s  father were the prime movers behind these events . 
In these meetings Kasaipwalova , dressed theatrically in African 
nationalist style , gave his version of Trobriand history under colonial 
rule . He emphasized how the people had become ' dogs-on-a-leash ' 
behind Europeans and how this could be different with new organization 
and confidence . He urged that Trobrianders could and should take 
control of their own affairs . As for positive prograrranes , he 
suggested without details Kabisawali-run trade stores , transportation 
services , a high school , and a tourist business . He also argued that 
the social depression in the i slands should be attacked by restoring 
gardening to its old prominence .  
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Large crowds attended these meetings and their mood was 
ambivalent . No one questioned the view of colonial relations nor 
stated aspirations different from the speaker . Caution and 
disagreement were expressed over whether or not the people could 
achieve these things on their own initiative . Ultimately the argument 
that carried the day was that creative experimentation was the 
Trobriand way of doing things and so , even if the venture failed , 
it was a risk worth taking . With this agreed , symbolically 
important financial contributions flowed from numerous chiefs , 
including the Omarakana incumbent , and a Kabisawali fund was 
underway . Most local government counci l lors boycotted the meetings 
and the reception of the news in Losuia was hostile . 
Early econanic progrcmm es 
The earliest programme of the movement was a system of basic­
commodi ty trade stores located in Kabisawali villages . The programme 
began in April 1972 and ended in May 19 7 3 .  
The plan was to provide basic consumer goods such a s  tobacco , 
sugar , rice and kerosene from traditional material buildings 
constructed and manned by voluntary labour . The ventures were to 
be started by village collections of KlOO as investment capital for 
the initial supplies . The Kabisawali central organization with its 
bulk store in Yalumgwa was to be overal l supplier of the system . 
The first store opened in Yalumgwa in April 1972 . The las t  half of 
19 72 saw the most rapid expansion of the system which ultimately 
included thirty-eight separate village outlets . 
The store system was a popular idea but not an economic success . 
Most stores ceased operations six to nine months after opening . The 
causes of the collapse were numerous : in August 1972 the tourist 
ho tel burned down , severely curtailing the flow of cash into 
Trobriand hands and therefore making consumer purchasing power 
unexpectedly weak ; the reduced monetary income , plus the July-
December drought of 19 72 , which diminished the food supply , created 
excessive credit and ' borrowing ' from the stores ; the store-system plan was 
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insufficiently comprehensive and rationalized to allow for unbought 
goods , natural wastage , overhead costs , and unexpected contingencies ; 
the wholesale supplier cut off Kabisawali credit at a ceiling of KlS , 000 
effectively halting the supply of goods . 
There was hard work and real commitment behind the stores 
programme . Nevertheless the business skills to manage it were weak 
and the enterprise had the bad luck of an ill-timed climatic and 
tourist drought . An interesting feature of the collapse of the stores 
was that it did not immediately damage the political credit of the 
new Itk)Vement and i ts leadership in the eyes of Itk)St of the movement ' s  
new followers . The reasons were , first ,  that the locali zed service 
aspect was novel and popular and , secondly , that many followers 
privately realized the stores failed because they themselves did not 
pay their bills . Those outside the Itk)Vement , both government and 
Trobriand opposition , derided the proj ect as unsound from the start . 
They charged that it was set up contrary to proven business principles , 
that the entire exercise was the action of a political ' con-man ' 
bent on personal advancement , and that the Kabisawali leaders were 
cunningly duping people out of Itk)ney for their own personal gain . 
While it was always hard for the observer to know what was happening 
to Kabisawali store funds , it can at least be said that there was 
no conspicuous consumption allX)ng the Itk)Vement ' s  leaders during that 
period or later - nor was there any known public or private complaint 
by Kabisawali followers about personal gain or consumption altk)ng 
the leaders .  
Transportation was another early programme . The aims were to 
give people along the Kiriwinan road system cheap access to fairly 
regular transport and to encourage communally-owned village trucks . 
Until 1972 only one Trobriander had ever owned a vehicle personally . 
The irregular transportation services of the traders and the local 
government council were deemed expensive , insufficient in relation 
to demand , and in one case corrupt . The transportation programme 
began in 1972 with the borrowing of a dilapidated old utility from 
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an in-law of Kasaipwalova . The vehicle was called Miraiwa , taunting 
the opposition who sarcastically called Kabisawali people ' men of 
Iwa ' after the cargo cultists of the nearby island of Iwa . 
In January 1973 the transportation programme moved on to a new 
plateau . A large white Toyota truck with KABISAWALI emblazoned on 
the sides was purchased through a Development Bank loan and financial 
contributions from six villages around Yalumgwa . A collective and 
competitive repayment scheme was started to pay off the loan . The 
truck stayed in seemingly constant motion taking women to mortuary 
exchanges ,  men to political meetings , copra to the buyers , and young 
people to the Saturday gathering in Losuia . It also ran constant 
errands on request by movement supporters .  But for Saturdays , no 
consistent policy of charges for the use of the truck was made and , 
in all probability , the vehicle did not recover its fuel costs . In  
addition , the truck at times carried 80  or more passengers , so 
maintenance quickly became a problem. The truck was ,  nevertheless , 
to Kabisawali supporters a potent symbol of their new organization , 
proof that the movement could deliver non traditional benefits to 
those who had felt disadvantaged for so long . However , unrecognized 
by the supporters , the loosely rationali zed methods of using and 
maintaining the truck also signalled the weakness of the IOC>vement . 
Another early programme , a minor one , was the building of a 
road through the northwestern Kiriwinan swamp . In the interior of 
the swamp lived some 800 people who had petitioned all authorities 
without success over the previous forty yearn about building such a 
road . It was for them the major issue of their area and they noted 
ruefully that the 1972 local government council road built to connect 
north and south Kiriwina had been put through swamps much worse than 
theirs . With an eye to potential support and to proving the communal 
e fficacy of the new organi zation , Kabisawali leaders called out their 
followers en masse to raise the earth foundation of the potential 
road and to lay a corduroy surface across it . This was achieved but 
the road fell short of completion because of the costs of renting 
a bulldozer to lay the coral super-surface of the track . 
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An index of the mounting tension surrounding the Kabisawali 
Movement and what its intentions were came in October 1972 during 
the road work . Two Kabisawali villages came to loggerheads during 
the work and sticks were thrown , causing two minor inj uries . The 
rumour process at government headquarters recorded this as a potential 
uprising and a special detachment of police was flown in in readiness . 
To Kasaipwalova the early economic progranunes were desirable 
in themselves as examples of what could be achieved by populist 
organization and new self-confidence . At the same time , he alone 
among the Kabisawali leadership saw these proj ects as building blocks 
for a new political organi zation . 
People 's Ka.bisawa Zi Government 
The idea for a counter organization to the local government 
council was first floated publicly by Kasaipwalova in November 1972 . 
After innumerable meetings and discussions , the new name and idea 
became established in December .  Before the usual issues o f  internal 
structure , policies , finance and the like were even discussable , 
however,  the immediate problem of the new organization was how to 
arrange the various Kabisawali chiefs in relation to each other . 
The sensitivi ties of these former rivals was a delicate matter 
which required three months of public and private meetings to sort 
out . The main problem was Vanoi , the Omarakana chief ,  who had earlier 
supported the movement ' s  economic efforts but vacillated over the 
new political move . At the same time other chiefs were reluctant 
to accord him precedence though Kabisawali supporters were not . 
Eventually Vanoi withdrew from the movement on the grounds of not 
wishing to offend the government , and a triumvirate of chiefs , openly 
acknowledging their ' equality ' of rank , emerged as the principal 
senior decision-makers . They were Narabutau of Yalumgwa , Mweyoyu 
of Kabwaku ,  and Pulitala of Gumilababa . Kasaipwalova ' s  university­
educated brother-in-law Beona and , of course , Kasaipwalova himself 
were the remaining two who have , since that period , comprised the 
five main figures of the movement . 
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The emergence of this new organi zation , especially its name 
and the ruroour that its leader { first Kasaipwalova , then Vanoi , then 
Kasaipwalova again ,  and finally Mweyoyu) was to be called kini or 
king , dramatically increased the significance of the Kabisawali 
Movement in the eyes of its opposition and in government circles . 
From the outside , the activity was variously interpreted as a 
secessionist movement , a latter-day cargo cult , a locali zed 
revolution against established traditional and governmental authority , 
a skilful political campaign for parliament, a threat to European 
interests , and a Machiavellian confidence game . Interestingly , these 
interpretations , held with deep feeling and conviction , occurred 
before the new organization had any established policies at all . 
The reasons for this were essentially twofold : first,  1972-73 was 
a period of heightened uncertainty nationally due to the accelerating 
decoloni zation ; secondly , Kasaipwalova had a personal reputation 
as an enfant terribZ� a reputation generated by himself about himself 
in his speeches and actions in the national capital in 1970-7 2 . As 
it turned out, the localized-revolution explanation was not wholly 
incorrect , though the concept needs careful cultural interpretation 
in order not to be misleading . In any case , no one , inside or 
outside of Kabisawali , noticed that the 1972 activities of the 
movement were entirely consistent with the new Papua New Guinean­
dominated cabinet ' s  much publicized Eight Point Plan for Development . 
Throughout late 1972 and early 1973  the ideological cleavage 
in Trobriand society was deepening rapidly . Kabisawali was 
encouraging people to put their faith in the organization which would 
be more expressive of themselves and their culture . The stores 
proj ect too was appearing to work . In addition , July-December 1972 
was a period of severe drought which was openly claimed to have been 
brought on by Waibadi , the Omarakana chief ' s  former {and still 
current) rival for ' paramountcy ' and as well the president of the 
threatened local government council . Waibadi publicly acknowledged 
that his feared fertility magic was behind the drought . The drought 
was therefore pervasively accepted as a demonstration of his power . 
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However , there was among the villagers a surprising twist in the 
interpretation of this event. It was accepted that Waibadi had a 
legitimate grievance against the Kabisawali leaders , who were seen 
to be challenging his prestige .
1 Hence his drought-making upon 
them was to be expected and was within the pragmatic rules of  
political competition and chiefly rivalry . But the drought was 
Trobriand-wide , even , in fac t ,  nation-wide , as government posters 
and radio broadcasts indicated.  This was arbitrary and unj us t ,  
beyond the legitimacy of punishing one ' s  enemies , s o  many villagers 
said . 
The drought ended and the rains came again in January 197 3 .  
For a brief spell , tensions lessened.  Nevertheless , within two 
weeks a fter the beginning of the rains , another scourge became 
apparent. The prolonged dryness had changed the growth cycle of 
the sweet potato hawkmoth . With the rains , a torrent of these pests 
was released on the only remaining crop for innnediate sustenance , 
the sweet potato . Expectations of drought relief had been raised 
only to come crashing down again . Blame for the hawkmoth blight was 
privately assigned to Vanoi , the Omarakana chie f ,  as he was thought 
to control the magic and also because he had only weeks before 
experienced humiliation in his withdrawal from Kabisawali . 
Tempers were at a low ebb and a substantively trivial but 
symbolically significant event brought matters to a head . In  
February 1973 the newly-arrived Kabisawali Toyota was dented by a 
local government vehicle while parked in Losuia . The incident inflamed 
onlookers who hurled partisan invective at each other . Within hours 
the rumour spread that the Toyota had been hit ,  badly damaged , or 
smashed . Kabisawali villagers responded by donning war dress , 
stoning a council vehicle carrying Waibadi , and burning a council 
tractor and trailer . An attack on the council chambers advocated 
by Kabisawali chief Mweyoyu and his village was narrowly averted 
by Narabutau ' s  intervention . Kabi sawali members j usti fied their 
1 See Weiner ( 1976 : 2 2 3-5 ) . 
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actions as retaliation against the ' attack ' on their truck 
and against the blight and drought which had preceded i t .  The 
Trobriand opposition and the government , failing to understand the 
subj ective symbolic signi ficance of the truck , saw the damage as 
minute , which in obj ective terms it was ,  and therefore interpreted 
the event as a pretext being used by Kabisawali to stir up trouble 
against existing authority ;  the affair then was proof positive of 
Kabisawali intent and the lawlessness of its methods . Government 
officials had no idea that the blight and drought were culturally 
connected with the affair in the minds of  the villagers . 
Riot police were called in to arrest the arsonists and to 
prevent a possible civi l  war . At Kasaipwalova ' s  instigation , a 
campaign of know-nothingism was adopted against the police , thwarting 
their abili ty to locate and identify the actual people whose names 
they had on lists of suspects .  To counter this tactic , the police 
induced Waibadi , the council president and Kabisawali rival , to ride 
through Kabi sawali territory covered in a sheet so as to identify 
suspects without being identified himself . The ruse was discovered , 
however , and shortly afterwards a government car carrying Waibadi 
and Vanoi to Losuia was ambushed with sticks and rocks . The 
attackers were driven off with tear gas . 
The police strategy then changed on the assumption that to 
remove Kasaipwalova was to undermine the whole campaign of 
resistance . A five-month old charge against him for cursing a 
government official was reactivated and , in undergoing the necessary 
formalities for thi s ,  a second charge of ' insulting behaviour ' was 
laid because Kasaipwalova spat on the arresting officer . Bail was 
arranged and some days passed before a third charge of ' laying hold ' 
of a police officer at a roadblock was made . Kasaipwalova was then 
held in Losuia until late evening before bai l was allowed . Before 
his release , however , Kabisawali villagers had massed along the 
main road in fury . They attacked the government station with the 
obj ect of releasing Kasaipwalova and burning the government headquarters . 
The attack was repelled with tear gas wi thout inj ury . 
Plaque by Trobriand arti s t  Vala ' o si depi c ting the history of the 
Kabisawali Movement 
( Photo R . J .  May ) 

The attack achieved sensational headlines nationally1 and 
brought a stream of national leaders to the Trobriands to investigate . 
The chief minister ' s  aides argued for a cooling-off period and a 
search for a political , not police , settlement . The police were 
withdrawn within a week . The entire affair has rankled government 
and council supporters ever since as lawlessness went unpunished . 
One European police officer resigned over the affai r .  
The departure of the police was followed by the two largest 
Kabisawali meetings to date . Ostensibly to make policy decisions 
about taxes , financial goals and village representatives , the 
meetings were also a show of strength against critics before the 
eyes of invited representatives of the chief minj ster and the national 
press . Kabisawali laplap-uni forms were handed out to village 
councillors and wooden tableaux were carved in celebration of recent 
events . 
The charges against Kasaipwalova were not ,  how�ver , dropped 
and in May 1973 he was tried by a specially-appointed Papua New 
Guinean magi strate . The results were ' innocent ' on the cursing 
charge , ' no case to answer ' for laying hold , and ' guilty ' on the 
insulting behaviour charge . The sentence was three months at hard 
labour , suspended on a twelve-month good behaviour bond of KlOO . 
Physically , however , Kasaipwalova did not go to j ai l ,  a fact not 
unnoticed by the people who had understood li ttle of the machinations 
of the trial process . 
By mid-197 3 ,  the People ' s  Kabisawali Government was a loose 
organization of three tiers : ( i )  the five central figures ;  (ii ) over 
seventy village representatives from about two-thirds of the separate 
1 
The entire affair was followed in detail in the pages of the 
Port Moresby newspaper Post-Cou:riier during March 197 3 .  
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villages and settlements of the islands ; and { i i i )  all the 
taxpayers or those symbolically allied to the movemen� whose numbers 
were somewhat more than half the adult population . 1 
The policies of the Kabisawali government were : ( 1 )  to 
collect taxes so as to undermine the local government council ' s  
taxation scheme ; ( 2 )  to take control of the council by winning the 
1973 council elections ; ( 3 )  to revive gardening to its former 
heights ; ( 4 )  to buy an inter-island trawler to aid outer islanders , 
copra marketing , and the kula , and ( 5 ) to start a village court 
system under the traditional chiefs . 
The tax collection programme was implemented in April-June 197 3 . 
The rate was set at 50 toea for men and 20 toea for women , as 
opposed to council rates of K4 for men and 50 toea for women . In  
setting the rate no calculation was made of the potential sum 
total nor indeed was there any clear plan as to how the funds would 
be used . The final sum was in excess of KllOO . Concomitantly , 
taxes to the council had virtually ceased , even from counci l  supporters . 
In June 1973  Kabisawali leaders ,  over considerable opposition 
from their supporters , persuaded the movement to enter candidates 
in their local wards for local government elections . The candidates 
were �ot hand picked or endorsed by the leaders but were local 
choices . The results were never announced in popular voting s trength 
terms . In any case , the partisan affiliations of many candidates 
were unknown to the polling officials . The overt test of the results 
came therefore in the new council ' s  election of officers . Kasaipwalova 
displaced Waibadi as president by a vote of 16-14 with two Kitava 
councillors absent . In turn , Waibadi was elected vice-president by 
an 18- 12 vote over Kabisawali leader Beona . As could be expected , 
1 The seeming anomaly of two-thirds of settlements but somewhat more 
than half the adults is explained by the facts that Kabisawali 
had innumerable tiny villages and the opposition was strong in 
all the largest ones . These figures are from 1974 and should not 
be read into later periods . 
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Kabisawali claimed electoral victory , which the opposition vigorously 
denied . The meaning of thi s  election has been bitterly disputed 
ever since . 
Through Kabisawali ' s  ' dominance ' ,  the new counci l  collected 
no counci l  tax in 1973-74 and lost its employees through lack of 
wages . In April 1974 a mass meeting mainly of Kabisawali supporters 
voted the council out of existence . The national government officially 
suspended the organization three months later . Kabisawali chief 
Pulitala sequestered the council centre as a home and meeting place 
during that period . He did so in the name of the new Kabi sawali 
government and because the land , though sold to the national 
government in 196 7 ,  was by traditional land rights inalienably his 
own . Official liquidators have been trying to sort out this problem 
since August 1974 . 
Concerning gardening , Kabisawali chiefs exhorted the various 
villages of the movement to engage in gardening competi tions called 
kayasa in 197 3-74 . In fact ,  only a few did so . Nevertheless , during 
the year the rains were good and the tourist trade down so the end 
result was ,  in fact ,  a better harvest in 1974 than had been the case 
since 196 7 .  New yamhouses for all Kabisawali chiefs were built and 
filled , Narabutau ' s  becoming the largest in the Trobriands . 
A short note on yam politics and political credit is appropriate 
here . Vanoi , the Omarakana chief , had withdrawn from Kabisawali in 
early 197 3 . Despite the weak harvest of that year , Vanoi could have 
expected several hundred baskets of yams as support for his many 
wives (eight at the time ) and affirmation of his affinal alliances . 
In fact , he received approximately twenty baskets in toto , mere 
tokens of his exi stence . The problem arose because his affinal 
alliances were with Kabisawali-supporting vi llages who had ,  wi thout 
instructions from the movement , independently decided to signal 
thei r  changed leve l  of support for him . The outcome was further 
humiliation for Vanoi , who began di sassociating himself from the 
Kabisawali opposition . He rejoined Kabisawali in April 1974 
explaining to his colJ.eagues in opposition that his purpose was 
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sorcery and subversion within . Back within the movement , he was an 
anomaly and both he and his Kabisawali counterparts were constantly 
wary of each other ,  especially when eating together . 
An inter-island trawler affair was a serious mi scalculation . 
The finances and methods of running such a service were far beyond 
the capabilities of the movement but this was only discovered 
after the commitment had been taken . A village court system was 
begun in July 1974 with the building of a small courthouse in Kabwaku 
village . The idea was that the chiefs were to sit on demand there 
to mediate or arbitrate disputes through customary law. In fact , 
village leaders had always handled most of the dispute settlement 
anyway , despite the presence of a local court magistrate , so all 
that was new was the name and the court centre . 
From mid 1 9 7 3 ,  the national government had come to put a new 
interpretation on Kabisawali activi ties . As a result of fact­
finding tours by ministerial aides and a vi sit to the chief minister 
by leaders of the movement and the opposition , cabinet policy shi fted 
to neutrality between the two sides and the view was taken that the 
whole conflict was basically part of the traditional rivalries of 
the island chiefs . Government officials who had ' overinterpreted ' 
the conflict in their reports and became too partisan in their 
positions were rotated out but not reprimanded . However , neither 
side got de jure recognition , which Kabisawali especially requested , 
though both sides had substantial de facto dealings with the national 
government even to the point of receiving subsidies . 
Later economic programmes 
By May 1973 the stores system had collapsed but business activites 
1 
were not stilled . Kabisawali ' s  media fame , both in Papua New Guinea 
1 The Trobriand situation was followed closely by the newspapers and 
the Australian Broadcasting Commi ssion made a current affairs 
televi sion film on Kabisawali in 197 3 .  I n  late 1973 Kasaipwalova 
read poetry at the opening of the Sydney Opera House and was again 
on television . In 1975 BBC-'IV made a documentary on Kasaipwalova 
and the Trobriands called The Trobriand Experiment. 
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and Australia , attracted tourist agents . Kabisawali accepted offers 
to handle day charters .  The agreement was to sponsor tours of 
Kiriwina , a locally prepared meal ,  traditional dancing , and occasions 
for artifacts trading . A large indigenous resthouse was built on a 
southeastern beach as the focal point of these tours . The tours 
were rather popular at the outset . Kabisawali earned about K230 
per plane load and a further K350 on rough average went directly 
into the hands of villagers through artifacts sales . 
To the close observer , however , the weaknesses in the tourist 
effort were apparent from the start . Kasaipwalova , the main local 
organi zer , was ambivalent about tourism in the abstract .  The income 
was essential but he inwardly disliked putting Trobrianders on 
display as exotica for the pleasure of outsiders .  Furthermore , his 
anti bureaucratic attitudes expressed themselves in refusing to do 
the necessary paperwork associated with the business . Hence relations 
with tourist agents rapidly became strained and Kabisawali became 
labelled as an unpredictable local link for successful tours . As 
well , tourism did not have the popular appeal of the stores system. 
Tours were an infrequent, not everyday , service and were centred on 
only a few places . The old problem of distribution of benefit 
reappeared slowly in the organization of local tourism . 
Coupled with organizational weaknesses in the new programme 
were two exogenous factors . Firs t ,  in 1973-75  there was a substantial 
decrease in Europeans resident in Papua New Guinea , the primary 
population from which Trobriand tourists came , due to locali zation 
in the national public service with approaching independence and due 
to the ending of the labour-intensive construction phase of the 
nearby Bougainville copper mine . Coincidentally with this decrease 
in potential internal tourists was a decrease in tourists from 
Australia due to the international economic recession and very high 
national inflation . 
All these factors meant Kabisawali ' s tourism efforts had 
a few months of considerable success followed by decline . 
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In April 1974 , Kabisawali incorporated i t s  economic activities 
under the national law governing company registration and limited 
liabi lity . The result was constituted as the Kabisawali Village 
Development Corporation . The reasons for this move were : firs t ,  
relations with the national government were ameliorating ; secondly , 
registration seemed likely to increase access to potential government 
subsidies, and thirdly , Kasaipwalova , inexperienced in business 
affairs , had only recently come to understand that the movement ' s  
financial affairs conducted in hi s name left him personally 
vulnerable before the law and that limited liability was an easy way 
around this problem . 
The main activi ty of the new ' corporation ' was artifacts trading . 
Tourism was already declining but had demonstrated the money in 
selling carvings . Two buildings were leased to begin the enterprise , 
one an unused warehouse in Losuia and the other a retail shop in 
downtown Port Moresby . The plan was to buy at reasonable prices , 
preferably undercutting the nearby United Church arti facts store 
on Kiriwina , and to sell more cheaply and in a culturally distinctive 
manner in Port Moresby . Carvers ,  however ,  ignored the ideological 
arguments at the Kabisawali store and simply played the various 
buyers off against each other for the best price to them$eaves . 
Nevertheless , the system was established, despite teething pains , 
depending heavily on the idealism of educated young Kabisawali 
supporters for its impetus . In Port Moresby , its store , Arts 
Trobriand , was distinctive for its 24-hour-a-day trading and i ts 
character as a grass-roots development pro j ect . 
Another progranune of the new corporation was the building of 
a Trobriand-style tourist hotel , fine arts centre , and museum . The 
five main Kabisawali leaders spent a great deal of time considering 
the kind of tourism they wanted and the kind of hotel it should 
revolve around . Their basic decisions were that the hotel should 
look like a Trobriand village but should have what tourists wanted 
as amenities , that it should serve mostly local foods , that it 
should be run by Trobrianders , that villagers should have free 
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access to it so they could at least come and see films there , and 
that it should be located at a considerable distance from the 
villages so as to prevent favouritism by proximity and intrusion 
of village privacy . The entire pro j ect was predicated on access to 
a newly-established development fund in the Chief Minister ' s  
Department. Kabisawali provided and cleared the land and was to 
donate labour to the proj ect . An imaginative architect ' s  plan was 
in existence before the end of the fieldwork period .
1 
Linked to the hotel scheme was a plan for an arts centre and 
a museum. The arts centre idea was generated by a visit to the 
Trobriands of a famous French ethnomusicologist.  The plan was to 
have a centre or retreat not far from the hotel site where Trobriand 
artists could congregate for mutual s timulus and where outside artists -
sculptors , painters and musicians - could come and disseminate new 
art forms . The Sopi Arts Centre was under construction on donated 
Kabisawali land j ust over a coral ridge from the hotel site when 
fieldwork ended .
2 The local museum idea was generated by news that 
the earliest collection of Trobriand artifacts , that of the first 
missionary , Rev . S .B .  Fellows , had recently been rediscovered and 
sold to the Office of the Prime Minsiter of Australia with the 
intention of returning it to Papua New Guinea . Kabisawali leaders 
vi sited Canberra in 1974 to see the collection . The proj ect went 
forward for government consideration but the Kabisawali chiefs , 
being not so enthusiastic about the collection on the grounds that 
it was not very different from contemporary material ,  never put i t  
high o n  their l i s t  of priorities . 
1 
2 
From secondary sources ,  it has been learned that the hotel plan 
effectively died in 1975-76 with the government ' s  waning confidence 
in Kabisawali and with the effective opposition to the hotel grant 
by the opposing movement . 
The Sopi Arts Centre appears under construction in the BBC-TV film 
The Trobriand Experiment 1975 . The centre apparently fell into 
disuse in 1976 and Kasaipwalova was convicted in 1977 of misusing 
government subsidies for the centre and local tourist development . 
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Opposition 
The Kabisawali Movement, as has been noted , faced opposition 
from varying sources at varying times . At its outset , even on its 
first day , it was seen as a threat by the people of the government 
station I.osuia and the villagers of the northern lagoon shore ( the 
central zone ) , and as well by the supporters of the counci l  president 
Waibadi . Beyond these sources , secondary categories of opposition 
developed ,  but less immediately , am:>ng Vakuta I slanders , some members 
of the indigenous United Church pastorate , co-operative store officials , 
and peoples of various villages such as Kaduwaga on Kaileuna I sland , 
Kurnwagea on Kitava I sland , and Sinakata in south Kiriwina . In 
addition , almost all Trobrianders working away from the i slands , 
with the exception of students who were divided , came to oppose the 
movement . In broadest abstraction , ignoring for the moment some 
exceptions , the opposition tended to be the greater receivers of the 
non traditional benefits and services of colonial institutions past 
and present . 
In 1972-73 the opposi tion did not develop into a counter 
organization but , nevertheless , as a loose congeries of leaders and 
groups , matched Kabisawali point-for-point in ideological debate . 
The main spokesmen in this debate were Waibadi , former parliamentarian 
Lepani Watson ( then resident on Vakuta ) , Charles Lepani (senior 
civil servant in the national government) , Elliott Eli j ah ( senior 
civil servant) ,  and various local civil servants , pastors and high­
ranking councillors . Their arguments were that Kabisawali represented 
an illegitimate usurpation of traditional leadership privileges , that 
it endangered government-mission-medical-education-trading services , 
that the villagers had insufficient knowledge for running large-
scale economic and political enterpri ses , and that Europeans could 
and should be co-operated with , not opposed . Kasaipwalova was 
despised as a political ' con-man ' and the other chiefs , his ' followers ' ,  
were considered fools and opportunistic usurpers . In 1972-73 the 
opposition was without concrete programmes , its major counter ' action ' 
being Waibadi ' s  drought . 
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In mid 1973 the opposition began to crystalli ze into a 
Ilk)Vement itsel f .  The first step in this direction was the short­
lived Tabalu Association . 1 Then in early 1974 the Tonenei Kamokwita 
Movement emerged as an organized opposition with defined goals and 
proposed programme ( see Chapter 9 )  . 
As has been mentioned , the national government was also a 
kind of opposition to Kabisawali , especially in 1972-73 . 
Kasaipwalova ' s  radical reputation and pre-existing personal enemies 
in high places were partly responsible for this . However , a second 
factor also counted . Unknown to themselves , the cabinet , police 
and senior Administration officials in Port Moresby received their 
formal and informal information about Kabisawali activities largely 
via partisan channels . Their search for ' Trobriand public opinion ' 
and the ' real facts ' was being fed from the other end of the 
information pipeline by opinion gathered on the government station 
or passed inwards to the centre informally by Trobriand civil 
servants . The process was not one of conscious deception or 
duplicity . All information-providers were genuine in their 
intentions ; it was j ust that no one perceived the underlying 
structure of the conflict situation so as to know how to evaluate 
different reckonings of the problem . In any case , ' objective ' facts 
are always more difficult to acquire in conflict si tuations , requiring 
infinitely more time and effort in cross-checking . It is probable 
that none of the government ' s  information providers had had any 
training with regard to this problem . In any case , as noted earlier , 
government officials eventually opened up dual channels of  
information which led to a more detached and even-handed approach 
to the Trobriand conflict , a policy still extant at the end of 
fieldwork . 
Finally , Kabisawali opposition was beginning to surface from 
within its own ranks in 1974 . After the stores collapse , Ilk)Vement 
activities shifted centripetally and gradually into the core area 
1 The Tabalu are the highest ranking sub-clan of the Trobriands , 
the descent group of Vanoi and Waibadi and previous • paramount 
chiefs ' .  
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of northeastern Kiriwinan villages surrounding Yalumgwa . These 
villages outside the core area - in the south , in the northwest,  
on Kitava , on Kaileuna - were beginning to question the benefit 
of the movement to themselves . To them, the old system of a central 
area , servicing a few to the disadvantage of the distant,  seamed 
possibly to be reemerging with a new locus . Some questioning and 
disillusionment was developing at the end of the field period . 
Leadership 
This section deals with the most controversial and divisive 
problem of interpreting the Kabisawali Movement , the nature of i ts 
leadership . It is primarily intended for readers inside Papua New 
Guinea . 
One or many 
For innumerable observers and even some Trobriand supporters 
of Kabisawali , the movement has been synonymous with the activities 
of its perceived initiator Kasaipwalova . The belief is , quite 
simply , that it exists because he created i t ,  that it does what he 
says , and that it is what he stands for . 
There can be little doubt that , despite anti council resentment 
and the latent greater receiver/less receiver division in Trobriand 
society , there would have been no organized movement without 
Kasaipwalova ' s  catalytic role . There are several factors , however ,  
which circumscribe this initiator ' s  role . First , Narabutau began 
the pre-Kabisawali development activities and Narabutau named the 
movement . Secondly , Narabutau and Kasaipwalova ' s  father managed 
all Kabisawali affairs , including the first store , during the first 
six months of the movement . Thirdly , Narabutau and several others 
attracted Kabisawali chief Mweyoyu into the movement . Fourthly , 
the Kabisawali chiefs and senior figures guided Kasaipwalova in 
1972-73 to seek support where it would be found and to avoid 
villages and personalities who would be impossible to convert . 
Kasaipwalova was unsure where his opposi tion would come from at the 
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beginning of the movement and he was steered by others . Fi fthly , 
Kasaipwalova and Kabisawali had the politician ' s  sheer luck of a 
burned-down touri st hotel and a simultaneous drought , phenomena 
which drove supporters into the movement while seeming to result 
from the leader ' s  influence alone . Sixthly , Kasaipwalova ' s  role 
was magnified vis-a-vis the world outside Kabisawali , especially 
the national scene , because he almost alone was in control of the 
outward flow of information in EngZish. Within these circumscriptions , 
Kasaipwalova was , nevertheless , the most vital figure in the movement 
in 1972-74 . He was especially important to the pace , the novelty ,  
and the confidence o f  the movement - while also being the creator 
and maintainer of an unnecessarily intense level of opposition to 
h . . . 1 t e entire activity . 
Was the catalytic figure an unfettered voice in Kabisawali 
decision-making? It is true that he brought forth most of the new 
ideas which moved the movement : trucks and transportation , bank 
loans , charter tourism Trobriand-style , new political· organization , 
silence to the riot police , art schools , the hotel , government 
grants , arti facts trading , standing in council elections , and 
the village court system . The qualification to this political 
creativity is , however , that these ideas were not imposed . Kabisawali 
was in action terms more than anything else a constant stream of 
meetings . During 33 months for which records were kept,  over 100 
formal meetings were held . Participation and debate was the pattern 
of decisions taken and almost every new proposal was altered by the 
process of group discussion , be that with the chiefs , the village 
leaders , or the people at large . A few ideas , such as an inter­
island trading vessel and a headquarters , came from persons other 
1 
Of the external models of Kabisawali-like activities , Kasaipwalova 
had an undetailed knowledge of Tanzanian ujamaa democratic ·socialism 
and a detailed knowledge of the Mataungan Association of the Tolai 
people of New Britain . Kasaipwalova is very close to John Kaputin , 
one of the Mataungan leaders . The particular conflict model of the 
Mataungan situation was unfortunately a mental ' charter ' for 
Kasaipwalova ' s  view of the Trobriands . 
than Kasaipwalova , and other of hi s proposals , such as anti 
mission and anti government activity , were dropped , mainly through 
the influence of the Kabi sawali chiefs . 
Nor was Kabisawali ideology simply synonymous with 
Kasaipwalova ' s  central beliefs . Outside the movement this was the 
appearance . The main aim of Kabisawali was to put control of 
Trobriand affairs in Trobriand hands . This overarching goal , is , 
of course , enormously ambiguous . Kasaipwalova ' s  interpretation 
was that thi s meant ultimately raising the level of confidence of  
the people vi s-a-vis Europeans and their institutions . The whole 
exercise was about shedding the sense of inferiority in the modern 
world and hi s prescription was simple : to stop feeling inferior 
one must stop acting as if inferior and as if one accepted the 
definition by others of one ' s  inferiority . This was the heart of 
the matter , an expressive before instrumental dialectic with 
Europeans and their society . For other Kabisawali leaders and 
followers , this was Kasaipwalova ' s  private meaning for the movement ,  
a level of  meaning which did not catch fire for them . To them, 
Kabisawali was about new instrumental achievements and improved 
distribution of real benefits . The dialectic was for them with the 
local social order present and past .  The rai sing-up to be done was 
vis-a-vis other Trobrianders who had benefitted most from the new 
socio-economic system emerging over the top of the traditional 
one . Hence the aggressive anti European , sometime anti government, 
message in Kasaipwalova ' s  English-language version of Kabisawali 
affairs was considerably at variance with the meaning that the 
movement had for its supporters . The new non traditional benefits 
were for them too valuable to risk driving away . The issues were 
how not to be subordinated to their primary beneficiaries , the 
greater receivers , and how to get a better distribution and an 
increase of those services .  
Finally , o f  the four figures who were with Kasaipwalova at the 
centre of Kabisawali deci sion-making , none was there through 
manipulation , threat ,  bribery , or the like . One came in , against 
Kasaipwalova ' s  advice , because of idealism, frustration at university 
and disillusionment with his church . A second joined because of a 
sense of injustice against the council , the co-operative system, the 
national government which ignored him, and ancient rivalry with 
opposition leaders . A third j oined after a religious vision commanding 
him to do so , backed up by a land grievance against the government 
and a perceived chance to restore his standing in relation to other 
chiefs . A fourth was there because of grievances against an 
ignoring government and an ' ineffective ' council ,  but was also 
contemptuous of those who called him ' bush kanaka ' because of his 
lack of education while he was pre-eminent in the kuZa . 
Literary versus po Ziticai creativity 
Kasaipwalova is Papua New Guinea ' s  foremost writer . To date , 
his productions include articles , plays , and poems , at least one of  
which has won minor international recognition .
1 
His  closest friends 
include artistically creative people as well as political radicals . 
Kasaipwalova ' s  creative modus operandi is one of immense egocentric 
spontanei ty .  He gathers his material from his own experiences , 
relying little on reading or thoughtful seclusion for his inspiration ; 
though aloof interactionally ,  hi s mind is continuously alive to the 
dramatic literary possibilities of his milieu . Inwardly , he generates 
innumerable potential literary productions , very few of which ever 
get written . When production does take place , it happens rapidly and 
intensely - soon to be forgotten in the throes of new possibilities . 
This generativity has ,  in Kasaipwalova ' s  eyes , foundations in 
both maj or domains of  his life . His western education has led him 
to admire the artisitic creations of Europeans more than anything 
else they are or do . At the same time , chartering his own self­
image is the fact that as a baby he received by ritual ingestion 
1 
See ' Re luctant Flame ' in Stevens ( 197 2 ) . 
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a highly valued form of carving magic from his uncle , which he 
interprets philosophically as a kind of creativity magic . 1 
Unfortunately , this kind of literary and dramatic orientation 
to experience is not easily compatible with the necessities of 
practical politics . Few successful politicians of this century have 
2 been simultaneously successful writers of fiction,  drama and poetry . 
This is not to say that politics lacks creativity only that i t  
comes out in a very different environment and in relation to very 
different problems and situations . 
The literary orientation is a bad bedfellow in politics for 
several reasons . First,  the process of literary creation has no 
necessary or immediate adversary . Compared with political problems , 
necessarily involving other people in relations of opposition or 
co-operation , it is thought in a vacumn. The writer does not 
have to calculate the real rooves of real players and face the 
consequences of his own calculations . A politician knows that his 
calculations count , that hi s credit partially rests on his decisions , 
and that mistakes can be painful for himself and others , especially 
in large-scale arenas . 
Secondly , large-arena politics has low tolerance limits for 
experimentation . Experimental political initiatives create 
expectations in supporters and in all participants in a political 
system. Too many initiatives too fast ,  especially if rapidly 
abandoned , are not conducive of creditworthiness because of the 
gyration effect on expectations . The writer , however , may throw up 
idea after idea to test for its dramatic potential . This usually 
happens privately , of course , and not in the public domain . In 
any case , were such experimentation public , by definition the 
1 
2 
See Kasaipwalova ( 1975 ) . 
Lest the reader think instantaneously of Mao Tse-tung as an 
exception , it should be noted that Mao Tse-tung on Literature 
and Art ( 196 7 }  is written throughout with the assumption that 
revolutionary writers and revolutionary politicians must 
necessarily be different sets of people . 
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fictional creation would not involve large-scale economic and 
political interests . Writing fiction therefore tolerates innumerable 
proposals , false starts , and incomplete efforts at little cost to 
anyone , except possibly the writer himsel f .  
Thirdly , large-scale practical politics involves mathematical­
like, even i f  non numerical , instrumental thinking . Calculations , 
planning , timing, cost-benefit analysis , and accomplishability are 
aspects of a practical politician ' s  mentality no matter how deeply 
committed ideologically he may be to certain values . The writer 
has far less need of this mathematical-like approach primarily because 
he has much more control over the fictional world he creates . 
Fourthlv , the writer in his craft uses intensi fication as a 
method of putting vast portions of life into small packages so as 
to bring out messages in sharp relief . A writer then seeks out and 
creates intensity as a method of entertainment and instruction . 
Politics , though with some theatrical attributes and �ntensity , 
equally needs the attribute of de-intensification primarily because 
it deals in live (non-playful ) conflict which must be contained . 
These four points , deliberately without ad hominem detail ,  speak 
of the weaknesses of Kabisawali leadership . They also seek to explain 
why all parties to the Kabisawali affair - supporters , opposition , 
government , and observers - have found the movement so bewildering 
when approached and interpreted through its central personality .  
ConaZusion 
Despite the leadership section above , this paper does not 
agree with government officials , some Trobrianders , and various 
outside observers who see the contemporary Trobriand conflict as 
a clash of ( flawed) personalities in a framework of traditional 
rivalries . This is the most superficial ,  though salient , model of 
the situation . Underlying i t  is  the age-old question of who gets 
what in society . For over eighty years , a set of islands made up of 
relatively or potentially self-sufficient units without overall 
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organi zation or a socio-economic centre have been undergoing uneven 
centralization . Newly-added non traditional benefits have been 
organized to the considerable disadvantage of many . Protests 
about this went unheeded and unrecogni zed by the governing 
authori ties , though not the prime beneficiaries . The Kabisawali 
Movement , through i ts catalytic leader and progranune s ,  made the 
latent division in society mani fest .  Personalities �ere and are 
only the surface of the situation . 
Editor ' s  Note 
Leach ' s  account of the Kabisawali Movement focusses on the 
period 1972-74 . Since 1974 there have been important developments 
within the movement which merit at least brief mention . 
Reference has been made above to Kabisawali ' s  later business 
enterpri ses in the fields of tourism and arti fact marketing . During 
the period 1974-76 there was a notable expansion in Kabisawali ' s  
business activi ties . The movement bought an expatriate owned trade 
store on Kiriwina , establi shed a trade store and a take-away food 
business in suburban Port Moresby , bought into a Port Moresby 
restaurant (which had been established by the wife of one of  
Kasaipwalova ' s  former expatriate universi ty teachers ) ,  acquired real 
estate in Port Moresby and purchased a small coastal trading vessel . 
There was an abortive attempt to establi sh an international commodity 
exchange in Port Moresby . Kabisawali also acquired the Air Niugini 
agency in Losuia , though this was subsequently withdrawn following 
complaints that the agency was discriminating against Ron 
Kabisawali passengers . During 1976 the Arts Trobriand shop in Port 
Moresby was c losed and converted into a fashion shop . Subsequently 
another artifact business in Port Moresby was purchased ( though the 
former owner ,  a Papua New Guinean , never received more than the 
initial down-payment ) . Gordon Central Agency was established in 
Port Moresby to provide centrali zed office services for Kabisawali , 
and eventually other groups . There were also plans for setting up 
a bank and a computer service (in August 1975 it was announced that 
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the movement had acquired a K35 , 000 computer ) ,  for participating 
in the construction of an international hotel in Port Moresby , 
and for taking over Chinese owned supermarkets in Port Moresby and 
Alotau . 
The initiative for this business expansion seems to have come 
from Kasaipwalova , though he was ,  during this period , receiving 
advice from an expatriate former employee of the central government , 
Michael Worsley . (Worsley , who had been dismissed from the Department 
of Finance , was subsequently refused a new entry permit and forced 
to leave the country . )  Many of Kabisawali ' s  more informed sympathi zers 
expressed doubts about the movement ' s  new business ambitions , 
especially in view of its meagre capital and limited managerial 
capaci ty .  There were also criticisms that the movement ' s  centre 
of gravity seemed to be shifting from Yalumgwa to Port Moresby , where 
Kasaipwalova seemed to be spending an increasing amount of time , and 
indeed in June 1975 it was decided to shift the movement ' s  head 
office to Port Moresby . 
In July 1976 Kasaipwalova was charged with stealing funds , 
amounting to K20 , 000 , allocated by the National Cultural Council 
for the construction of a cultural centre and arts school . In 
January 1977 he was convicted of stealing Kl4 , 000 of  the government 
grant and was sentenced to two years gaol . After serving nine 
months he won an appeal and was released . Another charge of stealing 
K6000 allocated by the Milne Bay Area Authority for village water 
reticulation systems was adj ourned in October 1976 pending hearing 
of the earlier charges . 
Shortly after the January 1977 decision the Ocean Trading 
Company Pty Ltd gave notice of a creditor ' s  petition for the winding 
up of the Kabisawali Village Development Corporation . 
In 1980 Kasaipwalova was residing in Lae and the Kabisawali 
Movement appeared to be moribund . 

THE TROBRIAND EXPERIENCE : THE TK REACTION 
R. J .  May 
The local social and political divisions against which the 
Kabisawali Movement emerged have been outlined in the previous 
chapter by Leach . 
Early opposition to Kabisawali in the Trobriands reflected a 
mixture of local political factors , di strust of Kabisawali ideology 
and of Kasaipwalova ' s  personal leadership , and a scepticism about 
Kabisawali ' s  promises of development . Increasingly , also , 
opposition to Kabisawali was galvani7.ed by a feeling of resentment 
that Kabisawali ' s  opposition to established authority , and 
particularly to the Kiriwina Local Government Counci l ,  were not 
only being tolerated by the central government but were yie lding 
bene fits to the movement which were not avai lable to those seeking 
development through more orthodox channels . Somare , for example , 
records ( 1975 : 12 3 ,  12 7 )  that ' John Kasaipwalova asked me to assi �t 
his movement in the legal work of incorporation , so I made one of my 
top lawyers available '  and that ' It was his [ Kasaipwalova ' s ]  
application that caused me to take a maj or new policy s tep . I 
obtained cabinet approval to set aside budget money to be used as 
direct grants to groups or counci ls to assist them in carrying 
out village-level commercial activities ' .  Kasaipwalova also obtained 
two grants for the establishment of a cultural centre . And when in 
1973 Somare ' s  special representative , Alexis Sarei , visited the 
Trobriands in an attempt to reconcile the two groups , his conciliatory 
attitude towards Kabisawali ' s  opposition to the Kiriwina Council (the 
first maj or concession to the opponents of local government councils ) 
was seen by the pro-council forces as a sell-out on the part of the 
government . 
Establishment and organization 
The opposition to Kabisawali was concentrated in the central 
zone and Vakuta {Leach , pers . comm. ) and the main activists were 
Waibadi , Lepani Watson and Watson ' s  son , Charles Lepani . Lepani 
Watson , who was minis terial member for business development in the 
1968- 72 House of Assembly , and Charles Lepani ,  who in 1976 became 
director of the National Planning Office , were particularly sceptical 
of Kabisawali ' s  capacity to fulfi l its promises of business development 
and critical of what they believed was an undiscriminating support 
by the central government . 
In mid 1973 Kabisawali opponents formed the Tabalu Association , 
the principal obj ectives of which were to support the Kiriwina Counci l ,  
to reestablish the traditional leadership and to promote local 
businesses . The Tabalu Association was shortlived , however ; its 
membership base was too narrow , drought affected the leader ' s  standing 
with potential members {see p .  2 71 )  and there were squabbles over rank 
among Tabalu members {Leach , pers . comm. ) .  
Subsequently , largely on the initiative of Lepani Watson and 
Waibadi , the Tonenei Kamokwita {TK) Movement was established . A 
manifesto was drawn up which stated as the movement ' s  guiding 
principles : 
1 .  KAMAYABA . Respect for the integrity and dignity of 
the individual ,  society , and culture must be paramount 
to sustain the continuity of social , political , and 
economic action for the common good . Strength in action 
is the result of the people ' s  real understanding and 
knowledge of their actions . The integration of the 
individual in his society and culture provides the 
grassroots basis of this understanding and knowledge . 
2 .  KAMOKWITA.  The search for truth implies that social , 
political and economic action must inevitably result 
in the achievement of greater social j ustice . 
3 .  TABU KENAKUSI .  You cannot harvest a garden without first 
planting it. Promises of prosperity and the raising 
of the people ' s  expectations without the prerequisite 
action based on sound realistic planning are actions 
destructive to the people ' s  search for truth and self­
dignity in their economic , social and political actions . 
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A general meeting was convened in June 1974 and an executive elected . 
Lepani Watson was chosen as chairman . 
Structurally , the movement consists of a vi llage-level 
organization and a central working committee and central fund . Each 
member vi llage has elected a committee and established a vi llage 
fund ; the committee is responsible for carrying out economic 
development proposals decided on within the village . The village 
committees are represented on the central working committee , which is 
presided over by village and clan chiefs ' on an honorary basis only ' ; 
decisions of the central committee require endorsement by two out of 
the representative of the chie fs and the president and secretary 
treasurer of the central committee . The central committee is 
responsible for intervillage development activity and for proj ects 
which are too large for individual vi llages to undertake . It 
maintains a central fund to which member villages contribute by 
way of shareholdings . By October 1974 each vi llage had raised 
Kl 500 . Subsequently , TK branches were established in Port Moresby 
and Alotau . 
In 1976 , following the example of other movements such as the 
Mataungan Association and Kabisawali , the TK movement was incorporated 
as the TK Development Corporation Pty Ltd . Among the obj ectives 
listed in its memorandum of association were the promotion and 
encouragement of development activities and businesses , through a 
variety of means including equity participation , sponsoring students 
and advancing adult education , sponsoring artists and craftsmen , and 
acting as agent for government bodies ; and carrying on business and 
other activities amongst which were speci fied kuZa exchange , welfare 
services ,  retai l and wholesale trade , industry , tourism, agriculture 
(with particular emphasis on improving subsistence production ) and 
artisti c  and cultural activi ties . Nominal share capital was set at 
K200 , 000  in Kl shares with restrictions on the right of transfer . 
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The Kiriunna Counci l i ssue 
Not surprisingly , in view of the circumstances from which it 
emerged , one of TK ' s  early preoccupations was with the fate of the 
Kiriwina Local Government Counci l .  
Following his election as president o f  the Kiriwina Counci l ,  
Kasaipwalova called three meetings . At the first o f  these a finance 
executive committee was appointed ; the committee , which according to 
TK sources was nominated by Kasaipwalova , excluded Kasaipwalova ' s  
political opponent Waibadi , who as counci l vice-president was a 
signatory to the counci l ' s  bank accounts , and this became a major 
source of grievance among the pro counci l group . The second was a 
meeting of taxpayers to discuss the council tax issue and to elect 
a respresentative to attend Area Authori ty meetings . Council supporters 
declared this meeting out of order (properly , the Area Authority 
representative should have been elected by the councillors , not the 
taxpayers ) and staged a walk-out . Finally , at a meeting in October 
in the pro-Kabisawali village of Kabwaku , whi ch non-Kabisawali 
counci llors refused to attend , it was resolved to dissolve the counci l 
and arrangements were made for the takeover of some of the counci l ' s  
assets , including some shares in Bougainvi lle Copper Pty Ltd , by the 
Kabisawali M;:>vement . No further meetings of the council were he ld , 
though there appear to have been some meetings of the Kabisawali 
dominated finance executive committee , and in June 1974 the commissioner 
for local government confirmed suspension of the counci l  and acceded 
to its ' request for the voluntary winding-up of the affairs of the 
counci l '  • 1 The pro-counci l group had regarded the dissolution of 
the counci l  as unconstitutional and , not entirely without cause , felt 
that they had been betrayed by the central government . 
1 Papua New Guinea Government Gazette No . 5 2 , 1 August 1974 , p . 11 .  
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One of the first acts of the TK movement was the pre sentation 
of a submission addres sed to the liquidator of the Kiriwina Counci l .  
While disputing the suspension o f  the counci l ,  the submission 
recommended that the property and buildings of the counci l be taken 
over by the central government with a view to the establishment of a 
high s chool and that all financial assets and accounts of the counci l  
b e  closely examined ( there were suggestions that council funds had 
been spent on Kabisawali proj ects ) . The submission proposed that 
i f  it eventuated that Kabi sawali had appropriated counci l  funds · 
for its own pro j ects the TK movement should be compensated from 
either central government or Kabisawali funds . The submi s sion also 
noted that a Kabisawali chief ,  from whom had been purchased the land 
on which the council chambers were bui l t ,  had taken up occupancy 
of the counci l chambers ; it threatened that i f  no action were taken 
against him by the central government , ' then the Tonenei Kamokwita 
Group wi ll have no option but to expropriate all crown land in the 
Trobriand Islands which belongs to clans and tribes of the Trobriand 
people who are members of the Tonenei Kamokwita Group ' .  Further 
representations along these lines were made during 1975 and 1976 but 
by the end of 1976 the liquidator ' s  report had not been received and 
in 1980 the issue of the counci l ' s  finances was sti ll not resolved . 
However ,  the TK JIK>Vement did receive , in 1975 , an assurance from the 
central government that , provided adequate project plans were submitted , 
whatever assistance was provided to the Kabisawali movement by the 
central government would be matched by similar assistance to TK . 
In 1974 and 1975 several attempts were made to reconcile the two 
groups . Kasaipwalova and Charles Lepani played an active part in 
these move s , which were initiated by the central government . In 1975 , 
following a visit by two senior public servants , Jack Karukuru and 
Rabbie Namali u ,  a working group was es tablished by the central government 
to ' di s cuss unity and look at the possibi lity of setting up a political 
s tructure acceptable to all groups on the island ' . 1 In November 1975 
1 Post-Courier 28 January 1975 . 
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it was announced that Kabisawali and TK chiefs had agreed to the 
formation of a counci l of chie fs , which ' would work with the Central 
Government in looking after all the people leaving the TK and 
Kabisawali to continue only business activities • ,
1 
but nothing appears 
to have come of this . 
Business 
Next to the counci l issue , TK' s  primary concern was with the 
establishment of business enterprises . Business was seen not only 
as a means of generating cash income but also of involving village 
people more close ly in the process of development, and particularly 
in the takeover by local people of existing expatriate enterprises , 
and of helping stem the outflow of educated young people to urban 
centres . 
Shortly after its establishment the TK movement presented a 
submission to the central government requesting a grant of K56 , 000  
from the Vi llage Development Fund for two development proj ects . The 
first was to acquire equity in Muwo Plantation , a copra plantation 
under expatriate ownership but on TK village land , with a view to the 
eventual takeover of the plantation . The second was for the 
purchase of Trobriand Fisheries , an expatriate business
2 
which as 
well as trading in fish and other marine products , processed copra 
and held the agency for the Shell Oil Company . In 1975 , with the 
assistance of a loan from the Papua New Guinea Development Bank , TK 
acquired Trobriand Fisheries . The former owners agreed to stay on 
as managers of the business until a suitable Trobriand manager was 
found . 
1 
2 
Post-Courie:t" 5 November 1975 . 
The owners of this business , Frank and Ji ll Holland , also had a 
trade store and ran the Air Nuigini agency . These were acquired 
by Kabisawali in 1975 . 
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Other business ventures have included small amounts of produce 
marketing and arti fact sales and the Port Moresby branch has operated 
a passenger motor vehicle , but none of these has amounted to much . 
There has been occasional talk of organizing tourism in the Trobriands 
(in competition with Kabisawali ) 1 and of establishing a bakery in 
Alotau . 
Culture 
Although its primary focus seems to have been economic , TK 
has sought to match Kabisawali in its concern for Trobriand culture . 
In the TK Development Corporation ' s  memorandum of association some 
prominence was given to the movement ' s  commitment to promoting 
arti stic and cultural activities . 
In 1974 , after the Kabisawali movement had received through 
the National Cultural Counci l  financial support for i ts proposed 
Sopi Arts Centre , it was agreed also to allocate an initial sum of 
KSOOO for the establishment of a TK cultural centre .
2 
However 
the proposed centre has never got beyond the planning stages .  TK 
followers also took delight in attacking Kabi sawali over an alleged 
sale of arti facts . An undated press release , signed by Chiefs 
Waibadi and Vivilua ,  supported a call by a group of university 
students for the the prevention of sale of kula armshells and neck­
laces to people outside the kula system and went on to say : 
1 
2 
The two Chie fs further call  on the national museum to 
investigate the recent sale of a kula canoe to a 
Japanese Group and a pending sale of armshells and 
necklaces by the Kabi sawali Group • . . •  ( the Chie fs ) said 
today that recent political and economic changes in the 
Trobriand Islands have confused the minds of the Trobriand 
people and that they are concerned that Kabisawali Group 
has exploited such confusion to devalue the worth of their 
culture . 
At one stage there was di scussion of possible central government 
assistance to Kabisawali for the purchase of the Guest House on 
Kiriwina . The expatriate-run Guest House is on land owned by 
TK supporters , who opposed the sale and formulated counter plans 
for a tourist development which would not require government 
assistance . 
National Cultural Counci l Report 197 3/74, p. 4 3 . 
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Conclusion : response and reaction 
Che cannot account for the deve lopment of the TK movement 
without regard both to the widespread concern wi th regional 
development which emerged throughout the country during the early 
1970s and to the historical basis of the situation which developed 
in the Trobriands at that time (see pp . 254-264 ) .  Nevertheless it  
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that had it not been for the 
establishment and early successes of the Kabisawali movement TK 
would not have been created . 1 It came into being primarily in 
response to Kabisawali ' s  capture and dissolution of the Kiriwina Council 
and as a means of balancing the demands which Kabisawali had so 
successfully pressed on a central government strongly committed to 
encouraging local developmental and cultural ini tiatives . As early 
as 1974 Charles Lepani pointed out the danger , given the government ' s  
undertaking to treat the two groups equally and given the small part 
which the Trobriand Islands play in the national e conomy , that 
government assistance to the i slands would be seen as privi leged 
treatment and could cause a reaction which would leave both groups 
worse off ; but wi thout TK there seemed li ttle doubt that what benefi ts 
were avai lable would go to those vi llages for whom Kabisawali spoke . 
Ideologi cally the two movements do not appear to be a long 
way apart . Both are primarily concerned with mobili zing local 
resources to improve living standards and achieve a greater degree 
of self-suffi ciency in the vi llage , though both seem to accept , at 
least for a transitional period , j oint enterprises with existing 
expatriate businesses . Both place particular importance on traditional 
culture and on traditional social and economic activities ( though both 
obj ect to the term ' cultural preservation ' ) . With respect to political 
ideology , both seem to support a blend of vi llage socialism with a 
1 Though it is perhaps a little unfair to describe TK, as a Papua 
New Guinean j ournalist did in 1975 , as ' the flip side of the 
Kabisawali Movement ' (Biga Lebasi , Post-Courier 13 June 1975 ) . 
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strengthening of the political role of traditional chiefs , though in 
practice of course the two movements have been sharply divided on their 
attitudes to existing institutions . TK, however ,  sees itse lf di fferentiated 
from Kabisawali primarily in the realism and practicality of its 
approach to development . This is reflected in the second and third 
of TK ' s  guiding principles - kamokwita, the search for truth , and 
tabu kenakusi , ' you cannot harvest a garden without first planting 
i t '  - which were clearly intended as a j ibe at Kabisawali . Kabisawali , 
TK leaders argue , has deceived the people with false hopes and ill 
conceived proj ects ; TK wi ll show people the true way to self-sufficient 
development . 1 
Although TK has made only limited progress towards achieving 
its broader social , economic and political ambitions , clearly it 
has succeeded in providing an effective counterweight to Kabisawali 
in Trobriand , and nationa� politics . In so doing TK has not only 
helped to channel regional hostility to Kabisawali leaders away from 
direct confrontation but has in effect enabled TK supporters , especially 
in their dealings with the central government , to capitalize on 
Kabisawali ' s  initiative . 
With the reversal in Kasaipwalova ' s  fortunes ( see p . 2 99 ) it 
seemed possible that TK might attract some support from former Kabisawali 
vi llages .
2 
However it is unlikely , . given the historical basis of the 
division between the two groups , that the r e  wi ll be any substantial 
shift of loyalties ,  and it is doubtful whether the bulk of TK followers 
would welcome such a shi ft . 
The development of the TK movement provides an interesting 
example of the way in which micronationalism may spread through the 
reaction of one group to another .  Kabisawali emerged in response 
1 
2 
For an early statement along these lines see Charles Lepani ' s  
letter to the Post-Courier 22  March 1974 . 
Some shift of support occurred even before this , notably on the 
part of Chief Vivilua , who le ft Kabisawali alleging distortion of 
the traditional chieftainship sys tem . 
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to a feeling of relative deprivation . Although in practice it later 
benefitted substantially from central government support ,  in 
principle it sought to promote self-sufficient devel0pment and in 
doing so to challenge the structures imposed by colonial rule and 
to assert the identity of the member vi llages . The TK response 
might be explained in part as the reaction of those who for various 
reasons supported the existing institutions ; certainly the division 
between Kabisawali and TK is based to some extent on tradition 
enmities . Moreover , there is no doubt that one obj ect of the 
establishment of TK was to counteract Kabisawali influence over the 
allocation of central government resources in the Trobriands . But 
it represents more than thi s .  Like Kabisawali , TK is a movement of 
change . TK leaders are scepti cal of the capacity of Kabisawali leaders 
(pRrticularly Kasaipwalova ) to achieve their obj ectives and anxious 
to succeed where Kabisawali might fail . What is at stake , therefore , 
is partly a competi tion for moral leadership in modern Trobriand 
society . Although this competi tion has taken place in an almost 
wholly non-tradi tional context its relation to tradi tional forms of  
competitive assertion of group identity is clear enough . 
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Chapter 10 
THE POLITICS OF AMBITION : DAMUNI , FROM 
MICRONATIONALISM TO A PRESSURE GROUP* 
Rolf Gerritsen 
Introduation 
The Damuni ( ' Ebb Tide ' ) Association began as a protest 
movement that tried to give voice to a ' micronationalist ' resentment 
at the deprived economic status of the Milne Bay Province . It was 
an elite-created association which emerged from the Provincial Local 
Government Councils ' Conference . Subsequently Damuni evolved into 
a loosely organi zed pressure group , closely connected. with the 
political ambitions of certain individuals who utili zed it to serve 
their own interests . In the process Damuni underwent substantial 
changes away from its original form : an evolution which in the long 
run ensured its demise as a popular force . 
In common with other Milne Bay political organi zations such 
as the local government counci ls , or even demi-political organizations 
like co-operatives and village agricultural clubs , Damuni ' s  development 
was intimately connected with recent socio-economic change . Political 
success resides in the ability to manipulate the concomitants of 
that change to the advantage of the select . 
In the past, geographic , economic and social factors , with 
their resultant inequities , combined to create preconditions favourable 
to the emergence of movements like Damuni . These inequities are not 
uniform; the topography of the Province , for example , ensured that 
agricultural development was concentrated on certain islands and the 
mainland littoral . Indeed felt disadvantage by some localities vis­
a-vi s others was a factor in the rapid spread of Damuni . 
* 
In the creation of these preconditions the continuing 
Unless otherwise stated , the material on which this paper is based 
has been drawn from personal interviews and official files . 
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geographical component has been that of  isolation . Traditionally 
there have been certain trade linkages within the Province such as 
the kuZa and secondary interlocking trade rings in the southern Massim 
(Malinowski 1 92 2 ;  Belshaw 1955 ) . While not denigrating these
1 
since they created a certain wider consciousness and in ' modern ' 
politics have a limited significance2 - they have not formed the 
basis of any concerted or formal political endeavours . In importance 
they are on a par with informal interpersonal relationships based upon 
consanguinity ,  
3 
religion or education . However , because these traditional 
linkages are relationships based upon traditional mores , the active 
participants are often not the people who are involved in ' modern ' 
politics . Isolation meant that prior to the advent of the Provincial 
Local Government Councils ' Conference , there was little indigenous 
political activity (wi th the qualified exception of that which took 
place through the churches )  extending beyond the inunediate locality 
of those involved . Transportation di fficulties and the dominant subsis­
tence orientation of the economies of  the Milne Bay peoples have in­
tensi fied thi s  lack of interaction ( Scott and Co . 197 3 : 36 ) . 
I solation and hi story created inequities which made Province­
wide co-ordination di fficult . Thus the Esa ' ala and Losuia districts 
are conspicuous for their lack of indigenous entrepreneurs ,  whereas 
the Samarai area and to a lesser extent the adj acent southern Massim 
had a virtual monopoly of indigenous conunercial enterprise thi s  
disparity being due t o  the combination of Samarai ' s  conunercial importance 
and the activities of the Kwato Extension Association . 
The desire for economic ' development ' was universal . A feeling 
that the Province was being neglected in that regard was harnessed by 
Damuni in 1 969/70 to create a rapid expansion of membership . Yet these 
1 
2 
3 
I would not describe the southern Massim trading as merely ' roving ' , 
as does Grosart ( 1965 : 32 3 ) . 
Ex-MHA Lepani Watson used kuZa contacts for his political campaigning . 
( See Fink 1965 : 297-98 . )  
For example Dennis Young has a tenuous relationship , through his wife , 
with Lawrence Iaubihi of the Aioma Association on Goodenough I sland . 
This led to a limited level of political co-operation between the two . 
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economic desires have been confused , multi-faceted and at best ambivalent 
(Moulik 1 97 3 ) . There have been elements of unrealistic expectations 
( seen below in some of the recrui tment to Damuni )  which have led too 
often to disappointment and apathy . This was an important consequence 
of the failure of the Milne Bay Development Company (Healy 1 961 ) . 
The isolation and polyfurcation of the Province led to the 
evolution of a multitude of associations , IOC>St of them with similar 
aims though di fferent strategies .  Contemporaneous with the formation 
of Damuni was an attempt to start a Damuni-style nucleus cattle project 
at Watalumla on Goodenough island . Groups as diverse as the Kabisawali 
Movement on the Trobriand islands and the Nimoa Fishing Association 
in the Calvados chain , sought development for their areas . The 
Damuni Association was j ust one of  a number of associational responses 
to this desire for economic betterment . It was sui generis only in 
that it gained a geographically wider influence , a result of its mode 
of formation through the local government councils rather than any 
intrinsic excellence in its organization or programme· . 
The connection between the development of cash cropping and 
the political evolution of the Province is pertinent . The relationship 
between cash cropping and political organization is not an economically 
deterministic one . The introduction of new cash crops coincided with 
the i ntroduction of new institutions ,  thereby providing a connection 
between the two in the popular mind . 
Copra is the maj or cash crop of the Milne Bay Province . The 
expansion of indigenous copra production was interrelated with an 
' accommodation-with-the-colonial-administration ' phase of indigenous 
political development . In more recent years copra production remained 
static even though there was extensive , if uneven,  replanting of 
coconuts . This was partly due to various social factors . But the fact 
that the level of exploitation of exi sting coconut palm resources was 
the lowest of any Province in Papua New Guinea {EIU 197 2 : 11 2 )  reflected 
disillusionment with the government-cum-expatriate road to development 
and its parapolitical concomitants ,  the co-operatives , the missions 
and expatriate plantations . 
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Coffee a l so disappointed great expectations in the southern 
Mas sim in the late 1950s and early 1960s . This had vitiating consequences 
for organi zations like the village agricultural committees . Recent 
expansion of coffee production has been in the hilly areas inland from 
the northeast coast ,  a n  expansion which became linked with a predisposition 
to support Damuni in those areas . 
The latest cash crop development has been smallholder cattle 
proj ects introduced through Development Bank loans . The introduction 
of cattle had critical relevance to the contemporary socio-political 
evolution of Milne Bay . Starting from 50 indigenous owned cattle in 
the whole Province , the smallholder proj ects begun in 1969 proliferated 
to the point where , by mid 1974 , there were over 100 , each holding 
between 6 and 12 cattle . This growth of cattle proj ects paralleled a 
revival of village agricultural clubs and the incipient big peasant 
class fostered by these . Thus at a Basima Agricultural Association 
meeting (on Fergusson island) the clubs , whilst reporting on their 
activi ties , listed individuals who had obtained bank loans . 
Although economic development is regarded with general approbation , 
the acceptance of the monetary economy has been associated with social 
and socio-psychological tension (Moulik 197 3 ) . These are not new 
phenomena (Armstrong 1 9 2 1 ;  Williams 1933 ) . One group who in the 
past would perhaps have been assiduous in the traditional methods of  
achieving prestige and power has resolved this conflict between what 
is loosely termed the ' traditional ' and the ' modern ' by seeking power 
and prestige through the local government system . Damuni i s  largely 
the story of these men . This elite provided the Association ' s  leader­
ship , and their followers its membership . 
The emergence of this Council elite from the cash cropping 
big peasants was an important social development in creating the 
preconditions that allowed the rise of Damuni . The general process 
varied in minor ways from locality to locality . The Tavara and Ealaba 
census divisions around the shores of Milne Bay will illustrate this 
point . 
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In these census divisions the elite ' s  emergence was related 
to the cash cropping developments and the expansion of pan-village 
political organi zation . The missions • influence will not be considered 
because there they had more pronounced effects than in any other part 
of the Province . The first development salient to our consideration -
apart from the establishment of the Milne Bay Local Government Counci l  
was the creation in the 1950s b y  Mr Cottrell-Dorman ( an agricultural 
officer) of village agricultural committees .  Membership o f  these was 
based upon clans , with strong accompaniments of traditional leadership . 
Their rapid expansion coincided with an initial flush of enthusiasm 
for coffee , which was planted in the period 1958-6 3 .  During 1963-68 , 
due to di sappointed expectations with regard to coffee and for a 
variety of organizational reasons not relevant here , the committees 
became moribund . 
It was during this latter period that , with the encouragement 
of the ( then )  Department of Agriculture Stock and Fisheries (DASF ) a 
big peasant class began to emerge . This social change , wi th its 
perceptible i f  quali fied emergent individuali sm,  coincided with DASF 
policy of encouraging progressive individuals rather than group 
endeavours . As one field officer reported in 1968 : 
For some time we concentrated our extension activities 
and resources on those interested individua ls and 
occasional small groups . The maj ori ty of Village 
Agricultural Committees were inoperative so I left 
them alone . (Emphasis added . )  
The emergence of thi s  new class (advantaged through being more 
enterprising and more forthcoming in making demands of agriculture 
officers than their fellows ) had profound implications for the development 
of the area . The incipient big peasants were reorganized after 1968 
into village agricultural clubs , with a voluntari stic style of member­
ship based upon activity and interest rather than recrui ting through 
traditional social structures ( such as clans ) . Members were those who 
fe lt like being members . These vi llage agricultural clubs were organized 
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by DASF into pan-village agricultural associations - in our area the 
Tavara Agricultural Association . The Tavara , Weraura , Misima and 
Basima Agricultural Associations were the most active in the Province . 
Signi ficantly these were the areas of greatest support for Damuni . 
The big peasant clas s ,  represented through the clubs and 
associations , was irre futably the originator of activi ty on a broad 
scale , i f  of fluctuating persistence . By no means an atypical example 
was the report MacLaren , the Divara Village Agricultural Club leader , 
gave of that club ' s  activities to a Tavara Agricultural Association 
meeting . In 196 7-69 the Association ' s  thirteen members had planted 
5072 teak trees , 860 new coconuts , and 166 cashew nut trees ; had 
helped clean the Anglican mission station at Ukaka , repair the church , 
and build a club and a meeting house ; had helped bui ld the medical 
orderly ' s  house , and helped the co-operative store work ramming copra . 
The fact that total copra production in the Province was static 
in the late 1960s suggests that the big peasant activi sts , even if they 
were not efficiently exploiting their trees , were gaining a greater 
proportion of potential ( i f  not actual ) cash assets through their tree 
planting . 
It has been claimed that leadership in this area was a compound 
of traditional and mission involvement . Moulik (197 3 : 29-30 ) saw 
Kwato-trained elders , who were clan headmen , as a self-conscious elite , 
holding their positions through a combination of knowledge of clan 
hi story , customs and magi c ,  and wealth , represented by pigs and garden 
foods rather than cash or ' modern ' assets . 
There is no doubt that leadership here is of the ' di ffuse ' 
type (Belshaw 1955 : 19 ) , restraining both too great a tendency to command 
and too great an accumulation of wealth . Implici tly social restraints 
like sorcery see to that . But there has been a functional separation 
of leadership roles . There is ' traditional ' leadership but there are 
also other types of leadership , such as church and ' political ' .  The 
political leader is often a leader in voluntary association activi ties 
(such as vi llage agricultural clubs ) or in local government - where 
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the leadership attributes are not necessarily counted in traditional 
terms . 1 Often he is not a traditional ' big man ' but usually is closely 
related to them. Thus Mahuru Mark , past president of the Milne Bay 
Local Government Counci l ,  is a ' big man ' , widely respected for his 
knowledge of tradition , especially land matters (he is a Land Titles 
Commission adj udicator ) .  Lebasi Mark , hi s hal f-brother , is  a political 
leader ; as an educated man (education being a vital criterion of 
po litica l leadership ) he plays a substantial role in the Milne Bay Local 
Government Council and the Tavara Agricultural Association and was 
prominent in the early mobi lizational phase of Damuni ' s  history . 
Though representative of the big peasants , the agricultural 
associations have played only a limited political role . They exert 
pressure on the Department of Primary Industry (DPI - formerly DASF ) 
and their members monopolize agricultural extension officers ' time . 
When it is felt necessary they put pressure on the government to 
retain DPI officers of whom they approve . Politicians attempt to 
sway these groups in a bid to recruit influential supporters . Dennis 
Young (MHA for the Milne Bay Regional electorate , 1972-7 7 )  o ften 
attended Tavara Agricultural As sociation meetings . Prior to his 
election in 1972 John Fifita (MHA for Kula ) was involved with the 
Mi sima Agricultural Association . Yet these groups have not been able 
to branch out directly into developmental efforts as groups . Mutual 
j ealousies , rivalries and the inhibiting example of the co-operatives ' 
fiscal problems ensure this . DPI has also discouraged the associations 
from collecting money , investing, or buying machinery . Other organizations 
have had to cater for the developmental leadership aspirations of the 
newly emerged big peasants . Damuni was able to capitalize on that 
si tuation . Being an association and so to a certain extent communal ,  
i t  was able to reconcile the desires for advancement by the ambitious 
with the types of social restraint ( jealousy , social disharmony , 
sorcery ) which act against too overtly individualistic advancement . 
1 
The early years of local government saw traditional ' big men ' as 
counci l leaders .  After this formative period , for a variety of 
reasons including the growing functional specialization of political 
roles , they have retired into the background . 
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The political impact of the agricultural associations , apart 
from initially catering for thi s  nascent class , was in providing a 
training ground for counci llors in a system complementary to the local 
government councils . As a 1964 field report said : 
It i s  agreed that where a counci l is now active in 
an Association area an attempt should be made to 
incorporate the Association activities into the council 
structure . It  is apparent that those previously active 
in association affairs are now prominent in the Council . 
For exarnple , Lebasi Mark , elected in 1968 as a counci llor of 
the Milne Bay Local Government Council , largely for his work in 
reorgani zing the Unabahe Association of Naura village , signalled his 
portending rise to the presidency of the council by defeating 
Gilipasi for chairmanship of a village agricultural club leaders '  
meeting at Bubuleta in 1969 . 
By the late 1960s there were in the Province , as in much of 
Papua New Guinea ,  substantial political pressures due to a mass 
consciousness of economic inequalities and a consequent desire for 
rapid change . A political elite had emerged from the growing big 
peasants . This elite was ready to direct the pressures for economic 
development . Bureaucratic and insti tutional-cum-legal restrictions 
ensured that these ambitions could not be reali zed within the frame-
work of co-operatives , producers ' associations , agricultural associations 
or local government councils . Damuni was able to reap this legacy . 
The forma tion of Damuni 
During the 1960s the whole of the Milne Bay Province came under 
local government councils , the first Province in Papua to do so . More 
than any other influence , with the limi ted exception of the mi ssions , 
the councils ' created a general awareness of public issues wider than 
the vi llage ' (Gostin 1971 : 94 ) . This awareness was institutionali zed in 
the Provincial Local Government Councils ' Conference , establi shed to 
provide a forum for leading councillors to di scuss their councils ' 
problems . It brought together leading council politicians from all 
over the Province :  people such as Vernon Guise of Maramatana Local 
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Government Council ;  Kingsford Dibela and John Solomon o f  Weraura 
Local Government Council ; Michael Dindillo of Bwanabwana Local 
Government Counci l ;  Billy Tanby of Milne Bay Local Government Counci l ;  
Roi Kaitolele o f  Goodenough Local Government Council ; B .  Somale of 
Dobu Local Government Counci l ;  Sote Kankan of :Louisiade Local Government 
Council , and Denni s Young , himself a Milne Bay Local Government Council 
councillor .
1 
These meetings provided opportunities for creating an 
esprit de corps among thi s group . Hitherto they had been parochial 
influentials ; now they were part of a Province-wide insti tution . The 
opportunity was thereby provided for an enlarged scope of political 
activi ty . A few of their number realized the potential this created 
and began to utilize the resultant opportuni ties . 
In 1968 the conference established an economic development 
committee comprising Vernon Gui se as chairman and Young , Solomon,  
Somale and Dindi llo . It was failure to attract a reply to this committee ' s  
report that was the ' Saraj evo ' that created Damuni . The report , in 
i tself quite unexceptional , reflected the dominance o f  Young ' s  experti se 
in economic matters . Its interest lies in its foreshadowing later 
Damuni proj ects in recommending , among other things , that cattle had 
commercial possibilities when combined with copra p�oduction . 2 It also 
advocated the establishment of an investment company , suggesting that 
the idea for a ' Damuni ' had already begun to take shape - probably 
with Young . 
The government ' s  failure to reply to the report ( c f  Stephen 
1972 : 140 ) allowed a coterie within the conference to help the members , 
as a group , decide to form one sort of developmental association . This 
1 
2 
All these prominent councillors later joined Damuni , together with 
Waibadi Caleb , president of the Kiriwina Local Government Council 
(not formed until 1966 ) . Young claims that at one stage twelve of 
the fi fteen local government council presidents were members . 
Report of the Milne Bay District Counci ls Conference on Economic 
Deve lopment within the Mi ln� Bay District .  Mimeo . ,  n . d . , p . 4 .  
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inner circle consisted of Vernon Guise , Billy Tanby and Kingsford 
Dibela , with Dennis Young in the background . By 1969 the former three 
had formed a steering committee and , with the ( then ) MHA for Alotau , 
John (now Sir John) Guise as patron , the Damuni Association was born . 
John Guise ' s  influence over these developments is hard to gauge . 
As the active elder statesman of the area he customari ly kept (and sti ll 
keeps ) a close eye on developments in the electorate . 1 This scrutiny 
extended to dominating many of such organi zations . 2 It is true also 
that later a certain tension arose between John Guise on the one hand 
and Young and Dibela on the othe r ,  a tension to do with their 
apparently di ffering conceptions of the political role of Damuni . 
But no development such as Damuni could have eventuated without the 
active and informed concurrence of John Guise . 
The formation of the Damuni Association excited considerable 
interest . Their stated principles were soon elaborated : multi­
racial egalitarianism -
Firstly Damuni believes that this Country and its wealth 
rightly belongs to the indigenous peoples . Damuni will 
not accept the current position where the indigenous people 
are considered as subservient second-class citi zens . The 
future of this Country wi ll be in equality - social , 
political and economic for all peoples . 
and peasant populi sm -
1 
2 
3 
Damuni comes from the village people . The village people 
are not angry but they are not content . They are respectful 
but not subservient . They want no big changes but this i s  
their Country and they wan� such changes a s  will ensure their 
equali ty in their Country . 
These opinions seem unexceptional today but in the late 1960s 
Guise ' s  career is outlined in Betti son et al . ( 1965 ) , and Epstein 
et al . ( 1971 ) . 
For example he controlled the Milne Bay Workers Association from 
its inception . 
Why Damuni . Mimeo . ,  Damuni Association , 5 November 1970 . 
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( the University ,  the Mataungans and Napidakoe Navitu excepted) such 
expressions were very radical . To define a group ' s  attitude to the 
government - ' advice and assistance can be sought from the Admini stration 
but decisions , policy and planning must be made by the indigenous 
peoples themselves ' - was then very daring ; so daring in fact that 
Young claims it was felt in the Province that he was in danger of 
deportation as a communist ! Generally then Damuni ' s  ideology could 
be categorized as ' early independence ' nationalism. 
The Damuni economic mani festo also followed these lines , clearly 
illustrating the influence of Young . It is interesting mainly for 
point seven of its proposals : that Damuni would ' assist in such j oint 
indigenous/expatriate enterprises as the Corporation shall consider 
fit provided that the indigenous equity is at least 50 per cent and 
1 there is real participation by indigenous peoples at all levels ' .  
This clearly presaged Damuni ' s  involvement with Young ' s  business 
enterprises . The establishment of a Damuni Economic Corporation was 
another Young idea . He traded on hostility towards co-operatives to 
convince his confederates of the necessity for such a company . 
The Damuni Association was established with Dibela as president , 
Vernon Guise and Billy Tanby as vice presidents , Levai George (Paneate 
I sland Primary School headmaster ) and Young as j oint secretaries and 
Kaitolele and Kankan as executive committee members . The foundation 
directors of the Economic Corporation consisted of the Association 
executive together with Dindillo and Waibadi Caleb , the president of 
the Kiriwina Local Government Counci l . 
The membe rship of the Association was shaped around this local 
government counci l-centred elite . But it also included prominent 
expatriates such as Chris Abel (Development Bank representative in 
Alotau) ,  Rev .  Fr Moore and Rev . Grey - the latter two important for. 
1 Proposed Establishment of the Damuni Economic Corporation and 
Prelimina.ry Plans for District Deve lopment . Mimeo . ,  Damuni 
Association , n . d .  
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making Damuni respectable in the eyes of both the government and a 
mission-oriented indigenous population . Also leaders of the mixed race 
community like Aloyi sius Gorogo and the Cadigans were included . 
The prestige of these people , together wi th the indigenous 
influentials , provided the impetus for a rapid growth in membership . 
By 1971 over 1000 people had paid their K2 . 00 admi ssion fee ( Stephen 
1972 : 13 9 ) .
1 
A year later approximately 2000 people had joined 
(membership records are scattered and incomplete ) .  Branches were 
established at Weraura , Maramatana , Mi lne Bay , Mi sima and Bwanabwana 
signi ficantly following local government counci l divisions . In other 
areas , people like Waibadi Caleb on Kiriwina island and Roi Kai tolele 
on Goodenough island , fostered large numbers of members even though 
there was no formal establi shment of branches .  A branch was also 
established in Port Moresby though it proved inactive . At Misima a 
leader of Damuni was John Fifi ta , a protege of John Guise , who 
uti li zed hi s Damuni eminence ,  together wi th his Workers ' Association 
activities ,  as a springboard for the 1972 elections . 
Atti tudes towards thi s acquisi tion of membership were ambivalent . 
Young felt that it served li ttle purpose . His conception of Damuni 
was of a nucleus , encouraging enterpri se by its own succe ssful example 
of business management . The indigenous leaders viewed Damuni as 
a mobili zational exerci se : sheer numbers were an affirmation of 
a popular wi ll for development . Also the size of an area ' s  member­
ship was seen as indicating the influence of the Damuni leader in 
that locality .  
At the grassroots level people joined Damuni for a variety 
of reasons . Joining was often an articulation of an individual ' s  
desire to appear informed and of some consequence . Recrui tment 
occasionally became intertwined wi th parochial village or clan politics . 
For example at Iapoa No . 2 vi llage in the Maramatana are a ,  recruitment 
was confused with rivalry between Ti laka , a Seventh Day Adventi s t  
deacon and councillor , and Duncan Dirome who was collecting money for 
a vi llage boat . This  rivalry occurred in the context of some confusion 
1 
The monies so collected were used to buy Bougainvi lle Copper Pty Ltd 
shares and then later used as capital when the Damuni Economic 
Corporation bought shares in Gi li Gi li Pty Ltd . 
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over the claims put forward by some labourers from Agaun for a 
K5000 profi t to be realized from a K2 . 00 investment in a chain letter 
which was then circulating . Councillor Tilaka spoke of large profits 
1 
to be made by investment in Damuni to counter the other proposals . 
In this  vi llage a large proportion of the Association ' s  membership 
came from the families of Nopeki Kalipara , Sidini Manabore , Maria Ana 
and Dumorowi Hamarei .  This  emulated the general pattern with figures 
of some authori ty bringing their supporters in with themselve s .  
The Damuni leaders 
The development of Damuni after 1972 revolved about Young 
and Dibela . John Guise had never taken an active interest and after 
1972-73  his position altered to one of opposition . The other leaders 
faded into the background as the day to day decision making increasingly 
came to revolve around Young and Dibela . 
Kingsford Dibela , though only one of a group of leaders in 1969 , 
had by 1973  emerged as the leading indigenous figure in Damuni . His 
background was typical of a certain type of Papua New Guinean politician . 
Head of the Manibolanai segment of the Bouni clan he had ' traditional ' 
status which , coupled with his education , provided an ideal spring­
board for political ambition . In his mid forties ,  he was educated 
during the war at Dogura Anglican Mis sion on the plateau overlooking 
Wedau , his home . From 1948 to 1963 he taught at the mi ssion schoo l ,  
i n  1956 achieving a ' B '  certi ficate . During this period he was twice 
chairman of the church guild and in 1966 attended church conference s  
i n  Suva and Noumea .  In 1 9 6 3  h e  was elected a councillor i n  the newly­
formed Weraura Council and largely due to his mi ssion-attained eminence , 
became inaugural president . From 1965 to 1 9 7 3  he was a member of the 
District Advisory Council and after 1970 became vice chairman of the 
District Education Board . 
1 
This misunderstanding of Damuni ' s  intentions was not unique . The 
1970/71 narrative report for the Province states ,  ' Damuni did not 
publicize very well  and as a result attracted some unfavourable 
publicity based upon suppositions ' .  Annua l Narra tive Report 1 970/71 
Mi lne Bay District, p . 21 .  
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Dibela has uti li zed such institutions as existed to realize 
his political ambi tions . In 1968 he was a member of Pangu . In 1971 
he received a setback when Gerald Corni sh , manager of Dogura mi ssion , 
defeated him in the Wedau ward of the Weraura Counci l elections . Dibela ' s  
behaviour had become remiss from the viewpoint of some mission affi liate s . 
He learned the lesson and in 1972  was re-elected for the Coastal ( Regional ) 
1 ward , the boundaries of the new ward reducing the necessity for full 
Dogura support . Dibela became the inaugural chairman of the Mi lne 
Bay Area Authority in 197 3 ,  thereby confirming his growing importance . 
Hi s involvement with Damuni can be seen as but another step on the 
ladder to political eminence . The logical next step was to contest 
the Alotau Open electorate . Following the appointment of Sir John 
Guise as Papua New Guinea ' s  first governor general on the granting 
of independence in September 1975 , Dibela duly won the by-election 
for the vacant Alotau electorate . 
Young , an Englishman , came to Papua New Guinea in the early 
1 960s from Irian Jaya . In 1966 he purchased Hihi la plantation and 
later Gi ligi li plantation . In 1967 he started a trade store in 
Alotau (which prospered as the Provincial headquarters was shi fted 
there from Samarai soon afterwards ) and became a councillor in the 
Mi lne Bay Local Government Counci l .  In 1968 he contested the Milne 
Bay Re gional seat in the House of Assembly elections , coming last in 
the field though making a good showing for a relative newcomer . 
In 1969 Young became chairman of the Provincial Local 
Government Councils ' Conference . Later in the year he lost his Milne 
Bay Local Government Council seat , through government intervention , 
and became instead the Conference ' s executive officer . His involvement 
in the Conference gave him a set of proteges and also a power base 
for a renewed , this  time successful , assault on the Regional seat in 
1972 . Young ' s  involvement in Damuni was politically convenient for 
making hi s name known around the Province . 
1 
Defeating ex-MHA for Huon , Mi chael Kaniniba , by an overwhelming 
plurality .  
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His involvement with Damuni also indicated a certain change 
of ideological heart . Prior to the formation of Damuni Young had 
been quite conservative . During the 1968 election campaign he was 
reported as saying : 
Now there are two very important points to this election . 
The first one is : do you want Home Rule and Independence? 
Or are you afraid of this and do you want to go slowly? 
I f  you want it quickly then you should vote for Cecil or 
for Elliot . And if you are frightened , and you want to 
go slowly , vote for John Stuntz or for myself . And 
the second question is do you want United Nations or do 
you want Australia to look after you? If you want U . N .  
you should vote for Cecil and Elliot . I f  you ,  like 
mysel f ,  prefer to trust Australia , you should vote for 
me . (Gostin 1971 : 124 . ) 
Politicians are creatures of the fashions of their time and it may 
be unwise to infer too much from these sentiments . But this 
campaign revealed another , more durable , clue to Young ' s  style in 
the way that he strove to use leaders ,  believing that they could 
deliver the vote (Gostin 1971 : 12 3 ) . This was a portent of the 
elitist style of Damuni and Young ' s  later indi fference towards the 
mobi lization of a mass membership . 
In explaining Young ' s  role in Damuni it is pertinent to 
consider hi s business affairs . These have undoubtedly had some 
influence upon hi s actions . Young , seemingly , has regarded hi s 
business activities as subordinate , though important ,  to his political 
activities . In 1967 he offered a 50 per cent interest in his trade 
store to the Milne Bay Local Government Council , whi le shortly there­
after expressing an intere st in converting the store into a co­
operative . This apparent , and repeated , inconsi stency can be resolved 
by realizing that Young was looking for an institution to which to 
attach hi s business interests - to be charitable both for reasons 
f . . 1 o principle and for long term enlightened self-interest .  
The period 1967-72 saw Young endeavouring to involve the Milne 
Bay Local Government Counci l in his business enterprises . His July 
1 Young wrote to the Cormni ssioner for Local Government in 1968 
stressing the necessity for counci ls to find revenue through business 
ventures .  
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1967 proposal , that the Milne Bay Local Government Council enter into 
partnership with him, only fai led because i t  was blocked by government 
action . 
This  epi sode caused a bureaucratic flurry . The provincial 
commissioner opposed the scheme , arguing that the financial involvement 
of some counci llors was not clear and that conflicts of intere st could 
arise . A disagreement occurred when the provincial commissioner 
accused the Alotau di strict staff of proselyti zing the scheme - a 
charge hotly denied by the officer-in-charge . Business Development 
and DPI supported the scheme . Initially it appeared that the commissioner 
for local government and senior officers in Port Moresby were 
sympathetic . Eventually opposition from headquarters of the then 
Divi sion of Di strict Administration (DDA )  prevailed and the scheme 
was blocked . 
Late in 1971  Young repeated the process with the Mi lne Bay 
Local Government Counci l attempting to purchase Hihila plantation from 
him . This new scheme foundered on the local government commissioner ' s  
opposition , a victory for the proposal ' s  DDA opponents over i ts 
DPI supporters . This  reverse coincided with a deterioration of Young ' s  
business fortunes .  The plan to sell  Hihila to the Milne Bay Local 
Government Council can be considered in the light both of a consistent 
Young policy and of a particular fiscal exigency . These attempts to 
involve the Council in Young ' s  operations were thwarted and are 
important only for the clue they give· to Damuni ' s  actions once it was 
formed . Counci ls and co-operatives were subj ect to statutory limitations 
upon their actions ; companies were not so bound . So Damuni formed 
a company and in 1972 entered into partnership with Young in his Giligili 
plantation . 
The government and Danruni 
Governmental reaction to the Damuni Association was at first 
reserved . 1969 saw the beginning of an anti colonial upsurge in many 
areas of Papua New Guinea and the government probably felt that Damuni 
was a related phenomenon .  Young' s involvement al so created suspicion , 
he being seen as an initiator of confusion and problems with which the 
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bureaucrats would eventually have to contend . The suspicion of Damuni 
was more pronounced on the national headquarters level than it was on 
the local level , where the district office was mi ldly favourable . 
Public service anxiety about Damuni ' s  political implications 
was not altogether unfounded , as could be seen from the 1971 Damuni 
Economic Corporation Memorandum of Regi stration . The memorandum 
allowed a wide range of economic and charitable activi ties but also 
asserted the right to ' obtain support or oppose an Act of Parliament 
or other statutory enac tments , rule , order , instrument , licence , 
privilege , exemption or authority as may seem to the directors to be 
expedient in the interests of the company ' .  This in an age when to 
the official mind politics were an anathema ! 
After 1972 official attitudes to Damuni became more blase 
and revolved mainly about interdepartmental rivalries . This reflected 
the results of a struggle that had taken place within Damuni during 
the 1970-72 period . The principal antagoni sts were �ohn Guise on the 
one hand and Young and Dibela on the other . Gui se wanted Damuni to 
assume a ' mi litant ' stand and to attack the government over the lack 
of development in the Province , a conception of Damuni ' s  role close 
to the populist pressures in i ts formation . The o thers saw Damuni as 
gaining very little from confrontation with the government ; the 
Association was to be primarily an organi zation to create development 
and to serve as an exemplar in this regard . Therefore if governmental 
assistance was forthcoming it was welcome . By 197 2 Young and Dibela 
had won their point and the militant aspect of Damuni disappeared . I t  
was a power struggle with important consequences for i t s  combatants ' 
(and Damuni ' s )  futures .  
O f  all the government departments DDA was generally least 
enthusiastic about Damuni . This  was primarily because of uncertainty 
about the political designs of the Association ' s  leadership . In 
contrast , the Development Bank and DPI lent some support . From being 
cautiously favourable in 197 0 ,  the provincial rural development officer , 
D . J .  Underwood ,  became actively involved in Damuni . He supported the 
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Damuni Economic Corporation ' s  acquisition of a 40 per cent share in 
Gili Gili Pty Ltd , 1 served on the steering conunittee of the 
Baniara Development Corporation (a Damuni northeast coast proj ect ) 
and became an honorary director on the board of Gili Gi li Pty . Ltd . 
The Development Bank showed its support , in 197 2 ,  by granting Damuni 
a K69 , 000  loan for the purchase of a 40 per cent share in Gili Gi li 
Pty Ltd .
2 This gave Damuni 1 7 . 6  per cent of the total loan allocation 
for the Province , the remainder being shared by the 240 other loans 
granted in Mi lne Bay that year . The Giligili slaughter house also 
got a free weekly meat inspection , a response to Young ' s  complaints 
about the high prices for thi s service . 
The support has not been unequivocal . A certain rivalry has 
always exi sted between Damuni and DPI over the promotion of smallholder 
cattle , due to the tendency for Damuni to get popular credi t for the 
introduction of this scheme .
3 
Young claimed to thi s writer (interview , 
March 1974 ) that Damuni had over 80 cattle proj ects when in actual 
fac t ,  at that time , only two such proj ects - Dibe la ' s  and that of 
Lui Boiuma of Siri Siri vi llage - could be so described , the rest 
being DPI/Deve lopment Bank sponsored proj ects . This rivalry has been 
expressed in DPI/Development Bank resistance to Young ' s  ' cattle loan ' 
ideas in favour of their own cash loan format ; at a mee ting at 
Naura in 1970 Underwood managed to convince the gathering of the 
superiority of this method over the Young proposal . In 1971-72 
Young had ambi tions to open up various areas of Fergusson island to 
cattle . Partly to pre-empt thi s ,  DPI started some smallholder proj ects 
there . After John Guise be came mini ster for primary industry in 1974 
DPI moved into a position of covert opposition to Damuni . 
1 
2 
3 
In this  matter atti tudes were substantially influenced by the 
favourable report Dr Kestevan , a consultant to the Development 
Bank , gave of the Gi ligi li scheme upon an inspection visit in 1 969 . 
Further loans of K3500 and K7000 were granted in 197 3 .  
A process o f  connection between economic change and i ts seemingly 
concomi tant institutions as described in the introduction . Thi s 
confusion has not been confined to indigenous peasants - the W . D .  
Scott report also identi fies Damuni with the DPI/Development Bank 
cattle proj ects . ( Scott and Co . 197 3 : 35 . ) 
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The Damuni Association also enjoyed the support of an informal 
group of ' respectable ' (defined in terms of sobriety and piety)  amongst 
the expatriates in Alotau . This led to tensions , with some government 
officers complaining that certain public servants carried their 
support so far as to have acquired a private shareholding in Gili 
Gili Pty . Ltd . (in actual fact these shareholdillJS Were so small as 
to be almost token; their only import being that they slightly 
affected the indigenous-expatriate ratio of shareholding ) .  
Damuni 's economic activities 
Damuni began as an economic protest group . After the defeat 
of John Guise ' s  attempt to render it more politically oriented the 
primacy of the Young-inspired economic focus was confirmed . The 1971 
establishment of the Damuni Economic Corporation , a subsidiary of the 
Association , provided the framework for this emphasis . 
The obj ectives of the Corporation were threef?ld : 
( i )  To assist indigenous peoples to establish themselves 
in primary , secondary or service industry . 
( i i )  To assist in , or invest in , the establishment of such 
faci lities as would provide firm foundations for the 
establishment of industry within the Province . 
(iii ) To j oin with Councils , Co-operatives ,  or other indigenous 
bodies to further development in the Province . 
Development was to be directed through individuals and to ' be based 
on maximum involvement of indigenous peoples in a self-employed 
capacity ' ;  ' the greater the stake an individual has in a proj ect the 
greater i ts chance of success • .
1 
This emphasis upon the individual 
made Damuni attractive to the emergent big peasant class described 
above , especially as it was associated with the new cattle proj ects 
which ( unavoidably , given their bureaucratic concomi tants ) assumed an 
individualistic bias . 
1 
At its inception the Corporation stated aspirations for involvement 
Proposed Es tablishment of the Damuni Economic Corporation and 
Pre liminary Plans for District Development . Mimeo . ,  Damuni 
Association , n . d .  
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in fishing , tourism , the development of alienated land , investments , 
and secondary and service industries . But it was in cattle , directly 
through i ts interest in Gili Gil i  Pty Ltd and indirectly through i ts 
association in the public view with the smallholder projects , that 
Damuni was most active . Its economic philosophy had been largely 
Young ' s . He had ambitions after the Gi ligili involvement to extend 
cattle proj ects throughout the Province . His cattle leasing scheme ,
1 
from i ts first promulgation in 1 967 , ran into sustained opposi tion 
from DPI .  
Young retained a paternalistic atti tude towards development . 
He told thi s wri ter ( interview March 1974 ) that ' the people do not 
understand development ' and that ' they j ust trust you to do the right 
thing by them ' . His part in the creation of Damuni thus involved 
making a point about how economic development should be organized . 
Therefore Damuni was , in a certain sense , from Young ' s  perspective 
an accident . Young was prepared to try his phi losophy through the 
counci ls (he was a prime mover in Vernon Guise ' s  Maramatana Local 
Government Council acquiring Puni Puni plantation ) but this was 
frustrated by the institutional restraints inherent in the Local 
Government Ordinance . An association , with a subsidiary company , was 
a means of evading these inhibitions . 
1 
Up to 197 5 the only concrete expression of Damuni ' s  activity 
This involved Giligili lending four cows to each participant and 
receiving five cows back after five years ; the client keeping the 
surplus he had managed to produce . This  method of cattle develop­
ment pre-dated Damuni . Young proposed to a meeting of Weraura , 
Daga and Makamaka Local Government Council representatives in 1968 
that he would donate four cows each to Siri Siri and Wedau vi llages 
for local government counci l cattle projects . Hi s later choice of 
Lui Boi uma of Siri Siri and Dibela of Wedau for the first Damuni 
projects can be seen as related to this fai led proposal . Similarly 
in 1974 he proposed five ' cattle leasing' projects on land near 
Gi ligi li , a proposition obviously designed to prove the viabi lity 
of his approach in the face of ' expert ' sceptici sm . His own 
followers , however , remained apathetic to this schema , which 
correspondingly reduced the pressure Young could apply to have it 
officially adopted . 
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was i ts purchase in 1971-72  o f  the 40 per cent equi ty in Young ' s  Giligi li 
plantation . The new company , Gili Gili Pty Ltd , also took over an 
outstanding Deve lopment Bank Loan from Hihila Pty Ltd (Young ' s  personal 
company) . The financial details of this arrangement are beyond the 
competence of this writer to assess . Suffice it to say that the purchase 
price of the plantation was les s  than the valuer general ' s  estimate 
and that Young ' s  annual salary as manager was a considerably more modest 
sum than . some such contracts in Papua New Guinea . 
Very much a theme of Gi li Gi li Pty . Ltd ' s  operations was its 
emphasis upon i ts supposed indigenous majority shareholding ; this  
being made up of the 40 per cent Damuni shareholding and a 20 per cent 
' local ' shareholding . The local shareholding included some of the 
Damuni leadership : Dibela,  Vernon Gui se , Lebasi Mark and Billy Tanby , 
as well as church councils ( Daio and Ladava ) and various school-associated 
groups such as the parents and citizens committees of the two local 
high schools . But the Young family and some expatriate public servants 
and their wives also had ' local ' shares .  The board o f  Gi li Gili Pty . 
Ltd . , was expatriate-dominate d .  Young and h i s  brother represented 
Hihi la Pty . Ltd . ; the Rev .  Canon Bodger and Mr Strange , Cameron High 
School headmaste r ,  represented the ' local ' shareholders ; and Dibela 
( the chairman ) and Vernon Gui se , the Damuni Economic Corporation 
shareholding . Vernon Guise , however , seldom, if ever , attended board 
meetings , being preoccupied , he claimed , with National Education Board 
meetings . In fact he was probably tacitly supporting hi s brother ' s  
hosti lity to Damuni . 
The ' local-maj ority-ownership ' image was important to Young for 
political reasons . In 1974 , to anticipate future criticism, Young 
intended to transfer hi s personal shareholding to his wife , a Papua 
New Guinean national , and to increase local equity by making a one-for­
one cash issue to Papua New Guinean shareholders . The board claimed 
that this share issue would increase indigenous equity to 75 per cent 
but this fallaciously assumed that all the 20 per cent ' local ' share­
holding was indigenous . 1 In 1974 the announcement of a K30 , 000 trading 
1 
See Kingsford Dibela ' s  report of the Board of Directors , Post-Gou.Pier 
14 August 1974 . 
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profit and the payment of a 10 per cent dividend was accompanied by 
a promise that all members ' contributions to Damuni would be con­
verted into shares in Gili Gili Pty Ltd . Dividends accruing to 
the Damuni Economic Corporation would be put into a trust fund and 
used to assist groups of individuals ( the initial idea was for 
scholarships ) in the Province . Young and Dibela obviously hoped 
that these actions would gain them political kudos . 
The decline of Damuni : the Baniara Deve lopment Corporation 
The connection with Young was at the base of many Damuni 
difficulties . Suspicion was aroused by his undoubted influence over 
some indigenous leaders and his critical attitude to the bureaucracy 
aroused resentment . On occasions Young publicly opposed government 
officers ' explanations of ' departmental ' policies . The resultant 
hostility to Young surfaced during the 1969 Mi lne Bay Local Government 
elections when the government nulli fied Young ' s  election for the 
Alotau ward on the ground that he was not residentially qualified . 
A subsequent inquiry by the chie f electoral officer revealed that this 
was incorrect but it caused Young to lose his  seat on the local 
government counci l (he de ferred to Mahuru Mark and did not contest 
the by-election ) . Mos t  indigenous opposition to Young in the Bay area 
was covert , as revealed by his failing to carry the area in the 1972 
elections . This opposition was for a variety of reasons : resentment 
at the closure of his village trade store outlets ; jealousy at the 
success of the Alotau Tea Shop , with which he was perhaps unfairly 
linked ; and for personal reasons (as with a former local government 
council clerk who had been ambitious to be appointed clerk to Damuni ) . 
It would become signi ficant only if Young and Damuni faltered . 
The reverse ' bandwagon ' effect was why the defeat of Damuni ' s  
proposed Baniara Development Corporation i s  so seminal to any 
consideration of Damuni . 
The Baniara proposal grew out of a generalized pressure for 
deve lopment on the northeast coast .  This was expressed i n  the late 
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1960s by demands for producer societies to handle the marketing of 
cash crops ( co ffee and later chillies ) in the area . Then in late 1972 
Kingsford Dibela proposed a nucleus Giligi li -style cattle proj ect , using 
a large block of clan land at Gawanaki .
1 
His scheme originally was for 
the three councils in the area , Weraura , Daga and Makamaka , to have a 
j oint proj ect . Signi ficantly , the proposal was made at a Provincial 
Councils ' Conference and thus had wider imp lications than if it had 
j ust been a parochial affair . Shortly afterwards Dibela claimed that 
Damuni could help in this Ruaba project and would provide a cattle 
barge for the northeast coast . It must have been about this time that 
the alliance between Young and Dibela crystallized . 
The scene was set at a meeting held in Apri l 197 3 .  Upon Young ' s  
persuasion this meeting decided to establish an area development 
company , the Baniara Development Corporation , rather than a producers ' 
society . The Corporation was to have 50 per cent participation by the 
Weraura and Daga councils and the remaining shares were to be held by 
the clan whose land was involved . Subsidiary producers ' societies were 
to be established to collect a levy on coffee (money was already being 
collected )  in order to provide capital . Dibela , John Solomon and 
Abraham Rogirogi were to be the directors of the Corporation . Young 
was authorized to hold discussions with appropriate persons on matters 
relating to the Corporation ' s  formation , a decision with signi ficant 
consequences .  
At first the reaction o f  the bureaucracy was sympathetic . At a 
meeting of the local government councils after the Corporation steering 
committee meeting , Young revealed that the Development Bank was 
consi de ring the proj ect and that the minister for lands
2 
had empowered 
a surveyor to delineate the boundaries . Provincial agriculture o fficials ,  
1 
2 
This  became known as the Ruaba proj ect , notwithstanding that Ruaba 
i s  some distance from Gawanaki . 
Thomas Kavali , whose friendship ( according to widespread belie f )  
led Young to join the National Party . 
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whi le originally entertaining reservations ,  soon promised support .  I t  
was only when John Guise became minister for primary industry and made 
his opposition to the Baniara Development Corporation explicit that the 
argument was advanced that there was no need for a nucleus estate in the 
area as the Province could achieve self-sufficiency in cattle supplies by 
1975 . DDA was initially cautiously pessimistic , fearful of possible 
management inadequacy , but eventually the provincial commissioner 
blocked the councils ' participation because ' instructions ' had been 
received to keep away from cattle company projects . 
The turning point came in early 1974 when Guise ' s  trans fer from 
the interior to the primary industry portfolio enabled him to halt the 
scheme . He instructed that there was to be no connection between the 
producers ' associations and any other form of political development in 
the area , in particular the Gawanaki cattle proj ect . Thi s  interdiction 
proved vital . The minister for busine s s  development , who came to Alotau 
to see what assistance hi s department could render the Corporation , hastily 
withdrew upon realizing the politi cal implications . Gui se ' s  opposition 
was ostensibly based upon his not favouring the tying up of land ( the 
scheme proposed a twenty year lease by the Corporation) and his concern 
that the people would lose their clan lands if the Bank loans were 
not repaid .  But i t  i s  hard to avoid the conclusion that a political 
hostility to Young (and Dibela ) was involved . 
Guise ' s  interference was not restricted to administrative 
intervention . He made two flying vi sits to Agaun and Biniguni and 
persuaded the people that three separate producers ' societies were 
the best means of developing their areas . Inter group rivalries 
were adroitly utili zed � the Agaun people noted that they had 
collected more money than the Wedau and Rabaraba groups and therefore 
decided to avoid delay and form their own society . Rivalrie s ,  especially 
between the in1and and the coastal people , were easy to capitalize upon ,  
the inland people long feeling that they were neglected in favour o f  
the coastals .  Also , ineptitude on the part o f  the advocates of the 
Baniara Development Corporation contributed to the ease with which 
these tensions came to the fore . It was not until February 1974 that 
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DPI was asked to collect a levy on chillies ( grown mostly in the 
coastal areas ) . For the previous eighteen months only levies on 
coffee , grown mainly in the hinterland , had been collected , to the 
understandable resentment of the inland group who felt that they '.Were 
providing all the capital for the Corporation . 
The Agaun group ' s  actions spelt the death knell of the Baniara 
Development Corporation . Rabaraba hinterland and the Wedau hinterland 
peoples then formed two other separate societies . Even though 
Dibela was able to get the Weraura Local Government Council to reaffirm 
their support for the scheme , ODA opposition rendered this no more 
than a futi le gesture of protest . 
ConaZusion 
The split between Young and Dibela on the one hand and John 
Guise on the other was to Damuni ' s  disadvantage . Initially Young 
and Guise had co�operated politically and in their plans for the 
development of Milne Bay Province . However they were never personally 
close and in the 1968 elections campaign Young travelled with Guise ' s  
opponents (Gostin et al. 1971 : 96 ) . An uneasy collaboration was 
maintained until 1972 when they rapidly fell out as Guise felt 
threatened by Damuni slipping from his into Young ' s  control . Differences 
over the Kabisawali M:>vement in the Trobriand islands accelerated this 
tendency . But the final step was taken when the April 1974 meeting 
of the Baniara Development Corporation empowered Young to act for the 
Corporation in its dealings with the government . Following this 
affront Guise administered a sharp lesson in the realities of political 
power . Dibela also inevi tably aroused Guise ' s  suspicion by his close 
associated with Young , his administering of a public rebuke to Guise 
during debate of the independence constitution at a Milne Bay Area 
Authority meeting in November 197 3 ,  and his obvious ambi tion to succeed 
Guise as MHA for Alotau . This latter element explains much of the 
manoeuvering that occurred around the Baniara Development Corporation 
as the northeast and south coast areas had provided most of Guise ' s  
votes in the past . Dibela with extensive northeast support was obviously 
a formidable potential opponent for Guise . 
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Damuni ' s  problems were also associated wi th i ts inabi lity to 
remain aloof from intra Provincial conflicts . Through hi s friendship 
wi th Waibadi Caleb , ex-Kiriwina Local Government Council president 
and Damuni Economic Corporation director , Young became embroiled in 
controversy with John Kasaipwalova , the leader o f  the Kabi sawali 
movement .  Young carried this di spute further than was useful by 
utilizing his parliamentary posi tion to attack Kabisawali . 1 Young ' s 
interest in this matter was possibly personal ; in 1972  he had obtained 
a deci sive majori ty of the votes from Kiriwina . Nevertheless the 
contention did not contribute positively to Damuni ' s  activities . 
The skil ful use of Gili Gili Pty Ltd profits could have 
reactivated popular support for the Association . But the nature of 
the formation of and the recruitment to Damuni rendered this di fficult . 
Damuni was bui lt upon ' influentials ' and the supporters these attracted . 
I t  had thus two weaknesses : that there was no real mobili zation o f  
people in any activi ty (other than j oining) and thus n o  broadly-based 
developmental endeavour , and , secondly , ' influentials ' tend to fade 
away . Damuni was built on a local government counci l-created elite . 
The poli tical careers of most of the Damuni ' activi sts ' in this elite 
tapered off and new influentials were not cultivated . 
The emphasis upon an elite as the basis for poli tical organi zation 
degenerated into the Association ' s  becoming a machine for the interests 
of Young and Dibela . This  development naturally attracted the fatal 
opposition of John Guise , the most powerful and seasoned politician 
in the Milne Bay Province . Therein lay the roots of Damuni ' s  decline 
as a popular force . 2 
1 
2 
HAD I I I  ( 2 8 ) : 3667-8 , 25 April 1974 . Young also suggested that the people 
were worried about the government ' s  favourable response to ' militant ' 
groups, an indirect attack upon Kabisawali ( House of Assembly , Economic 
Development Committee , Rep ort No . 5 ,  mimeo . ,  March 1974 , p . 2 ) . This  
campaign eventually led to a heated clash between Young and Kasaipwalova 
at an Area Authority meeting in September 1974 . As a result Kasaipwalova 
called for Young ' s  resignation. ( See Post-Courier 9 September 1974 . )  
Nevertheless , in the 1977  elections Dibela was re-elected and became 
speaker in the National Parliament .  Young was de feated by hi s neme si s ,  
John Guise , who contested the Provincial seat upon retiring as 
governor general . Dibela had adroitly used Damuni ( and hi s chairman­
ship of the Area Authority )  to create a reputation for himsel f .  Hi s 
connection with Damuni had undoubtedly been to his poli tical advantage . 
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Chapter 11 
PAPUA BESENA AND PAPUAN SEPARATISM 
Bob McKillop 
Papua New Guinea gained independence on 16 September 197 5 .  
I n  the period leading up to independence forces of  political 
disaggregation rather than of national unity appeared to be in the 
ascendency . A spontaneous form of political decentrali zation made 
its appearance in many areas in the form of micronationalist 
organizations (May 1975 ) . Among these organizations was a number 
with the declared aim of establishing a Papuan state independent 
from New Guinea . 
The Papuan separatist movements are founded on a belief 
among educated Papuans in their ' Papuaness ' . Josephine Abai j ah ,  
widely regarded as the leader of the best known movement , Papua 
Besena , has stated (Steinbauer 1974 : 42 ) : 
I am a Papuan . That makes me different 
from other people . I feel I have 
a nationality ,  a name , and a common future 
with Papuan people . 
Some Papuans have gone so far as to assert that they are 
culturally different from New Guineans . This orientation is evident 
in the emphasis given to the maintenance of traditional cultural 
values by Papua Besena . The primordial base for Papuan ethnonation-
alism is a weak one . The region consists of small economically 
self-sufficient communities , many speaking mutually unintelligible 
languages . Attempts to stimulate Papuan group solidarity by invoking 
contrasting stereotypes held by Papuans of New Guineans are based on 
serious distortion of widely accepted facts (Premdas 197 7 : 2 70-7 1 ) . 
Unfortunately for Papuan nationalism ,  coastal people tend to apply 
the stereotypes to all inland people , thus excluding the maj ority of 
Papuans from their Papuan cultural stereotype . 
The sense of Papuan identity has its origins in recent 
historical experience . Papua Besena leaders have stressed the 
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di fferent colonial histories of Papua and New Guinea , particularly 
1 
the separate legal status of the Australian Territory of Papua . 
The issue of the status of Papuans as Australian citi zens , which 
became important during the second House of Assembly ( 1968-72 ) ,  
served to give many of the Papuan elite the hope that they had a 
special status which gave them privilege s  over New Guineans . 2 
There were characteristics of Australian administration in 
Papua prior to 1942 which served to develop a sense of Papuan identi ty . 
The most significant of these was the development after 1910 of an 
embryonic Papuan civi l service .  The advent of a j oint Admini stration 
after the second world war was a cause of dissatis faction among the 
Papuan elite ,  for the influx of low-ski lled European workers into 
Port Moresby resulted in the relegation of some Papuan workers to 
lower ranks (Griffin 1975a ) . 
Two central themes dominate the emergence of separatist 
movements from this general sense of Papuan identi ty : a belief that 
Papua was being neglected in the area of economic development , and 
a reaction against migration from New Guinea to Port Moresby . Both 
issues are complex; a deeper analysis i s  necessary as an initial 
step in the explanation of the separati st movements . 
Equa l deve lopment. 
Papuan separatists claim that Papua has been neglected by 
the colonial Administration and a recurring demand has been for 
more development funds for Papua . Abai j ah (1975 : 8 )  has claimed : 
1 
2 
See , for example , Abaij ah ( 1975 ) . 
For more detailed accounts of Papuan separatism before 197 2 ,  see 
Nelson ( 1972 ) , Gri ffin (1973a , 1973b ,  1975a)  and Daro ( 1976 ) . 
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The role of Papua , under the j oint administration , 
is to be a baby farm to provide temporary labour 
for the economic and political development of New 
Guinea . Up to the present day , Australia ' s  story 
has been a continuation of the story of Australia ' s  
neglect and disinterest in Papua with emphasis on 
the destruction of Papuan economic and political 
self reliance . 
Although a belief in government neglect of Papua is now 
widely held by Papuans the claims by Abai j ah ,  that Australia 
deliberately neglected Papua , do not stand up to obj ective 
examination . 
The long history of attempts by the Australian Administration 
to develop Papua are not widely known , no doubt because colonial 
administrations tend not to publicize their failures . The history 
of agricultural development in Papua has been a story of constant 
s triving for new proj ects , ranging from cotton , sisal and tobacco 
industrie s in the 1920s , the Sangara sugar industry in the 1930s , the 
native plantation phase , and the Northern Province re.settlement scheme s , 
through to the eight Mekeo Rice Schemes over the past fi fty years 
(McKillop 1976b} . In mining there were large and costly proj ects 
in the 1920s
1 
and their spectacular collapse had a dampening effect 
on subsequent enthusiasm for investment in Papuan development . The 
fact that practically every one of these proj ects proved to be a 
costly fai lure is not a condemnation of Australian neglect of Papua . 
Rather it suggests that there are special features of the Papuan 
environment which necessitate more than the allocation of funds and 
enthusiasm to achieve ' developmen t ' . For example , more finance and 
e ffort have been expended on coffee extension work in the Milne Bay 
Province than in the Chimbu Province , yet the Chimbu produces over 
fi fty times more coffee than Milne Bay . Recent attempts to establish 
a sugar industry in the Central Province were cancelled after the 
Rigo people refused to make sufficient land available , and the 
government ' s  attempts to promote development along the Hiritano Highway 
have been rewarded by claims by the villages involved for substantial 
compensation for damage to gardens . 
1 See Papuan Annual Reports 1922 to 192 8 .  
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In 1978 the mini ster for primary industry , Julius Chan , directly blamed 
lack of support by Papuan people for the difficulties faced by Papuan 
proj ects . 1 
Papuan separati sts are concerned that current expenditure on 
development is biased against Papua . They point to the stated 
development strategies of the 1960s when , following a report by the 
World Bank ( IBRD 1965 ) ,  there was support for the strategy of 
directing funds to the areas of greatest potential . Because of the 
lack of objective data , the things people talked about doing , rather 
than the things they did ,  were often accepted as fac t .  It was not 
until 1975 that any attempt was made to develop measures which would 
enable a comparison of socio-economic development between the 
di fferent areas of Papua New Guinea . In that year R .  Kent Wil son 
published a socio-economi c index based on the Papua New Guinea 
villagers ' concept of development (Wilson 1975 ) . The index, although 
limi ted by the accuracy of statistics , enables a classification of 
di stricts2 according to levels of socio-economic development , thus 
providing a useful base for assessing Papuan claims of neglect . Port 
Moresby di strict had the highest index in the country , reflecting the 
range of services o ffered in the country ' s  largest city, and three 
other Papuan di stricts (Alotau , Daru and Samarai ) fell  into the top 
group . Overall , 38 per cent of Papuan districts fel l  into the top 
three groups , compared with 54 per cent of the New Guinean districts -
suggesting that Papua i s ,  to some extent , less developed than New 
Guinea . However , of the eleven most disadvantaged districts in the 
country (group 6 )  only one (Nomad ) i s  located in Papua . On these 
grounds the charge of colonial neglect may be applied equally to 
parts of New Guinea . 
An obj ective comparison of development between areas , however , 
fai ls to recogni ze the nature of Papuan claims of underdevelopment . 
The Papuan separati st movements gain their greatest support from the 
Central Province , especially the areas around Port Moresby . In other 
1 
2 
Post-CoUPieP 22 March 1978 .  
At  the time Wi lson ' s  paper was written Provinces and di stricts 
were known , respectively, as Districts and sulrdi stricts . Here 
we have used the current terminology . 
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words i t  is  the people from the most developed areas who speak most 
loudly about lack of development . They are the people who have had 
the closest contact with the colonial masters , the people whose 
culture and traditions have been most dramatically undermined ,  and the 
people who have lived closest to the inequality between themselves and 
the foreigners who have come to dominate them. Port Moresby represents 
the greatest concentration of foreign wealth in the country - foreign 
administrators , diplomats , company executives and academics form a 
dominant international community which exhibits a material wealth and 
life style which generates envy among the indigenous majority . Abai j ah 
( 19 75 : 6 )  expresses their feeling of underdevelopment thus : 
The story of my parents is the story of Papua under the 
Australian administration . Basically they were taught 
and believe that Papuans were inferior to other people , 
that Papua was poorer in resources than other countries , 
and that Papuans could never govern their own country or 
control its development .  The white man and other people 
were superior in every material way to Papuans and the 
basic colonial philosophy was Papuans , on their own , 
would starve to death and blood instead of honey would 
flow in the land . 
New Guinean migration 
Behind much of the rhetoric of Papuan separatist leaders , 
especially Josephine Abaij ah ,  lies a fear of domination by New Guinean 
immigrants to Port Moresby . 
Port Moresby now has a population of 115 , 000 which is increasing 
at seven per cent per annum. The city is rapidly taking on the 
appearance of a typical Third World city .  Expatriates and the country ' s  
elite live in material comfort in exclusive ' high covenant'  suburbs ; 
public servants and semi-skilled workers live in ' low covenant ' suburbs ; 
recent immigrants to the city live in the numerous squatter settlements 
which ring the planned suburbs . An additional settlement pattern is 
provided by the five Motuan vi llages wi thin the city boundary . With 
the rapid rate of migration and limited employment opportunities 
social problems are acute . Street brawls and crime are prevalent and 
the urban elite live in constant fear of threats to their material 
wealth through break and entry . The media regularly expresses the 
elite ' s  fear of crime , which is usually attributed to unemployed 
immigrants in the city .  To the Papuans who regard Port Moresby as 
their city and who constitute the maj ority of the indigenous elite , 
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the immigrants who flock to the city are a disturbing factor they 
would pre fer to eliminate . As many of the immigrants are from New 
Guinean provinces it is easy for the Papuan separati sts to use New 
Guinean immigrants , and especially those from the Highlands , as a 
scapegoat for the city ' s  problems . 
The Papuan fear of New Guinean immigrants was crystalli zed in 
the Papua vs . New Guinea football riot of 197 3 .  Prior to the annual 
inter territory football match the seeds for conflict had been sown . 
The lord mayor of Port Moresby , a Motuan , had said that the urban 
unemployed should be deported back to their home areas . Josephine 
Abaij ah addressed a number of meetings where she referred to attacks 
on Papuan women by New Guineans and the desire of New Guineans for 
Papuan land . At one meeting she said that New Guineans spoke a kanaka 
language , were violent primi tives and that Papuans were not safe wi th 
them around (Standi sh 1973b) . A number of observers ha s claimed that 
these inflammatory speeches were a basic cause of the rioting which 
followed . On the other hand Papua Besena supporters point to a 
simi lar riot in 1968 which occurred without the benefi t of Abai j ah ' s  
speeches (Daro 1976 ) . However , all observers agree that the result 
of the riot was a dramatic increase in the fear of highlanders among 
Port Moresby Papuans and because of thi s an increase in their support 
for Papuan separati sts . To Abai jah and many Papuans the riot s 
confi rmed their fears of the primitive savagery of New Guineans . 
Many leading Papuans publicly called for unemployed New Guineans to 
be shipped out of Port Moresby and for stri ct controls to be placed 
on migration (Standi sh 1 9 7 3b ) . 
On closer examination the issue is not a parti cularly useful 
one for the separati st cause . Many of the despi sed highlanders were 
in fact Papuans .  The Southern Highlands Province accounts for some 
200 , 000 of Papua ' s  700 , 000 people , though their ethni c ,  li ngui stic 
and communi cations links are with the people of the highlands valleys 
to the north of the colonial border . Even within the Central Province 
the people of the Goi lala di strict are a mountain warrior people much 
feared by the coastal Motuans and during the 197 3 riots the Mountain 
Koiari Papuans are reported to have fought the coastals (Standi sh 197 3d ) . 
Some of the largest migrant camps in Port Moresby are settled by 
Goi lala and Kerema people from Papua and it is these groups , rather 
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than the much maligned highlanders , who represent a large proportion 
of the court convictions in Port Moresby . Moreover research shows that 
the best organi zed groups amongst Port Moresby ' s  criminals are Papuan 
(Po ' o  1975 ) . 
One further fact needs to be considered in analysing the 
apparent fears of New Guineans amongst Papuans : the over-representation 
of Papuans in the public service , a bias which is most apparent for 
the Central Province . A Public Service Commi ssion review of staffing 
of senior positions by province of origin in 1976 showed that people 
from the Central Province , which had less than five per cent of the 
population , held 40 per cent of the executive positions ( class 9 and 
above ) in the public service , the same proportion as all New Guinean 
provinces , which had 72 per cent of the population . Milne Bay , Northern 
and Gulf Provinces are also over-represented at the top of the public 
service , but the Southern Highlands , with 7 . 5  per cent of the 
population , held only one per cent of the executive positions (all 
class 9 • token ' appointments ) . To appreciate the s�gni ficance of 
these figures one has to consider the dominance of the public 
bureaucracy in Papua New Guinea . In 1973  some 85 per cent of the 
professional and semi professional manpower and 66 per cent of the 
technical manpower were employed in the public sector (Manpower 
Planning Uni t 1 9 7 3 ) . Two international consultants , advi sing the 
central government and the Constitutional Planning Committee early in 
1974 , reported that 
. . .  in our experience of poli tical systems in Asia , 
Africa and the Caribbean , we have not come across 
an administrative system so highly centralised and 
dominated by i ts bureaucracy (Tordoff and Watts 1974 : 
2/2 ) . 
Papuans then , particularly those from the Central Province , 
are currently in a unique posi tion of power and authori ty . However , 
they can expect from other areas increasing demands for more equal 
representation in positions of power . They are in a vulnerable 
position and it is a natural reaction to seek safeguards to protect 
their privi lege . 
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Formation of Papua Besena . 
1\s observed above , a sense of Papuan identity had emerged before 
the second world war and during the second House of Assembly 
a number of Papuan MHAs were advocating a separate destiny for Papua . 
In the 1972  elections Josephine Abai j ah became the only female member 
of the House when she was elected on a campaign 'for Papua , for its 
land , and for its culture and life ' (Daro 1976 ) . 
Abai j ah ' s  campaign was closely connected with two expatriate 
identi tie s  - Dr Eric Wright , the assistant director of health education , 
who was patron to Abaij ah '  s former career in the public hea lth department 
( she was heir apparent to hi s position ) 1 , and Percy Chatterton , a 
well known mis sionary and former MHA . By late 1972  Abaij ah openly 
advocated a secessionist line , embracing the view that Wright had 
put forward some years previously at the University of Papua New Guinea 
( Gri ffin 1975a : l l ) . Chatterton publi cly di ssociated himself from 
Abai j ah ' s  policies , leaving Wright to exert what many observers saw 
as a powerful influence over her . 
On 3 June 197 3 the Papua Besena Movement was formed by what 
was described as a counci l compri sing vi llagers , councillors , professional 
people , tradesmen and other citizens •
2
. The Motu name means ' Papua 
Tribe ' according to Chatterton , who i s  credited with having helped 
to choose it (Daro 1976 ) , and ' Papua Nation ' or ' Papuan nationalism '  
according to Abaij ah (1975 ) . The movement claims to have conducted 
about one hundred formal meetings in the first year of its existence , 
most of these held in Abai j ah ' s office in Hohola , a suburb of Port 
Moresby . 
In November 1974 a policy document was i ssued under Abaijah ' s  
name . The document, which i s  reproduced at the end of this chapter , 
set out as the aim of Papua Besena : 
1 
2 
To make Papua a free , independent nation and 
make the Papuans free people and masters of their 
own lands , their own resources ,  their immigration 
and their own lives . 
See National Times 11 August 1975 , ' Dr Eric Wright : 
by his war ' (Chri s Ashton ) .  
Post-CoUI'ier 2 5  June 1 97 3 .  
A man defeated 
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Papua Besena was to be a peaceful , non violent , anti colonial movement . 
It sought to achieve its aim ' by freeing the minds of the Papuan people , 
lifting from the Papuan people the slave mentality of colonialism,  and 
destroying the colonial myth in Papua ' .  
The claim of Papua Besena to be an anti colonial movement was 
undermined by contradictory strategies . Sometimes there were attacks 
on Australian colonialism ,  particularly for ' past neglect ' of Papua ; 
paragraph 26 of the basic policy document conclude s : 
Because of the great harm that Australia has done 
and continues to do to Papua while we were helpless 
under its colonial rule , Papua Besena strongly 
supports the confiscation of all Australian owned 
properties in Papua and their free return to the 
Papuan people . 
On the other hand , unti l well  into 1975 Abai j ah continued to 
demand that Papua remain an Australian territory and that Papuans 
retain Australian citizenship . She made several trips to Australia to 
seek support for Papua Besena and eventually retreat,ed there in 
1977 , ostensibly to write a book . An undated leaflet produced by 
Abai j ah shows her holding a koala and carries the me ssage ' Papua 
i s  a natural trading partner of Australia ' . 1 Such contradictions 
have enabled Papua Besena ' s  opponents to label it a colonial movement 
which wants to reintroduce a colonial border . 
Although Papua Besena ' s  leadership is centred in Port Moresby 
and its meetings are held there the movement claims to be vi llage 
based . It has sought to gain support among vi llage people and has 
frequently taken up local grievances on behalf of rural communities . 
One of the first campaigns of this nature was Abai j ah ' s 
assumption of the role of spokesman for the Koiari people from the 
Sogeri area near Port Moresby . The Koiari people had been included in 
the large Hiri Local Government Counci l and their initial concern 
l Reproduced in Davis (1974 ) . 
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was for a separate Sogeri Local Government Council .  Abai j ah came 
to their aid during 197 3 ;  she claimed that the Koiari people should 
have their own counci l because they had suffered as a result of 
economic development (plantations and the Port Moresby hydro electric 
scheme ) on thei r  lands . 1 A year later Abaij ah and seven Koiari 
representatives presented a petition listing twelve demands to the 
Electricity Commissioner . The demands included a Kl0 , 000  annual 
royalty for ' the electricity generated from the resources of the 
Koiari ' s  land ' , a road , school ,  village water supply and electri fication , 
and the return of some plantations . 2 At the same time the Koiari 
set up a road block denying Electricity Commi ssion vehicles access  
to the Sirinumu dam. The government soon agreed that a road should 
be built to the village area . In June 1976 the Koiari people were 
granted their own counci l to represent the 2000 people of the area . 
The Somare government granted K2000 towards its e stablishment and 
the prime ministe r ,  deputy prime minister and governor general were 
all present at the official opening ceremony ( Daro 1976 ) . A pattern 
of action had been set for subsequent Papua Besena campaigns . 
The Somare government refused to be drawn into repressive measure s  
and eventually was able t o  take much of the credit for the establishment 
of the Sogeri Local Government Council . 
A more heated , urban based campaign was the women ' s  demonstration 
against the high cost of living in Port Moresby in 1974 . Again 
Abai j ah played a central role , leading a number of marches by women 
in support of demands for more money for their husbands , a price 
freeze and for cuts in politicians ' salaries .  I n  successive days 
of demonstrations angry women , led by Abaijah and inflamed by her 
numerous speeches ,  laid siege to the chie f  minister ' s  office , rampaged 
through a conference room, attacked the chief minister and the minister 
for foreign relations and their advisers , threw stones ,  caused damage 
1 Post-Courier 19 April 197 3 and 1 June 197 3 .  
2 Post-Courier 17 May 1974 . 
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to both the main stadium and the airport terminal , and tried to 
prevent the chief minister from boarding an aircraft .
1 
Chief 
minister Somare later said that he felt ' as though Papua Besena 
were trying to use street politics and inflation to bring my 
government down ' ( Somare 1975 : 1 3 3 ) . Abai j ah ,  for her part , did not 
seem concerned at the violence of her supporters . 
The Somare government again responded to the demonstrations . 
Wi thin a week cuts on import levies and profi t  margins for staple 
foods were announced after an all day cabinet meeting . 2 The following 
3 
day an increase in the urban minimum wage was announced . As a 
longer term measure the government also announced the expansion of 
the Fresh Food Market - an expensive and heavily subsidi zed marketing 
organization which was aimed at bringing cheaper vegetables to urban 
areas by encouraging large producers at the expense of small 
indigenous farmers (McKillop 19 8 1) .  Somare also responded 
with a frank open letter to Abai j ah ' explaining ' the government ' s  
s tand on the i ssues rai sed by the women . 
A third instance of Abai j ah ' s uti li zation of local i ssues 
occurred whe n ,  during June 1976 , unseasonal heavy rains brought 
widespread flooding to the Central Province . With only a little 
prompting from Abaij ah the government announced that it would provide 
relie f food for villages in the Hula-Marshall Lagoon area . One 
hundred and eighty bags of rice and an equal number of bundles of 
sago were sent in a convoy of trucks which was led by Abaij ah and 
4 
James Mopio , the leader of the Papuan Liberation Movement . The 
incident emphasized the dominance of the central government in Papua 
New Guinea and the dependence of all individuals , communities and 
organizations on handouts from the bureaucracy . Abai j ah ' s presence 
1 Post-Courier 1 3 ,  1 4  June 1974 . 
2 Post-Courier 20 1974 . June 
3 Post-Courier 2 1  June 197 4 . 
4 Post-Courier 19 July 1976 . 
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at the head of the convoy symboli zed her acceptance of this 
dependence and her powerlessness to offer an alternative to the 
present government . 
Another strategy employed by Papua Besena , and by Mopio , was 
the use of symbolic gestures as a tactic of social action . Mopio 
developed· plans to pull down Papua New Guinea flags everywhere in 
Papua and replace them with the flag of Papua Besena .
1 
He envisaged 
police intervention and planned to capitalize on any overreac tion 
on their part . 
Little has been heard of these plans , but a Mopio strategy 
for a uni lateral declaration of Papuan independence was carried out . 
On 16 March 1975  a uni lateral declaration of independence was made 
2 
by Papua Besena at Baruni vi llage near Port Moresby . At dawn 
Abai j ah lowered the Australian flag and raised the Papua Besena 
flag . At her feet were symbolic replicas of gi fts which Australia 
had made to tribal elders of the Port Moresby area when Papua was 
annexed in 1884 . Somare was quick to point out that the declaration 
was limited to only six villages .
3 
Organization. 
Papua Besena lacks a formal organi zational structure . Although 
Abaij ah was initially regarded as the leader of Papua Besena she 
has maintained that leadership is open to anybody who wants to be a 
leade r .
4 
Papua Besena claims to be a mass movement which works through 
other institutions and organizations which support its aims . Thus 
it has become closely associated with a number of political movements ,  
many o f  which have conflicting interests . They include : 
1 
2 
3 
4 
National Times 3 March 1975 , ' Papuan Independence : An unreal 
Papua New Guinea concept , but not for Mopio ' (Chri s Ashton ) . 
Post-Courier 17 March 1975 . 
Post-Courier 19 March 1975 . 
See Abai j ah ' s  article on ' Papua Be sena Policy ' , Post-Courier 
16 June 1977 . 
Josephine Abai j ah  making a uni lateral de cl aration of Papuan independence , March 19 75 
( see p. 340 ) 
( Photo courtesy Post-Courier) 
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The Social Workers Party of Papua New Guinea which was formed 
in May 1973  to fight for a strong and viable socialist Papua New 
Guinea . The Party ' s leaders were all Papuans and in July 197 3 the 
secretary Peter Kawo said that the SWP ' most strongly supported the 
principles of the Papua Movement • .
1 
The SWP was an uncertain ally , 
however , and the president , Laki Laya , subsequently planned a protest 
march against Papua Besena ( Daro 1976 ) . 
The Papuan Black Power Liberation Movement was formed in 
September 197 3 .  The movement ' s obj ective s  included the protection 
of the freedom1 rights , hi story , prestige and identity of the Papuan 
people (Daro 1976 ) . The first president , Leo Charles Kavaua , 
subsequently became an advisor to Abaij ah .  
The Papuan Liberation Movement was formed a s  a breakaway group 
of the Papuan Black Power Movement , with James Eki Mopio as president 
and Paterson Ki la as secretary . Mopio , a former extension officer 
of the Department of Primary Industry , president of the Mekeo Local 
Government Counci l and businessman , was elected to the National 
Parliament in the Central Provincial by-election of 1976 . 
The Papua Group was formed by a group of success ful candidates 
for the Port Moresby Ci ty Counci l  fol lowing the 1974 council 
elections . The group was able to control the council and it set 
out as general obj ective s  an immediate provincial state government 
for Papua 1 legal aid from Australia1 and financial assistance from 
the Papua New Guinea government (Daro 1976 ) . The Papua Group e lected 
a central executive of ten councillors and subsequently added a 
working committee compri sing the executive committee and some 
prominent Papuans from outside the counci l ,  including James Mopio .  
Subsequently i t  was announced that ' the Papua Group consi sts of 
Papua Besena , the Social Workers 1 Party , some members of the Port 
Moresby City council ,  the Papuan Black Liberation Movement ,  village 
and church leaders ' (Daro 1976 ) . 
1 Post-Courier 4 July 197 3 .  
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The Port Moresby City Counci l became a vocal source of support 
for Papuan separatism and it passed a series of motions calling for a 
1 separate independent Papua . But though the council became a source 
of irritation to the central government , the actions of the Papua Group 
councillors did little to assist the separatist cause . The councillors 
seemed more interested in their personal comfort , and accusations of 
political patronage became common in the government-oriented national 
press . In May 1975 the counci l voted Kl0 , 000 to send eleven 
counci llors on a ' goodwi ll vi sit '  to the Philippines j ust one week after 
the counci l had sacked forty-eight labourers because there were 
insufficient funds to pay them;
2 
the national newspaper had some 
lighthearted fun at the counci llors ' expense over the nature of unpaid 
bi lls the group left behind in Mani la .
3 
The political activi ties of 
the counci llors were not popular with executive staff and four key 
offi cers re signed over a twelve month period .
4 
The central government 
threatened to abolish the council following allegations of waste of 
publi c funds and political patronage . Charges that the c i ty counci llors 
were granting tenders for counci l work to their own companies were 
widely circulated in Port Moresby and in 1978 a Workers Pressure Group 
was formed to contest the counci l elections in opposi tion to the Papua 
Group . The group claimed to be ' an alliance of vi llage leaders , workers 
d t d I d • d 0 h • 5 an s u ents an nominate eig teen candidates . Campaigning against 
the • wantok sys tem ' of the council , the group was successful in winning 
control of the counci l with the support of independents .
6 
The Papuan Republican Fighters ' Army was a more bi zarre 
group . The ' Army ' was formed by Simon Kaumi fol lowing hi s 
suspension from the public servi ce for political activities 
against the government in 1974 . 7 In January 1975 the PRFA sei zed 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Post-Cour>ier 6 November 1974 . 
Post-Courier 2 2  May 197 5 .  
Post-Courier 3 July 1975 . 
Post-Courier 4 July 1975 . 
Post-Courier 2 May 197 8 .  
Subsequently Papua Besena was successful i n  placing i ts candidate in 
the Lord Mayor ' s  position while the Workers Pressure Group incumbent 
was overseas . 
See Post-Cour>ier 15 October 1974 ; 
16 , 25 February 1975 . 
15 , 16 , 1 7 , 2 1 ,  28 January 1975  and 
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a run-down plantation near Popondetta , an act which Abaij ah heralded 
as a peaceful coup for ?apuan liberation from colonialism.
1 
In February 
1975 Abaij ah issued a press release to announce that Kaumi had been 
2 
appointed ' provisional Chief Minister for the Republic of Papua ' .  
Papua Besena and the media . 
With i ts strong urban base , the Papua Besena movement is well  
placed to obtain a wide media coverage and the�e is  evidence that 
the leaders have sought to exploi t this potential . Abaij ah regularly 
issue s  press statements and is well known for her long letters to 
the Post-Courier . Her ability to sensationalize issues has made her 
attractive to the media and she has become one of the most widely 
known Papua New Guineans wi thin Australia . 
However , the use of the mass media by political movements can 
be a difficult strategy to pursue over a long period . There is  
little doubt that the media coverage o f  the 1974 Port Moresby women ' s  
riot , for example , was a factor in the rapid government response 
to the grievances of the urban people , but the long-term benefit to 
Papua Besena is  not so obvious . 
Part of the problem facing Papua Besena in its media campaign 
for Papuan independence was to identify a target audience . In the 
period before independence the power to grant a separate independence 
lay with the Australian government , but there was a number of 
potential sources of opinion which might have influenced i ts decision , 
including the Papua New Guinea government, the Australian public 
and the Uni ted Nations . Papua Besena made some attempt to appeal 
to the Australian government through the Australian people . 
Abaij ah frequently wrote letters to the Australian press explaining 
3 
her cause and , in company with Wright , she made a number o f  
1 
�bai j ah press release 11 February 1975 . 
2 Post-Courier 7 February 1975 . 
3 
For example , see Sydney Morning Hera Zd 10 August 197 3 .  
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publicity visits to Australia which were wide ly reported .  However , 
the usefulness of these visits is open to doubt , as Australian 
reporters concentrated on her inabi lity to present coherent 
programmes for the development of an independent Papua and on the 
influence of Wright in formulating her policies . She was evasive 
on these issues . 1 When chances came to present her case to 
Australian decision makers her behaviour was often di fficult to 
follow .  I n  19 7 3  she was granted two appointments to see Bill  
Morrison , the Aus tralian minister for territories , but on both 
occasions she elected not to appear . Afterwards she rationalized 
that Morrison had ' only one thing in mind and that is to dump us ' 
(Membrey 19 74 ) . 
The media campaign created a long term problem for Papua 
Besena which was eventually to undermine its ob j ectives and isolate 
the movement as an urban oriented splinter group . In order to gain 
the s upport of the maj ority of Papuans a secessionist movement would 
need to gain the support of the vi llage people who constitute the 
bulk of the population . However , the mass media in Papua New Guinea 
is almos t exclusively urban in both its orientation and contact . 
Thus the more energy Papua Besena directed to media publicity the 
more it isolated itself from the rural people . Eventually Abai j ah 
be came better known in Australia than among the Papuan people and 
the movement has not been able to take up any significant cause 
outside of Central Province . 
The media also served to highlight the bas i c  weakness of 
the Papua Besena strategy . The rhetoric of Papua Besena has been 
rich in visionary re ferences to the development of Papua ' s  resources 
of copper ,  oil ,  timber , gas and copra . Abai j ah has re ferred 
frequently to the ' golden tri angle ' of Papua , formed by the Ok Tedi 
copper deposi t ,  the Purari hydro electric s cheme , and the agricultural 
potential of the Southern Highlands .
2 
However the vis ion is based 
1 
2 
See Pacific Islands Monthly September 19 7 3 . 
Post-Courier 16 June 19 7 7 .  
3 March 19 75 . 
See also Ashton in National Times 
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on a material development mode l ,  which views development in terms 
of roads , airports , schools , better houses and the material comforts 
of Western society .  In Papua New Guinea these things have always 
been provided by the government . I ts near monopoly in the provision 
of the material forms of development and the vi llagers ' desire for 
these forms consti tute the basis of the power of the central 
government bureaucracy . Thus a strategy which emphasises material 
goods i s  a strategy of increased dependence on the central government 
and ultimately on Australian aid .  On the other hand a non violent 
s trategy is  one which mobilize s  the public to deny the source of 
the government ' s  power by non co· .. opera tioo and disobedience . In the 
Papua New Guinea context thi s  would involve a denial of the government­
development mode l ;  a rej ection o f  government-built roads , the 
government education system and the aspiration for highly paid 
posi tions in the public service . While these i ssue s  remain central 
to the protesters ' aspirations the government retains enormous power 
simply from the threat to redirect development funds unless  the group 
co-operates with the government . This presents a central dilemma 
to the Papuan cause . While protest action by Papuan separatists 
has resulted in signi ficant redirection of government resources 
toward the well-off groups of Port Moresby and i ts hinterland , this 
is hardly a challenge to the private interests of the decision-
making elite of the public bureaucracy . Where the protest went too 
far and offered the prospect of a separate power base to the central 
elite , such as the case of the Port Moresby City Counci l ,  i t  
required only a threat t o  withdraw the support of the central 
government to bring the protest to heel . An excellent example of 
the dependency of the Papuan separati s ts on the central government 
is offered in Papua Besena ' s  decision to send a delegation of ten 
on an extensive overseas tour to publici ze Papuan independence ; 
when it came to funding the operation , Abai j ah led a delegation to 
the minis ter for finance to ask for a K20 , 000 grant to pay for the 
. 1 trip . 
1 Post-Courier 31 July 1975 . 
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The decline of Papuan separatism . 
The early years of Papua Besena were marked by exaggerated 
claims of support among Papuans . In 197 3 Abai j ah made several 
promotional tours to Papuan provinces and by the end of the year she 
1 claimed to have the support of eighty per cent of Papuans .  At this 
time the movement was identified with opposition to independence and 
much of the apparent support from village s  may be attributed to this 
opposition ( Daro 1976 ) . 
However , while Papua Besena promoted itself under a secessionist 
banner it was obliged to show some results i f  it was to maintain 
support . The most signi fi cant action to this end was the unilateral 
declaration of independence in March 1975 . Apart from some light­
hearted reporting in the media the act caused scarcely a ripple in 
Papua New Guinea .  It  was sununed up by Gri ffin (1975b : l2 3 )  a s  pathetic 
in both senses : moving and ineffectual . 
The ' non event ' of unilateral declaration marked a turning 
point in Papua Besena ' s  development . From that moment Papuan secession 
was dead and Papua Besena gradually adapted to reality and organized 
itself into a political group intent on gaining a greater share of 
resources for its supporters within the framework of the Papua New 
Guinea state . The change was gradual and it took some time for 
people to realize that it had occurred . 
In January 1976 Mopio won a by-election for the Central 
Province and j oined Abai j ah in the National Parliament . In Apri l ,  
as parliamentary leader of Papua Besena , Mopio announced that a 
Papua Party had been formed and would soon formulate policy . 2 In 
June an advertisement in the Post-Courier announced that the Papua 
Party aimed at good and stable government through democrati c 
principles ,  national self-determination and abolition of old colonial 
influences . 3 
1 Post-Courier 2 January 1974 . 
2 Post-Courier 8 April 1976 . 
3 Post-Courier 4 June 1976 . 
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Emphasi s  shifted to gaining a Papuan provincial government , 
following a mode l  already establi shed by the North Solomons and the 
Eastern Highlands , but the concept apparently had little support out­
side Central Province . The reaction of other Papuan areas was summed 
up by a spokesman for Boda Togelu, an Esa ' ala (Milne Bay ) group , who 
said , ' The Papua government , i f  agreed , would ideally favour the power 
hungry minority to manipulate and take advantage of other Papuan 
• • • I 1 provinces to suit i ts own ends . 
By August the Papua Party had declared its hand as an interest 
group out to protect the entrenched power position of the Papuan elite . 
In response to rumours of shifts for senior Papuan public servants and 
the announcement that the chai rman of the Public Service Conunission , 
Sere Pitoi , was to be replaced by a Tolai , the Papua Party called a 
• • I 
2 
meeting to ' discuss recent developments in public service appointments . 
Papuan departmental heads and politicians were asked to attend . A 
prominent Papuan supporter and former head of the Teaching Service 
Conunission said that ' he was aware that axes had bee� laid at the feet 
o f  senior Papuan public servants' . 3 
In 1977 the conunander-in-chief of the Defence Force , Brig adier 
General Diro , a Papuan , was reprimanded by the government for an 
unauthorised meeting with Irianese rebel leaders . This too brought 
an outburst from Abai j ah who c laimed that the government was conducting 
a smear campaign over the Diro affai r ;  she added , ' it was based on 
4 
Government fears and insecurity when dealing with Papuans ' .  
In early 1977 the Papuan factions moved to amalgamate into a 
single political group to contest the forthcoming national elections . 
The various splinter groups of the Papuan movement ,  inc luding the 
Papuan Black Power Movement , the Papuan Liberation Front , the Papua 
Party and the Port Moresby City Counci l ,  j oined with Papua Besena to 
form the Papua Besena Organisation under the initial chairmanship of 
Oala Oala Rarua , the former Papua New Guinea high commissioner in 
1 Post-Co'UY'ier 26 August 1976 . 
2 Post-Co'UY'ier 26 August 1976 . 
3 Post-Co'UY'ier 26 August 1976 . 
4 Post-Co'UY'ier 12 October 197 7 . 
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Australia .
1 
Oala Rarua was quietly removed from the Organisation the 
fol lowing week , but the group went on to develop a party platform . 
Papua Besena ' s  policies , announced in May 1977 , emphasi zed integrity , 
2 
j ustice and equal development . The policy platform marked the formal 
end of Papuan secession and its replacement with a policy according 
to which ' regional administration should be encouraged ' .  An emerging 
i ssue in Papua New Guinea at this time was alleged corruption among 
government minis ters and official s ,  and the Papua Besena policies 
indicated that the movement ' s  leaders saw political advantage in this 
issue . Abai j ah spoke of the misuse of power by poli ticians in an 
article in the Post-Coza>ier the following month . 3 Papua Besena , she 
wrote , stood for re form of the parliamentary system in order to limit 
corruption and bring the government closer to the people . This would 
be achieved by a system in which all politicians were on equal pay , 
with equal status and authority . The policy sought to limi t the 
power of politicians , the maj ority o f  whom come from New Guinea , and 
thus leave the admini strators ,  who are predominantly Papuan , with 
greater power in decision making . 
The emergence of the Papua Besena Organi sation coincided 
with the apparent eclipse of Josephine Abai j ah as the Papua Besena 
leader . On hi s election to parliament in 1976 Mopio soon began to 
act as a Papua Besena spokesman - often an independent one , which 
4 
has placed him in conflict with other leaders of the Papuan movement . 
After the 1977 elections Papua Besena found itself with five seats in 
the National Parliament and thi s  was increased to eight in subsequent 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Post-Courier 7 February 1977 . 
Post-Courier 26 May 1977 . The policy was featured in a full page 
advertisement on 27 May 1977 . 
Post-Courier 16 June 1977 . 
In July 1978 Papua Besena politicians passed a vote of no 
confidence in Mopio ' s  leadership (Post-Courier 19 July 1978 ) . 
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by-elections to give Papua Besena a clean sweep o f  the Central Province 
and National Capital seats . Abai j ah was re-ele cted but was granted ex­
tended leave from the house and over the next two years she spent most of 
her time in Australia . Her main political activity during that time has 
consisted of writing long letters to the Post-CoUPier defending hersel f 
against increasing attacks on Papua Besena ' s  lack of action and her own 
absence from Papua New Guinea .  Traditional Papuan pre judice against women 
is probably an important factor in Abai j ah ' s decline as a Papua Besena 
leader , though she herself claims she has grown tired from her e fforts on 
behalf of Papua and the lack of support she has received .
1 
In November 197 8  
she announced plans to s e l l  o f f  her business interests and to concentrate 
. . 2 on writing . 
Papua Besena ' s  electoral success  in 1977  posed a ques tion about 
i ts role in parliament .  In the jockeying for power which followed the 
e lection , Mopio committed Papua Besena to an alliance with the highlands 
3 dominated United Party . Following a Uni ted Party split in 19 78 Papua 
Besena formed an alliance with Iambakey Okuk ' s  National Party and the 
Papua Besena leader became deputy leader of the opposition , thus placing 
Papua Besena in a position to share in political powe r .  The contradiction 
between this alliance and the origins of Papua Besena was not los t  on many 
4 
Papuans . 
Papua Besena policy was further refined when , in a by-election in 19 7 8 ,  
a lawyer , Joseph Aoae , won the Kairuku-Hiri seat for Papua Besena . Aoae 
presented a paper to the Waigani Seminar in 19 78 (Aoae 19 79) , which argued for 
a federal system with s tates representing broad regional intere sts . He argued 
that Papua had been neglected by Australia and that the constitutional amendment 
1 
See Letter to Post-Co 'Ul'ier 24 August 19 78 . 
2 Post-Co urier 2 1  November 1978 . 
3 Post-Co urier 19 July 19 7 7 .  
4 Post-Co'Ul'ier 11 August 197 8 .  
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and Organic Law on Provincial Government were ' fully contrived pieces of 
legislation ' .  Papua Besena , he said , rej ected provincial government as 
fanciful and inconsequential and favoured a federal system of states which 
would ' guarantee Papuan political sec�rity from outside domination , 
complete control over land and resources ;  complete control over priorities 
of economic development , and all residual powers ' .  
Ironically the electoral success of Papua Besena has tended to isolate 
the movement further as an intere st group of the coastal elite of Port 
Moresby and the Central Province . The new parliamentarians have been 
obliged to promote the issues of their constituents . Both Mahuru Rarua 
Rarua and Dr Goasa Damena have taken up the demands of the Koitabu and 
Motu villagers in Port Moresby ; these include the removal of squatters 
from their land . As the squatters are mostly from the Gulf Province , in 
settlements which in many cases date from before the second world war , 
Papua Besena has done l ittle to enhance its support in the Gulf Province .  
During 1978 the Post-Courier carried an increasing number o f  letters from 
previous supporters who had become disillusioned at Papua Besena ' s  failure 
to match its rhetoric with positive action and Abaij ah for her continued 
absence in Australia . 1 
In April 1979 elections were held for the Central Provincial 
government . Despite Papua Besena ' s  announced opposition to provincial 
government the movement had no hesitation in endorsing candidates ,  frequently 
a number for each electorate . On the basis of the author ' s  field observations ,  
Papua Besena received strong support in coastal electorates but inland 
villages were openly hostile to the movement . Papua Besena candidates in 
the Rigo West Coast electorate felt that the movement stood for more economic 
2 development in Papua and they re j ected an independent Papua . By economic 
1 
2 
See Post-Courier 25 May 197 7 ,  25 November 1977 , 11 August 1978 , 
25 September 1978 , 4 December 1978 . In August 1979 Abaij ah returned to 
Post Moresby to address a wild rally of Papua Besena supporters . Demands 
were made , inter a lia , for the repatriation of unemployed non-Papuans in 
Port Moresby and for regional autonomy and control of law and order ( see 
Post-Courier 29 August 1979) . 
Personal communication , Malaga Malaga and Gima Kalogo , Tauruba village , 
26-30 April 1979 . 
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development they meant large proj ects for the Rigo District rather than 
other areas of Papua . In the Rigo Inland electorate there was open 
hostility to Papua Besena candidate s on the grounds that ' Papua Besena is 
1 
a party of the coastal people and coastal people never know our problems ' .  
Papua Be sena claimed that a maj ority of the elected members were supporters 
of the movement , but the allocation of executive positions in the provincial 
government was made on the basis of area of representation rather than 
party line s .  
Response to Papua Besena 
To assess the response of Papua New Guinea ' s  elite to Papuan 
separatist movements , a small survey was conducted among j unior and middle 
level public servants and pol ice attending training courses in Australia 
during 197 6 .  Seventy-five questionnaires were distributed and fifty 
replies received.  The survey included attitudina1questions which enabled a 
measurement of support for Papuan separatist movements on a seven point scale . 
The level of support according to ethnic background is shown in the table 
below. 
Support for Papuan movements 
Origin of 
Opposed Neutral Supporting respondent 
New Guinea 19 11 0 
Papua 5 3 7 
Not stated 1 4 0 
Hal f  the Papuans in the sample showed sympathy for the Papuan movements ; 
perhaps more importantly , a fi fth had fairly neutral attitudes towards them. 
The survey also included a number of open-ended questions . One asked 
about reasons for the development of the movements . Inequality of 
development between Papua and New Guinea was the most frequent response 
1 
Personal communication , Kene Kone , Tauruba village , 2 7  April 1979 . 
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( seventeen respondents ) ;  e ight respondents nominated Papuan fear of  
domination by New Guineans ; six saw the movements as a means of getting 
control of the pub lic service for Papuans , and six replies suggested that 
the cause was a disaffected e lite . More interesting were the replies to 
a question asking why the movements had not been more successful in 
achieving thei r  aims . Half the respondents simply said that it was 
because the movements did not . have support among Papuans . The remainder 
offered more use ful conunents : a number thought the movements were too 
elitist , e i ther because the leaders were too far removed from vi llage 
people or because they were based only in the Port Moresby area ; another 
group nominated poor strategy , such as unrealistic or vague aims , attempts 
to move too quickly , threats of violence , the apparent influence of 
Europeans in the movement , and differences between leaders ; others 
suggested that the opponents of Papuan separatism had been too effective , 
ei ther by removing the causes of dissatis faction ( for example by pay rises 
and localization)
1 
or by their influence in the village . The principal 
opponent was seen to be the central government , but missions were also 
mentioned as was the Australian government . 
Assessment 
It is apparent from this review that as a s ecessioni st 
movement Papua Besena has fai led.  However , to focus on the separatist 
cause is  to overlook the basic impact of the Papua movement - the 
reallocation of development proj ects to the Central Province and the 
protection of the over-representation of the Central Province among 
Papua New Guinea ' s  elite .  As we have seen , the government has shown 
a wi llingness to capitulate to many of the demands of the various 
protest causes which Papua Be sena has championed . Indeed , on the uni­
lateral declaration of independence for Papua the deputy chief minis ter , 
Dr (now Sir John ) Gui se , saw cause to make a detailed statement on the 
development proj ects which the government had carried out and would be 
undertaking in the Papuan Provinces and to publish it as an advertisement 
in the Post-Courier. 2 The most substantial of these proj ects , including 
roads , agricultural settlement schemes , and a sugar industry , 
1 
2 
It i s  interesting that the response s did not see this as a victory for 
Papua Besena , but as an action by the government to reduce Papua 
Besena ' s  support . 
Post-Courier 13 March 1975 . 
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were t o  b e  located in the Central Province . Thus in its response to 
largely urban protests the goverrunent capitulated to demands for more 
development in the most developed areas . 
A more fundamental but less obvious shift in the allocation of 
development resources towards more favoured areas has occurred as a 
result of attempts to make the bureaucracy more responsive to rural 
people . Such attempts have been in response to a general dissatisfaction 
among Melanesians with the apparent insensitivity and rigidity of foreign 
bureaucratic organizations . They feel that the large bureaucracies they 
have inherited contain built-in obstacles which make it difficult for 
applicants to get the service they want . The Somare government created 
special institutions such as the Village Development Task Force and 
channelled funds through the Rural Improvement Programme and the Village 
Economic Development Fund in an attempt to bypass bureaucratic channels 
of access  between village groups and the central government (Ballard 1976c ) . 
But within the inherited bureaucracy new informal networks developed to 
bypass the normal information channe ls . The vil lager who wanted access to 
government services soon found that the most effective way to obtain this 
service was through a friend or wantok rather than waiting for a response 
through official channels , with all their red tape . As Ballard ( 1976a : l2 )  
has put it , ' Blessed i s  he who has an educated wantok ; even more blessed 
is  he who has a wantok in high office ' .  The people most likely to have a 
wantok in high office are those who have had a long history of education . 
Of all such groups those with the most wantok in high places are the 
coastal villagers of the Central Province .  Thus the process o f  locali­
zation has increased the potential of urban Papuan groups and villages 
in the Central Province to obtain access  to government services and funds . 
The impact of the Papuan separatists has been to activate this potential . 
By claiming that the government has neglected Papua ,  the separatists have 
mobilized village people in their area of influence around Port Moresby 
to demand more goverrunent services ; this in turn has sharpened the 
concern of senior Papuan public servants to do something tangible for 
their village people . The redirection of development resources toward 
the most favoured areas has been masked by the slogans of the government ' s  
new developmental policies ,  especially the emphasis on ' self-help ' . 
Prompted by Papua Besena publicity and guided by their own 
intrepretation of ' self-help ' , many senior Papuan public servants have 
developed links back to their own villages .  These l inks have a strong 
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emphasis on the e stabl ishment of development proj ects . Ballard ( 1976a : l5 )  
points to the involvement o f  a group o f  senior public servants in the 
development of Hood Lagoon as a good example of this trend . The author 
has interviewed a number of senior Papuan public servants on this topic . 
Most point with pride to their own ' sel f-help ' proj ect back in their 
village . Investigation of such projects reveals a heavy reliance on 
privileged access  to important decision making areas in order to make the 
proj ect possible at al l .  Through this communication channel ,  government 
services such as plans , technical advice and marketing are obtained , and 
preparation and consideration of applications for development grants and 
loans are facilitated . The people involved speak openly of ' cutting red 
tape ' and ' bypassing the bureaucracy ' ,  factors which they consider to have 
been important in the ' success ' of their proj ects . That people from remote 
areas without senior public servants or educated politicians to help them 
in this way are thus being cut out of the development process is a fact 
that receives rather less emphasi s .  
The impact of the Papuan movement needs t o  b e  viewed i n  relation to 
other groups in Papua New Guinea .  While it has cemented the determination 
of the Papuan elite to maintain national unity it has increased the potential 
for other areas - the Highlands , the Sepik , Western Province - to splinter 
off or to react in some other way to the increased domination of Port 
Moresby . Thus the Papuan separatists have both served the interest of 
the Papuan elite and they have dramatically increased the potential for 
future conflict . Far from developing a successful strategy of sece ssion 
they achieved their moderate succe ss because their subgoals coalesced 
with those of a powerful sector of the government . Such a similarity of 
interest virtually precluded a repressive reaction by the government , 
and this in turn made it difficult for the separatist leaders to mobilize 
support for their goal of Papuan independence . In this situation the 
Papuan separatists and their supporters became more firmly tied to dependency 
on government funds and services , making Papuan independence increasingly 
unrealistic . 
As a political party , the movement was constan tly faced wi th 
the dilemmas and frustrations of being an opposition ginger group . During 
1 9 7 7  it appeared that Abaij ah might develop the movement into a ' conscience 
of the nation ' to lessen excesses of ministerial power , but electoral 
success  soon changed that and in a bid for political office the new 
parliamentary members threw their principle s aside and formed an all iance 
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with the highlande rs . In doing so the Papua Besena parliamentary wing 
denied the origins of the movement , as an expression of Papuan fears 
of highland domination , in the quest for national political power .  
Whether such a strategy can b e  j usti fied to those e lectors who believed 
they had voted for Papuan separatism remains to be seen . 
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Appendix to Chapter 11 
BASIC DOCUMENT ON PAPUA BESENA POLICY 
1 .  Papua Besena i s  an anti-colonial movement . 
2 .  Papua Besena i s  not a political party . 
3 .  I am the founder and spokesman o f  Papua Besena but Papua 
Besena does not appoint any leaders or create any particular 
structures .  
4 .  Papua Besena leaders may arise but they are not appointed.  
5 .  Papua Besena supporters are in almost every village in Papua , 
among the highest and lowest public servants ,  in the police 
force and the army . Papua Besena supporters come from every 
walk of life but I do not appoint anyone of them as a leade r .  
6 .  A Papua Besena supporter i s  known entirely by his acts and 
his attitudes . A Papua Besena leader is known entirely by 
his acts , his attitudes ,  his followers or the leadership role 
that he assumes in the Papua Besena anti-colonial movement . 
Nobody appoints him or her . 
7 .  This  i s  a very important concept i n  Papua Besena because we 
expect all Papuans will  support Papua Besena or Papuan 
Nationalism.  We are not trying to create a new society with 
new structures and leaders but we are freeing the minds of the 
Papuan people which is the first step to making a free 
independent nation and Papuans free people . 
8 .  Papua Besena belongs to the Papuan people .  I t  belongs 
equally to the poor and the rich , to rural people and the town 
people , to the village farmer and the profe ssional worker 
alike . All are equal . 
9 .  Papua Besena has only one aim : 
TO MAKE PAPUA A F'��-• __ I_�f>-�PENDENT NATION AND MAKE THE 
��UAN� - ���_ PE�PLE_ _AND �?'.!'_E:� OF THEIR OWN LANDS , 
TH�IR 9_'V!N RESC:)'y�C::ES , _THEIR IMlUG�']:'_l�� �I? THEIR OWN LIVES . 
10 . Papua Besena will  achieve this aim or obj ective by freeing the 
minds of the Papuan people ,  l ift ing from the Papuan people the 
slave mentality of colonialism ,  and destroying the colonial 
myth in Papua . 
11 . Papua Besena strongly criticised the role that Australia played 
in Papua . Australia , instead of developing Papuan resources ,  
Papuan independence and Papuan freedom o f  mind and spirit has 
given us the rotten lies of the colonial myth : 
A .  Papuans are inferior to all other foreigners and cannot 
do anything properly . 
B .  Papuans are timid,  non-aggressive people and can easily 
be controlled by colonial masters . 
C .  Papua i s  poor and has no re sources .  
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D .  Papuan lands wi ll b e  much safer and Papua will b e  much 
better protected if they are dominated by New Guinea than 
i f  they controlled their own land , resources and lives 
themselves .  
12 . The colonial myth of foreign superiority and Papuan poverty 
and hopelessness was first implanted in the minds of Papuans 
by the Australian colonials but it is now being carried on 
by other forei gners and New Guineans , particularly in the 
Tertiary Education institutions where Papuans are being 
brainwashed to follow a certain colonial line instead of 
developing freedom to think and make up their own minds . 
13 . Papua Besena will  free the minds of the Papuan people from the 
dependent slave mentality of colonialism but the Papuans 
themselves must gain their own freedom in their own way . 
14 . Papua Besena follows along the lines of such movements as 
peaceful , non-violent , anti-colonial movements in other parts 
of the world which obtained their obj ectives by freeing the 
minds of the people from the evils implanted by colonial 
indoctrination . 
15 . Papua Besena has developed policy papers and structures for 
an i ndependent Papua but it has only done this under pressure 
as Papua Besena does not see that Papua Besena has a functional 
role in the Government of Papua after Papua becomes an 
independent nation free from Australia and free from New Guinea . 
The papers are for discussion purposes only . 
16 . Papua Besena strongly opposes the idea of Papua as a state in 
a combined country of Papua-New Guinea . If this occurs as an 
interim step then that is O . K . but it has got nothing to do 
with the aims of Papua Besena . 
17 . Papua Besena supports all Area Authorities and other Papuan 
groups who oppose state government for Papua in Papua New 
Guinea . 
18 . Papua Besena wants strong autonomous District {Provincial ) 
and Conununity Government in a free , independent Papua . 
19 . The Western District , Gulf District , Southern Highlands , 
Northern District , Mi lne Bay District and Central District 
should all have strong autonomous District Government . 
2 0 .  Each District i n  Papua should be largely responsible for 
controlling its own lands , resources and inunigration . 
2 1 .  The entry of New Guineans and other foreigners into Papua 
will  be strictly controlled . 
22 . Large towns should be developed in the Gulf District to serve 
the vast resources of the area and a large town developed in the 
Marshall Lagoon/Abau area to serve the link with the Northern 
District and Mi lne Bay . 
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2 3 .  Port Moresby should be decentralised to Bereina and Kwikila 
and each of these towns should become district capitals .  
24 . There is not limit to the number of structured organisations 
that can arise in Papua but these are not the Papua Besena 
anti-colonial movement . Papua Be sena will affect every 
structure and every organisation that develops in Papua . 
25 . The Districts of Papua should be called states . 
Additional STATES or larger STATES can be created if necessary . 
This is entirely a matter for the Papuan people . At present 
the Papuan states would be , but no doubt some of the names 
would be changed : 
WESTERN STATE 
PAPUAN HIGHLANDS STATE 
GULF STATE 
CENTRAL STATE 
NORTHERN STATE 
MILNE BAY STATE 
A federation of these states would form the FEDERATION OF PAPUA 
or the REPUBLIC OF PAPUA. 
26 . Because of the great harm that Australia has done and continues 
to do to Papua while we were helpless under its colonial rule , 
Papua Besena strongly supports the confiscation of all 
Australian owned properties in Papua and their free return to 
the Papuan people . Australia can thus compensate its own 
people and make up for its disgrace ful disregard and neglect 
during the period of its colonial rule in Papua . 
J . M .  Abaij ah ,  MHA 
Papua Besena Leader 
25th November , 1974 
Chapter 12 
ELITE COMMUNALISM : THE HIGHLANDS LIBERATION FRONT* 
Bill Standish 
The Highlands Liberation Front ( HLF) was a transitory 
phenomenon in the decolonizing period . Despite the 
revolutionary connotations of its name the HLF was an elite 
manifestation of Highlands consciousness , and a Highlands 
manifestation of eli tehood .  
The story o f  the HLF clearly illustrates certain import­
ant aspects of political change in Papua New Guinea , particularly 
the problems of political mobilization by eli tes on the scale of 
a whole region . 1 The movement was most active on the adjoining 
campuses of the University of Papua New Guinea ( UPNG) and the 
government ' s  Administrative College at Waigani over about six 
months in 1972- 7 3 . But while its history reflects the feeling 
of campus discussion at the time , more importantly it points to 
continuing elements in the politics of an emerging s ta te with 
deep ethnic and geographic divisions . 
1 
*This study , undertaken in re trospect,  focussed on those 
ac tivities of the HLF known to the writer , whose interest in 
the movement in 19 72- 7 3  was only peripheral . The emphasis 
will no doubt differ from that o f  insiders - whose own 
emphasis has changed s ince 19 72 . Particular thanks go to 
Michael Mel of Mount Hagen , Theodore Banda of Gembogl , 
Philip Kaman of Minj and Barri Keviame of Mendi for their 
help in piecing together this account . The late Paul Kup 
Ogut of Mount Hagen and Vincent Aisinufa o f  Kainantu also 
assisted . I am grateful to all those friends who endured 
its preparation and improved the draft (especially to 
Dr Marie Reay) and to the Univers ity of Papua New Guinea 
and the Australian National University for financial support . 
In Papua New Guinea ' region ' usually implies a large unit . 
In the past , four regions have been di stinguished for adminis­
trative and statistical purposes : Northern Coastal ( formerly 
New Guinea Coastal) ;  (New Guinea) Islands ; Highlands ( including 
the Southern Highlands ) and Southern Coas tal ( formerly Papua) . 
The former ' regional '  electorates , however ,  were in fact the 
equivalent of the present provincial electorates . 
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The region 
Centrally located in the Papua New Guinea mainland , the 
Highlands constitute a di stinct geographical region which 
spreads across the former land border between New Guinea { the 
Trust Territory) and Papua { the Australian colony) . This 
rugged area of 68 , 400 square kilometre s now supports about 
900 , 000 people , most of whom live in the 1500-1800 metre 
altitudinal range of the central cordillera . In some places 
population densities reach Papua New Guinea ' s  highest level s ;  
i n  these parts land pre ssures were acute even i n  precolonial 
times . The existence of these people was discovered by out­
siders only in the 1930 s ,  when Australian patrol officers 
(kiap ) and gold miners f irst entered the area . This contrasts 
with the colonial experience of many coastal peoples ,  which 
extends back for more than a century. The processes of 
' contact ' and ' paci fication ' in the Highlands were slowed by 
the Pacific War of 1942-45 . Modern economic development did 
not penetrate the village people ' s  lives in the Eastern High­
lands till the late 1940s and in areas further west , such as the 
Enga and Southern Highlands , not until the 1960s . In the last 
two decades there has been a surge of  highway building and 
economic development based mainly on plantation and small­
holder coffee , and a slow spread and intensification of 
educational and health services . The area has proved a fertile 
hunting ground for numerous competing Christian sects ,  with 
over twenty missions in the Southern Highlands alone and up to 
eight in a single district of that Province . The various 
colonial influences have partially alienated many of the youth 
from their elders , whose cultures have in turn been directly 
assaulted by the dual processes of pacification and the new 
religions {Kerpi 1976 ) . 
While ecologically and culturally the Highlands 
soc ietie s display a degree of uniformity unique on such a 
scale in Papua New Guinea , they are not homogeneous . There are 
over fifty languages most of which can be classified into f ive 
families {WUrm 1961) . Within the spread of a single dialect the 
people usually divide themselves into c lan formations and some-
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times tribes .  I n  the precolonial era , geographic mobility was 
very restricted and the small political and social segments 
were arrayed in constantly shifting patterns of alliance and 
enmity ,  lacking any overall political structures . Their 
fissiparous tendencie s are sti ll expre ssed in clan warfare , a 
cultural expression which has indeed seen something of a 
renaissance in recent years (Papua New Guinea 1973 ; Standish 
1973c ; Kerpi 1976 ) . 
The colonial phase brought new means of communication -
aircraft and the car - but with increased political 
participation in the pre independence decade the prospects for 
regional unity seemed to be declining . In  197 2 there were 
four Highlands districts ( after 1974 five , with the separation 
of the Enga from Western Highlands ) ,  and at independence these 
became Province s .  No provinc ial border divides a large language 
group and most Provinces have a sound linguistic base (Lang 
1976 : 9 ) . However there have been intermittent moves to change 
the colonial boundarie s and create new Provinces from within 
the old . 1 
Both within and between the Province s ,  tok pisin is the 
usual lingua franca . English is the language of formal 
education and is used in offic ial documents , but is rarely 
heard except in expatriate and senior offic ial c irc le s .  While 
tok pisin is virtually e ssential for partic ipation in the 
introduced pol itical institutions ( local government councils , 
Provincial level bodies and the National Parliament) , the use 
of English antagonizes many uneducated highlanders and - as  
elsewhere - serves to create a social distance between the 
educated elite and the rural and urban maj ority (cf . Anderson 
1966 ; Mazrui 197 3 ) . 
1 The main ones have been the Wahgi Tuale movement of the Wahgi/ 
Jimi division (a linguistic entity) which seeks to leave the 
Western Highlands ; intermittent pushes from some Kainantu 
politic ians seeking to break from the Eastern Highlands , and 
recent (1976 )  moves by Huli speakers from the Tari area wanting 
to secede from the Southern Highlands . In addition , there are 
frequently breakaway drives within local government council 
areas . 
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Po ZitiaaZ background 
The absence in Papua New Guinea of a s ingle overweening 
anti colonial movement acting to integrate the state has long 
been recognized (Rowley 1969 ; Somare 1970 ) , as has the strength 
of various regional and locally based movements (Nelson 197 1 ;  
May 1975 ) . Some critics have seen the expatriate emphasis on 
internal divisions as a colonial divide-and-rule tactic . Yet 
both the colonial and transitional governments have been 
centralist . The Administration in the colonial territory was 
centralized - many would say not on Port Moresby but on 
Canberra ( Ballard 1976c ) - and those Papua New Guinea radicals 
who sought to alter the power structure became decentralizers 
(Standish 1974b ; 1975a ) . In its years of ' loyal opposition ' ,  
from 1967 to 1972 , Pangu Pati took seriously Australian prime 
minister Gorton ' s  words in July 1970 suggesting piecemeal 
decentralization in response to growing pre ssures for autonomy 
on the Gazelle peninsula and Bougainville . 1 In the 1970 debate 
over setting up the large ly advisory bodies called Area 
Authorities at Provincial leve l ,  Pangu pres sed for real 
devolution . I t  has s ince vacillated on the degree of power 
it will allow Provinces ( Standish 1975b; 1976a ; Conyers 1976) , 
but it never sought a structure based upon large regions or 
even semi-autonomous state s .  Separate regions have for years 
been advocated by Papuan politicians , including the then deputy 
chief min ister Dr (now Sir) John Guise (Guise 197 3 ; Chatterton 
1970 ) , so regionalism is not new in Papua New Guinea . 
Precolonial divisions of culture and topography were 
reinforced by the uneven spread of material benefits under 
colonial rule . From 1964 , resentment of uneven development was 
often expressed in the House of Assembly, which ,  though a 
colonial creation , was the only offic ial body above the level 
2 of Province with any affective pol itical power . 
1 Post-Courier 13 July 197 0 .  
2 The intermittent conferences of regional counc illors had no 
legal status . 
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A Highlands bloc emerged early in the fir st house 
( 1964-68 ) . Highlands politicians , with white settler 
encouragement and sometimes even leadership (Wolfers 1968 ) , 
have for over a decade eloquently reiterated that their past 
isolation and abbreviated colonial experience have caused their 
relative lack of the modern infrastructure - roads , schools 
and hospitals ,  and economic development - which they crave . 
Thus they sought to postpone self-government and independence 
until their youth could ' catch up ' with the coastal people and 
receive suffic ient education to gain their share of politically 
influential and rewarding positions in the bureaucracy . Anton 
Parao , then secretary of the dominant United Party (UP ) , made 
this point in a letter to Highlands schools in late 197 1 .  Pangu 
used the letter in raising a matter of public importance 
( spreading misleading political information) ,  and accused the UP 
of regional ism.  While the UP was embarrassed , Parao ' s  points 
were endorsed by the party ' s  deputy leader Sinake Giregire 
1 (MHA for the Daulo Open electorate ) . Highlanders often see 
themselves as being in a ' dark age ' compared to the sophisticates 
from developed areas around Port Moresby and Rabaul . 2 In the 
hope that time would bring equalization , led by the UP they 
resisted the push of those whom they saw as coastal radical s 
eager for rapid constitutional change . The hostility to 
political decolonization , however , was not universal , some 
Highlands groups supporting change because they perceived local 
advantage with a national government ( Standish 1973c ) . There 
were also a few Highlands students at UPNG who resented their 
l HAD I I ( 2 0 )  : 5 3 09-16 , 19 November 1971 . 
2 These colonial capitals were centres of intensive economic 
activity , long known to Highlands migrant labourers who (along 
with their pol itician and educated elite kinsmen) tend to 
generalize the leve l of deve lopment around these towns to 
the coastal regions as a whole , and then contrast this with 
the less developed Highlands ( again , taken as a whole ) . Some 
coastal areas (especially the We st Sepik Province )  are as 
badly off as the Highlands . The Highlands ,  however , form 
the lowest rating region by most development indicators 
(Wil son 1975 ; Standi sh 1976b) . 
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elders ' expressions of dependency . They took a frankly pro­
Pangu stance for early self-government .  In late 1970 these 
students had enlisted Thomas Kavali (Jimi ) to be parliamentary 
leader of their newly formed Niugini National Party ( Standish 
1976c ) . Amongst their number was a Chimbu law student from 
Gembogl , Theodore Banda , who in early 1972 campaigned for a 
radica l  candidate for the Chimbu Regional seat in parliament . 
The UP highlanders lost their delaying action . Their 
tactic , sometimes described as ' conservative ' (Wolfers 1968 : 40 ) , 
was undermined by the 1971 dec ision of the second house to 
endorse preparation for ' internal self-government ' in the 
anticipated life of the next parliament , 1972- 19 77 . In the 
1972 election campaign very few Highlands candidates espoused 
early self-government ( Stone 197 6 ) . The UP was confident of 
victory and indeed won the greatest number of seats , forty-two . 
But after a month of brilliant negotiation , in April Michael 
Somare put together his tripartite Pangu-Peoples ' Pr6gress­
National Party national coalition . It had a broad regional 
base , but included under the National Party banner only e ight 
of the thirty-eight Highlands members . Four of these eight 
became ministers ,  but many highlanders felt left out . On 
20 April , the opening day of the new parliament , a Mt Hagen 
law student , Michael Mel , a strong UP supporter and friend of 
Anton Parao , wore traditional dress around campus , bare-chested 
and with a frontal apron below. In the alien urban coastal 
context it was a dramatic statement : ' I  am a Highlander ! ' .  
Parao and others sought to deny the legitimacy of the new 
government ( Standish 1972 ) . 
In early July Somare toured the Highlands ,  promoting his 
target of 1 December 1973 for self-government . He won a great 
deal of generali zed ( and personal ) support on this tour 
( Standish 1973a ) but the UP fought a long and emotional rear­
guard action for their pol icy of delaying self-government . 
Anton Parao ( subsequently the member for Western Highlands 
Regional )  accused Somare , during the self-government debate , 
1 
of instituting a ' guided democracy ' ,  and his manner displayed 
1 HAD I I I ( 7 ) : 692 , 19 September 1972 . 
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extreme agitation . But , on the night of 19 September 197 2 ,  
what had been foreseeable since April occurred . The house 
accepted by fifty-two votes to thirty-four Somare ' s  proposed 
1 date for self-government . Highlands politic s  would never be 
the same again , although another delaying action was yet to be 
fought over independence date s .  UP coherence declined 
(Loveday 1975 ) and its pol iticians and the ir educated elite 
supporters saw an urgent need to find effective political 
channels for their people . 
The foPmation of the HLF 
The HLF was formed on 21  September 1 97 2 . Anton Parao 
was its patron and Theodore Banda its spokesman . The Front had 
started informally at UPNG on the evening of Sunday 17 September 
in the context of considerable social conflict on campus . 
Tolai-highlander tensions (and occasionally bloody f ights)  were 
not uncommon at UPNG at the time . They echoed c lose ly the 
occasionally fatal clashes in the Tolai homeland on the Gazelle 
(where many highlanders are plantation labourers)  or in land 
re settlement schemes such as the oil palm proj ect at Cape 
Hoskins in West New Britain . 2 Tolai on the Gazelle sometimes 
fear highlanders and highlanders sometimes resent the better 
educated Tolai population with their relative affluence and 
occasionally superior attitudes . These resentments are often 
muted and there are friendships between individuals from the 
two areas , but for several months in mid 1972 feelings were 
high after clashes at Kokopo on the Gazelle . The emotions 
which had flared on campus were part of a longstanding 
difference between students from the two areas which for some 
went back to school days . Increased interaction arising from 
modernization, as  well as competition with other groups also 
seeking upwards mobility ,  had heightened the ethnic consciousness 
1 Ibid . 7 09 . 
2 Following the deaths of a Tolai and a Chimbu at Kimbe in 
September 1976 a Tolai student was hospitalized with head 
inj uries received in a brawl at UPNG . On at least one 
occasion in the early 1970s Theodore Banda received injuries 
requiring hospitalization after a s imilar fight . 
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of elite highlanders . This experience , also noted in Nigeria , 
directly contradicts those social theorists who argue that 
modernization brings communal barriers down and hence promotes 
national integration (cf . Me lson and Wolpe 1971 : 7-14 ; Ake 1974) . 
In the conflict situation in which they found themselves , and 
as the recipients of occasional expressions of contempt , the 
UPNG Highlands students felt the need metaphorically to ' walk 
tall ' along with students from other areas . 
They set about organiz ing themselves with a wil l .  About 
half the Highlands students on campus at the time attended the 
first HLF meeting . They had frequently discussed and analysed 
their people ' s  situation and their own role as an elite . They 
dec ided to form a ' pressure group like 
Association and Napidakoe Navitu which 
the Mataungan 
would exert some 
sort of influence or pressure on the government , in order to 
try to obtain some of the things they were claiming ' (Keviame 
1974 ) . They formed a central committee with representatives 
from each Province and drew up a ' Manife sto ' (which is appended 
here ) . They �·oted explicitly against having a constitution 
(Keviame 1974) . The avoidance of formal constitutions may have 
re sulted from pol itical caution and fear of oppression , or 
from a dislike of formalitie s .  But according to one committee 
member this decision confused ( and perhaps antagonized) some 
Highlands students (ibid) . The activists ' main goals were 
obviously pol itical and maybe symbolic , and they saw no need for 
a tight organization . Nonetheles s ,  the Manifesto contain s  
seven organizational points ( Points 10 , 17 , 25-6 , 3 1-3 ) . While 
Parao spoke of about fifty ' supporters ' at UPNG1 and I was told 
early in 1973 that there was no formal membership , the 
Manife sto does include provision for membership . It was an 
optimistic document . For example , Point 17 stated , ' The Front 
will establish its own newspaper ' , but none ever appeared even 
in mimeograph from. Some funds were collected,  and HLF T-shirts 
2 manufactured but rarely worn . 
1 Post-Courier 22 September 1972 . 
2 They were to be seen more frequently in the Highlands than in 
Port Moresby , and worn by non- students .  The $A60 earned by 
sale s was later transferred to the Olu Bus pro j ect , of which 
more below. 
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The Front brought together under a common name a group 
of students who , when in the capital , had a great deal in 
common . They were the educated elite of a group which in Port 
Moresby was an alien minority , 1 most of whom had little 
education (Oram 1976 : 11 5 )  and whose jobs were often unskilled .
2 
They have a violent image and low status amongst Papuan coastal 
people (Latukefu 1978) , reinforced by Papuan parental 
indoctrination inculcating contempt , fear and loathing .
3 
Often , in an alien situation , communal identity i s  
defined for the individual by others , and h e  accepts their 
label . As Mead ( 1956) , Wallerste in ( 1960) , Geertz ( 1963 ) and 
Connor ( 19 7 3 )  have noted , an ethnic group can in part be 
other-defined , and achieve its common identity at least 
initially from the perceptions of others . Thus highlanders are 
commonly known collectively as ' Chimbu ' ,  after one Highlands 
Province , and frequently accept this label . Especially in towns , 
these diverse people are often seen as a coherent minority . Yet 
if  they are numerous , they themselve s may be acutely aware of 
their internal differentiation s . 4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
In the 1971 census , the enumerated proportion of highlanders in 
Port Moresby ' s  76 , 507 population was 10 . 1  per cent (having been 
4 . 4  per cent in 1966 ) . It continued to grow rapidly for several 
years ( Oram 1976 : 106 ) , but appears more recently to have tapered 
off (Richard Curtain , personal communication , 1976 ) . 
Mt Hagen workers in Port Moresby do not necessarily express 
concern over the status of the ir employment , having a conception 
of themselves as independent agents only temporarily resident 
in town ( Strathern 1975 : 305-6) . But for an eloquent plea for 
ending the indignities they suffer see the speech of Traimya 
Kambipi (MHA for Kompiam-Baiyer) :  ' Our role is that of lackey . 
Is this to continue? Must we always be the diggers of ditches , 
the cleaners of toilets , and the washers of saucepans? This is 
not fair ' (HAD I I I ( lO )  : 1293 , 24 November 197 2 ) . 
Boio Daro , verbal presentation at Australasian Political Studies 
Association Conference , King ' s Cross ,  August 1976 . 
Thus even during Port Moresby ' s  New Guinea versus Papua riots of 
July 1973 , members of two Gumine clans fought each other at the 
six mile rubbish dump settlement , requiring police mobile ( riot) 
squad attention , and different Papuan groups also fought each 
other there . But traditional feuding partners like the Tolai were 
allowed by highlanders to pass without hindrance , because they 
were New Guinean . Thus ethnicity can be situational , dependent 
on context (cf . Uchendu 1975 : 26 6 ,  269 ) . In Moresby a man may be 
a ' highlander ' ,  in the Highlands a ' Chimbu ' ,  in Chimbu Province a 
' Kerowagi ' , in Kerowagi District a ' Kup ' , and in Kup census 
division a Kumai c lansman . 
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Certainly , the few highlanders on campus were readily 
1 
identifiable , and perhaps because they were united on campus 
the HLF leaders never felt the need to define their soc ial base . 
This  was assumed . Explaining on the radio why they had not 
worked through existing parties ,  Philip Kaman came closest to 
explaining their feelings . He said : 
Political parties [are] concerned with the national 
bas i s . We as Highlanders we feel that we got a 
particular , you know, interest , a particular 
history and background (ABC 1972b : 2 ) . 
But this commonality is less c lear when viewed from the high 
valleys in the central cordillera , the students '  home region . 
Aims 
The Manifesto declared as the Front ' s  first aim ' To 
liberate the people of the Highlands from white and coastal 
domination in the public service and in private enterprise as 
well  as the armed forces ' ( Point 1 ) . Its second aim · was ' to 
build a Highlands ' unity and then to stand to identify our­
selves with the rest of Papua New Guinea on the basis of 
equality ' ( Point 2)  . It thus sought to develop a regional 
communal identity and to promote the interests of the people of 
that region . 
Apart from asserting the need to wipe out nee-colonial ism 
and liberate the people of the Highlands , the goals of the HLF , 
as embodied in the Manifesto , fall into five categories . These 
were 
1 
. promoting Highlanders ' pride , dignity and identity ; 
. pol itical and administrative decentralization and 
autonomy (with occasional references to separatism) ; 
Papua New Guinea residents almost automatically try to locate 
the origin of almost everyone they see , j udging by physical 
characteristics ( c f .  Uchendu 1975 : 272-3 ) . Of 7 51 indigenous 
students at UPNG in 1972 ,  only 108 ( 14 per cent) were high­
landers (UPNG n . d . : Table 7 ) . Highlanders were a visible 
minority. Given that most lived in the rather isolated Waigani 
campus , they had a sense of regional identity perhaps stronger 
than that of other highlanders in the c ity who lived mostly in 
large settlements and labour barracks , which were internally 
fairly homogeneous (cf . Oram 1976 : 15 6 ) . 
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• rural and urban community development and education ; 
. local control of business and increased economic 
development ; and 
advanced promotion for highlanders in public 
employment . 
Implicit in much of the document was the belief that the 
highlanders form the country ' s  human as well as topographic 
' backbone ' .  They had provided , and would continue to provide , 
the bulk of the population , workforce and human energy , as well 
as political weight . This belief was thus one of pride and 
potential menace , in effect asserting that the Highlands are 
essential to the survival of the Port Moresby regime . The 
Manifesto emphasized the obligation of the educated elite to 
repay their privileges by serving the people . This was the 
paternal ist theme of leadership by virtue of education with 
which this first generation of educated youths had been 
indoctrinated ad nauseam from high school days , but it was 
also an article of faith which served to legitimize their 
1 ,  ' 1 
1 I ' po itica role . The Front s various themes will be discussed 
separately , but f irst it is necessary to describe briefly the 
peculiar inte llectual context at the university in late 1972 . 
This was the year in which Economics Professor Clunies 
Ross wrote a plea for a socialist state with Tanzania as mode l ,  
and a paper called ' Secession without Tear s '  (Clunies Ross and 
Langmore 1973 : 228-53 , 131-8 ) . Following what the vice chancellor 
Professor Inglis  called the ' electrifying ' performances at the 
S ixth Waigani Seminar of the international key speakers , Lloyd 
1 For representative statements illustrating this theme see Young 
1976b . Awareness of elitism was he ightened by Bougainville 
graduate Leo Hannett ' s  condemnation of it on the ABC ' Kivung ' 
programme on 11 October 1972 . In this programme , Fr Jo.hn Momis 
(MHA , Bougainville Regional)  accepted the inevitability of the 
creation of an elite which ' in itself is a very good thing , 
because be fore you can have any movement you must have somebody to 
inject new ideas and to spearhead it ' (ABC 1972a : ll ) . The 
HLF ideology of leadership by the educated was obviously some­
thing that had to be expressed , and Momi s articulated it in 
terms similar to the HLF ' s ( see Chapter 1 3 ) . 
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Best , Rene Dumont and Ivan Illich (May 197 3 ) , there was 
general consensus among the student body on the need for 
decentralization and self-reliance and on the rej ection of a 
national bourgeoi sie role , which echoed Fanon (Fanon 1966 1 
Staniland 1969 )  • In May the Students Representative Council 
president ( John Kasaipwalova) proposed a student vegetable and 
pig farm to promote self-reliance and healthy manual work in 
the Melanesian manner .  Much to the students ' amusement , this 
suggestion provoked an interchange of heated memoranda between 
expatriate teaching staff on such a farm ' s potential to prevent 
growing e litism.  But a committee was formed and a few students 
did make gardens , including Theodore Banda and Barunke Kaman , a 
Chimbu Economics student from Kundiawa who was then national 
secretary of the National Party . 
In June 1972 Somare tabled a parliamentary paper stressing 
the need for village improvement as a condition for national 
unity and called for debate on development priorities .  The 
Australian colonial strategy of maximiz ing growth by concentrating 
on most profitable enclaves was discredited . A visiting United 
Nations Development Programme team rej ected large scale capital 
intensive foreign inve stment and industrialization and condemned 
aid-based development ,  rapid urbanization and increasing soc ial 
stratification (Overseas Development Group 197 3 ;  Hart 1974 ) . 
Many of these ideas caught the imagination of UPNG student 
activists , their expatriate friends and staff alike , and the 
rhetoric of decentralizing populist egalitarian self-reliance 
became common . The end of the year saw the chief minister 
announcing his ' Eight Aims for Improvement ' , thus offic ially 
endorsing the new intellectual trend . 1 By then certain key 
members of the HLF had already caught this intellectual wave , 
which had been visible in the 1970 programme of the National 
Party . 
Concern for Highlands pride was central to the Front 
members ' goal s  of liberation from domination , exploitation and 
oppression . Their general aims carried political ,  economic and 
1 Papua New Guinea Press Re lease 3591 , 15 December 197 2 . 
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psychological implications ( Points 28  and 2 ) . They called for 
Highlands unity , pride and equal ity ( Points 2 ,  2 0 ,  23 and 3 0 ) . 
They sought the abolition of the Highlands Labour Scheme , under 
which tens of thousands of highlanders were contracted for 
unskilled work on plantations ,  which are mostly on the coast . 
Their preoccupation with status is clearly shown in the 
students ' comment about highlanders being ' puppets ' for the 
white tourist business in the annual Highland shows , in which 
the performance s of competing dance groups in traditional 
finery are nonetheless enjoyed by many thousands of Highlands 
people . Philip Kaman said on the radio ' We feel our people are 
being fooled , merely fooled , to play up l ike cats or dogs so 
that the minority of small whites there could pack up all the 
money . • •  ' (ABC 1972c) . These concerns with dignity are 
espec ially important to new el ites , who to some extent have been 
desocialized from their own society but not yet become integrated 
into another . 
The aim of autonomy proved controversial . The HLF ' s  
concept was that Highlands unity and common identity should first 
be built up , ' then to stand to identify ourselves with the rest 
of Papua New Guinea on the basis of equality ' (Point 2 )  . This 
has been labelled the ' building block ' theory of national 
integration , 1 although it is usually envisaged as applicable 
with provincial units . On 21 September Banda was asked in a 
radio interview whether he was prepared to sacrifice national 
unity for this regional goal and replied , ' Yes , we will stand 
for the Highlands no matter what , whether it splits the country 
or not ' . 2 It was the Front ' s  only public secessionist noise but 
was to have wide repercuss ions . Another strongly separatist 
measure was the call for revenues raised in the Highlands to be 
spent in the region ( Point 5 ) . In fact most Papua New Guinea 
revenues are collected on urban income s ,  imports and mineral 
2 
The expression is that of E .  P .  Wolfers . The doctrine appears 
to have influenced the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) 
in its recommendations for district level provincial govern­
ments .  The CPC was concerned a t  the intensity o f  both High­
lands and Papuan regionalism (CPC 1973 : 4/27 ) . 
Age 23 September 1972 . 
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exports , and with {until recently) no export tax on coffee 
the Highlands revenue base has been miniscule . { Indeed , if 
applied to Bougainville , the ' derivation principle ' of 
returning all revenues to their sources would impoverish the 
rest of the country . ) At a lower level again the Front wanted 
increased autonomy for local government councils {Point 4 ) , 
which lacked j udic ial powers and were both largely dependent 
upon central government funds and c losely supervised by kiap . 
The HLF also wanted to establish its own effective l inks with 
villages and with councils { Point 1 0 ) . The attaching of 
importance to local government councils was unusual amongst 
students of the time who mostly saw councils as parasitical 
colonial puppets . 
The community development ideology of the Front was 
expressed in seven of the thirty-five Manifesto points and 
merge s with the thrust for pride in Highlands identity . In mid 
1972 Theodore Banda had worked with his then girlfriend Evelyn 
Hogan { an Australian fellow student) in undertaking a study of 
conditions in highlander settlements and labourers '  compounds 
in Port Moresby . They concentrated on the Gumine people from 
the south of Chimbu {whose language differs from Banda ' s ) . 
Highlands students are generally on the periphery of the urban 
live s of their immigrant kinsmen { see , for example , Strathern 
1975 : 11 ) , but thi s  close contact with the Gumine settlers was 
a profound experience for Banda , who sought to improve their 
conditions and spoke out publicly on the matter . 1 The study 
contributed directly to the Front ' s  later pol icy for the 
e stablishment of social venues in urban areas { Points 11 , 2 0 )  
aimed a t  facilitating informal contact between highlanders with­
out the risk of the fights with coastal people that often 
develop in hotels and taverns .  {There may also have been the 
hope that highlanders would not f ight each other) . 
1 To the ir horror they found only sixteen women in the s ix mile 
rubbish dump settlement and discovered that two thirds of the 
450 res idents were unemployed . {Australian National University , 
New Guinea Research Unit Seminar , 24 August 1972 ) . 
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At the rural end,  the HLF sought to promote home 
industries , practical learning for school dropouts , and adult 
learning centres (Points 2 0 ,  27 , 18)  all current in Waigani 
di scussions at the time (May 1973 : Section IV) . They wanted 
soc ial institutions to be created ' through the mobilisation of 
the Highland masses '  so that ' the benefits of modernisation may 
reach the grass roots ' ,  and reappraisal of the education system 
' with the view to preparing people for the realities of their 
agricultural existence ' (Points 6 and 7 ) . 1 Here , they 
obviously faced the danger , given the demand for academic 
education as a ladder to white-collar affluence (McKinnon 1 9 7 3 )  , 
that they could be seen by rural dwellers as seeking to pull 
that same ladder up behind themselves .  Their economic polic ies 
may have served to allay such fear s .  
The desire for expanding Highlands economic activity 
contained some apparent contradictions with some of the 
community development goals (which envi sage small-scale 
activitie s ) , and also led to charges of socialism and divisions 
within the Front. Anton Parao spoke of the need for expatriates 
to share economic development . ' It should be fifty-fifty , and 
if they don ' t  agree they go ' , he said in his first statement 
on the Front . 2 Perhaps because of ensuing controversy , such a 
figure never appeared in the HLF ' s Manifesto . Home industries 
and the tourist trade , c ited above , and the road haulage 
industry were to come under a Highlands Deve lopment Corporation 
(Point 1 2 )  following the Mataungan Assoc iation ' s  New Guinea 
Development Corporation model (Kaputin 1970)  . Thi s  enterprise 
was to be governed by ' Melanesian business practice and style ' ,  
and company laws should be amended to suit Melanesian soc iety . 
Motel s  and hotels in the region would ' be bought off by the 
people through the proposed corporation ' ,  as would foreign 
plantations ( Point 13 ) . Plantations , and alienated land 
1 Ms Hogan , an education student , says these points were 
consciously borrowed from Nyerere ( 1968 ) and Freire ( 1 973 ) . 
(Personal communication 1976) . 
2 Post-Courier 2 2  September 1972 . 
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generally , are highly sensitive topics in the Highlands , where 
race relations have sometimes been extremely bad , even since 
independence . 1 Mt Hagen law student Michael Mel ,  who was 
prominent in the HLF , argued in April 1973 that the best 
agricultural land , then being held by ' a  few parasite s ' , should 
be returned to the people with minimum ( improvements only) 
compensation . ' It is time they retired ' ,  he said . High profits 
were not important and villagers would earn enough even if 
plantations were divided into smaller blocks (Mel 1 97 5 : 81-2 ) . 
Philip Kaman and Anton Parao in other contexts sought 
allocation of urban land and assistance for commerc ial develop­
ments to people from the local area . 2 
University students were very conscious in the early 
1970s of the advances being made by their contemporaries in 
the public service , and even those on public service cadetships 
were not themselves eligible for promotion whilst studying . 
The Front ' s concern with the public service was thus · natural , 
espec ially in a country where colonial inputs and neo-colonial 
aid were so high that government was by far the biggest 
industry . In 1973 some 85 per cent of the professional 
and semi-professional manpower ,  and 60 per cent of the 
technical manpower ,  were employed in the public sector (Manpower 
Planning Unit 197 3 ) . The Manifesto envisaged a simple , 
decentralized public service (Point 1 )  in tune with the needs 
of the people , with highlanders promoted into dec ision making 
positions ( Point 8 ) , and it sought equal ity for highlanders 
(Point 2 0 )  . Banda spoke of putting Highlands public servants 
into the Highlands , so they could build their own unity , and 
also remarked that the HLF was strongly against bureaucracy .
3 
1 Cf.  Kup ( 19 7 2 ) , Reay ( 1974 ) . The Commission of Inquiry into 
Land Matters recommended government purchase of freehold 
alienated land (which is mostly in coastal areas ) , and the 
return of some to Papua New Guinea nationals .  It added that 
in this situation , with its potential for violence , continued 
delay would be irresponsible (Post-Courier 18 August 1973 ) . 
2 ABC 1972b and HAD III ( 8 )  : 1010 , 29 September 197 2 . 
3 Post-Courier 28 November 1972 . 
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Mel was more specific on the radio , calling for rapid 
promotion for highlanders with relevant educational and 
practical backgrounds , giving them preference over coastal 
people and Europeans . I f  a highlander had the education but no 
experience , Mel said , he should receive on-the- j ob training 
(ABC 1972c : 2 ) . Philip Kaman said highlanders had failed to 
achieve promotions and could not understand the reason . He 
thought it was ' because they think we highlanders are inferior , 
not capable of taking high positions ' .  Without acce lerated 
promotion , he said , it might be ' too late ' to catch up , given 
the wantok system (of helping one ' s  own communal group members)  
which he alleged existed in the publ ic service (and to which 
Ashton 1973 and Keviame 1974 also alluded) . Kaman explained 
that under HLF policy 
preference would be given to a coastal fellow if a 
coastal fel low is boss of that particular depart­
ment .  So this is the time we should be quickly 
promoted to get j obs so we can get a fair 
representation in the Public Servic e .  Now this 
does not mean we want any stupid highlander to be 
promoted . There are a number of good educated 
highlanders (ABC 1972c : 2- 3 ) . 
Parao had expressed to the house the highlanders ' 
desire for accelerated promotion and said ' the fear of be ing 
dominated , perhaps repressed ' by people newly appointed to 
positions of authority had given rise to the HLF . He called for 
a review of the Public Service Board (PSB) legislation , and for 
the immediate appointment of highlanders to recruitment and 
promotions boards . This would encourage a fee ling of 
participation and avoid discrimination by those with better 
opportunities .  The HLF , he said , wanted a committee to enquire 
into appointments to responsible positions in the public 
service to ensure equity , specifically in relation to their 
proportion of the total population of Papua New Guinea . 1 
From 1970 onwards ,  when it was clear that Australia had 
finally moved towards the ' sooner rather than later ' position 
verbalized by prime minister Menzies in 1960 , there was a rush 
to localize the public service ,  using whatever manpower was 
1 
HAD I I I ( 8 )  : 1010 , 29 September 1972 . 
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available . The question of regional balance was not mentioned 
1 
in official published documents in the early 1970s , apparently 
in order to avoid controversy such as Parao had stirred up in 
1971 and the HLF was to raise in 1972 . The tactic has not 
entire ly succeede d ,  as Highlands MHAs often ask about 
representation in the bureaucracy of people from their region . 
When appropriate , the government released l imited information 
on the origin of public servants . 2 It was known that the number 
of highlanders at senior levels is very low indeed , 3 especially 
as their homelands contain nearly forty per cent of the 
country ' s  population . The reason for their low representation 
in public employment lay initially in the late arrival of 
modern education and employment in the Highlands - as Soma.re 
himself told the house in March 197 5 . 4 
The chie f minister said on that occasion that in the long 
run the national public service would try to provide positions 
for people from all districts but that promotion was · based on 
seniority . Later , in a more considered reply to a question 
upon notice , he said that the government was concerned to achieve 
1 See for example , PSB Annual Reports 1969-1974 ,  and its 1972 
information submission for the House of Assembly (PSB 197 2 ) ; 
also McKinnon and Daloz ( 1971)  • Chief Minister Somare 
mentioned the rubric • wantok system ' in his 1973 address 
( Somare 197 3 : 4 )  but did not enlarge on the point . 
2 Thus in answer to allegations from a retired Papuan 
educationalist of a plan to replace Papuans with New Guineans ,  
the Department o f  Education released figures showing that of 
forty-nine positions at Class 9 or above , twenty-eight 
( 5 7  per cent) were held by Papuans .  Twenty-one ( 4 3  per cent) 
were from the Central Province (which has 7 . 2  per cent of 
Papua New Guinea ' s  population) ,  and n ine ( 1 8  per cent) were 
from East New Britain ( 4 . 4 per cent of Papua New Guinea ' s  
people) .  (Papua New Guinea Press Release 167 6 , 9 September 
1976 ) . 
3 In 1972 there was only one highlander among thirty-two men in 
the Senior Executive Programme (PSB 197 2 : Appendix 4 ) , and he 
was still the only one there when the programme ' s  numbers 
subsequently doubled . 
4 HAD I I I ( 4 3 )  : 5516 , 3 March 1975 . 
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a more even regional representation , particularly at the senior 
levels , but this was impossible under exi sting legislation . 
Promotion was on the basis of relative effic iency , with 
relative seniority being considered only in the event of equal 
effic iency . He said the PSB had been directed to undertake a 
survey on the degree of regional imbalance and to recommend on 
ways it could be corrected . The house would then be informed 
of the recommendations . 1 
Thus the exi stence of the problem was openly admitted 
but the figures remained confidential until 197 6 .  The results 
of a survey such as Somare mentioned were noted in 197 4 ,  along 
with a pol itical warning of the undesirable consequences of 
regional imbalance and a strong recommendation to allow 
preferential promotion for its reduction (Austin 197 5 : 383-4 ) . 
I understand that this survey - which may have been the one 
mentioned to parliament by Ron Neville ( Southern Highlands 
Regional )  in November 1 97 52 was commenced before the HLF 
started its campaign . Official data collated in June 1973 shows 
serious regional imbalances in public sector employment , high­
lighting the entrenched position of Papuans and the advantage 
held by New Guinea islanders compared to the people from the 
Highlands and Northern coastal area s .  In the public service 
overall , highlanders had less than thirty per cent of their 
hypothetical ' share ' of positions (calculated on their 
proportion of the population) .  In the middle management and 
higher levels they held less than one fifth of their share . No 
other region was so badly disadvantaged , although the Northern 
coastal areas also occupied le ss than their share of positions .  
Papuans ,  on the other hand , held more than twice their 
proportional representation . 3 A similar pattern occurs in 
other public authoritie s , including the pol ice . Any attempt 
at equal ization would involve a reduction in influence for Papua 
1 HAD I I I ( 4 4 )  : 5 794 , 10-12 April 1 97 5 .  
2 NPD I ( 5 )  : 45 3 , 5 November 1975 . 
3 A ful l  tabulation of public service employment by province 
highlights the disparities most dramatically (Welch 1976 : 27 0 ) . 
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and the I slands , and arouse predictable resistance from organi zed 
bodies wi th entrenched interest s ,  such as Papua Besena ( see 
Chapter 1 1 ) . 
As Somare noted,  the origins of the imbalance are clearly 
seen in the education system . Particularly at higher levels , this 
problem is likely to prove very tenacious , although a conscious 
recrui tment programme at the lower levels might reduce the imbalance . 
The Highlands Provinces provided only twelve per cent of students in 
higher education from 1971 to 1974 , a third of their hypothetical 
proportional share , whi le some other areas had up to three times their 
hypothetical share (Welch 1 9 7 5 ) . These figures relate to the two 
universities and the Goroka ( secondary ) Teachers College ; even 
starker figures are available from the Administrative College , of 
officers in training for higher positions (Austin 1 97 5 : 482-4 ) . There 
are some signs of pos sible future improvement in this imbalance , 1 but 
it will take a long time indeed to equalize regional proportions 
within the bureaucracy once the first wave of localization has filled 
the places of departing expatriates , even assuming that there is no 
negative discrimination against presently under-represented areas . 
The HLF could not have spotlighted a more sensitive issue . 
Responses : general 
The Front ' s  initial impact relied on the English-language media ,  
which immediately narrowed i ts audience to fellow members o f  the 
educated elite . HLF discussions and all its conceptualization used 
the English language , which made for eloquent press releases , but 
did not reach the mass of the Highlands public . Publicity is easily 
obtained in Papua New Guinea , with j ournalists often accepting ' news ' 
rather than finding it themselves . For the first two months the media 
gave the Front wide exposure , not least through letters to the editor . 
From these it became clear that there were divisions over the HLF aroongst 
elite highlanders in Port Moresby . The Front ' s  capacity to mobi li ze in 
the Highlands was not to be tested until the Christmas vacation . 
1 Thus in 197 2 ,  highlanders numbered 24 per cent of preliminary year 
students at UPNG as against 11 per cent of other indigenous students 
(UPNG n . d . : table 7 ) . UPNG selec tion procedures were based on meri t ,  
with n o  specific emphasis o n  the area of origin of students CK. Inglis , 
personal communication)  . 
380 
Banda ' s  first Contact interview broaching secession 
created a shockwave amongst the educated el ite of Papua New 
Guinea . Although in private correspondence he denied 
secessionism (Banda n . d . ) as did Keviame ( 1974 : 8 ) , the damage 
was done . Parao ' s  f ir st statement claimed fifty supporters on 
campus with many more telephoning him support . Ten days later 
Philip Kaman claimed over one thousand supporters in Port 
1 Moresby alone . In early 1973 an activist claimed that chapters 
of the Front had been set up amongst students at tertiary 
institutions in four centre s around the country ( Standish 
1973a) . Kaman unilaterally volunteered his subclan ' s  self-
help re settlement project involving about two hundred people at 
Olu Bus near Minj as Highlands Liberation Front Demonstrat ion 
Village No . 1 . 2 Banda ' s  file indicates that a few supportive 
reque sts for information came in . 
People asking for further details received a letter 
dated 23 September 1972 , setting out the Front ' s  goal of 
' communal effort in a socialist society ' , mentioning the High­
lands Development Corporation and adding that third world 
experience , espec ially that of ' China and Tanzan ia , is more 
relevant than the We stern World ' (Banda n . d . ) . 
Responses : parliamentary 
Anton Parao ' s  role guaranteed continued controversy for 
the HLF . One of few educated highlanders in the UP , he was 
the opposition ' s  shadow minister for labor . In 1970 he had 
sought to turn the (Four Forgotten) Brothers Club at Goroka 
Teachers College into a pan-Highlands political movement . In 
this he was partly rebuffed by fellow students but was taken up 
by expatriate politician bus ine ssmen keen to form what f ir st 
3 became Compass and later UP . The students who started the HLF 
1 Post-Courier 2 October 1972 . 
2 Post-Courier 29 October 197 2 . This  project is described by 
its founder in Kaman (1975)  and by Reay ( 19 79 ) . 
3 See Standish ( 1976c : 3 19 , 3 3 5 )  and re ferences cited therein ; 
also Steinbauer ( 1974 : 31- 5 ) . 
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were a different group , but the ideas were much the same , Parao 
said in late 19 72 (ABC 1972b) • His early statements had been 
strongly pro planter and , despite his long-term tactic of 
mobilizing highlanders ,  Parao had said unity was a prerequisite 
to self-government (Steinbauer 1974 : 3 3 ,  3 5 ) . Hence when his 
role in the HLF became known the National Party parliamentary 
executive rej ected its secessionist tendencies but immediately 
and gleefully issued a statement designed to split Parao from 
1 . . the UP , saying it was pleased to see 
his change of attitude about expatriate businessmen , 
in particular planters who have been exploiting 
the Highlands labourers for a long time . Pressure 
certainly needs to be applied to liberate the 
people of Papua New Guinea • • •  and at last Parao 
realised thi s ,  as every educated Papua New 
Guinean should . 2 
Parao had been brought to lunch at UPNG on 20 September 
by Michael Mel and a few others , presented with an already 
agreed platform, and asked if he would be parliamentary sponsor . 
Despite some reservations on the matter of local equity in 
investment pro j ects , he agreed to become patron . When questioned 
later about the inconsistencies between UP and HLF polic ies , 
Parao accepted that the UP stood for a united Papua New Guinea 
under a central government and said his first duty was as a UP 
member to his electorate . Yet as a pressure group the Front 
sought some of his goals , and he asked ' Why should l step out 
of the thing that is there to be used? ' (ABC 1972b : 5 ) . He 
modified the Front ' s  investment stance in public statements 
( reducing it to the obligation on foreigners to try to obtain 
local equity) but spoke emotively about suppression of high­
landers in the bureaucracy ( ibid) . Late in the Front ' s  second 
week of existence Parao made a personal explanation to the 
house about it , saying in part that he had not consulted his 
party before j oining .
3 
But neither had all the members of the 
Front been consulted on his role , and Parao ' s  presence 
1 J .  Kaupa , personal communication . 
2 Post-Courier 22 and 25 September 1972 . 
3 HAD 1 1 1 ( 8 )  : 1011 , 29 September 197 2 . 
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antagoni zed many National P arty sympathizers on campus who s trongly 
resented what they saw as his earlier ties with expatriate interests . 
Informally the Front members sought to win over their parl iamentarians . 
Initial ly they received some support (Keviame 19 74 ) . At least two 
meetings were conducted at night on the UPNG campus , attended in at 
leas t one case by UP deputy leader Tei (now Sir Tei ) Abal (Wabag) , 
1 and John Kaupa ( Chuave) amongst others . One mee ting divided over 
the issue of discontinuing the Highland Labour Scheme (which sub­
sequently occurred) . On this issue Kaupa sided with the students 
against Aba l  and other UP members present who came from remote areas . 2 
Their electors depended on the scheme to get to the coast and earn 
some money , despite the low pay and bad conditions . Their concerns 
obvious ly di ffered markedly from the prestige-conscious students , 
and the parliamentarians particularly rej e cted any taint of 
secessionism . These meetings proved a failure wi th a conflict o f  
both policy preoccupation and interest always impli ci t  between the 
parliamentari ans and the younger men .  The students ( de spite their 
expressed des ire to help with such matters as research) were per­
ceived as potential electoral rival s by the profes sional politicians . 
So the meetings l apsed , though individual students kept up their 
contacts with parliamentarians separately . 
Publicly , both National and United Parties shunned the HLF , 
the latter ' having difficulty enough making credible its claim that 
it is more than just a Highlands party ' (Ashton 19 7 3 ) . Parao los t  
favour with Front leade rs ,  allegedly for his lack of e ffort in 
representing the huge Wes tern Highlands area (which s till included 
the Enga Division ) , but the National Party leaders Thomas Kavali 
(Jimi , Lands Minister) and iambakey Okuk ( Chimbu , Agriculture 
Ministe r ) , and Kaupa all maintained close liaison with Front members . 
If the initi ative for these contacts belonged to the students , their 
reasons may have related to their individual pro j e cts in their 
1 
2 
M. Me l ,  personal communication and writer ' s  personal observation ; 
both refute Keviame ' s  criticism of the Front for not organizing 
a meeting wi th Highlands pol iticians (Keviame 19 74) . 
Kaupa is young to be a parliamentarian . His ties with UPNG 
students were close when the National Party was formed in 19 70 . 
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home areas rather than the Front ' s  overall obj ectives . I f  it 
also came from the parliamentarians it was a pointer to the 
regionalism these men were later to display ( Standish 1976b)  • 
The parliamentarians ' public attacks continued . As a 
resul t ,  Philip Kaman quickly dissociated the Front from any 
political party , saying no support was being sought and ' we 
cannot be manipulated by any party politics or ideology . But 
1 individual MHAs should have the guts to support the Front ' . 
The National Party soon changed its ' support ' for the Front to 
' sympathy ' .  Kavali spoke against promoting regional movements , 
adding that in representing the Highlands his party wanted ' true 
2 national development ' . Then Pangu backbencher Toni Ila (Lae ) 
on 24 November led an urgency motion about the Front , and 
against Parao ' s  role in stirring up regionalism ,  repeating the 
events of the previous year . He read into Hansard most of the 
Front ' s  letter of 23 September to potential supporters , 
repeatedly challenging Parao to explain himself . He ' argued 
that the HLF ' s  name reminded him of the ' devastation and misery ' 
in Vietnam and Algeria . He managed to mention in his speech 
the scare words ' terrorism'  and ' socialist ' and said he would 
' hesitate to borrow technology from China because if we do we 
cannot be sure that we do not unintentionally borrow its 
ideology as well ' . He claimed that the ultimate obj ective of 
the letter ' s  writer was ' the complete destruction of the 
existing political , social and economic order , and to install 
in its place a very destructive dictatorial system ' . He asked 
for Parao ' s  assurance that he was not a ' communist • .
3 
Not surpris ingly Parao sought to play the matter down , 
rereading his earlier statement including the remarks : 
Technically white colonial inhabitants of the 
Highlands are not such to reflect the worst aspects 
of colonialism.  They are in effect quite innocuous , 
but we are afraid that in its place is rising a black 
nee-colonialism • • . •  
1 Post-Courier 2 October 1972 . 
2 Ibid. 
3 HAD I I I ( l O )  : 1290 , 24 November 197 2 . 
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John Kaupa deplored the Front ' s  narrow-minded approach and 
said that its ' trickery and lying ' only ' confuses the older 
members from the Highlands ' .  He believed its socialism would 
destroy the government . UP frontbencher Traimya Kambipi 
(Kompiam-Baiyer) made a strong speech endorsing most of the 
Front ' s  ana lysis and aims but added his ' personal opinion • • •  
that various men and women in this Front are organizing it and 
trying to use it to introduce communism' . Enga MHA Waitea 
Magnolius (Lagaip) agreed with the HLF on public employment . 
But he , too , sought to dissociate himself from the Front , to 
deprecate its significance , and moved to throw out the motion . 
Its purpose achieved , and it being late in the afternoon , the 
house agreed to do this without a division and adj ourned . 1 If  
Anton Parao had sought to manipulate the HLF (Ashton 1973 ) , it 
had sure ly blown up in his face . 
Responses : the executive 
Somare ' s  reaction to the HLF was one of tolerance , not 
oppre ssion . He told a press  conference , after mentioning 
Theodore Banda ' s  radio interview a few days previously ,  that 
' The Highlands students are impatient - I sympathi ze because so 
was I ' . He said that the highlanders had shown a great capacity 
to advance to prominent roles and he announced the appointments 
(which had already been dec ided) of two We stern Highlands men to 
senior positions .  But he firmly rejected the creation of 
' arti ficial divisions '  by making appointments on a ' racial 
basis ' . 2 
PSB Chairman Sere Pitoi ' s  reaction was testier : he said 
that claims for favoured treatment would encourage nepotism ,  
more s o  than i f  promotion continued o n  merit . H e  rej ec ted Banda ' s  
claim that expatriates and coastals were be ing preferred and 
refused to speculate on predictions of resulting instability .  He 
argued that Highlands tertiary students had a better chance than 
others with lower qualifications and sa id any amendments to the 
3 legi slation ( to favour highlanders ) would be a political matter . 
l Ibid : l292-5 . 
2 Post-Courier 25 September 197 2 .  
3 Post-Courier 4 October 1972 . 
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A ' Concerned H ighlander ' wrote to the editor o f  the Post­
Courier that public service promotion was based on effic iency 
and it was groundless to allege that highlanders were not being 
promoted . He c laimed that a new problem had been set up , 
creating a stumbling block to national unity , where previously 
none existed . He attacked the students as being blinded by 
their books , ' ethnocentric and egotistic ' ,  and begged them to 
1 reconsider , to work to solve and not create problems . Thus 
at least one ' in-system ' highlander feared a coastal backlash . 
His argument was reinforced by controversy over top 
positions within the police forc e . 2 Indigenous officers 
threatened to res ign if kiap Joseph Nombri from Kundiawa was 
groomed for the Commissioner ' s  po s ition , while nominally in 
competition with a career pol iceman . The Police Assoc iation 
spokesman said that a meeting of four hundred men opposed the 
appointment of Nombri (who had been a founding member of Pangu 
Pati ) , and c laimed that there were serving officers ·  better 
fitted for the job .  Oppos ition leader Matthias Toliman (Gazelle)  
said the proj ected move was a political payoff to put the police 
under Pangu control . Police officers emotionally accused Somare 
of having c losed his mind on the subjec t .  The police and courts 
had long been a concern of Theodore Banda , and not without cause 
given their poor performance in both urban and rural contexts . 3 
Predictably ,  therefore , he brought the HLF into the row over 
the police commissioner with a statement that the Front welcomed 
such a political appointment , adding that no one had complained 
at the pol itical appointment of a Tolai as  Re serve Bank manager . 4 
1 Post-Courier 3 1  October 197 2 . 
2 Post-Courier 24-26 October 197 2 .  
3 Banda was of course a law student ;  his HLF papers indicate a 
strong concern over the relevance of western law and the role of 
the police force . Police incompetenc e ,  arbitrariness and in­
discipline have been frequent ( Standish 1973b;  1976a ; Oram 
1976 : 2 28-9) . Oram says ' There is ample evidence of people being 
arrested without cause and that members of certain tribal groups , 
including those from the Goilala sub-district and from the High­
lands , are arrested by the pol ice because they belong to those 
groups ' .  
4 Post-Courier 26 October 197 2 .  
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Nombri ' s  appointment as assistant commissioner was never made , 
and he may have had grounds for wishing his wantok had left 
well  alone . 
Somare , long a nationalist , has usually been accessible 
to regionalist s ,  or has approached them himself . In the first 
days of the coa lition it was evident that he would seek to bring 
more highlanders into government (Standish 197 2 : 9 ) . Thus when 
Theodore Banda as a public service cadet wrote on 29 September 
1972 seeking permission to work in Chimbu at the gras s-roots 
level over the coming Christma s ,  his wishes were granted after 
lengthy personal discussions with the PSB chairman and the chief 
minister himsel f .  H i s  application to Somare mentioned several 
community development proj ects upon which he wanted to work . 
While he may have been warned at this time again st making 
inflammatory statements , he spent some of the vacation period 
on full  pay as a political education officer in the Gumine 
area .  After graduation early i n  1974 he worked i n  the chief 
minister ' s  own office ; s ubsequently he had several senior 
headquarters posts in the Department of Natural Resource s in 
Port Moresby . At least one other HLF supporter reached assistant 
secretary status within a few years of graduation . 
The new government ' s  emphasis on self-rel iance , its 
increased allocations to both rural improvement funds and 
village economic development schemes and also its land re­
purchasing activities enabled further tactical flexibil ity in 
dealing with rebellious rural ' self-help ' movements . 
Somare had been instantly impressed by the Olu Bus 
communal resettlement project at Minj on his July 1972 Highlands 
tour . Since then , aided by kiap intervention in a December 1972 
council meeting , Kaman ' s  project has been allocated rural 
improvement funds by the council for road building and other 
works and has had special assistance from the national govern­
ment in the form of grants for capital works and staff appoint­
ments to small industries and intermediate technology proj ects . 
Monetary aid from both source s totals over K2 5 , 000 , with offic ial 
e stimate s of additional invisible aid in the form of salaries , 
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transport and s o  o n  of the same order . Kaman received this help 
despite some conflict with j ealous neighbouring groups and the 
Wahgi Counc il , whose grader he ' borrowed ' in December 1972 to 
force some action on roadworks he wanted done . His written and 
public verbal attacks on agricultural officers and expatriates 
around Minj similarly did not stop the flow of outside 
assistance . In 1973 Philip Kaman travelled to S ingapore and 
Taiwan to survey rural industrie s and received government 
assistance for the trip . In 1973 Somare was able to c ite his 
aid to Olu Bus when challenged as to what help his government 
1 was giving to self-help movements . 
Michael Mel ' s  people at Wurup near Mt Hagen j oined with 
other traditional allies and formed a neo-tribe covering many 
fragmented groups in the Medlpa language area , which they called 
the Pibl ika Association . By manipulating inter-clan 
competitiveness they slowly gathered about Kl6 , 000 , Kll , 000 
of which was used in 197 5 as  a deposit on a large expatriate 
plantation . A combination of sometimes crude , sometimes subtle 
pressure on Highlands expatriates , 2 as well  as Mel ' s  direct 
access  to the chief minister ' s  advisers through university con­
tacts , helped overcome any ministerial or bureaucratic block­
ages to the government ' s  acquisition for K367 , 000 of two large 
coffee plantations from a retiring Australian businessman . The 
government provided easy credit to enable local groups to buy 
these propertie s ,  with Wurup going to the Piblika group who come 
from that area . At the handover ceremony in 1975 , which was 
attended by three ministers , oppos ition leader Tei Ahal said the 
sale was an act of free enterprise , the sort of thing that should 
continue in Papua New Guinea , and j ustice minister Ebia Olewale 
1 For example , after his address to the UPNG Economics Students ' 
Association on the Eight Point Plan , 19 March 1973 . 
2 Michael Mel ,  personal communication , Mark ( 1975 )  and Post-
Courier 2 May 1975 . While concentrating his Port Moresby 
activities on negotiating the Wurup deal , Mel was largely in­
active in student politic s .  He was , however , president of 
the Catholic Students Soc iety at UPNG , and making every post 
a winner he was helped by the University Chaplain in the 
campaign for Wurup . 
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said the transaction was visible proof of the Eight Point P lan 
in action . 1 
Continuing controversy 
The government ' s  mellow reaction to the HLF was not matched 
on campus nor in the correspondence columns of the newspaper . 
Several bitter exchan0es between Highlands students and others 
variously alleged political bandwaggoning , isolationism artd 
hypocrisy , and even that one writer was a brainwashed colonial 
2 ' pet ' . Separatists from other areas of Papua New Guinea welcomed 
the formation of the Front because they thought it strengthened 
their own cause , 3 but the regionalist issue clearly divided 
highlanders on campus (Keviame 1974) . Students Representative 
Council president Peter Paypool from Ialibu in the Southern 
Highlands , and National Party activist Barunke Kaman were two 
prominent highlanders particularly hostile to the HLF . 
In late September 1972 a threat of famine developed in the 
Highlands , fol lowing widespread frosts which destroyed subsistence 
food crop s .  This led to a massive food relief operation which used 
both air and surface transport . The government perhaps over­
reacted to the crisis (Waddell 1974) . Its motivation was probably 
partly political : the dramatic operation served to contradict 
charges of central government neglect of the region and allowed the 
public to demonstrate their national solidarity by contributing 
K0 . 9  mil lion cash to the K2 . 2 5 million campaign . The dependence 
of the highlanders on other areas ,  so clearly shown in this episode , 
4 was duly stressed by highlanders opposed to the HLF . The Front 
was thus partly on the defensive from the very beginning . 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Post- Courier 2 May 1975 . 
See Letters to the Editor , Post- Courier 11 , 1 6 ,  2 3  and 3 1  
October and 1 ,  2 ,  9 and 17  November 197 2 .  
Standish ( 1973a)  and Post-Courier 1 November 1972 . 
For example , see Post-Courier 9 November 1972 . 
389 
The Front itself di splayed internal contradictions 
arising from its multifarious aims . 1 Thus Michael Mel and 
Philip Kaman , in their radio interview (ABC 1972c : 2 ) , gave first 
priority to the goal of public employment and barely mentioned 
community development . Theodore Banda in response to a news­
paper article admitted to a friend that the public service 
imbalance problem was a temporary problem which could be over­
come , but said the public servants were pressuring the Front to 
take its strong stand (Banda n . d . ) . Whilst the Front in part 
was regionalist and even separatist , it was also seeking a 
place in the central ist sun . Some members sought top jobs 
( to help the people) , but Banda was anti b ureaucratic and 
condemned western education as a ' cargo cult ' . He wrote that 
' The education system has given us false hopes of getting good 
jobs , big money , European houses and big cars • . 2 
Banda himself was not without his critics , not only 
because he had a white girlfriend but also because she attended 
HLF meetings . It has been said that Ms Hogan may have 
encouraged Banda ' s ' socialism '  but not his regionalism (Neilsen 
1973 ) , and she feared the Front ' s  potential extremism.
3 
Strong 
expatriate influence was widely assumed by outsiders , who on 
one occasion even identified an academic opponent of the move­
ment as its principal manipulator ! (Me l ' s  accompanying state­
ment rather cryptically indicates a willingness to work c losely 
with chosen expatriates. ) The socialist j argon was seen by 
various expatriate j ournalists as Marxist,  and one even saw the 
4 Manifesto as both Maoist and a ' Mein Kampf' . ' Highlands 
Socialism' was rej ected by ' Conerned Highlander ' ,  who admitted 
communal elements in H ighlands society such as group land owner-
1 The contrast is most easily shown by the priority given to 
the points in the Manifesto by the different activities .  (See 
notes to Appendix . )  
2 Post-Courier 16 November 1972 . 
3 Ms Hogan was quoted as saying ' It could be so wonderful . But 
it could be so dangerous . It is so emotional and irrational ' 
(Ashton 197 3 ) . 
4 Ashton ( 1973 )  and Post-Courier 2 February 1973 . 
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ship and work parties but denied that all aspects of Highlands 
societies were socialist .  He further argued that the traditional 
competitive ' big man ' leadership system was capitalist and 
sought to clinch his case by mentioning individual ownership of 
that contrary animal , the pig . 1 Given that individuals have 
very strong usufructural rights to land within a system of group 
ownership , he had a very strong case indeed , and his argument 
was to be used against the Front in the Highlands later that 
year . 
HLF members in advocating communal ownership were 
dedicated ideologists but poor social theorists . There are some 
instances of development enterprises which started as group 
schemes continuing to run in a communal form in the Highlands . 
But Olu Bus now appears to have failed as a group pro j ec t , 2 and 
the Piblika Association in early 1977 had hired an outside 
person of mixed descent as managing director and was moving into 
large scale urban investment away from any sort of communal base . 
Indeed , communal rivalries may have started to act as a limiting 
1 Post-Courier 2 November 1972 . 
2 By the end of 1976 the Olu Bus village was physically quite 
run down . An adult education scheme had foundered.  A 
Canadian volunteer had left in despair of obtaining co­
operation from the community which increas ingly refused to 
work for the young leadership . An uncompleted integrated 
pig waste dige ster proj ect , as first advertised in Papua New 
Guinea by university lecturer George Chan (1975 )  , lay in 
inoperative ruin . A few pigs were kept by individuals in a 
building intended for this communal enterprise and Phil ip 
Kaman himself was buying coffee for his own family busine s s .  
Several other schemes using intermediate technology were 
moribund. Kaman ' s  house was surrounded by a high wire fence 
of doubtful effectiveness but great symbolic potency . All 
that remained of the 1972 hopes for a micro- scale social 
revolution was a water reticulation scheme paid for by the 
central government . 
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factor in its expansion .
1 
Many other group pro j ects have 
rapidly become individualized by the ir principal organizers 
(Finney 1973 ; Gerritsen 1975) . This  occurs because bank 
lending polic ies require individual title to proj ects (McKillop 
1976a)  and because of the neo-colonial economic structure as a 
whole in a dependent peripheral state , but also it develops as 
an amplification of precolonial patterns of inequality 
( Standish 1976d) . Thus it can be argued that some of the Front ' s  
emphases were mi splaced and were indicative of foreign ideo­
logical influences upon the group ' s elite membership ; indeed 
some were manife stations of the students ' al ienation from 
their own societies .  
In the Highlands : Christmas 1 9?2 
Back home , perspectives seem to have changed . With 
their English language skil ls  and modern knowledge , senior 
students are sometimes seen by villagers and even their 
close kin as being aloof . While highly eligible , anQ kept busy 
by village girls and female cohorts from other colleges , they 
may not yet have status by any traditional criteria . Potential 
leaders in the outside world , they are untried in their own 
1 By 31 December 1976 the government loan of K2 1 2 , 000 had been 
fully repaid after fifteen months of extraordinarily high 
coffee prices ,  and the group was planning to expand into coffee 
buying and processing ( to use excess capacity in their factory 
available when a neighbouring Wurup group decided to take their 
coffee el sewhere following a dispute ) . Piblika had also 
bought a Mt Hagen motel for K22 5 , 000 (with K65 , 000 cash down 
payment and no need for government Development Bank as sistance ) .  
Again , expatriate management was being used initially and 
attempts were being made to sponsor professional trainee s  who 
would later work for the group ' s  enterprises . A dividend of 
one hundred per cent had been paid to the Association ' s  4 , 000 
members . Mel ,  its secretary, said its next step would be to 
buy into urban real e state to e ffectively utilize the group ' s  
large cash surplus .  All these activitie s , he said , were 
practical applications of the HLF ' s aims (personal communication , 
1977 ) . However , inter clan tensions involving Piblika members 
and embroiling the Wurup area had developed in 1976 and could 
disrupt the smooth operation of the Assoc iation ' s  businesses . 
Attempts were being made to block the group ' s expansion into 
Mt Hagen town property ownership and local j ealousies seemed 
to have been aroused by the Association ' s  windfall successes . 
By mid 1977  the Wurup estates had been divided into separate 
un its comprising different c lan groups . 
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society and to prove themselve s they must work at home for a 
long time or else have a position of clear status in a 
prominent institution such as church or state . Sometimes 
students do make this necessary investment of time and effort , 
and succeed , but it takes years of dedicated work . 1 
The material I have collected on Chimbu Province village 
level perceptions of educated e lite members contrasts strongly 
with the rather naive self-perceptions of themselve s as leaders 
reported by Young , as indeed doe s observed student behaviour 
back home . Yet ,  a quarter of Young ' s  568 respondents boldly 
said they would take a guiding role even in ' traditional ' 
village affairs ( 1976b : 29) . The fact that so many students 
spend their vacations lounging around the towns talking to 
each other is indicative of the ir cultural isolation . To ask 
them about their actual or potential leadership roles is an 
instructive exerc ise , but doe s not nece ssarily achieve val id 
results . Young says he is inclined to agree to an extent with 
an informant ' s  assessment of university students as receiving 
respect back home . He quotes one saying , ' They will think of 
them more than the big man in the village ' (respondent ' s  
emphasi s ) . In a footnote he acknowledges that villagers ( and 
particularly ' bigmen ' ) may not agree , adding that long term 
acceptance may well  depend on succe ss in bringing home the 
development bacon ( 1976b : 28) . In fact , of course , the two 
categories of men are j udged according to different criteria . 
Older ' bigmen ' are known for the ir wealth , oratory and 
generosity, with exchange relationships built up over many years . 
While the educated men ' s  knowledge of the modern world is 
recognized , their maturity ,  wisdom and awareness of the ancient 
lore are all belittled.  The kinds of attitudes Young reported , 
and which had also been expressed by HLF members , were a self­
imposed handicap the young political activists had to overcome 
during the Christmas 1972 vacation . 
1 Standish ( 1976c) . Barunke Kaman has , since 1974 , made his mark 
in the Chimbu , most recently as executive officer of the Interim 
Provinc ial Government . Philip Kaman ' s  six year programme at 
Olu Bus is also instructive , as is Mel ' s  four years ' work at 
Wurup . 
Olu Bus , HLF Demonstration V i l lage No . 1 
(Photo R . J .  May) 
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When seeking to mobilize people politically in the Papua 
New Guinea Highlands , the politicians ' principal handicaps 
(and weapons)  are the interlocking clan rivalrie s and loyalties .  
I f  these are well mobilized , elections can be won (Kuabaal 1976) , 
but they can also just as easily erupt in clan warfare or provoke 
divisive j ealousies . Young students are usually not part of the 
exchange network that big men use to create obligations and 
increase the ir influenc e .  However , while some flatly refuse to 
partake in ceremonial dances and gift exchange s ,  others 
deliberately graft themselves onto their fathers ' partnership 
networks in a small way . Until they reach positions in which 
they can di spense patronage , they can only exploit their skills 
as brokers (Boissevain 197 4 )  between the village and the modern 
world in order to gain influence at home in their own right . 
They are , neverthele ss , often perceived by local councillors and 
parliamentarians as potential rivals and are frequently belittled 
in their absence or rudely brushed aside when present . It was 
in this inhospitable local level context that the HLF sought to 
mobilize the Highlands . 
The only group activity was a seminar held at the YMCA 
in Mt Hagen ten days before Christmas 1972 . About fifty people , 
mostly students and public servants ,  attended . Anton Parao was 
there , but very few local councillors and village e lders . 
There was considerable divi sion about the Front ' s  foreign 
investment pol icy and the attendance and response was di s­
appointing to the organizers . As noted earlier in this c hapter , 
two individual students had more success with their own proj ects . 
Me l started his work with Piblika in earne st that year , heavily 
promoted by his unc le who was then leading the infant group , 
and slowly he began to gain the confidence of the membership . 
The Olu Bus project was probably at its zenith over that 
Christmas . The assistant district commissioner in Minj attended 
the opening ceremony for the newly built village , at which a 
Papua New Guinea flag was raised next to Philip Kaman ' s  home , 
adding to the impression it gave of being a kiap 's house . (The 
gardens were decorated with anc ient ferns and pigs ' j aws , 
symbols of clan wisdom and fertility Kaman spoke at the 
Minj market and sought to organize marches on the district off ice 
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in the township in January , but at least two planned 
demonstrations on matters contained in the HLF platform did 
not occur . 1 Nonetheless , Kaman seemed to this observer to have 
got his message across well to some younger people from the Minj 
area . But the special attention the proj ect received from the 
government has aroused considerable jealousy amongst neighbouring 
sub-clans and also other UPNG students from the area . 
Banda sought to spread the word in Chimbu . At a 
Catholic students ' seminar at Minggende ission near Kundiawa on 
21 December he outlined the Front ' s  programmes to an audience 
of secondary students ,  teachers and various mi ssion workers . 
His emphasis was on community involvement , with local councils 
or corporations taking over expatriate bus iness and profits 
going back to the people in the form of public works , wel fare 
and community development programmes .  ( It i s  unfortunate that 
in his own area a young man collecting for just such a 
corporation absconded to Port Moresby with the funds he had 
collected . Yet such occurrences are not unusual and help 
explain the lack of trust of the ordinary villager if his own 
money is  involved . )  Banda expressed his view that the HLF ' s  
public sector employment policie s  were secondary , adding that 
they were designed to prevent a ' Nigerian situation ' arising 
( that is , of regionalism leading to civil war)  because of one 
region ' s  dominance in the bureaucracy . He met considerable 
criticism from a high school teacher clan ' brother '  on the whole 
question of communalism . Furthermore , his fundamental critique 
of the education system appeared incomprehensible to this 
particular audienc e .  (This is  not surprising , given their 
common interest in the existing system and the usual conservatism 
of high school students . )  Banda said later that he experienced 
considerable difficulty in attempting to persuade the Gumine 
people to accept self-government on 1 December 1973  and reported 
that in fact he spent most of his time merely conveying basic 
information on the political system rather than mobilizing 
opinion to change it. He fe lt he had been rej ected in Gumine 
(which is eighty ki lometres from his home area)  because he was a 
university student . 
1 Post-Courier 2 February 197 3 . 
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Disturbances in the Highlands became a focus of national 
concern around Christmas 1972 . Many large scale tribal fights 
had erupted earlier in the year and in mid December the chie f 
minister appointed a committee to inquire into the problem , 
with two highlanders amongst the five members .
1 Then , on 
Christmas eve , two Bougainvillean senior public servants were 
murdered near Goroka after their car fatally injured a young 
girl , an event which helped to catalyze Bougainvillean 
secessionism after a period of quiescence . Michael Mel commented 
that such instant ' payback '  would probably have occurred even if 
the car driver had been a highlander , and that the inc ident 
should not be played up ( as the media was doing) as a Highlands/ 
coastal conflict . He said coastal public servants working in 
the Highlands were worrying needlessly for their safety . 
Mel argued that there was less fighting now than in the 
colonial days , but that the people were now frustrated because 
of confusion over western ideas and rapid changes .  (For a 
socio-political interpretation of clan warfare see Standish 
1973c . )  Mel said that teachers ,  doctors and the Public Service 
Association (whose members are mostly coastal people) were all 
expressing fears about serving in the Highlands region . High­
landers back home wanted their services , and were embarrassed 
by the occasional harassment they received . Mel expressed their 
concern well ,  even though it contradicted Banda ' s  polic ie s  for a 
regionalized bureaucracy. In 1972 there simply were not enough 
highlanders to man their own infrastructure and the government , 
sharing the highlanders ' concern at the expressions of fear from 
coastal officials ,  seized upon Mel ' s  statement , issuing it as an 
2 official press release . Overall , then , the HLF seems to have 
had a chastening experience back home in the Highlands that 
vacation . 
Denouement 1 9 73 
It is difficult to specify the time of the HLF ' s  demise 
given its lack of a formal structure and the fact that individual 
1 
See Papua New Guinea (1973 )  • 
2 
Papua New Guinea Press  Release 12 , 3 January 1973 . 
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members in 1975 could say they were still carrying on its 
ideals by themselve s in their home areas . Theodore Banda 
ceased making public statements in 1973 , 1 which following his 
earlier frequent method of politics by press release gave the 
impression that the Front was moribund . On 2 November 1973 , 
though , following a statement by UP frontbencher Sinake Giregire , 
calling upon the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) to 
recommend a state government to cover the whole Highlands (with­
in a tri-partite federation) , Banda quickly organized a similar 
submi ssion to the CPC . The petition carried the HLF ' s  name and 
sixty signatures .  I t  protested against early self-government and 
independence , and also about rapid localization and the regional 
imbalance in the public service . 2 This was the last echo of 
Banda ' s  intricate concept of building a stronger nation on a 
' concrete foundation ' rather than what he saw as its existing 
' artificial ' base .
3 
But earlier in July , Banda himself had been 
persuaded to j oin the committee of the Melanesian Action Group 
(or ' Front ' ) .  This new body , also shortlived,  was dedicated to 
Papua New Guinea national integration and self-reliance . It 
came into prominence following the Papua versus New Guinea 
' football '  riots . 4 
1 Banda ' s  role had been crucial . Keviame noted ( 1974 : 9 ) that 
Banda had entered the public service and was ' under the Chief ' s  
eye which implies that his direct activities with the Front 
will  now be very limited and diminish greatly ' .  
2 ·rhe submission , which contained ideas which Banda had developed 
over time (Banda n . d . ) , envisaged a state government for the 
whole Highlands , which would control the work of all central 
government departments in the area , while the central govern­
ment would control all taxes and finances . The central govern­
ment ' s  executive would comprise three men ,  one each from Papua , 
the Highlands and New Guinea coastal areas . One of these three 
would be elected prime minister by the parliament , with the 
other two becoming president s .  The people in the districts and 
states could draw up their own constitutions , with central 
government approval required (HLF n . d . ) . See also Post-Courier 
5 November 1973 . As noted above , all submissions seeking 
regional government were rej ected by the CPC . 
3 Post-Courier 16 October 197 2 .  
4 
Kuamin ( 197 3a) and Standish ( 1973b) • The Melanesian Action 
Group ' s ideology had much the same intellectual pedigree as 
the programme of the HLF (Kuamin 1973b )  • 
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As self-government approached , secessionism flourished 
in Papua New Guinea severely testing the degree of people ' s  
commitment to the Port Moresby regime . Various regional movements 
sought to exploit Australia ' s  ' lame-duck ' colonial status and 
achieve the ir goals before the Port Moresby regime firmly established 
itself as the controller of all arms of government , with all the 
international status and internal coercive power and patronage which 
would follow independence .  In June 197 3 ,  Josephine Abaij ah (MHA 
for Central Regional ) started the Papua Besena movement she had 
1 explicitly foreshadowed a year before . In provocative speeches 
around the Port Moresby area , she and other Papuan politicians spoke 
of expelling New Guineans , she disparaged highlanders within the 
hearing of some Highlands people and spoke of assaults on Papuan women , 
land-grabbing , and so on . Somare asked highlanders to forbear from 
carrying out what would be their normal cultural response to such 
provocation . 2 But on Sunday 22 July (after Papua beat New Guinea 
at a football match) the anti Papuan rioting which had been rumoured 
for weeks spread quickly throughout the city . The rioters shouted 
' You cannot break the country , you cannot expel us ' ,  even while 
they divided the city into well defined and defended sectors .  The 
name of Miss  Abaij ah was on many highlanders '  lips in different parts 1 
of the city as they ( and others )  attacked . 3 Whi le some elite New 
Guineans were assaulted at the roadblock manned by highlanders at 
Waigani , Tolai and other coastal New Guineans reported that they 
passed through freely , giving a ' black power ' salute . This action 
was a recognition of territory-wide identity on the part of the 
rioters , although there were also some overtones of class conflict . 4 
The next day , the Melanesian Action Front under Barunke Kaman ' s  
leadership inspired a march for peace and unity by UPNG 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Age 3 April 1972 . 
Post- Courier 2 July 197 3 . 
Standish (1973b ) ; interview with Eastern Highlands rioter 
broadcast by Australian Broadcasting Commission and taped by 
writer , and letter by Enga student Kopii Kepore to Post-Courier 
24 August 1973 . 
Bill Kuamin and Ikini Yaboyang , personal communciations , 197 3 .  
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students . Mixed ranks of Papuans and New Guineans paraded 
through the deserted streets of the tense city .  Michael Mel ,  
apparently sti ll feeling the emotions o f  the previous day , had 
argued in the university forum against the march and refused to 
participate when it went ahead . Several other HLF activists , 
however , took prominent roles . They may have been displaying the 
capacity of individuals simultaneously to hold apparently 
contradictory communal and national loyalties { c f .  Klineberg 
and Zavalloni { 1969 : 59 ,  76) on African students ) ,  but it appeared 
in this instance to reflect a conscious policy decision after a 
serious debate by these students . 
Highlands students { including Mel ) , along with the 
Melanesian Action Group , moved out to make contact with thei r  
wantok i n  settlements around the city during the following weeks . 
They thereby put into practice their ideology of public service , 
seeking to quell the fears of the sti l l  nervous population . 
They explained the political background to the crisis and 
extolled the government ' s capacity to handle matte rs . Various 
ministers ' personal staff took an active role in organizing thi s  
campaign and encouraging the new body , although the initial 
action of the students seems to have been spontaneous . Indeed 
they marched against the wishes of the police , but pressured 
Somare in a face-to-face confrontation to be al lowed to continue . 
Slowly people returned to work and eventually to the city ' s  
markets which are always flashpoints of communal interaction . 
The whole country had experienced a maj or shock , but - as after 
the similar riots in 1968 - scar tissue grew slowly over the 
deep and painful wounds . The loyalty of the Highlands students 
and the rioters to the Port Moresby regime was ultimately 
reinforced . A similar response also could be detected amongst 
highlanders over Bougainvi lle ' s  1975 breakaway move s .  When the 
chips were down , the Highlands Liberation Front members were 
Papua New Guinean nationalists { c f .  Emerson 1962 : 9 5 ) . 
Subsequent events and assessments 
The HLF leaders did not cease political activity when thei r  
movement faded , although some dropped the political ambitions they 
had previously expressed. Phi lip Kaman in 1974 became active in 
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the Wahgi Tuale As soc iation , the Middle Wahgi valley group 
seeking to separate the Wahgi-Jimi areas from the We stern High­
lands . This  would create a new provincial infrastructure , and 
hence more jobs and increased capacity to exert pre ssure for 
government inputs . In June 197 5 ,  without graduating from UPNG , 
Kaman finally moved back to Minj after four years of frequent 
commuting between Moresby and Olu Bus .  This time he worked as 
a government liaison officer ( ' political educator ' )  in the 
Wahgi-Jimi division : a j ob which potential candidates have 
seen as tailor-made for the ir particular purpose s .  I n  June 
1975 he was appointed to the board of the Papua New Guinea 
Development Bank . 
Michael Mel had to stay on in Port Moresby and whilst 
there helped Raphael Doa (a Hagen busine ssman and local 
politic ian)  to obtain a grant to help stage the Mt Hagen show 
in August . Doa later exploited this success as a sign of his 
political skills .  The Piblika group performed at the 1975 
Hagen Show and charged handsomely when acting as photographic 
models for tourists . When he graduated at the end of the year , 
Mel also moved back home . De spite occasional claims to the 
contrary , very few UPNG graduates have returned to stay ' in 
the village ' for any length of time . While we can only speculate 
on the reasons ( such as demands from kinsmen upon their resource s ,  
or that they now work for the years o f  sacrifice by their kin) , 
their actual record reflects student unwillingness to work in their 
1 
home area . By the time Kaman and Mel returned home they had 
1 R. G .  Ward and Herbert Weinand surveyed 702 first year tertiary 
students around Papua New Guinea in 1971 and found that 
nationally 32 per cent expressed a desi re to work in 
a district other than their home district upon graduation . The 
overall pattern was followed fairly closely in Western and 
Southern Highlands , but the desire to avoid the ir own district 
was markedly stronger than the national average for Chimbu and 
the Eastern Highlands students .  In 197 5 ,  when 166 prel iminary 
year students at UPNG were surveyed , there was expressed a 
des ire to work in the rural areas , which had not been present 
in 1971 . The government ' s  propaganda in the interim on the 
Eight Aims may have in fluenced these statements of intention ,  
which of course have yet t o  b e  put t o  the test i n  practice 
(Herbert Weinand , personal communication 197 6)  . 
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used their role in an anti government organization to extract 
considerable financial assistance from the central government , 
which should have boosted their local political potential . 
In June 1975 Michael Mel wrote to the Post-Courier about 
his experience s ,  and particularly the help received from 
ministers :  
We , the university students , have tremendous 
enthusiasm for progress and solving all the world ' s  
problems , but regrettably little practical 
experience • • •  As one of the ' cross young men ' , I 
have learnt during the last twelve months that I 
can achieve much more by sitting down and watching 
the enemy ' s tactic s and talking to him ,  than by 
throwing small stones and only getting him 
annoyed , without achieving my aims (Post-
Courier 11 June 1975) . 
Having made such a great shift towards the government and 
incidentally benefitting their groups by utilizing the national 
political system , Kaman and Me l both stood in the We stern High­
lands Regional by-election of January-February 1976 . Mel was 
a People ' s  Progre ss Party candidate but Kaman remained independent . 
A.ny chance of a united Wahgi/Jimi vote was effectively split when 
several candidates from these areas stood . The UP campaigned 
hard on economic issue s ,  emphasizing inflation and promis ing to 
control it.  The two former HLF leaders were soundly beaten in 
the poll , as was Univers ity of Technology graduate Sandy Kelly 
Kagl . Raphael Doa won clearly for UP and two other men from UP 
took second and third place s . 1 While not a direct test of the 
appeal of the HLF , the by-election was indicative of the 
difficulties faced by young men seeking to build up a large 
popular base . 
From 1974 onwards ,  internal Highlands ' troubles had pre­
occupied politically active students on the Waigani campus . 2 
1 Post-Courier 9 ,  10 February 1976 . 
2 Indeed , regionalism subsided as a political issue through most 
of 1974 when the constitutional debates were at their peak . 
UPNG student s decided that the be st means of social control were 
district assoc iations , and thenceforth these bodies provided the 
basis of selection to the Students Repre sentative Council 
(Ballard 1976b)  • 
40 1 
Two example s will suffice for this discus sion . Education 
minister Reuben Taureka in August 1974 warned that harassment 
of coastal teachers and tribal fighting might lead to a 
situation in which Highlands schools would have to close for 
lack of staff willing to serve in the region . Some Chimbu 
members immediately exploded with anger and John Kaupa sought 
unsucces sfully to use the incident to set up a pan Highlands 
movement ( Standish 1976b) . A different tack was taken by the 
Chimbu students , who obtained government help to send an 
investigating team around the Province to assess the views of 
both villagers and teachers .  They produced a dispassionate 
and constructive report (Kambu 1974 ) . In the second instance , 
fighting at Kup ( c lose to Chimbu ' s  western border near Minj ) , 
which had been endemic for e ighteen month s ,  led to a concerted 
peace drive from students acting together but also working 
within their own separate clans . They took part in several 
attempts at negotiation and promoted rural development as one 
outlet for the clans ' competitive instincts (Kerpi 1976) . With 
government help they brought the leaders of the feuding groups 
to Port Moresby to meet government and police leaders and to 
attempt reconc iliation on neutral ground . Tacit interdependence 
grew up between the students and certain government officers , 
with the pol ice commissioner and senior kiap freely opening their 
doors for consultations . Things had certainly changed since the 
antagonisms of 197 2 .  
I n  assessing the HLF , i t  is  useful to quote a t  some length 
the words of an ' insider ' , Barri Keviame ( 1974 : 8 ) : 
There has been considerable support all over the 
country by highlanders for the Front but the 
organisational ability of the students is lacking 
However much the Front has attempted to 
drive its grievances home to the government • • •  
the pol itical implications have not really been 
significant . . • •  [The Front] has not genuinely 
advocated the desire to break away . 
While the direct impact of the Front as such is difficult 
if  not impossible to evaluate , Keviame was wrong if he was 
suggesting that none of its aims has been realized in any way . 
The government has adopted polic ies of decentralization and rural 
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improvement , provided credit for group enterprises through rural 
improvement and village economic funds ,  and so on . Obviously , 
much more than the HLF was behind the se major public policy 
shifts ,  and implementing them is infinitely harder than merely 
mouthing them . 
It is more difficult to see if there has been any shift 
in public service personnel practice , and if so for what reason . 
However ,  in March 1974 a private meeting of Pangu and National 
Party min isters decided to appoint Joseph Nombri (by then 
Southern Highlands district commissioner)  to an acting position 
on the PSB itself , and also resolved that Fr Ignatius Kilage 
should become a permanent member as from June 1973 . Kilage , 
from the Gembogl area , was an unsuccessful candidate in the 
1972 Chimbu Regional e lection . He was a close friend of both 
Somare and the lands minister Sir Maori Kik i .  In h i s  rapid 
political advance he had a combination of two special 
advantages :  he was a highlander , and he was trusted by Pangu 
(Standish 1976c : 3 30-4 ) .  Kilage led an influential investigation 
into reforming the public service structure in line with the 
Eight Aims and emphasizing decentralization , which was largely 
accepted in early 1976 .  I n  December 1975 he was appointed 
chairman of the new Ombudsman Commission . Nombri subsequently 
replaced him permanently on the PSB . These men are not satisfied 
with merely playing symbolic roles .  
Keviame in 1974 mentioned the HLF students ' internal 
conflicts and strongly criticized the Front for making ' little or 
no attempt at all in trying to mobilize the village people and 
gain their support - after all these are the people the Front 
claims it wants to assist most ' ( 19 74 : 13 ) . He contrasted this 
with the Mataungans and Napidakoe Navitu . Keviame did not make 
explicit the relevant points that both the Tolai and Bougainville 
movements started in the rural areas initially, and were sub­
sequently ' captured ' by tertiary educated elite members . The 
HLF , by contrast , started in the capital and then sought to 
develop a grass roots base , which is a much more difficult 
sequence to complete successfully . But Keviame added bluntly 
' I  can ' t see the HLF becoming a strong pressure group unless it 
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seeks the support of the village people rapidly and reorganises 
themselves to hit and hit out at the government at every avail­
able opportunity ' (ibid) . He argued that it may be true that 
the highlanders will eventually control the country ( and so 
have no need to ' cry out ' at this time ) , but concluded 
' Nevertheless it is thoughtful to make some concessions now ' 
(ibid) . 
Any attempt to assess the Front ' s  impact on government 
rai ses problems . No doubt the media coverage and Somare ' s  
early responses were psychologically rewarding and encouraged 
the HLF campaign , but there were no continuing rewards for the 
membership . In fact , by dealing with the government , the Front ' s  
leaders may have lost some legitimacy with the bulk of their 
supporters ( c f .  Lipsky 1968 ) . The government has shown an 
acute awareness of questions of a regional nature since its 
inception ( Standish 1972) . Its initial acceptance of provincial 
government in 1974 , and again in 1976 after a period ' of rejection 
in 1975 -1976 , are other signs of its willingness to concede to 
potential secessionists l ike Bougainville . It has done thi s  
without strengthening those forces operating o n  a regional 
scale such as the various Papua movements . The occasional 
Highlands thrusts for autonomy , along with Papuan separatism ,  
might indeed b e  greatly weakened once local politicians become 
entrenched in the different provincial governments and start 
competing with each other for scarce resources .  Divide , and 
you may indeed rule . It has been obvious for a decade that 
most Highlands pol iticians see their role as that of delegates 
carrying requests but not demands (Meller 1968 ) . They are 
supplicants from the periphery seeking favours in a • concentric 
political system dominated by the capital ' such as Staniland 
found in Africa ( 1969 : 2 5 ) . The H ighlands ,  as an impoverished 
region needed the centre more than they were needed by the 
centre , so long as the income from coffee remained low. With no 
obvious benefits to be gained from Highlands separatism ,  then , 
it is not surpri s ing that few Highlands people at any level were 
mobilized by the HLF . 
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The Front ' s  fanciful organizational j argon and lack of 
rigorous analysis are two indicators that the students were 
playing a form of shadow pol itics ,  and as Keviame implies it is 
therefore not surprising that they were unable to exert real 
pre ssure upon the National Coalition . Indeed , the criticisms 
made by public servants of Papua Besena in McKillop ' s survey 
( see Chapter 11 , p .  352 ) were also applicable here : vague 
goals ,  poor strategy , remoteness from the village , moving too 
quickly , being thought too close to Europeans ,  all compounded 
by extreme threats made in sometimes vigorous language . 
The students '  main problem surely lies in the nature of 
the socio-political structure ,  with its emphasis on modern 
bureaucratic values in a highly centralized and dependent state , 
and their own role in it . Consciousness of potential vertical 
mobility in the modern soc iety is heightened both for them­
selves and their kinfolk because they are the first generation 
of modernizers . To a certain extent the students have been 
educated out of their society . The antagonizing effect of their 
use of the English language has already been mentioned . E litism 
and paternalism were predominant attitudes found in a 1973 
survey of 528 secondary and tertiary students in Papua New 
Guinea , with elitism stronge st amongst highlanders (Young 1976a )  • 
Thus the HLF which , by its reiterated stress upon public 
service positions , had downgraded its rarely mentioned 
egalitarian goals ,  basically conformed within the mainstream of 
student opinion . It will  be some years before there can be an 
effective test in the form of actual life patterns of the 
egalitarian polic ies officially promoted as from December 1972 
through the E ight Aims , but present prospects indeed seem 
bleak . Nonethele ss  the HLF did to an extent popularize amongst 
Highlands students the ideas which were behind the Eight Aims. 
Perhaps this could only have been done by fellow highlanders 
and so the HLF was useful to the government at the time . The 
self-reliance rhetoric served to dilute many regional demands 
for foreign inve stment and (to a lesser degree ) for increased 
governmental inputs . 
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The HLF students were members of the country ' s  best­
educated group and by definition were potential members of a 
political elite in the politico-bureaucratic system . As a 
small regional group on campus they were fairly coherent . But 
they could not mobilize a shared sense of ethnic ity in the 
larger society off campus either in Port Moresby or in the High­
lands . As noted earlier , the Highlands population is composed 
of many ' micro ' units ( if that means the smalle st political 
groups to which men owe allegiance in any context) . It can 
even be argued that the true ' micronational '  or primordial 
groups are the clan s .  But collectively the highlanders are not 
micronationalists until they see themselves as forming a 
' nation ' , defined as a single culture-political entity (Connor 
1973 ) . Even in Port Moresby , highlanders tend to confine 
their social contacts to close kin although educated ones tend 
to socialize with s imilarly educated coastal people from both 
Papua and New Guinea (Whiteman 1973 : 95 , 10 0 ) . I have observed 
the campus integration of e lite s  break down rapidly on 
graduation and ' dropping out ' as new ties are made and social 
demands are met . 
While Highlands people may in certain situations 
identify themselves collectively as ' highlanders ' , using 
Connor ' s  terminology again they do not at present perceive 
themselves as a ' nation ' , although they might be called ' pre­
nationalists ' .  Their ' supreme loyalty ' (Kohn 194 4 ) is not 
to a Highlands nation . Hence the H ighlands regionalism the HLF 
students worked for in 1972 was , in this instance , a case of 
communali sm amongst educated elite members from a fairly wide 
region . 
This analysis should not be seen as denying the import­
ance of Highlands pride , and the intensity of the emotions which 
continue to be fe lt strongly . Thus in June 1975 a correspondent 
to the newspaper complained of ' coastalization ' of the public 
service .
1 
Important politicians such as Giregire , Okuk , Kavali 
and others were involved in an attempt both before and after 
1 Post-Courier 9 June 197 5 .  
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Independence Day ( 16 September 197 5 )  to realign the whole 
regional balance of the party structure and the ministry. They 
were seeking to control the capital , and dominate the state , but 
not , however , to destroy or leave it . Significantly , these 
drive s have come from men deposed from power and seeking to 
regain it { Standish 1976b) . They failed to cohere on these 
occasions , but their intense fee lings at exclusion from power 
and status remain and are widely shared in the Highlands . 
Further unsuccessful Highlands pushes were attempted in late 
1976 . Thus the HLF succeeded in broadcasting sentiments which 
are not only strong but also tenacious . They have outlived the 
HLF . 
Conclusion 
Geertz wrote ( 1963 : 12 9 )  of new states that , being 
imitative , poorly organized , eclectic , subj ect to 
fads , ill-defined,  uncertain , they are extremely 
difficult to o:rrler typologically , either in 
classical categories or invented one s .  
H i s  words apply neatly to the HLF , as does his subsequent point 
that the recalcitrant issues of primordial identity can also 
serve to produce innovation in politics .  Geertz recommended 
that rather than pretending these tensions do not exist,  the 
governments of the new state s should ' dome sticate ' them , 
reconciling them 
with the unfolding civil order with respect to 
government authority , by neutralising the apparatus 
of state in relationship to them, and by channelling 
discontent arising out of their dislocation into 
properly political rather than parapolitical forms 
of expression (ibid : l28) . 
All these techniques have been appplied by the Somare 
government , not just to the Highlands but also to other 
separatist areas . The government ' s  professions of even-handed­
ness and apparent sense of calm in the vortex of the national 
whirlpool have partially disarmed several mutually reinforcing 
and politically fragmentary movements . This doe s  not mean that 
in incorporating the rebellious HLF youth Somare greatly changed 
his government ' s  course , or even that he led these activists to 
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opportunistically ' sell out '  their causes .  Regarding govern­
ment employment , for instance , the country was so short of 
trained manpower in the early 1970s that most graduate s 
rece ived several offers of position s ,  all with good promotion 
prospects . More importantly for this case study , the HLF 
leaders were seeking for themselves a greater allocation of 
re sources and a greater role within the new state . Basically, 
then , they were never outside the national system (despite some 
de sire to modify it) , and so did not have to be bribed (back) 
into it . 
I f  nationalists out of power are typically populists 
(Weiner 1971 : 653 ) , so too are many Papua New Guineans on the 
fringes of power also regionalist (Standish 1974b ; 1975a) . The 
flexibility shown by these men can be quite astounding (Standish 
19 76b) . A call to ethnicity is the most tempting tactical 
option open in the quest to build up support or to exert 
pressure for a target, even when the pressure come s via the 
re sponse of third parties (Lipsky 1968 ) . Given that the 
resources available in the form of expatriate j obs to be 
localized are rapidly depleting , and given also the static 
nature of foreign aid and investment sources in the foreseeable 
future , and hence the probability that not all ' self-help ' 
movements can receive government aid on a large scale , then 
the possibility of ethnic factions with modern elite leadership 
competing between themselves become s very strong indeed. The 
capacity for restraint of elite members from the espec ially 
disadvantaged areas ( and also those areas with a strong 
bargaining hand in the form of valued resources)  will become 
even more crucial to the survival of the Papua New Guinea state 
as we now know it . 
I s  regionalism ,  as epitomized by the HLF , Papua New 
Guinea ' s  most serious political problem? Fears of Papua New 
Guinea ' s  bureaucratic elite acting as a self-serving quasi­
wantok group have been expressed by one observer with Nigerian 
experience (Ballard 1976a) . (The idea is not unlike the 1960s 
concern that the old Pacific Islands Regiment might become a 
' super-tribe ' . )  Ballard managed to be optimistic about regional 
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manife stations of the • wantok system' (Ballard 1976a : l7 ) .  The 
fears expressed by the HLF may indeed be self-reinforc ing 
prophecie s ,  and their exi stence has been known but ignored for 
many years . By provoking a defensive response amongst 
privi leged groups the HLF might perhaps have worsened the long­
term prospects for equity on a state-wide scale . Yet by 
articulating sensitive issues more dramatically than had been 
done previously , the Front certainly brought these matters to 
consciousne ss and thus ( it could be argued) performed a 
valuable function as a start towards deliberate action aimed at 
reversing existing trends . If so , the Front may indirectly 
have increased the ultimate resilience of the state . Even if 
hard dec isions are taken immediately , and can be implemented 
without stirring regional movements in the more privileged 
areas ,  the results of these decisions will take many years to 
show. Only with time , then , can a verdict be made on the High­
lands Liberation Front and its ultimate impact . 
Postscript 
A new body , the ' non-partisan ' Highlands United Front 
(HUF) , was formed at UPNG in June 1977 after an evening 
meeting addressed by Theodore Banda . Student members of this 
group were active in the lobbying to form a new government 
after the 1977 national elections , with the aim of ensuring 
that the Highlands was adequately represented . The new govern­
ment did include more highlanders than previously , partly 
because of a conscious decision to appoint at least one minister 
from each province and partly because of the successful 
penetration of the Highlands by Pangu and the People ' s  Progress 
Party (PPP) , at the expense of the UP (Standish 197 7 )  . 
Iambakey Okuk , returned for Chimbu Provincial in 197 7 ,  
sought to use the HUF i n  move s to discredit the new coalition 
for allegedly under-representing the highlanders . A seminar 
was held by the HUF in Mt Hagen over Christmas 1977 to discuss 
tribal fighting and other matters , but attendance was low and 
its impact apparently negligible . 1 Nonetheless the HUF 
1 Post-Courier 10 January 197 8 .  
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President , Malipu Balakau , from Enga , emulated Banda ' s  flair 
for grabbing headlines . In October 19 78 Balakau was elected 
president of the Students Representative Council at UPNG . He 
deplored the divisions amongst Highlands MPs which occurred 
when Okuk unseated UP leader Sir Tei Abal as opposition leader 
in May 19 7 8 , 1 but displayed close links with Okuk during a 
student strike in May 19 78 , a time when Okuk was attempting 
to unseat the Somare government . Okuk had formed a new body , 
the People ' s  United Front , in an attempt to bring together UP 
members and Papuans into a coherent opposition coalition , but 
this never really gained much momentum. When PPP le ft the 
Somare coalition in November 19 78 , and the bulk of UP crossed 
the floor and j oined Somare , Okuk abandoned the People ' s  United 
Front and resuscitated the moribund National Party , with Michael 
Mel as its presi dent . Perhaps to win Papuan support , Okuk 
demanded the removal of the provincial government system in 
favour of regions . He continued to cultivate Highlands senti­
ment (he was once greeted with a poster proclaiming him the 
' Supreme Leader of the Highlands ' )  and argued that the next 
prime minister should be a highlande r .  
Okuk ' s  s ustained attack o n  Somare was rewarded when the 
weary and accident prone government eventually split , brought 
down - i ronically enough - by the CPC ' s  main advocates of 
provincial government , Fr John Momis and John Kaputin . On 
11 March 1980 Okuk success fully moved that Sir Julius Chan 
(PPP ) replace Somare , with the s upport of PPP , National Party , 
hal f of UP , and almost all Papua Besen a .  Michael Me l said 
in May 1980 that ' You can see in this government that the 
HLF is still going . Iambakey still  wants regional government 
and he says so occasionally j ust to keep the point in the 
public eye . It ' s  o fficially our party ' s  policy , too , but 
we ' re not pushing for it.  There are so many people involved 
in it now , it ' s  here to stay ' . Although committed to regions-, 
Okuk in May 19 80 agreed that provinces would probably s tay , 
and s ai d  that the need therefore was to get the system working 
with proper controls . 
1 
Post-Courier 24 May 197 8 .  
4 10 
But was the HLF conception still alive? Certainly 
highlanders occupied more of the higher positions , but as 
political appointees were vulnerable . In mid 1980 Banda 
was using a posting as Lands Officer in Kundiawa as launching 
pad for an intended parliamentary career , Mel was a bus iness­
man/politician in Mount Hagen , and Phi llip Kaman the s ame in 
Minj . Much o f  the i dealism o f  the old HLF had gone , as shown 
by Mel ' s  remark concerning the various provincial elections 
in the Highlands : 
In Hagen and in Enga it ' s  been a very expensive 
campaign . We have asked for , and got , a lot of 
help from expatriate bus iness here in the Western 
Highlands . You have to give away a lot of beer 
and spend a lot to be elected. 
The young Highlands elite continued to mobilize conununal 
identity , but on a lower s cale than the region , and - quite 
apart from coastal fears - competitive j ealousy arnong the 
highlanders may well deny Okuk ' s  ambition of a highlande r  
prime ministe r .  Mel was quite right i n  his concluding conunent , 
which will  be my last word , too : ' Politics is really hot here , 
now. Everything is politi cs ' .  
4 1 1  
* 
HIGHLANDS LIBERATION FRONT MANIFESTO 
APPENDIX 
1 .  To liberate the people o f  the Highlands from white and 
coastal domination in the Publ ic Service and in private 
enterprise as well  as in the armed forces .  This is not to 
say that we shall maintain the pre sent colonial setup , but 
we want a simple and decentralised public service . 
2 .  To build a Highlands identity , Highlands unity and then to 
stand to identify ourselves with the re st of Papua New 
Guinea on the basis  of equality .  
3 .  That educat ed Highlanders repay the privilege of  their 
education by dedicated service to the mass of the people . 
4 .  That a high degree o f  autonomy at the local government 
level be written into the Constitution . 
5 .  Under a high degree o f  regional autonomy revenue from any 
form of taxation should be used for development within the 
Highlands Region . 
6 .  That through the mobilisation o f  the Highland masses social 
institutions are created through which the benefits of 
modernisation may reach the grass roots . 
7 .  Re-appraise the present education system with the view to 
preparing people for the realities of their agricultural 
existenc e .  
8 .  Decentralisation of the Public Service , intuned ( s ic )  with 
the needs of the mass of the pople , to be promoted into 
decision making positions .  
9 .  Abolition o f  the Highlands Labour Scheme . That each High­
lander lives in dignity and is respected by his fellow human 
beings . 
10 . That an effective communications network is e stabl ished 
between the Central Committee , the Local Government Councils 
and the villages .  
* 
Mimeograph copy provided by Philip Kaman February 1973 . 
Banda ' s  
order : 
13-3 5 .  
1 2  and 
1972 typescript listed these points in the following 
3 ,  2 ,  4 ,  5/7 , 6 ,  9-12 . His handwritten notes then added 
Keviame ( 1974)  l i sted the points in the order 1 ,  8 ,  4 ,  7 ,  
13 , also mentioning 5 .  
Mel ' s  1975 HLF manuscript listed the points in the order 8/2 0 ,  
2/1 , 9 ,  3 0 ,  2 1 ,  19 , 14-15 , 2 3-4 , 9 ,  7 ,  28 , 31-35 . 
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11 . Social life in urban centre s - That a network of meeting 
places be e stablished , soc ial clubs , coffee shops and beer 
bars . 
12 . Highlands Development Corporation - ( a )  Tourism ,  (b)  small 
home industrie s ,  (c)  trucking company . 
13 . The proposed Highlands Development Corporation shall be 
governed by Melane sian business practice and style . 
14 . Laws governing companie s ,  corporations ,  associations and 
cooperatives should be changed to suit the Highlands 
Melanesian society . 
15 . Existing foreign business in the highlands , plantations ,  
hotels and motels etc . , are to be bought off by the people 
through the proposed corporation . 
16 . The front will  maintain and promote our cultures and 
traditions .  
1 7 .  The front will have its own newspaper .  
18 . The front will set up centres of learning for adults through­
out the Highlands . 
19 . The front has respect for blackman ' s  property - neo­
colonial ism will  be wiped out completely . 
2 0 .  The front will fight for equality i n  the public service 
and for the Highlanders in the public service .  (a )  For 
highlanders in urban areas ,  the front will provide Highlands 
coffee bars and social clubs . (b)  small home industries for 
people in the villages .  
2 1 . Fines imposed by the courts on any blackman must be 
proportionate to his earnings and capacity or capability to 
pay . 
22 . The famous Highlands Show to be controlled - it will be a show 
of the people for the people themse lve s - tourists will only 
be allowed if they l ive and travel in our future touri st 
facilitie s .  At present our people are treated like puppets 
to attract tourists for white tourists business . 
23 . The front will make every Highlander proud of what he i s ,  
and what he can do with what h e  has . 
24 . Foreign investments in the Highlands are to comply with 
our terms and conditions .  
25 . The HLF shall have a Savings Account , - deposits and 
withdrawals shall accompany signatures of two of the 
committee members .  
2 6 .  The HLF shall have its Headquarters i n  a central position 
in the Highlands . 
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27 . T o  set up practical learning centres for school dropouts . 
28 . To liberate the masses at the grass roots from ignorance ,  
discrimination and all forms o f  oppression . 
29 . The H . L . F . ' s  fundamental obj ective is to liberate the 
masse s  of the grass roots leve l from whites and black 
e lites ' exploitation. 
3 0 .  To have one class of proud people with human dignity and 
se lf re spect . 
3 1 . The annual membership fee of the front will be 50 cents to 
Two dollars . 
3 2 .  There shall be four executive members in every branch of 
the H . L . F .  in P . N . G .  - Out of the four members of the 
Executive one will be elected Chairman of the general 
meeting of the members and supporters . 
3 3 . It is in the interest of the Front that there should be 
Branches wherever there are Highlanders in the Territory . 
34 . The success of the front ' s  obj ectives depends on your 
moral and financ ial support . 
35 . The Front invite s every Highlands man and woman to fight 
for the Liberation of the people of the Highlands . 

Chapter 1 3  
HIGHLANDS LIBERATION FRONT : 
* 
AN INSIDER ' S  STATEMENT 
Michael Mel 
In any country , especially a developing country like 
Papua New Guinea , educated people have been known for playing a 
vital role in the good government of their country . By doing 
so they contribute something very few people have , and which few 
can experience in their lifetime . There is a great need for 
educated people in this country to unite themselves into an 
organization with s imilar ideas on how to aid our people who 
very much need our help now . 
The Highlands people are great people . The village 
people back home are quick to adapt themselves to new ideas . 
But they need the educated people to help them effectively take 
the ir proper stand in the development of this country of ours . 
We the educated Highlanders have an obligation towards our 
people to he lp them to adapt themselves to our changing 
environment . To do this we cannot deny our culture , because it 
is through our culture that we educated Highlanders can 
effectively use our traditional style of communication to achieve 
our aims . Our aim i s  to help our people in both traditional and 
modern ways . 
The Highlands Liberation Front has been functioning 
e ffectively for some time . The main aim was to liberate the 
masses of the people at the grassroot level from exploitation by 
white s and by black elite s ,  including even Highlanders who might 
be exploiters . 
The word ' liberation '  has caused confusion among some of 
our supporters , and also among our sympathizers . The word 
' liberation ' does not imply a group of people us ing arms and 
* 
This paper was written between mid 1974 and early 1975 , when 
Mr Mel was a law student at the University of Papua New Guinea . 
ammunition to achieve their aims . The word ' liberation ' ,  to us 
Highlanders , simply means ' freedom from ' , ' freedom to ' and 
' freedom for ' . 
We want to be ' free from ' being exploited by either black 
or white men economically , socially , religiously , culturally or 
educationally . 
When we are free from these then we can be ' free to ' 
create a society which would be more suitable for the Highlands 
people , a society in which we Highlanders through our culture 
create an economic structure which would be most beneficial to 
all Highlanders . We then can be free to help create a Church 
and Education which will suit our environment . We want to be 
free from Injustice to educated Highlanders in the public service 
so that we may take our fair share in running this country . 
The Highlands Liberation Front wants ' freedom for ' the 
Highlands , but not at the expense of (or with exploitation of)  
others , and not so as to degrade other brothers of ours in 
Papua New Guinea . 
We the educated people and the leaders are the spearhead , 
and it is our duty to help our people constructively and 
effectively to help themselves . 
To strive for development ,  progre ss , dignity and equality 
for our people ,  we must mobilize our best resources and make our 
people aware that they can also find opportunities to advance 
themselves in their own rural areas . This can be achieved in a 
most peaceful way if we the spearheads work together to lead the 
way . 
To bring our people up to date with the changing world , 
we must act together to make our people become aware of the 
problems around them, to take an interest in the world , to desire 
to solve the problems , to try practical solutions and to adapt 
their practices . When we finally achieve satisfaction , only then 
are we on the road . That is the way development can take place . 
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For the Highlands to be free of white and black 
exploitation , we must win through non-violence .  This must come 
not only through lip-service but from young men and women and 
leaders who perfect and purify themselve s through action . 
Action means work with truth to provide goals and directions 
amongst our people so that speedy and effective development and 
progre ss can be achieved in the Highlands . 
At the time the students of the University of Papua New 
Guinea formed what then was called the Highlands Liberation 
Front, we got publicity and we had great support . What we the 
students had hoped to do was to enlighten our politic ians to see 
the real issues involved ,  concerning the welfare of our people , 
and therefore to work as a group to recommend to the government 
how best they could help our people in the Highlands . We got 
good responses from the politic ians but not to the extent that 
they would themse lves spend some hours doing practical work . 
Most of them could not spend time with students from ' the ir 
di stricts to do research in their elec torate and learn about 
economic strategies which could help their people . Some of us 
students could see the big gap of understanding exi sting 
between ourselves and the pol iticians . 
The be st thing we could have done at that time was to 
get an expatriate who had lived in the Highlands for a long 
time , and was then living overseas , but was interested in 
advi sing the Highlands politicians about what best they could do 
for the people and Papua New Guinea . Of course that man would 
not have had any personal interest for himself in the Highlands . 
Only then some politicians might have seen the need for co­
operating with the Highlands Liberation Front to work for the 
be st intere sts of the Highlands people and consequently for the 
be st interests of the government and Papua New Guinea . They 
failed to see this , and therefore they failed to help their 
people with the re sources that were available at the particular 
time . 
What we the students hoped to do was to create an under­
standing of the H ighlands , of certain bas ic problems of all kinds 
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that we had , and of the need to organize ourselves to help our 
people in the best way we could . 
Other similar groups which have emerged in Papua New 
Guinea might have achieved something , but whether HLF did achieve 
something for the Highland people is a question which only other 
people who observed the progress of the movement can say . 
The biggest achievement we have made for the Highlands 
people and the country is the fact that the movement has induced 
its members to be more aware of their standing in the society 
and of how best they can help their people . So we believe that 
with our Manifesto we have produced educated people who are now 
willing to work and have shown an active interest in the affairs 
of the rural areas . They have accepted the challenge of living 
in the village and more effectively implementing the govern­
ment ' s  Eight Point Rural Improvement Plan at the grassroot level , 
which is very important . One can implement the Eight Point Plan 
at the grassroot level at a lesser cost than one could working 
from district headquarters . A government officer would not 
take enough of the time required to explain things and 
practically to bring about the programme which the government 
wi shes to be implemented.  After all , the government officers 
are only trained to preach - but their preaching lacks 
practicality , and their bible is superficial . 
The ideologies of the Front go on : therefore while to 
some liberation ideals remain living belie fs , and the problems 
still exi s t ,  those people who believe in a Highlander becoming 
a full man doing a full j ob will live for ever and ever . 
A full man will do a full day ' s  j ob .  A government with 
many full men doing many full days ' work , will in the eyes of 
the international community feel proud , and a feeling of deep 
satisfaction will run through the people ' s  blood with every 
heart beat . 
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CONCLUSION 

Chapter 14 
MICRONATIONALISM : WHAT , WHEN AND WHY ? 
R. J .  May 
The preceding chapters i l lustrate , selectively but in some detail ,  
the range and pattern o f  micronationalist activi ty in Papua New Guinea in 
the 1960s and 19 70s . They show micronationalism as a diverse reaction to 
politi cal , social and economic circumstances of the time ; yet the conver­
gence in objectives and organi zational style , which we have remarked in 
chapter 1 ,  is unmistakable . In the following paragraphs , before attempting 
to explain the proliferation of micronationalist movements and to assess 
their place in the process of political and social change , an attempt is 
made to draw together ,  from the data presented in the preceding studies , 
some of the broad characteristi cs of the movements : to present an anatomy 
of micronationalism . This will be done under three headings : objectives ; 
leadership and organization ; strategies and achievements . 
An anatomy of mi crona ti onalism1 
Objecti ves . The obj ectives of micronationalist movements reflect the 
circumstances of their origins . For the most part they are broad , ambitious 
and ill-de fined . This is only slightly less true o f  the comparatively 
sophisticated movements whose obj ective s  have been spelt out in corporate 
charters than it is of the marginal cargo cul ts , and it is a generali zation 
which applies both to village leve l  organizations and to regional movements 
like the HLF and Papua Besena . Nearly all the movements discussed in this 
volume are ' universalistic ' ,  embracing a package of political , e conomi c ,  
social and cultural obj ectives . Even those such a s  the Mataungan Association , 
l This section draws on material presented in a preliminary form in 
May ( 1975 , 19 79 ) . 
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Napidakoe Navitu , and Wahgi Tuale , which began with fairly narrowly 
political aims soon acquired economic and cultural obj ectives ; and the 
majority of those , like Damuni and Piblika , whi ch see themselves in 
1 narrow economi c terms have a clear politi cal aspe ct.  
If one can distinguish a common primary ob j ective i t  is  that of 
material improvement through the mobilization of local resources . In 
those movements with a more coherent ideology (principally those with 
young educated leadership ) there is a general emphasis on improving sub­
sistence living , but most movements have aspired to take over expatriate 
plantations and businesses and mos t  have been quick to take advantage of 
government assistance through financial and techni cal support; indeed 
probably the mos t  s table of the movements are those , like the Mataungans ,  
Ahi , and perhaps Damuni ,  which have managed to invest in fairly large­
scale capi talist enterprises . 
The demand for materi al returns , however,  cannot be interpreted in 
s imple economic terms . The desire for improvements in subsistence living 
and for success in modern business is  motivated al so by considerations of 
status : micronationa list groups are anxious to demonstrate that they can 
achieve for themselves what government has failed to provide for them , 
and the takeover of foreign-owned plantations and businesses is probably 
as much a symbolic assertion of independence as an attempt to secure 
2 monetary returns . Indeed it is perhaps only in these terms that one can 
account for the continued exis tence of movemen ts whose performance , in 
material terms , has been so poor . 
l 
2 
Mcswain ( 19 7 7 : 183 )  makes the general comment on the people of Karkar : 
' One of the important differences [b etween the Karkar and Europeans ] 
was the Karkar merging of economic ,  politi cal and educational 
institutions into one generalized social system oriented towards the 
traditional value of local communalism as against European speciali za­
tion and compartmentali sm ' .  
For an interesting cri tique of the materialist interpretation , from 
the viewpoint of a miss ionary discussing cargo cults , see Heuter ( 19 74) . 
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Among social obj ectives special importance has frequently been 
attached to education , including adult education ,  and to providing useful 
occupations for the already large and potential ly politically signi ficant 
group of schoo l leavers , though few seem to have achieved much in this 
regard. 
Although all the movements des cribed in this volume are essentially 
modernizing in their outlook , most have also emphasized traditional values 
and some , such as Kab isawali and Komge Oro , actively seek to maintain 
traditional social and cultural forms . 1 In this  they differ fairly sharply 
from most of the earlier pos twar movements . In part the emphasis on 
traditional values and forms is a symptom of withdrawal2 and in part it 
reflects a genuine desire to cull the best from both traditional and 
western cultures ; but also i t  repres ents a manipulation , conscious or 
unconscious , of traditional cultural symbols to legitimize the activities 
of movements whose main obj ectives and organization are foreign to the 
traditional cul ture and whose leaders frequently lack s tatus within the 
traditional social framework . 3 
1 
2 
3 
Adas , in his s tudy of ' millenarian protes t  movements ' ,  observes 
similarly that ' prophetic ideologies are normally eclectic both 
temporally and culturally ' ( 19 79 : 114) . 
Compare Jarvie ' s  comment ,  in relation to the revival of old customs 
by cargo cults : ' • . •  the revived culture is a symbol reminding people 
of a time of freedom or happiness when there were no frustrations ' 
( Jarvie 196 3 : 12 ) . Simi larly Smith ( 19 79 : 176- 179 ) sees ' ethnic 
nationalism ' as a romantic reaction to the centrali zed , modernizing 
s tate . 
In his analysis of the leadership of millenarian protest movements 
Adas ( 19 79 : 112- 119 ) distinguishes between , at one pole of a continuum , 
' displaced indigenous leaders ' ,  who ' emerge as defenders of the 
customary , precontact cultural order ' and respond to well-established 
models of behaviour , and , at the other , ' men of low birth '  who have 
no established place in either the precolonial or the colonial order 
but whose exposure to both al lows them to act as ' cultural brokers ' 
and who draw on both for their ideologies , leadership styles , and 
modes of organization . 
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In this context , it should be observed that the various participants 
in a movement may interpret the obj ectives of the movement quite differently . 
The studies of Peli and Pitenamu ( chapters 2 and 3 above) illustrate how 
spokesmen for movements can exploit ambiguity in their pronouncements , pre­
senting the movements for the most part in modern , secular terms but at the 
same time tapping the rich vein of magico-re ligious explanation which moves 
many of their followers . Griffin suggests ( p . 135 ) that Lapun may have acted 
simi larly . Leach (pp . 2 84-285)  also comments on the differences between 
Kasaipwalova, and other Kabisawali leaders and followers in the interpre­
tation of that movement ' s  broad aims . 1 
Leadership and organi zation . In the majority of the movements described 
in this volume , initiative and leadership have come mostly from the 
younger ,  be tter educated and more sophisti cated members of the communi ty , 
though in several cases their main function has been to help articulate 
demands already expressed by village leaders and to provide the organiza­
tional impe tus of the movement . Just as in the immediate pos twar period 
new movements were frequently ini tiated by men whose outlooks had been 
widened by their wartime experiences ,  so in the late 1960s and 19 70s 
several micronationalist movements were launched by university students 
or recent graduates who returned to their village or dis trict to work 
with their people . This educated group brought with them a mild radicalism 
and an ideology which placed emphasis on self-help and poli tical decentra­
lization . Frequently , too , ( self-help notwithstanding) they brought a 
greater awareness of the pessibilities of government assistance and a 
knowledge of the means by which access is gained to i t .  Young men like 
Kasaipwalova , Kaman , Mel ,  Avei , and Waiko owed their leadership largely 
to their effectiveness as brokers between vil lage people and a central 
government anxious to encourage local development initiative . ( Compare 
Enloe 197 3 : 162 . )  
l Lawrence comments similarly on the Yali movement ( 1964 : 2 5 5 ) : 
' • . .  in 1945 , when Yali  tried to introduce a programme that did not 
include ri tual activity . . . . the people distorted his propaganda • • . •  
It had to be made consistent not only with their economi c and socio­
political aspirations but also wi th their intellectual assumptions ' .  
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There may also be something of relevance to Papua New Guinea in 
the observation o f  Ake ( 1967 : 9 7 )  that in the social trans formation brought 
about by modernization , ' Those obliged to leave their folk culture may 
become lonely and insecure and inclined to doubt the meaning of their new 
life ' , and that such loneliness and insecurity ' tend to breed alienation 
extremist politi cal movements ' .  Though micronationalism in Melanesia has 
seldom taken the form of ' extremist political movements ' ,  for the educated 
elite , participation in micronationalist movements has probably been 
motivated often by a felt need to j us tify themse lves to themselves and to 
their vi llage peers . 
The outstanding exceptions to the generali zation of youthful , 
educated or sophisticated leadership are those movements like Peli and 
Pitenamu , which we have categori zed as marginal c argo cults . In these , 
as in earlier cult movements , leadership has usually been ves ted in per­
sonal charisma or believed ' special powers ' rather than in education 
qualifications , experience of introduced institutions , or leadership 
within a traditional social context , which have generally been slight.  
And in the Peli  case , at  least , there is  an illustration of the divi s ion , 
observed by several students of cargo cults ( for example Thrupp 1962 , 
Talmon 1966 ) , between a prophe t-leader (Yaliwan) and an organi zer­
lieutenant (Hawina) . 
Sometimes , as in the case of the Mataungan Association , Kabisawali , 
Komge Oro and Wahgi Tuale , the initiative of young people has resulted in 
clashes between the younger activists and traditional leaders . In no case , 
however , can a movement be explained s imply in terms of a conflict between 
young radicals and old conservatives1 ; whi le the Mataungan case study 
provides perhaps the best i llustration of the general complexity , all 
movements have found some support amongst the older people ( frequently 
1 Pye ( 1962 : 2 2 )  argues that ' sharp differences in the political orientation 
of the generations ' are typical of ' transitional politics ' .  In the 
Papua New Guinea context Townsend ( 19 80 )  pos its ' difference in the 
attitudes of the generations '  as explanation for the contrasting post­
colonial reactions of ' di sengagement '  and ' incorporation ' .  
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deliberate efforts have been made to involve traditional leaders in the 
movements ' activitie s )  and many have found opponents amongs t  the young . 
Wi th regard to the general membership , a common characteri stic of 
the movements is  the looseness of their organiza tional structure . Most 
have some sort of executive , though the members o f  this seem more often 
to ' emerge ' or to be self-appointed or chosen by the leader or patron 
of the movement than to be the product of a formal election . Commonly 
these executives are dominated by one or two individuals who act as 
spokesmen for the movement . The majority of movements have a formal 
membership core defined by fee paying or shareholding , but records are 
not always rigorously maintained and non-contributors are not necessarily 
excluded from the movement ' s  general activi ties . Papua Besena , in fact, 
specifically re j ected any idea of formal membership or organizational 
structure and deliberately keeps no records . In some ins tances a broader 
membership is defined by ethni c  or regional boundaries : in a loose sense 
al l Piblika people are regarded (er at least ,  at the outset were regarded ) 
as ' members ' of the Piblika Association , all Koiari are regarded as 
' members ' of the Koiari Associ ation and all Papuans as ' members ' of Papua 
Besena . But movements are se ldom overtly exclusive and even those which 
appear to have a distinct ethnic basis may admi t outsiders , even , 
occasionally , Europeans . 
In most cases the movements draw most of their energy from a small 
number of activists , usually recruited by the founder and sometimes ,  as 
in the Pi tenamu case , held together by preexisting interpersonal ties . 
Next to these is a larger group of members with a fairly s trong psycho­
logical and sometimes financial commitment to the movement .  I n  most 
movements , and especially in the marginal cargo cults , there is  then a 
still larger group of ' suppo rters ' ,  who may or may not be fee paying 
members , whose attachment to the movement is tenuous ; they are there either 
through communal pressures to conform or because ,  whi le not really 
expecting much of the movement , they do not want to miss out i f  it does 
somehow succeed - as many Peli supporters expressed i t ,  ' mipela traim 
tasol ' ( ' we are j us t  giving i t  a go ' ) . 1 These floating supporters have 
1 Compare Bailey ' s  ( 1969 : chapter 3 )  distinction between ' core ' , bound to 
a leader through multiplex ( ' moral ' ) re lationships , and ' fol lowing '  
whose attachment i s  transactional .  
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accounted for a large part o f  the membership claimed b y  movements at 
their peak ( and in the cases of Peli and Pi tenamu the numbers were 
considerable ) but they have been quick to let their membership lapse 
when it appeared that the material returns were not quickly forthcoming, 
and this largely accounts for the apparent instab ility of  so many of  the 
movements . 
What does not emerge from these case studies is a clear picture 
of who joins and who does not join micronationalist movements . Worsley 
( 19 5 7 ) and others have commented on the strong integrative aspect o f  
popular mass movements i n  Melanesia . Morauta ( 19 7 4 )  o n  the other hand 
argues that such movements may link people across vi llages but divide 
them wi thin villages . Walter ( 1981)  takes this latter view further ,  
seeing cul t movements , and by extens ion ' community development associa­
tions ' ( roughly equivalent to our micronationalist movements ) as movements 
of  smal l men against traditional leaders . The data provided by the studies 
in the foregoing chapters suggest that both Worsley ' s  and Walter ' s  inter­
pretations overs impli fy .  Micronationalis t movements - even those with a 
specifically ethni c  base - have seldom i f  ever united all of the people 
wi thin the group , and many , like the Mataungan Association , Kabisawali 
and Neme a ,  have been highly divis ive . Nor is there conclusive evidence 
for the view that micronationalist movements have been revolutionary 
wi thin their own smaller societies : not only have many micronationalist 
movements made deliberate e fforts to involve traditional leaders 
(Kabisawali and TK actually coming together in their support for 
establishing a council of chiefs)  , frequently leadership has come from 
people who either possessed status in traditional terms by virtue of  
' special knowledge ' or  ' powers ' ,  or ( l ike educated elites ) had other 
avenues to status achievement . 
Final ly with respect to organization , micronationalism in Papua 
New Guinea i s  overwhelmingly a non-urban phenomenon . The urban ethni c  
associations which have been s o  prominent i n  Africa , Asia and Latin America , 
have had some counterpart in Papua New Guinea ( Skeldon 19 76 ) ; but, with 
the pos sib le exception of the Mungkas Association ( an organ ization created 
by young North Solomons people living outs ide their province ) , their social 
and political significance has been slight . Apart from these , nearly all 
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the movements have been rurally based . The obvious exception is the 
Ahi Association , which however represents the interests of peri urban 
vi llages agains t  urban intrusion . Possib le exceptions , also , are the 
two regional separatist movements . Papua Besena , while seeking a rural 
bas e ,  draws much of i ts support from an urban elite and from villages 
close to Port Moresby ; s imilarly , although the HLF earnestly sought a 
rural base , it remained , by S tandish ' s  accoun t ( chapter 12 ) , a movement 
of the urban-based elite . 
Strategies and achi evements . It is more difficult to generalize about 
the strategies by which micronationalist movements have pursued their 
broad obj ectives , 1 and about their achievements ,  than it is  to generalize 
about other characteris ti cs . In part this reflects a fundamental contra­
diction inherent in the concept of withdrawal from the political system : 
the more positively movements ' withdraw ' from the larger system the more 
inevitable it becomes that they will attract the attention of government . 
Sometimes this has led to confrontation ( see below ) , but more often since 
19 72 it has attracted the sympathetic concern of the central government -
a concern which few micronationalist leaders seem willing to rej ec t .  
Thus , paradoxically ,  the ultimate effect of withdrawal has often been 
to foster accommodation between the movement and the state and eventually 
to bring about a degree of incorporation . With these qualifications in 
mind , some common patterns may be di scerned . 
As we have noted abo ve ,  the philosophy of micronationalism , whi le 
fundamentally a revolutionary phi losophy , is one of withdrawal or dis­
engagement rather than of active confrontation . Consequently , the movements 
discussed here typically have tended to re ject the institutions of the 
imposed system - government , mission and , to a lesser extent , private 
business - rather than seek to capture them (possible exceptions here 
are , again , the HLF and Papua Besena) or deliberately enter into conflict 
1 Compare Pye ' s  comment ( 1962 : 2 4 ) , that the ' functionally diffuse 
character ' of groupings in the transitional politi cal process 
' tends to force each group to develop i ts own ends and means of 
politi cal action , and the relationship of means to ends tends to 
be more organi c than rational or functional ' .  
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with them. Some confrontation , however , has been inevitable , especially 
in the early years of the period when the colonial government often regarded 
such deviant behaviour , parti cularly refusal to pay local government council 
taxes , as a threat to its authority and responded repressively . The 
histories of Hahalis , the Mataungan Association and Kabisawali all contain 
instances of violent clashes with central government , and in the mid 19 70s 
clashes with Papua Besena and the Eriwo Association were avoided only by 
considerable tolerance on the part of the central government . 
A particular aspect of the micronationalist withdrawal is the 
general antipathy , and occas ional open hosti lity ,  which movements have shown 
towards local government counci ls . In a few instances such antipathy has 
been bound up with , or has become bound up with ,  local political differences ; 
Kabisawali provides the most obvious example . More o ften it has been a 
fundamental aspect of the micronationalist outlook . It is clear that local 
government councils are commonly seen more as survivals of colonial 
administration and agents of a distant and impersonal central government 
than as custodians of vi llage interests . To many village people they have 
been the most tangible element of an imposed system which has undermined 
traditional social and political structures and , having imposed taxes , has 
failed to deliver the hoped-for material benefi ts of development .  
I n  several instances micronationalist leaders have sought to use 
their local support base to gain election to the national parliament -
though , as the Peli case i llustrates , without necessarily accepting the 
rules of the parliamentary game . Mataungan Association leaders stood 
successfully as Mataungan candidates in the national elections of 1972 
and 1977  and in the East New Britain provincial elections of 197 7 ,  and 
unsuccessfully in the 1981 provincial e lections .  Papua Besena leader 
Abai j ah became a member of the House of Assembly in 19 72 and , as McKillop 
describes in chapter 1 1 ,  the movement subsequently mobilized support in 
Central Province provincial e lections and s cored a notable success in the 
1977 national elections , which however it exploited in an unlikely coalition 
with Highlands dominated parties . Prominent members of Napidakoe Navitu , 
Peli and Damuni also contested elections successfully , and some others -
notably Stephen Ahi and some of the ' young radicals ' of the early 19 70s -
did so unsuccessfully . Apart from these , the HLF claimed support from the 
4 30 
United Party and the National Party ; the Nemea Association and Pitenamu 
both identified themselves with the Pangu Pati , and in 19 7 3  the short­
lived Social Workers Party listed among its ob j ectives ' support for the 
Free Papua Movement and for the liberation struggles of the Mataungan 
Association and Kabisawali People ' s  Government ' .  There was even an idea,  
which seems to have had some currency among educated spokesmen for 
movements in the early 1970s , that micronationalism might be used as a 
basis for political action at the national level ( as recently as 19 77 
John Kaputin was quoted as saying that,  ' Development groups and not 
political parties should organize Papua New Guinea ' s  Government 1 1 ) .  
For the most part, however , micronationalist movements have chosen to 
operate outside existing formal political institutions and independently 
of political parties ,  and where micronationalist spokesmen have been 
elected to parliament the tendency (with Peli the notable exception) has 
been for them to become incorporated into the larger system and to act 
largely independently of their micronationalist origins . 
On the economic front most movements have been ambivalent. Despite 
the common ideological emphasis on se lf-sufficiency and subsi stence ,  
movements have been active seekers o f  financial and other assistance from 
government and many of them have taken over expatriate plantations and 
businesses ; on the other hand the frequent commercial fai lure of trade 
stores , trucks and other businesses can be largely attributed to a lack 
of commitment to orthodox business methods . 
Measurement of the achievements of micronationalist movements , 
apart from the conceptual problems raised above (p . 4 2 8) , i s  made difficult 
both by lack of information and by the fact that the generality in which 
most movements have described their aims makes it difficult to evaluate 
the extent of their successes even in terms of their own stated obj ectives 
( and this itself is a dubious criterion ) . Nevertheless a few generaliza­
tions can be offered . 
1 Post-Courier 16 March 19 7 7 .  A similar view was expressed to me by 
John Kasaipwalova in 19 75 . Also see the comment by Nemea leaders 
in 19 74  (quoted p . 183 above ) . 
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The first is that micronationalist movements have been remarkably 
successful in quickly bringing together groups of people as members and 
supporters , groups which in many instances have extended across tribal 
and linguistic divisions and have prevailed over traditional enmities . 
They have also been notably success ful in rai s ing funds from supporters 
and in many cases have pursued successful applications for financial ( and 
in a few instances technical ) assistance from the Development Bank , VEDF , 
Plantation Redistribution Scheme , and other sources . As against these 
achievements ,  in the majority of cases the initial enthusiasm has been 
shortlived; few self-help movements seem to have been able to sustain the 
1 active interest o f  members for more than three or four years . Of the 
eight movements studied in detai l in this volume , for example , only two -
the Mataungan Association and Papua Besena - appear to be reasonably active , 
and both those at a level well  below their earlier peak . The difficulty 
of tracing a number of other groups which attracted public attention in 
roughly the same period , or which were early applicants for VEDF grants , 
suggests that this picture holds for a wide range of movements (May 19 79 ) . 
The apparent fal ling away of support for the movements might be 
explained by several factors . In most cases , it  would seem , support has 
declined because the movements have fai led to fulfil the expectations 
which they generated;  this  will be discussed in more detail below . A more 
fundamental failure is suggested by Gerritsen ' s  comment {p . 326 , above ) , 
made in relation to Damuni but applicable , eventually , to several movements : 
there was no real mobilization of people in any activity (other than 
joining) and thus no broadly-based developmental endeavour ' .  Paradoxically , 
another major reason for decline in support has been the early success of 
some movements in achieving limited ob jectives . This applies particularly 
to the smal ler , more recent sel f-help groups whose immediate ob j ectives 
have centred on , for example ,  buying a truck or boat or freezer , or taking 
over a local plantation : once the immediate obj ective of the group has 
been achieved , enthusiasm has waned and the commitment necessary to keep 
the pro ject going has proved difficu lt to sustain . Other reasons for 
decline (which relate to the common importance of individual leadership) 
1 
Compare thi s  observation with the comments of Wilson ( 19 7 2 )  on the 
performance of village industries . 
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have been departure of the initiators of the movement and loss of 
momentum through internal dissention . Interes ting ly , considering the 
history of cooperatives ( Singh 19 74)  , misuse of funds by movement 
leaders does not seem to have affected movements on a large scale . 
The achievement of micronationalist movements in re lation to 
broad social and cultural ob j ectives appears to have been modest . A few 
have ini tiated adult education programmes , though the impact of these is  
diffi cult to assess . Some may have encouraged an interest in their 
traditional cultures but of three proposed cultural centres for which 
government funds were al located to self-help movements ( Kabisawali , TK 
and Ahi )  none has materialized . 1 
Few of the movements have admitted political obj e ctives . Of those 
which have , Kabisawali and the Nemea Landowners ' Association both proposed 
to establish their own autonomous ' governments ' and both did ( after a 
fashion) , though ne ither seems to have been very effective . Several , 
like the Mataungan As sociation , Napidakoe Navitu , the Ahi Associ ation and 
Komge Oro , were concerned to protest particu lar local issues , and seem to 
have been fairly successful in persuading the first Somare government to 
accommodate their demands . Where micronationalist leaders have attempted 
to use the movement as a support base in seeking election to the national 
parliament the results have been mixed ( see pp . 429-430 ) ; whether ,  as the 
Constitutional Planning Committee ( 19 74 : 10/3)  suggested , provincial govern­
ment provides a more effective stage for micronational ist politics remains 
to be seen . 
We have suggested above that a major reason for decline in micro-
na tionalis t movements has been their fai lure to fulfil the expectations 
which they have generated . Often the expectations of supporters have been 
unrealisti c ;  they have expected radical transformations in vi llage e conomy 
and society when , by their nature , the most that the movements could offer 
was a modest improvement in village conditions . But equally , few movements 
1 This is perhaps not quite fair in the case of Ahi . Recently a Morobe 
Cultural Centre has been established in Lae - but only with substantial 
initiative from sources outside the Ahi Association . 
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have returned to their supporters , in terms of continuing material 
benefits , as much as their supporters have been encouraged to expect. 
Concern for improving subsistence living ( including the intro­
duction of appropriate technologies ) has generally produced more rhetoric 
than action . Komge Oro , which placed particular emphasis on this aspect, 
planned vi llage pig and poultry breeding centres and sought to organize 
village youth clubs to clear and plant communal gardens , but these pro­
jects do not seem to have made much progress . Olu Bus established a pig­
breeding was te-digester project but the proj ect was heavily dependent on 
the encouragement of a Canadian volunteer and when he left the proj ect 
ran down . 
Business ventures , especially takeovers of expatriate enterprises , 
have probably been more successful ; however most seem to have suffered 
from deficiencies in managerial competence , due in part to the inexperience 
of local managers and in part , as we have already suggested , to ambivalence 
about pursuing development through orthodox western methods ( Kabisawali 
providing an instructive case study ) . Where existing outside management 
has been retained ( as ,  for example , in the case of TK and Piblika) the 
record seems to have been better , but even then ( as recent developments 
within Piblika suggest) performance can be disrupted by conflicts over 
the direction of control . In the specific instance of plantation take­
overs , poor performance by local groups has threatened the viabi lity of 
the government ' s  Plantation Redistribution S cheme , which was suspended in 
1980 . 
An alternative ' development '  strategy has been inves tment outside 
the group ( for example in real estate or company shares ) .  In general this 
has yielded steady but unspectactular returns ; but whi le it  has proved a 
useful way of generating income , especially for groups ( like Napidakoe 
Navitu , the Mataungans and Ahi)  close to urban centres , it is a dubious 
form of sel f-help . 
It might be argued that outside observers are prone to overestimate 
the importance of material returns , that for most village people what has 
been important is  the demonstration of their ability to organize a coherent 
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movement , and that the takeover of foreign-owned plantations and busi­
nesses is , as we have suggested above (p . 422 ) , as much a symbolic 
as sertion o f  independence as an attempt to secure monetary returns . 
There is obviously a good deal of force in this argument ,  though it 
will provide little consolation either for those who have been responsible 
for distributing government resources to micronationalist movements or for 
a number of sympathetic observers who have regarded such movemen ts as 
potential vehicles for social change in accord with the government ' s eight 
aims and five national goals and directive principles . 
At a more abstract level ( not reflected in movements ' own defini­
tions of their obj ectives)  it might be argued that substantial positive 
achievements of micronationa list movements lie in their contribution to a 
shift in development initiative from the centre to the village , their 
influence in the move towards political decentral i zation ( see , for example , 
Constitutional P lanning Committee 19 73 : 4/4 ) and in helping to bridge the 
growing gap between a largely urban-based elite and the predominantly 
rural masses . 1 
Explaining the mi crona ti onalist phenomenon 
Granted both the simi larities and the differences whi ch are dis­
cernible in the movements which proliferated in the 1960s and 19 70s , two 
important questions which this survey poses are : why did the movements 
emerge on this scale when they did , and how are they to be placed in the 
broad process of political and social change in Papua New Guinea? 
The question of timing 
We have already suggested (pp . 5-9 ) that the movements which sprang 
up in the late 1960s and early 19 70s have precursors among the spontaneous 
local movements which have appeared from time to time throughout Melanesia 
1 On the last point compare Walterstein ( 1960)  and Ake ( 1967 ) . 
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since European colonization ( and perhaps before) , but that the increase 
in what we have termed ' mi cronationalist ' activity coincided with a marked 
increase in the pace of moderni zation and of political development directed 
towards the estab lishment of a unified , and unitary , independent state . 
It was inevi tab le that modernization , and especially the indigeni­
zation of the political and ( to a lesser extent) the economic system , should 
. . . 1 s timulate the growth of pol i tical , social and economic organizations . 
And the great diversity of tradi tional cultures and the lack of obvious 
major social or economic divi sions at the national level provide strong 
reasons why such mobili zation should have taken place predominantly at the 
local leve l .  Further , the fact that Papua New Guinea achieved independence 
without signi ficant resistance from the colonial power probably acted 
2 against the growth o f  s trong nationalist movements , and tended to direct 
energies towards more parochial concerns . Even at the height of nationalist 
feeling at the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) , for example , i t  was 
reported (Morgan , quoted in Davis 19 70 : 29 1 )  that 
1 
2 
3 
Integration has been surprisingly poo r .  No genuine attempt 
has been shown in learning about and understanding a person 
from another area • . . •  Tribal bias and snobbishness is pre­
valen t . 3 
For an interesting discussion of the effects of ' si ze ' on political 
activity , see Dahl and Tufte ( 1974 , especial ly chapter 3 ) . 
Cf . Mazrui ( 19 70 : 56 ) : ' Unti l the recent interest in large scale 
mining enterprise , Aus tralian indifference denied New Guineans even 
the advantage of a shared anti- colonial resentment ' .  
Six years after Davis wrote , o f  thirty-one s tudent groups affiliated 
with the University ' s  Studen t Representative Council eleven were 
University-wide sporting clubs , fourteen were provincial associations 
( Central Province S tudents Association , East Sepik S tudents Society ,  
e tc . ) and five represented sub-provincial regional groups ; the 
remaining group was an association of ( non Papua New Guinea) Paci fic 
Islands s tudents . Ballard ( 19 76b) has also commented on student 
parochialism at UPNG. 
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I t  was equally inevitable that the increased pace of development 
would leave some groups fee ling relatively disadvantaged , frustrated or 
threatened ;  for these groups the formation of movements with ethnic or 
regional boundaries and emphasi zing group identity and sel f-de termination 
was a natural , and a historical , reaction . 
The variety of responses in the 19 70s compared with earlier periods 
can probably be explained in terms of greater complexity of the society in 
the 19 60s and 19 70s , increased involvement of Papua New Guineans in govern­
ment and the cash economy , and growing sophisti cation among both rural 
vi llagers and an educated elite which has been able to act as broker between 
the vi llage and the centre . 
Hegarty ( 197 3 : 440) , following Geertz ( 1963 : 120 ) , has suggested a 
more specific explanation of the surge of micronationalism in the early 
19 70s : 
One of the characteris tics of the period of transition to 
independence is the rapid formation of pol i ti cal groups and 
movements . An awareness of the imminent withdrawal of the 
colonial power develops , movements - some with formal 
organisation , some without - begin to make demands of 
government on a wide range of issues . Communal groups with 
only vague and unspecified economic ob jectives tend to pro­
liferate . Minori ties fearful of their vulnerability at 
independence seek constitution or political safeguards . . • •  
Certainly the well  publicized approach of self-government and independence 
mus t  have sharpened the sensitivities of groups which felt disadvantaged , 
frustrated or threatened.  The Nemea Association , and on a rather larger 
s cale Papua Besena and the HLF , were speci fically concerned to define 
thei r  rights and secure their positions before the departure of the colonial 
government ; in several ins tances ( including Napidakoe Navitu , the Ahi 
Association , MODIPE , Papua Besena , the Nemea Association , the Purari Action 
Group and the West New Britain Action Group) fears of large scale inmigration 
were a parti cular source of insecuri ty and a stimulus to ethni c  or regional 
solidarity .  
I n  looking for more particular reasons for the growth o f  thes e  
movements , another factor of obvious importance is the intellectual climate 
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of the period . Already in the latter part of the 1960s there was some 
questioning in Papua New Guinea of the dominant development strategy , 
endorsed in 1964 by a visi ting World Bank team, of concentrating re­
sources in areas of expected greatest short term productivity , and at 
the University of Papua New Guinea ( created in 1966)  students were being 
introduced to critiques of capitalist , urban-oriented development and to 
theories of small scale sociali st development with Tanzania and China as 
models . There is some evidence of a growing concern with self-reliance 
and decentral i zation in papers presented to the fifth Waigani Seminar , 
on rural development , in Port Moresby in 19 7 1  (Ward 197 2 )  but at the 
following year ' s seminar , which was dominated by the presence of Lloyd 
Bes t ,  Rene Dumont and Ivan Illich , these principles were swept forward on 
a wave of popular enthusiasm . ( See  May 19 7 3 . )  After the seminar the 
Students ' Representative Council endorsed a proposal by its president , 
John Kasaipwalova , to set up a student vegetable garden and pig farm 
beside the campus ( a  garden proj ect was commenced but it was shortlived) 
and in 1972 and later years , encouraged by their university supervisors 
(who gave course credi ts for ' action research ' in rural areas during 
vacations ) ,  a number of s tudents returned to their vi llages to initiate 
or assist local deve lopment proj ects . In 19 7 3 ,  as an outcome of a work­
shop of students , staff and recent graduates of UPNG , the Melanesian 
Action Front was established , with a manifesto which emphasized equality , 
self-re liance and vi llage development . The following year a joint staff­
student Development Investigatory Group was estab lished at UPNG with a 
view to supporting student involvement in vi llage development pro jects . 
Many of these efforts produced more enthusiasm than action but they 
exercised a las ting general influence over village development in a number 
of areas . 1 Somewhat ironically these ' radical ' influences were complemen­
ted by the propaganda of the re tiring colonial administration , which 
emphasi zed the importance of self-re liance as a precondition of e ffective 
poli tical independence ( Parker 19 71 ) . 
The principles of small scale development and self- reliance were 
further endorsed in 1972 by a visiting UNDP-sponsored team which reported 
1 For a more detailed description of the mood of this period, see 
Ballard ( 19 76b ) and Standish ( chapter 12 below) . 
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on development s trategies for Papua New Guinea (Overseas Development Group 
197 3 )  and following this , in December 19 72 , chief minis ter Somare announced 
his government ' s  ' Eight Aims for Improvement ' , which included decentrali­
zation of economic activity and (nationa l )  self-reliance . 
It may be argued that the announcement of the Eight Aims , and sub­
sequently the embodiment in the Constitution of a sympathe tic ' Five National 
Goals and Directive Principles ' , merely gave offi cial recogni tion to already 
prevalent sentiments and provided no clear basis for action . However 
Somare recognized the potential importance of local self-help movements 
as a means of implementing the Eight Aims and in a number of policy 
decisions his government gave pos i tive encouragement to them ( see pp . 26-27 
above) • 
Finally , the apparent success  of some of the early movements 
encouraged the growth of others . This happened in two ways . On the one 
hand , groups in one part of the country emulated movements which appeared 
to have succeeded elsewhere . Thus , for example , in the early 19 70s a 
number of the young radicals were strongly influenced by the example o f  
the Mataungan Association : Kasaipwalova ' s  Kabisawali Village Deve lopment 
Corporation was closely modelled on Kaputin ' s  New Guinea Development 
Corporation , as was Avei ' s  Hiri Vil lage Development Corporation , Waiko ' s  
Komge Oro , the ( Goodenough ) Island Development Corporation and a number 
of other vil lage sel f-help charters . In a more general way , the 
Mataungan example also influenced the leaders of both the Nemea Association 
and the HLF ( and possibly others ) and there were various supportive contacts 
between all these movements , and between Papua Besena and the Koiari , 
Eriwo and Nemea Associations . On the other hand , the success  of one group -
especially in gaining access to government as sistance - sometimes prompted 
a competi tive (one might even say defensive ) reaction from other groups in 
the area . The outstanding instance of this is the TK reaction to Kabisawali 
( see chapter 9 ) ; the establishment of the Wake and Ganai Asso ciations in 
the Abau area ( see chapter 6) and the proliferation of local ethnically­
based movements in Manus (Pokawin 19 76 ) provide others . 
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Rot bilong developmen 
We have already observed (pp . 6-7 above ) that several commentators 
saw in the movements which emerged in the early postwar years a shift 
from cargo cult to secular deve lopment movement . This view received 
' official ' endorsement when in 1972 the Admini strator o f  Papua New Guinea , 
Mr L .W .  Johnson , went so far as to suggest that cargo cults might be 
. . . 1 dying out and being replaced by economic development associations . Some , 
more speci fic , saw the postwar movements in political terms as evidence of 
an emerging anti-colonial nationali sm . 
Such comments suggest two , related , questions :  firs t ,  what sort 
of a link is  there between micronationalist movements and cargo cults ? 
Secondly , does micronationalism represent a passing historical phase , an 
element perhaps o f  transition from colonial to new-state politics , or is it 
a reflection o f  more fundamental aspects of Papua New Guine a ' s changing 
soci ety? 
(i)  The cargo cul t connection . The data presented in this volume leaves 
little doubt that there is some continui ty between the movements we have 
described as micronationalist and those earlier movements ( and some con­
temporary movements ) loosely referred to as cargo cults . 2 The link is 
mos t  obvious in cases like Peli , Pitenamu and TIA where there is a direct 
historical connection between prophet- led mil lenarian movements promising 
some form of kago and more recent secular movements pursuing ' development '  
through more o r  less conventional means . But even in the more obviously 
' modern ' movements , with educated leadership and impres s ive corporate 
1 Post-Courier 14 January 19 72 . 
2 
A definition of ' cargo cults ' ,  and a comment on the usage of the term, 
is offered in note 3 ,  page 3 .  Also noted is Walter ' s  ( 19 8 1 )  objection 
to the term . It is not our intention here to debate the semantics o f  
th e  cargo cul t literature ; however ,  a s  S trelan ( 19 7 7 : 11}  argues , 
cargo is an inadequate translation of the Pidgin term kago , and in the 
fol lowing discuss ion we will  use the term in the broad sense elaborated 
by S trelan ( ibi d . ) :  ' Cargo cults have to do with Me lanesian concepts o f  
power ,  status , wealth , and th e  good life ' . 
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charters , there are clear similarities of obj ective , organization and 
• h h I • • • I 1 1 strategy wit t e more primitive cu t movements . 
These similarities of form reflect fundamental similarities in 
the nature of the movements . In a recent review of the literature on 
cult movements , for example , Lanternari distinguishes four aspects of 
' nativistic and socio-religious movements ' :  religion ; search for 
cultural self-identi ty ;  acculturation , and the psycho logical aspect 
( the last being expressed in such terms as ' deprivation ' and ' crisis ' )  
(Lanternari 1974 : 487 ) . 2 All but the first of these i s  equally pertinent 
to micronationalism, and in the more recent movements ' development ' ,  or 
more narrowly bisni s ,  has in effect become a substitute for religion . 
The basis of this coincidence has been suggested by several writers who 
have seen cargo cults , rightly , as a particular form of a more general 
class of revolutionary social movement . Hobsbawm ( 1959 ) , for example , 
places ' millenarian movements ' in the middle of a hierarchy of social 
movements ranked 'in order of increasing ambition ' ,  but observes (ibi d . :  57 ) : 
1 
2 
3 
The essence of mi llenarianism ,  the hope of a complete and 
radical change, in the world . . • is not confined to primitivism . 
It is present almost by definition , in all revolutionary 
movements of whatever kind . . . .  3 
Gerritsen s imilarly sees his ' dynami c communal associations ' as ' the 
spiri tual if not the lineal descendants of the cargo cults ' ,  even to 
the point of describing the Mataungan Association as ' the heir to 
earlier cargo cults ' ( 19 7 5 : 8-9 , 14 , 18) . 
Comparable lists of the ' characteristics ' of cargo cults are presented 
and discussed in Stanner ( 19 5 3 ) , Hogbin ( 1958) , Hobsbawm ( 1959 ) , 
Mead ( 1964) , Jarvie ( 1964) , Brown ( 1966 ) , Talmon ( 1966 ) , and elsewhere . 
Hobsbawm suggests three main characteristics of the ' typical old­
fashioned mi llenarian movement in Europe ' :  ' Fi rs t ,  a profound and 
total rej ection of the present , evi l world . . . .  Second , a fairly 
standardi zed " ideology" of the chi liastic type • . . .  Third . . .  a funda­
mental vagueness about the actual way in which the new society wil l be 
brought about ' ( 19 59 : 57-58) . Being essentially revolutionary , however ,  
millenarian movements are eas i ly modernized or absorbed into modern social 
movements .  Once so transformed or absorbed ,  Hobsbawm argues , they 
normally re tain the first of these characteristics (rejection of the 
present order) ; abandon the second at least to some extent , substi tuting 
a modern , generally secular , ideology ; and add a superstructure of modern 
revolutionary politics (ibi d . : 59 ) . In the Papua New Guinea case , it  
might be argued that in the 1970s  political responsibility was already 
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In an otherwise not particularly i lluminating paper on the explanation of 
cargo cul ts , Inglis ( 19 5 7 )  also hints at the continuity between cults and 
modern development movements when she suggests that cults might be arranged 
on a scale according to degree of sophis ti ca ti on , ' And by sophistication , 
in this context ,  I mean the capacity of the natives to understand what 
kind of effort wi ll  enable them to gain their ends ' ( ibi d . : 2 49 -250 ) . 
Similarly Brown ( 1966)  distinguishes between cults and secular movements 
but observes that cults may alternate with secular movements and that 
' Movements which are practical both in their ends and in their means may 
incorporate the sort of false beliefs which are common in cults ' ( ibid . : 
161) . ( See also Wal lace 1956 ; Brookfield 1972 ; Stephen 19 7 7 ; Adas 1979 . )  
At the risk of oversimplifying an extensive and often subtle body 
of scholarly wri ting , one might summarize the relationship : both cargo 
cults and micronationalist movements have their origins , at least in part ,  
i n  a sense o f  relative deprivation , whether i n  terms of material goods , 
s tatus , or politi cal power1 ; both seem to occur with greatest frequency 
in periods of rapid change ; and both , in seeking ultimately to remove the 
blockages which prevent the ir supporters from enjoying those things of 
which they believe themselves to be deprived,  do so , in varying forms and 
to differing degrees ,  through ' wi thdrawal ' or ' disengagement ' , redrawing 
the world , as it were , within their own perspective and on their own scale . 2 
1 
2 
being transferred from the colonial government to ' the people ' - but 
wi thout a corresponding transfer of economic power ,  and that in conse­
quence what was added to the armoury of local mass movements was not a 
superstructure of revo lutionary politi cs but one oriented to ' develop­
ment ' through a combination of modern bisni s and a somewhat romanticized 
ideology of communal sel f-help . 
The concept of relative deprivation i s  explored in Aberle ( 1962 ) . Note , 
however ,  Aberle ' s  warning that analysis in terms of deprivation does 
have ' a  certain excessive flexibility .  I t  i s  always possible after the 
fact to find deprivations ' ( 1962 : 2 1 3 ) . 
Compare Aberle ( 1962 : 2 14) : ' • . •  the deprivations which form the back­
ground for the [ mi l lenarian ] movement not only involve the sense of 
blockage . . .  but also the sense of a social order which cannot be re­
constituted to yield the satisfactions desired . The millenarian ideology 
justifies the removal of the participants from that social order • • • •  
[ I t]  j us tifies withdrawal , and that is  its functional significance ' �, 
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With regard to modern movements ,  it is this tendency to wi thdrawal which 
principally distinguishes micronationalist movements from , for example , 
pressure groups or political parties .  
Within this framework , what differentiates micronationalist movements 
from cargo cults is essentially their reliance on a secular rather than a 
magico-religious world view and their use of ' modern ' means over ritual . 
This is not , however , to draw too sharp a distinction . As we have already 
implied by the use of the term ' marginal cargo cult ' (pp . 10-12 ) , and as 
wi ll have become clear from the detailed studies above , the dividing line 
is not always preci se . 1 Moreover , it requires a certain amount of ethno­
centricity to believe that because the behaviour of recent movements 
corresponds more closely than that of cults to economic and politi cal 
norms familiar to Western trained observers , there is necessarily a greater 
' rationality ' on the part of the mass of supporters , to whom the rituals of 
business organization and parliamentary politics may be no less exotic than 
those of ' money houses '  and ' memorial gardens ' ,  and for whom expectations 
about material returns may be no less unrealisti c . 2 
Nor do we support the view that cargo cults are on the verge of 
extinction . Wi th increasing sophistication among vil lage people it is to 
be expected that economic development associations , self-help movements , 
and suchlike ' modern ' organizations will be seen as more potent , more 
official ly acceptable and more fashionable than movements which begin 
from a magico-re ligious world view ( even the leaders of Peli and Pi tenamu 
vigorously denied charges of cargo cultism) . But the magico-religious 
world view is a persistent one . Lawrence wrote in 1964 that ' many natives 
in the southern Madang District seem to have accepted development as a 
potentially sati sfactory alternative to cargo cult ' ( 19 64 : 2 74) ; in a pre­
face to Mcswain ( 19 7 7 ) , however , he acknowledged that cargo belief had not 
1 
2 
Stent ( 19 7 3b : 2 ) , in proposing a definition of cargo cults , has some 
interesting comments on what ,  in the Papua New Guinea context , is and 
what is not a cargo cult .  
On the sub j ect of ' rationality ' i n  relation to cult behaviour s e e  Jarvie 
( 1964 : chapter 5 ) , Jarvie and Agassi in Wilson ( 19 70) , Brookfield ( 1972 : 
chapter 13 ) , and especially Adas ( 19 7 9 : 160- 164) . 
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disappeared with economic and sociopolitical development ,  adding that 
' cults as such are relatively unimportant . What is important is the 
general condition of cargoism , which is interwoven with everyday events 
. . . .  the distinction between religious and secular may have little 
meaning for [Papua New Guineans ] ' (Mcswain 19 77 : xii-xiii)  . 1 Moreover , 
whether or not we can expect some decline in magico-religious thinking , 
both cargo cults and micronationalism derive from s imi lar feelings of 
deprivation , frustration and insecurity , and so long as the underlying 
social and economic forces which generate these feelings continue to 
h . . 2 operate , sue movements wi ll continue to appear . 
( i i )  Nationalism and microna tional i sm . This brings us to the second of 
the two questions posed above ( p .  4 3� namely that concerning the 
relationship between the movements which proli ferated in the 1960s and 
1970s and the emergence of a broadly based nationalism. 
Among those who saw a transformation in cargo cultism in the early 
postwar years , many interpreted the change in terms of a shift from cult 
to political movement . Worsley , for example , wrote : 
. . •  we have seen a general trend in the development of the 
cults away from apocalyptic mys ticism towards secu lar political 
organization , a trend from religious cult to political party 
and cooperative . . . .  We are , in fact , witnessing the early 
s tages of formation of national groupings in Melanesia 
(Wors ley 19 57 : 2 3 1 , 254 ) . 
Worsley referred to such groupings as ' "proto-nationalist" formations o f  
a transitional kind ' , endorsing Guiart ' s  earlier description of postwar 
1 
2 
Lawrence has further elaborated his 1977  comments in Lawrence ( forth­
coming) . Simi larly see S trelan ( 19 7 7 : 10 ) : ' Cargoism in Melanesia is 
endemic ;  i t  exists even when and where there is no overt cargo movement 
or cargo activity ' .  Mcswain ( 19 7 7 )  and Stephen ( 19 7 7 )  are among others 
who have recently documented the coexistence of cultic and secular 
beliefs and social action . 
Similarly , see Gerritsen ( 19 75 : 8-9) . 
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movements as ' forerunners o f  Melanesian nationalism ' (Guiart 19 5 lb ;  
Worsley 19 5 7 : 2 55 ) . Simi larly , Lawrence ( 19 5 5 : 2 0 ;  196 4 )  re ferred to 
cargo cult as ' an embryonic nationalist movement ' ,  and Mead ( 1964 : 19 7 )  
cormnented that ' Whereas cargo cults had become endemic i n  the New Guinea 
area , political movements were epidemic in the irmnediate postwar atmos­
phere ' .  This interpretation of events was shared by such other prominent 
and enlightened observers of the Papua New Guinea scene as Belshaw ( 1950 ) , 
Bodrogi ( 19 5 1 ) , Hogbin ( 19 5 8 ) , Rowley ( 19 6 5 ) , and Brown ( 1966 ) . 1 Indeed 
Hogbin ( 1958 : 2 3 2 )  warned that ' The governments of Melanesia may in the 
future find themselves confronted with a Mau-Mau cult or • . •  with a 
serious attempt to obtain political independence ' ,  while Rowley opti­
mi stically saw ' The sol u tion . . .  being worked out largely through the 
extension of the Local Government Counci ls ' ( 19 6 5 : 186 , italics added) . 
Developments in Papua New Guinea in the 19 70s could have been 
interpreted as supporting such a viewpoint: at a superficial level , 
micronationalist movements proli ferated in the period leading up to 
independence , and in at least some respects ( the emphasis on cormnunal 
self-help , local political autonomy , and tradi tional values , for example) 
most did express an emerging Melanesian nationalism .  More speci fically , 
in several instances movements confronted the colonial government or had 
prominent members contest elections . There was even the suggestion ( see 
pp . 430 ) that micronationalist movements might provide a basis for politi­
cal action at the national leve l ,  which suggests that some people within 
micronationalist politi cs saw the movements in ' proto-nationalist ' terms , 
and in 1973  the Pangu Pati , the leading nationalist politi cal movement 
in the country , invited representatives of movements to the Pangu Pati 
2 Congress . Thus , within this volume , Grosart argues (pp . 174 , 149 ) thdt 
Mataunganism was both a nationalist and a micronationalist movement , 
Adams attributes to the Ahi Association ' strong nationalist sentiments ' 
(p. 240 ) , and Gerri tsen describes the ideology of Damuni as ' "early indepen­
dence " nationalism ' (pp . 3 1 1) . 
1 
2 
It was not , however ,  universally accepted;  see , for example , Stanner 
( 1958 )  and Jarvie ( 1964 : 6 1) . A more recent critic of the hypothesis 
is Smith ( 19 79 : chapter 2 ) . 
David Hegarty , personal cormnunication , 1976 . 
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As agains t this , however : first , the spread of micronationalist 
movements , and the form they took , can be explained ( as we have attempted 
above ) in other terms , relating more to ' primordial ' differentiation in 
the period leading up to ,  and in the period fol lowing , independence than 
to an emerging pre-independence nationalism;  secondly , rather than meta­
morphose into segments of a fully-fledged nationalist movement ,  the 
tendency has been for micronationalist movements simply to lose their 
initial impetus and dissipate thei r  support . The pos sible significant 
exceptions to this latter generali zation are the Mataungan Association and 
Papua Besena , both of which have participated successfully in national 
politics ; but even these two movements have remained essentially local or 
regional in their orientation . And the idea of a pan micronationalist 
group in national politics was never made operational ,  and was effectively 
re j ected in 1974 by the Constitutional Planning Committee , of which the 
North Solomons ' John Momis and the Mataungan Association ' s  John Kaputin 
were prominent members ( see p . 2 7 above) . Thus without denying that an 
emerging broader Melanesian nationalism may have been one element of the 
micronationalist phenomenon in the 1970 s ,  and bearing in mind also that 
a period of colonial s truggle might have brought micronationalist movements 
together in a more concrete way than in fact occurred ( c f .  Adams ' s  comment 
p . 73 above) , the general conclusion must be that micronationalism in 
Papua New Guinea cannot be seen simply as a transitional phase of ' nation­
building ' ,  but rather reflects the continuing strength of localism,  
regionalism ,  and ethnici ty in Papua New Guinean society .  To the extent 
that micronationalism in Papua New Guinea has been a revolutionary force , 
in other words , the micronationalis ts have sought their new order not so 
much in the overthrow or capture of the colonial regime , as Worsley and 
others seem to have anticipated,  as in withdrawal from i t .  
Going from the particular to the general , i n  retrospect the view 
expressed by Worsley and others might be seen as belonging to a more 
general s chool o f  thought , dominant in much of the ' development '  literature 
of the 1950s and 1960s , which saw political and social change as an 
evol u ti onary process in which particuliarisms like micronationalism and 
ethnici ty inevitably gave way in the face of emerging nationalism ,  and 
in which ( in some formulations ) social class superseded ethni c  and local 
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divisions as a fundamental basis for political organization . 1 But the 
tendency to regard micronationalist and simi lar movements as a feature 
of transi tion , by aggregation , from tribal societies to an integrated 
nation-state underrated the persistence of ethnic and regional divisions , 
not only in the new states but in the longer established states of Europe 
and North America as well . In Africa , As ia and Latin America micro­
nationalist-type movements have not disappeared , despite the frequent 
efforts of independent governments to eliminate them, and in Europe and 
North America there has been a resurgence of what Birch ( 19 78 : 3 3 1- 3 3 2 )  
refers to a s  ' minority nationalist movements • . 2 
Reflecting the historical facts , from the 1960s a number of 
scholars rej ected the evolutionist idea of ' nation-bui lding • 3 , arguing 
not only that ( in the words of Melson and Wolpe 19 70 : 112 ) ' communalism 
may • • •  be a persistent feature of social change ' ,  but that 
To ask whether new national identities will replace or be bui lt 
upon existing "primordial " identities is to miss  the point that 
these "primordial " identities are themselves in the process of 
being created. For many of  the s ame factors generatinq national 
identities . . •  are generating sub-national identities as well 
(Weiner 19 7 3 : 25 3 ) . 
This view was well  elaborated by Heeger ( 1974) . In non-Western societies , 
Heeger argued (ibi d . : 5 ) , ' Social change ,  far from being inevitab le and 
ultimately moderni zing,  i s  sporadic ,  erratic and unpredi ctable in i ts 
consequences ' . In much the same terms as Shils ( 1963)  had employed a 
decade earlier , Heeger characterized ' underdeveloped societies ' as highly 
segmentary ( ' segmented by region , community ,  kinship and the pace of 
social change ' ,  ibi d . : 2 3 )  and their politics as amorphous and inherently 
1 
2 
3 
For a recent formulation of such an ' evolutionary ' viewpoint ,  wi th 
specific re ference to Papua New Guinea , see Townsend ( 19 80) . Townsend 
sees ' the present disengagement in some rural areas ' as ' a  transi tory 
phase ' (ibi d . : 16 ) , preceding eventual incorporation into the world 
system . 
Also see Smith ( 1979 ) and Gourevitch ( 19 79 ) . 
See , for example , Wallerstein ( 1960 ) , Geertz ( 1963 ) , Connor ( 1967-6 8 ,  
19 71-72 ) ,  Roth ( 1968) , Melson and Wolpe ( 1970) , Enloe ( 19 7 3 ) , Heeger 
( 19 74)  , Birch ( 19 78)  , Smith ( 1979 ) . 
4 4 7  
unstab le , being held together at the centre b y  a tenuous cohesion o f  
political elites . 
Much of the ' post evolutionist ' writing on political and social 
change in new states has drawn on experiences in Asia and Africa , and 
this has influenced the respective emphases whi ch different authors 
place on such questions as e thnicity , stability and the role of elites . 
But the general emphasis on the persistence of segmentary elements in 
the politica l process , and on the importance of understanding these 
elements if one is to comprehend the nature of political and soci al 
change , has an obvious relevance for Papua New Guinea ( and one which 
Papua New Guineans have not been slow to reali ze1) .  
Concl usion 
What , then , is  the like ly future of micronationalism? If the 
analysis o f  Heeger and others is  broadly correct - and I believe it is 
then we may expect to see movements of this type playing a con tin uin g 
role in the e:xpression of regional , communal and ethnic elements in 
Papua New Guinean society .  Obviously thei r  future form an d  activities 
will depend largely on the way in which the country ' s  political and 
2 
-
social ins ti tutions develop . Of particular importance will be the 
institution o f  provincial government :  in part at leas t ,  the introduction 
of provincial government was seen by its proponents as a means of con­
taining the centrifugal tendencies which micronationalism seemed to present;  
i r.  fa.et, however ,  provincial government may provide a favourable environ­
ment for micronationalis t movements - especially in view of the decision 
in several provinces ' not to have ' political parties in provincial elections . 
It must remain a strong pos s ibility that micronationalis t movements 
wi ll turn increasingly to more conventional methods of poli tical and 
e conomi c activity and thus be gradually incorporated within the system , 
at the provincial i f  not at the national level . Equally plausib le , however ,  
1 
2 
See , for example , Somare ( 19 70 ) . 
For one thing, i t  helps explain the non-development of a coherent 
national political party system. 
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is that micronationalist movements ( and also perhaps cultic movements ) 
will continue to eme rge , sporadically , as a form of protest among groups 
who consider themselves relatively deprived , slighted or threatened .  
For the country ' s  political leaders the central problem wil l 
continue to be much as i t  has been over the past decade or so , namely 
one of minimizing the unproductively disruptive e ffects of movements 
local ly while maximizing their undoubted potential as innovative indigenous 
responses to poli tical and social change . 
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Bougainvi lle Combined Councils 
Conference , 129 , 130 
Bougainvi l le Copper Agreement , 126 , 
12 8 ,  134 , 135 , 136 
Bougainville Copper Pty Ltd , 1 19 ,  
125n , 294 , 3lln 
Bougainvi lle Landowners ' Association , 
12 1 
Bougainvi lle News , 128 
Bougainvi lle , North , Open electorate , 
12 3 '  129 ' 132 
Bougainvi lle Regional e lectorate , 
12 1 ,  129 , 133 , 370n 
Bougainvi lle , South , Open electorate , 
12 1 ,  132 
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Bougainvi lle Spe cial Political 
Conunittee (BSPC) , 22 , 137 ; see also 
Napidakoe Navitu 
Boundary Road , 2 2 3  
Boun i , 3 1 3  
Brokers , s e e  Elites 
Brookfie ld,  H . , 442 
Brown , George , 144 
Brown , P . , 440 , 444 
Brown , W .  , 132n 
Bubes a ,  20 
Bubuleta ,  308 
Bugandi High S chool ,  2 35 
Buin , 113 , 119 , 126 ,  129 ; language , 
118 ; Local Government Council , 
126 ; see also Bougainville 
Buka , 8-9 , 115 , 118 ,  12 3 ,  12 7 ;  
Local Government Counci l ,  8 ,  115 , 
1 19 ,  12 3 ,  12 7 ;  see also 
Bougainvi lle 
Bukaua, 82n , 2 0 7 ;  Local Government 
Council , 2 lln 
Buko settlement ,  80 , 82 , 2 09-2 10 , 
2 19-22 3 ,  2 2 5-226 , 2 30 ;  see also 
Ahi Association 
Bully Beef Club , 16 1 
Bulo river , 90n 
Bulolo , 79 , 90 , 9 1 ,  92 , 9 8 ,  102 
Bulum val ley , 6 3 ,  6 5 ,  6 8 ,  7 8 ,  86 
Bumbu, 2 0 7-209 , 2 12-2 13 , 2 2 3-22 4 , 
229 , 232 ; see also Buko settlement 
Buneabura , 188 
Burns Phi lp ,  178 , 188 ; see also 
Robinson River Plantation 
Busiba ,  132 
Business Development , Department of , 
3 7 ,  54 , 79 , 8ln , 94n , 196 , 3 15 
Buskanaka , 260 
Busu, 90n ,  9 7 ,  102 , 2 1 3 , 22 3-2 2 5 , 
232 ; see also Ahi Asso ciation 
Busu-Bumbu mini coun ci l ,  2 2 4 ,  2 2 5  
Butibam, 2 0 7- 2 16 , 2 1 7n ,  2 2 0-2 2 3 ,  
2 30-2 3 1 , 2 3 3 , 2 35 ,  2 4 1-245 ; 
see also Ahi Association , 
Butibam Progress Association 
Butibam Progress Association , 2 10-2 16 , 
2 2 1 ,  228-2 3 1 ,  2 3 8 ;  see also Ahi 
Association 
Bwanabwana , Local Government Counci l ,  
309 , 312 
Bwaleto , K . , 27 
CRA , 12ln , 122 , 125n , 128 , 130 , 132 ; 
see also Bougainville 
CTA, see Catholic Teachers Association 
Cadigan fami ly , 3 12 
Calvados is lands , 303 
Canadian volunteers , 433 
Cape Hoskins , oil palm pro j ect, 366 
Cape Rodney , land settlement scheme , 
see Mori-Bomguina land settlement 
scheme 
Cargo cults , 1 ,  3 ,  6- 7 ,  8 ,  11- 1 2 , 2 5 ,  
3 1 ,  55 , 6 1 ,  63 , 6 8-7 0 ,  87 , 115 , 118 , 
134 , 144 , 16 3 ,  2 70 , 42 3 ,  427 , 434-
435 , 4 39-443 , 444 , 448;  see also 
marginal cargo cults , Skin guri a ,  
Tangke t cult 
Catholic church , 12 , 3 3 ,  3 4 ,  36 , 37 , 
40 , 118,  119 , 147 , 153 , 157- 1 5 8 ,  
175 , 2 19 ,  2 2 1 ;  s e e  also Missions 
Catholic Teachers Association ( CTA) , 
157 , 158 
Cattle pro j e cts , 304 , 318 , 320  
Central District Coordinating 
Commi ttee , 195 ,  2 0 1  
Central government ,  1 ,  2 ,  5-6 , 12- 17 , 
19- 2 3 ,  2 5 - 2 8 ,  38- 39 , 60 , 134 , 136 , 
138 , 169 , 19 1 ,  199 , 339 , 345 , 352-
355 , 365 , 409 , 422 , 42 8 ,  448 ; see 
also Aus tralian adminis tration 
Central Province , 18 , 2 1 ,  2 3 ,  37 , 19 3 ,  
2 02n , 3 3 1 , 332 , 334 , 3 35 ,  339 , 347 , 
3 49 ,  350 ,  352 , 429 ; Central Regional 
e lectorate , 34 1 ,  346 , 349 , 39 7 ;  see 
also Nemea Landowne rs ' Association , 
Papua Besena 
Chain le tter scheme s , 35 , 3 1 3  
Chan , George , 390n 
Chan , Sir Julius , 14 , 332 , 409 
Chatterton , Percy , 336 , 363 
Cheeving ,  69 
Chief Minister , Office of the , 186 , 188 
Chimbian-Timbunke , 48 
Chimbu Province , 25 , 368n ,  386 , 392n , 
39 4- 39 5 , 40 1 ;  Interim Provincial 
Government , 392 n ;  Provincial/ 
Regional electorate , 365 , 382 , 402 , 
408;  see also Highlands Lib eration 
Front 
China ,  437 
Chiriwa , 18 
Chowning , A . , 152 
Chris tan , 91 
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Christian Democratic Party , 36 , 38 , 42 , 
49 , 50 , 5 1 ,  5 8  
Chuave Open e lectorate , 382 
Cloudy Bay ,  17 7 ,  178 ,  186 , 194 ,  195 ;  
Local Government Counci l ,  15 , 178-
179 ; Savings Club , 198 
Clunies-Ross ,  A . , 370 
Cochrane , G . , 6n , 7n 
Coffee , 5 3 ,  65 , 66 , 70 , 304 ,  305 , 325 , 
3 3 1 ,  36 1 ,  3 7 3  
Cohen , A . , 2 n  
Colebatch , H . , 2 7  
Colonial administration , see 
Australian administration 
Commission of Inquiry , Gazelle 
Peninsula , 14 , 14 1 ,  152 , 166 
Commission of Inquiry into Alcoholic 
Drink , 127 
Commission of Inquiry into Land 
Matters , 201 , 2 2 7 ,  2 28 ,  375n 
Commonwealth Bank , 53  
Communal action , see  self-help 
Communi ty Development Office , 100 
Compass , 380 ; see also Uni ted Party 
Connell , J . , 2 7 ,  137  
Connolly , P . D . , 166 ; see  also 
Commission of Inquiry , Gazel le 
Peninsula 
Connor , W . , 2n , 368 ,  405 , 446n 
Consti tutional Planning Committee 
( CPC) , 2 7 ,  134 , 170 , 2 0 1 ,  335 , 
372n , 396 , 409 , 432 , 434 , 445 
Conyers , D. , 2 2n ,  36 3 
Co-operatives ,  5 ,  8 ,  11 , 34 , 4 3 1 ,  
4 4 3  
Copra ,  5 3 ,  302 , 305 
Cornish , Gerald , 3 13 
Cottrell-Dorman , 304 
Counci l of Chiefs ( Trobriand Islands ) , 
296 , 4 2 7  
Crichton , Albert, 3 ln 
Cults , see Cargo cults 
Cul ture , tradi tional , 7 ,  8, 12 , 13 , 
16, 17- 18,  19 , 2 7 ,  33 , 47 , 70 , 7 1-
76 , 95 , 110 , 12 4 ,  149 , 158,  159- 160 , 
2 0 8 ,  2 32-2 3 3 ,  242 , 256 , 2 5 7 , 2 7 5 , 
2 77 ,  2 78-2 79 , 2 85-286 , 2 88 ,  2 9 2 , 
29 7 ,  302 , 306 , 36 1 ,  4 12 , 4 15 , 422 ,  
42 3 ,  444 
DASF , see Agriculture , Stock and 
Fisheries , Department of 
DDA, see Di strict Administration , 
Division of 
DPI , see Primary Industry , Depart-
ment o f  
Daba , 260n 
Dabasi gal a , 260 
Daga Local Government Counci l ,  320n ,  
323 
Dahl , R. A . , 435 
Daio church counci l ,  3 2 1  
Damena , Goas a ,  350 
Damuni Association , 20 , 301- 3 2 6 , 
4 2 2 ,  429 , 4 3 1 , 444 ; aims , 30 1- 302 , 
3 10- 312 , 3 19-320 ;  establishment ,  
301- 303 , 308- 3 13 ; economic activities , 
20 , 3 10-3 12 , 3 16- 3 18 ,  3 19-32 5 ;  
leadership , 301 , 304- 312 , 3 13-316 , 
32 5-326 ; membership , 3 11-3 13 , 326 ; 
po liti cal activities , 20 , 30 1 ,  305-
30 8 ,  3 10 ,  314- 3 15 , 320 , 32 5 ;  
and government ,  3 1 1 ,  3 16-319 , 322-
325;  and local government counci ls , 
302-304 
Damuni Economic Corporation Limited , 
2 0 ,  3 1 1 ,  3 17- 3 2 2  
Dangal , 9 1  
Darava , 1 7 7  
Daro , Boio , 330n , 334 , 3 36 ,  3 3 8 ,  
34 1 ,  346 , 368n 
Daru ( e thnic group) , 1 1 3n 
Daru Dis trict,  332  
Daulo Open e lectorate , 364 
Davis , M . M . , 3 3 7n , 435 
Decentrali zation , 24 , 26 , 170 , 329 , 
357 , 36 3 ,  364 ,  369 , 3 7 1 ,  401-40 3 ,  
42 4 ,  4 32 , 4 34 ,  437-438,  4 47 ; 
see also Regional separatis t  
movements , separatism 
Deprivation , relative , 5 ,  63 . 86 , 
2 52-257 , 299-300 , 363- 364 , 
440 , 44 1 ,  44 3 ,  448 . 
Deuts ch , K . , 174 
Development Administration , Division 
o f ,  2 29n 
Development Bank , see Papua New Guinea 
Development Bank 
Development Investigatory Group , 4 3 7  
Dialogue , 12 1 
Dibela,  Kings ford , 309 , 3 10 , 3 1 1 ,  3 13-
3 14 ,  3 1 7 ,  3 18 ,  320n , 3 2 1-322 , 323 , 
325 , 326 ;  see also Damuni Association 
Dindillo ,  Michael , 309 , 311 
Dinu, Mudio , 184 , 188 
Diro , Brigadier-General , E . R . , 347  
Dirorne , Duncan , 312 
Disengagement , see Withdrawal 
Distric t Administration , Division 
of, 3 8 ,  3 16 ,  317 , 3 2 4 ,  325  
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Divara Vil lage Agricultural Club , 306  
Doa , Raphael ,  399 , 400 
Dobu Local Government Counci l ,  309 
Dogura Anglican Mission , 313 , 314 
Dorna , 177 
Dove , J . , 119 , 12 4 
Dregerhafen , 79n 
Dreikikir Open electorate , 39 , 50 , 5 1  
Dudua census division , 8 3  
Duggan , D . J . , 137n 
Dumont ,  Rene , 3 7 1 ,  4 3 7  
Dumorowi Harnarei , 3 1 3  
Dutton , T . E . , 177n 
ELC-PNG , see Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in Papua New Guinea 
ELCONG , see Evangeli cal Lutheran 
Church of New Guinea 
Ealaba census divi sion , 304 
East Coast Buka Society , 8; see 
also Hahalis Wel fare Society 
East New Bri tain Provi nce , 12-15 , 
37 , 139- 175 , 283 , 429 ;  Provincial 
government ,  14 3 ,  159 , 165 ,  1 7 1 ,  
172 ; see also Gaze l le Peninsula , 
Mataungan Association 
East New Bri tain Regional electorate , 
166 
East Sepik Distri ct Workers ' 
Association , 42n 
East Sepik Province , 10- 1 1 ,  3 1-62 
East Sepik Provincial Advisory 
Conunittee , 40 
East Sepik Regional electorate , 49 
Eastern Highlands Province , 2 4 ,  2 5 ,  
3 6 1 ,  362n ; Provincial government , 
34 7 
Ebabang compound, 80 
Education , 12 , 15 , 2 4 ,  133 , 29 3 ,  
379 , 384 , 401 , 413 , 4 15 ,  4 1 8 ,  423-
4 2 5 , 432;  see also Elites 
Eight Aims , see Eight Point Plan 
Eight Point Plan , 26-27 , 2 7 0 ,  3 7 1 ,  
387n , 388 , 399n , 404 , 4 1 8 ,  434 , 
438 
Eivo , 113 , 126 , 134 
Elections , 5,  7 ,  11,  12 , 13,  14 , 
17 , 2 0 , 23 , 26 , 36 , 42n , 49- 5 1 ,  
52 , 5 8 ,  60 , 85 , 10 3 ,  115 , 118 
120-1 2 1 ,  124 , 12 7 ,  129 ,  132-13 4 , 
136-138 , 139 , 143 , 155 , 163 ,  166-
167 ,  170- 172 , 182n , 2 14n , 2 15-220 , 
2 36 n ,  314 , 322 , 32 5 ,  326n , 341 ,  
346 , 348-350 , 354-355 , 365 , 400 , 
408-409 , 429-430 , 432 , 44 4 ,  445 
E lectrici ty Conunission , see Papua 
New Guinea Electri ci ty Commission 
Eli j ah ,  E lliott , 280 
E li tes , 23 , 24 , 34 , 2 4 3 , 2 45 , 30 1 ,  
304- 309 , 3 1 1 ,  3 15 , 326 , 330 , 3 3 3 ,  
3 35 , 345 , 347 , 352- 354 , 359 , 366-
368 ,  370 , 372 , 39 1-394 , 39 7 ,  402 , 
404-405 , 407 ,  415 , 4 16 , 422 ,  424-
425 , 4 36 , 439 , 44 7 ;  as brokers , 
2 38 ,  39 3 ,  423n , 42 4 ,  4 3 6 ;  see 
also Social class , Status 
Eli zabeth Park , 167 ,  170 , 172 
Ellis , Torn, 38 , 39 , 41 
Emerson , R. , 398 
Emmanuel ,  Jack , 200 
Enga , 36 1 ,  362 , 382 , 409 
Enloe , C . H . , 42 4 ,  4 46n 
Enos Teve , see Teve , Enos 
Epstein , A . L . , 144 , 15 3 ,  309n 
Epstein , T . S . , 144 , 158 
Eriwo Development Association , 
19- 2 0 , 429 , 438  
Esa ' ala Di strict , 302  
Etek , Nubos , see Nubos Etek 
Ethnici ty , 2 ,  4 ,  16 , 1 8 ,  2 1 ,  2 5-
26 , 82-83 , 107 ,  113 , 126-12 7 ,  
139 , 149 , 175 , 177 , 181 , 204 , 2 0 7-
2 0 8 ,  329-330 , 359 , 3 6 8 ,  384-
385 , 405 , 407 , 426 , 435-436 , 438 , 
445-44 7 ; see also Regional 
separatist movements 
Ethnonationalisrn , 2 ,  137- 13 8 ,  141 ,  
329 , 423n;  see also Ethnicity ,  
Regional separatist movements , 
Separatism 
Europe , 446 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in Papua 
New Guinea ( ELC-PNG) , 95n 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of New 
Guinea ( ELCONG) , 9 5  
Expectations ,  35 , 6 2 , 66-68 , 69 , 
86 , 87 , 125 ,  204-205 , 303 ,  304 , 
423-424 , 4 3 1-434 , 442 
External Territories , Department o f ,  
12 7 ;  see also Australi a ,  Australian 
administration 
FMDS , see Finschhafen Marketing and 
Development Society 
Fanon , F . , 3 7 1  
Fel lows , S . B . , 2 5 3n , 2 79 
Fergusson is land , 304 , 306 , 3 18 
Fifi ta , John , 306 , 3 1 1  
Finance , Department o f ,  19 5 
Fingelton , w . , 119 
Fink , R .  , 302n 
Finney , B . R . , 39 1 
Fins chhafen , 6 3 ,  65 
Finschhafen Marketing and Develop­
ment Society ( FMDS) , 66 , 67 , 70 , 
72 , 73  
Forests , Department of , 196 , 197 , 
235  
Fortune , Reo , 34 
Four Corners , 58n 
( Four Forgotten ) Brothers Club , 3 80 
Four Square Gospellers ' Interdenomi-
national Church , 5 3  
Freire , P . , 374n 
Free Papua Movement , 430 
Gala kasi , 2 59 
Ganai , 182 , 187 
Ganai Association , 15 , 182 , 438 
Garaina compound , 2 35 
Gawanaki , 32 3 ,  324 
Gazelle Open e lectorate , 385 
Gazelle League of Savings and Loan 
Societies , 16 1 
Gazelle Local Government Counci l ,  
14 , 14 1- 142 , 14 7- 14 8 ,  155 , 160 , 
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166 ; see also Mataungan Association 
Gazelle Peninsula , 13- 15 , 139- 175 , 36 3 ,  
366 ; see also East New Bri tain , 
Mataungan Association 
Gazelle Town Counci l ,  170 
Geertz , c . , 9 ,  120 , 2 4 1 ,  368 , 406 , 
436 , 446 
Gembogl , 359n , 365 , 402 
George , Levai , and Damuni Association , 
311  
Germany , 144 
Gerritsen , R. , 4n , 39 1 ,  4 3 1 ,  440 ,  
443 , 444 ; Damuni Association , 
30 1- 32 6 
Gers chenkron , A . , 175 
Gi li Gili Pty Ltd, 3 12 , 3 18- 32 2 , 
326 ; see also Damuni Economic 
Corporation 
Giligi li plantation , 3 14 ,  318,  3 2 1  
Gilipas i ,  3 0 8  
Giregire , Sinake , 364 ,  396 , 405 
Goilala , 334 , 385n 
Goodenough island , 20 , 30 ln ,  3 0 3 ,  
3 12 
Goodenough Local Government Council ,  
308 
Gordon Central Agency , 2 88 
Gorogo , Aloyisius , 3 12 
Goroka , 36 , 135 , 395 
Goroka Teachers College , 379 , 3 80 
Gostin , O . , 308 ,  3 14 ,  3 2 5  
Gorton , John , 36 3 
Gould , P . R . , 168 
Gourevi tch , P . A . , 446 
Greater Maprik Local Government 
Council , 55 
Greater Toma Council , 14 ; see also 
Gazelle Local Government Council 
Grey , Rev . , 3 1 1- 3 12 
Gri ffin , J . , 2 ,  3 ,  22n ,  1 15 , 12 1 ,  12 2 ,  
12 3 ,  12 5 ,  12 7 ,  129 , 130 , 135 , 136 , 
137 , 330 , 336 , 346 , 424 ; 
Napidakoe Navitu , 1 13-138 
Grosart , I . , 144 ,  14 8 ,  152 , 15 3 ,  
30 ln , 444 ; Mataungan Association , 
139- 175 
Guava, 118 , 119 , 133-134 
Gui art,  J . , 6n , 7n , !On , 443 , 444 
Guise , John , 203 , 310 , 3 1 3 , 3 14 ,  
317 , 3 18 , 3 19 ,  324 , 32 5 ,  352 , 36 3 ;  
see also Damuni Association 
Guise , Vernon , 308 , 309 , 3 10 , 3 1 1 ,  
320 ,  32 1 
Gulf Provin ce , 7-8 , 16- 1 7 ,  120n , 
335 , 35 0 
Gumi l ababa , 269 
Gumine ,  3 7 3 ,  386 , 394 
Gurr , T . R . , 86n 
Guyau , 2 6 1  
Gware , Muttu , 2 10-2 12 , 2 1 3n ,  2 16 ,  
2 18 ,  2 2 2 , 2 2 3 ,  2 2 8n ,  2 30 , 2 3 8 ;  
see also Ahi Association 
HLF , see Highlands Liberation Front 
HUF , see Highlands Uni ted Front 
Hagai , Francis ,  9 
Hahali s Welfare Socie ty ,  8-9 , 2 2 , 26 , 
115 , 116 , 118 , 135 , 137 , 429 
Hamoronong ,  79n , 80 , 82n ,  83 
Hannett , Leo , 22 , 11 3 ,  120 , 12 1 ,  133 , 
136- 138,  370n 
Harries , 0 . , 116 
Hart,  K . , 3 7 1  
Harvie , C . , 150 , 1 5 4  
Hastings , P . , 118 
Hawari , Wi lliam ,  42 , 43 , 46 , 49 
4 73 
Hawi na , Danie l ,  3ln ,  35 , 36 , 37 , 3 8 ,  
39 , 40 , 42 , 46 , 49 , 5 5 ,  56 , 57 , 60 , 
62 , 42 5 ;  see also Peli Association 
Hay , D . O . , 2 13n 
Healy , A . M . , 303  
Heeger , Gerald , 2 ,  174 , 446 , 447 
Hegarty , D. , 436 , 444 , 
Helbig,  M. , 69n 
Hepau , Lainus , 52 , 58, 60 ; see also 
Peli Association 
Hicks , E . , 38 
High Court of Australia , 126 ,  2 15 
Highlands , 2 1 ,  2 3 ,  2 4 ,  2 5 ,  135 , 
151 ,  152 , 33 1 ,  3 34-335 , 355 , 359-
418 ,  429 ; see also Chirnbu Province , 
Eastern Highlands Province , Enga , 
Southern Highlands Province , 
Wes tern Highlands Province 
Highlands Development Corporation , 
374- 375 , 380 
Highlands Labour Scheme , 3 7 3 ,  3 82 
Highlands Liberation Front {HLF) , 
2 4 , 359-4 1 3 , 415-4 1 8 ,  42 1 ,  42 8 ,  
429 , 438 , 4 46 ;  aims , 2 4 ,  367 ,  
369- 370 , 372 , 39ln , 407 , 411-
4 1 3 ,  416 ; establishment , 2 4 ,  
366- 367 ; leadership , 366 , 36 7 ,  
370n , 3 80- 3 8 1 ,  4 16 ;  organization , 
36 7 ,  401 ;  politi cal activity , 
39 3- 395 , 400 ; support,  2 4 ,  36 7 ,  
379- 380 , 4 0 1 ,  402-403 , 416 ; and 
development ,  369 , 370 , 3 7 1 ,  3 72-
373 , 374 , 376 , 381 , 389 , 40 1 ,  
415 , 4 16 ,  418 ; an d  education , 
379 ; and central government , 3 84 ,  
385 , 386 , 3 88 ,  40 1 ,  40 3 ,  404 , 406 , 
409 ; and local government councils , 
3 7 3 ;  and Highlands autonomy , 372 , 
380 , 381 , 388 , 396 , 403 , 405 , 406 , 
40 7-40 8 ;  and poli tical parties , 
381- 384 
Highlands Liberation Front Demon­
s tration Vil lage No . 1 ,  see 
Olu Bus 
Highlands United Front {HUF) , 408-
409 
Hihi la P ty Ltd , 32 1 
Hihi la plantation , 3 14 ,  3 16 
Hiri Association , 15 , 18 
Hiri Local Goverrunent Council , 
3 3 7- 3 3 8  
Hiri Motu, 8 
Hiri Village Development Corporation , 
18 , 438;  see also Hiri Association 
Hiritano Highway , 3 3 1  
Hobsbawm, E . J . , 440 
Hogan , Evelyn , 373 , 3 74n , 389 
Hogbin , H . I . , 440 , 444 
Hohola, 336 
Holik , 57  
Holland , Frank , 296n 
Holland , Jil l ,  296n 
Holy Trinity seminary , 12 1 
Hornbinei , 35 
Hood Lagoon Development Association , 
2 1 ,  354 
Hosea Biu,  see Biu , Hosea 
House o f  Assembly ,  7 ,  13,  2 0 , 26 , 3 1 ,  
3 8 ,  46 , 5 1-52 , 55-57 , 6 1 ,  6 8 ,  118 , 
120 ,  12 1 ,  129- 131 , 14 1 ,  147- 14 8 ,  155 , 
16 1 ,  164 ,  2 01-202 , 2 16 ,  2 34 ,  292 , 314 ,  
326n , 330 , 336 , 34 1 ,  346 , 348-
349 , 363- 366 , 37 7 ,  429 ; see also 
Elections 
Hua , Phi lemon , 180 , 183n , 19 3 ,  198 ,  
201  
Hube company , 8 1 ,  94n , 99n 
Hueter,  D . , 422n 
Huli , 362n 
Huon Local Government Council , 
2 10 ,  2 11-213 , 2 16 ,  2 19-224 , 229-
2 30 ,  2 4 1 ;  see also Ahi Association 
Huon Open e lectorate , 314n 
Huon Peninsula , 6 3 ,  7 1 ,  75n ; see al so 
Morobe Province , Pitenamu Society 
Hurun , 3 1 ,  3 3 ,  34 , 40 , 44 , 52 , 56 , 
6 0 ;  cul t ,  35-41 , 43 , 44 , 5 3 , 6 1 ,  62 ; 
see also Peli Association 
Hwekmarin , L . , 35n , 36 , 4 1 ,  44 , 45 
ITG ,  see Interim Tolai Government 
Ialibu , 388 
I anu , 18ln , 182n , 184 , 188 
Iapoa No . 2 ,  312 
Iaubihi , Lawrence , 302n 
Ideology , 169 , 2 70 , 284 , 3 7 3 , 422 ,  
42 3n , 424 , 430 , 4 3 7 , 440 ; see also 
Micronationalis t  movements , 
objectives 
I la ,  Tony , 2 17 - 2 19 , 2 2 1 , 2 2 2 , 2 26 , 
2 34 ,  2 3 5 ,  2 3 7 ,  383 
I llich ,  Ivan , 371 , 437 
Independence , 9,  2 3 , 45 , 46 , 51,  5 2 , 
5 8 ,  60 , 103 ,  126 , 12 7 ,  12 8 ,  141,  
148 ,  16 8 ,  179 , 186 , 204 , 314 , 329 , 
346 , 364 , 375 , 396 , 406 , 435 , 4 36 , 
4 3 7 , 4 4 1 , 445 
Information , Offi ce of,  2 1  
Inglis , J . , 44 1 
Inglis ,  K . , 370 , 379n 
Inner Fire Movement , see Mangzo 
Movement 
Institute for Social Order , 158 
Interim Tolai Government ( ITG) , 171  
Ipongi , 69  
Irian Jaya , 313 , 347  
Island Carvings , 2 30 
Island Deve lopment Association , 20 , 
438 
Iwa i sl and ,  268 
Jabiro, 207 
Jackson , K . , 12 2 ,  12 8 
Jackson , R . , 153  
Janssen , H . , 95n 
Japanese , 34 , 115 , 2 54 ; see also 
World War I I  
Japlik , 152 
Jarvie ,  I . e . , 3n , 4 2 3n, 440 , 442 , 444 
Jehovah ' s  Witnesses , 34 , 3 7 ,  40 
Jensen , 2 2 6n 
Jimi , 2 4 ,  362 , 399 
Jimi Open electorate , 365 , 382 
Johnson cult,  11- 12 
Johnson , L .W . , 6 1 ,  4 39 
KZUBT company , 6 7  
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Kabi sawali Movement (Association) , 15 , 
17- 18,  26 . 249-2 89 , 2 9 1- 300 , 325 , 
326 , 42 3 ,  42 4 ,  42 5 ,  427 , 429 , 430 , 
4 3 3 ,  438 ;  aims , 17 , 265 , 2 84 ,  424 ; 
e conomic activities , 17- 1 8 ,  2 66-
269 , 275 , 2 76 ,  2 88-2 89 , 291 , 29 7 ,  
303 ,  433 ; establi shment , 265 , 199-
300 ; leadership , 2 49 , 265 , 269 , 
2 82- 2 85 , 2 86 ,  2 87 ;  opposition to , 
18 , 249 , 267 , 2 80-2 82 , 2 9 1 ,  292 ; 
political activities , 17 , 269 , 
2 7 4-275 , 295- 29 6 ;  support , 266 , 
2 6 7 ;  and government , 2 6 ,  2 7 1- 2 7 2 , 
275 , 2 76 ,  2 8 1 ,  29 1 ,  2 9 5 ;  and local 
government councils , 17 , 2 66 , 
2 69 , 2 74- 2 7 5 ,  29 1 ,  294 , 29 8 ;  see 
also Tonenei Kamokwita Movement . 
Kabisawali Village Development 
Corporation , 18 , 2 7 8- 2 79 , 2 89 
Kab u ,  Tommy , 7-8 
Kabwaku, 269 , 2 76 ,  2 9 3  
Kabwum, cults , 75n , 8 8  
Kaduwaga , 2 80 
Kafaina , 25  
Kagl , Sandy Kelly ,  400 
Kaidadaya , K . J . , 20 
Kai leuna is land, 2 80 ,  2 82 
Kainantu , 2 7 , 362n 
Kairi , J . , 17 
Kairuku-Hiri Open electorate , 349 
Kai to lele , Roi , 309 , 3 1 1 ,  3 12 
Kalasa , cults , 75n 
Kalogo , Gima , 350n 
Kaman , Barunke , 3 7 1 ,  388 , 392n , 
39 7 
Kaman , Phi l lip , 2 4 ,  359n , 369 , 372 ,  
375 , 376 , 383 , 3 86-387 , 3 89 ,  392n , 
39 3-394 , 399 , 4 00 ,  4 10 ,  4 l ln ,  424 
Kamayaba , 292 
Kambangei ,  4 8n 
Kambipi , Traimya , 368n ; and HLF , 384 
Kambu , J . , 40 1 
Kami , 57 
Kamkumun , 207 , 209 , 2 17n,  2 20-222 , 
2 3 2 ;  see also Ahi Association 
Kamkumun Progres s  As sociation , 2 30-
2 32 
KaIOC>kwi ta , 292 ,  299 
Kaniniba , Michael , 3 14n 
Kankan , Sote , 309 , 3 1 1  
Kapari , 185 
Kapari-Viriolo , 19 4 ,  196 
Kaputin , John , 154 , 161- 163 , 164 , 165-
169 , 183 , 2 83n , 374 , 409 , 4 30 , 445 ; 
see also Mataungan Association 
Karkar , 422n 
Karukuru , Jack , 295 
Kasaipwalova , John , 18 , 264-265 , 26 8 ,  
269-2 75 , 2 76n , 2 77 , 2 7 8 ,  2 79n ,  2 80 ,  
2 88-2 89 , 29 1 ,  294-29 5 ,  299-300 , 
326 , 3 7 1 ,  42 4 ,  430 , 437 , 4 3 8 ;  
see also Kabisawali Movement 
Kate , 65 
Katuma , 90 , 9 1  
Kaukwa , 2 59 
Kaumi , Simon , 19 , 20 , 2 3 ,  50 , 342 , 
343  
Kaupa , John , 381n ,  382 , 384 , 40 1 
Kavali , Thomas , 2 2 6 , 3 2 3n ,  365 ,  3 82 , 
383 , 40 5 
Kavaua,  Leo Charles , 341 
Kavieng Open ele ctorate , 12 
Kawa , 207 
Kawo , Pete r ,  341 
Kayasa , 2 75 
Keari , Anton , 115 , 116 , 118 , 119 
Keesing,  R . M . , 7n 
Kepore , Kopii ,  397n 
Kereku , Damien , 141 ,  164 , 166 ,  167 , 
171 
Kerema , 334 
Kerevat, 37 , 79n , 149 
Kerowagi , 368n 
Kerpi , K . , 36 1 ,  362 , 40 1 
Kes tevan , Dr . , 3 18n 
Keveri valley , 182n 
Keviame , Barri , 359n , 367 , 376 , 
380 , 382 , 388 , 396� , 401 ,  402-
40 3 ,  404 
Kieta , 12 , 13, 113 , 115 , 116 , 118 , 
119 , 12 2 ,  12 3 ,  12 7 ,  129 , 133 , 138 
Kieta Local Government Counci l ,  13 , 
115 , 116 , 118,  12 2 , 124-12 5 , 
126 , 12 8n , 129 , 132 , 134 , 136-
137 
Kiki , Albert Maori , 9n , 12 0 ,  179 , 
180 , 185 , 222 , 402 
Ki lage , Ignatius , 402 
Ki la , Patterson , 34 1 
Ki linai lu atoll , 137 
Ki livila,  2 5 8  
Ki livi la , 2 5 8 ,  2 60 
Ki livila I.£>cal Government Counci l ,  
260 
Kimbe , 366n 
Kini , 2 70 
Kinigunan , 150 
Kiriwina island , 2 5 1-2 6 8 ,  2 7 7 , 278 , 
2 80 ,  2 82 ,  288 ,  312 ;  s ee also 
Kab isawali Movement , TK Movement 
Kiriwina Local Government Council , 
17 , 260 , 266 , 2 69 , 2 7 4-2 75 , 290-
292 , 294-29 6 ,  297 , 326 
Ki tava i s land ,  2 52 , 2 74 ,  2 80 ,  282 
Klineberg , 0 . , 39 8 
Knoll , Werner ,  9 3 , 99 , 2 10n 
Kobe Association , 2 0  
Koe ,  Peter , 37 , 4 1 ,  42 , 44n , 47 , 
49 , 5 1 ,  5 8  
Kohn , H . , 405 
Koiari , 3 34 ,  337- 3 3 8 ,  426, 438 ; 
see also Koiari Association 
Koiari Association , 12 , 16 , 2 3 ,  26 , 
183 , 426 
Koitabu , 350 
Kokopo , 150 , 152 , 15 3 ,  15 7 ,  366 ; 
electorate , 166 
Komge Oro , 15 , 18- 19 , 4 2 3 ,  42 5 ,  432 , 
4 33 ,  438 
Komi ti , 43 , 50 , 60 
Kompiam-Baiyer Open e le ctorate , 
368n , 384 
Komuni ti kaunsil ,  27  
Kone , Kene , 3 5 ln 
Kopa Ozion g ,  7 1 ,  72 , 77 , 7 8 ,  8ln , 
84 ; see also Tangket cult .  
kori-yava , 3 3  
Koromira , 113n , 124 
4 7 5  
Kotkin , 72 , 82n 
Ku valley , 6 5 , 72 , 78 
Kuabaal , L . , 39 3 
Kuamin , B . , 396n 
Kubalia , 4 7 , 4 8 ,  59 
Kuka ,  125 
Kulamata , 258 
Kulamata , 258  
Kula Open e lectorate , 307 
Kul a ,  18 , 2 5 7 , 259 , 261 ,  2 74 ,  2 85 , 
29 3 ,  29 7 ,  302 
Kumagolo settlement , 79 , 90-94 , 100 , 
102 
Kumwagea , 2 80 
Kunauki , 4 8  
Kundiawa , 385 , 394 ,  4l0 
Kup , J . , 375n 
Kup census division , 368n , 401 
Kupiano , 178, 2 0 1  
Kurakakaul , 15 3 
Kwato Extension Association , 302 , 306 
Kwato mission , 182n , 185 , 186 
Kwikila , 181 
Ladava church counci l , 320 
Lae , 12 , 16 , 1 8 ,  6 3 ,  7 7 ,  80-8 3 ,  86 , 
90-9 3 ,  99 , 100 , 152 , 2 0 7- 2 10 , 2 13-
2 15 ,  2 18n , 2 30 ,  2 34-2 36 , 289 , 4 32 ;  
see also Ahi Association 
Lae City Council , 2 11n , 2 14n , 2 2 4-226 , 
2 35 
Lae Urban Development Study , 2 13-2 15 , 
226-22 7 ,  2 2 8 ,  2 39 
Lae Open e le ctorate , 2 15 ,  2 16-220 , 
2 2 1- 2 2 2  
Laewomba , 20 7 ,  208 
Lagaip Open e lectorate , 384 
Lahe people , 207;  see also Ahi 
Association . 
Land Commi ssion , Inquiry ,  see 
Commission of Inquiry into Land 
Matters . 
Land Titles Commission , 183-184 , 188 , 
196 ,  30 7 ;  Act , 183n 
Lands , Surveys and Mines , Department 
o f ,  188 
Lang , R. , 362 
Langnore , J . , 3 70 
Lanternari , V . , 440 
Lapu , Bagau , l80 
Lapun , Paul , 1 1 3 , 1 16- 122 , 125 - 12 7 ,  
130 - 138 , 424 ; see also Napidakoe 
Navitu 
Latin America , 2 ,  2 5 , 42 7 ,  446 
Latuke fu ,  R . , 368 
Latuta dudubi l e ,  260n 
Lavongai , 11- 12 
Lawrence , P . , 6 ,  424n , 442-44 3 ,  444 
Laya , Laki , 341 
Laycock , D . C . , 32 
Leach , J . W . , 2S4n , 2S6n , 424 ; 
Kabisawali Movement , 2 49-2 88 
Lebas i , Biga , 298n 
Lee , Jock , 129 
Legion of Mary , 36 
Lehner ,  S . , 7 ln 
Lepani , Charles , 280 , 292 , 29S ,  29 8 ,  
299n ; see also Tonenei Kamokwita 
Group 
Lepani Watson , see Watson , Lepani . 
Levai George , see George , Levai . 
Lipsky , M . , 40 3 ,  40 7 
Local Government , Commissione r for ,  
31Sn , 316 ; Office of 189 , 19 1 
4 76 
Local government councils , S ,  12 , lS , 
16 , 1 7 ,  20 , 26 , 2 7 ,  3S , 40 , 4 3 ,  44 , 
SS , 6 8 ,  94 , 9 7 ,  llS- 116 , 124- 12 5 , 
12 7 ,  138 , 141,  147- 149 , 15 3 ,  156-
15 7 ,  170 , 174 , 178- 179 , 188- 19 3 ,  
20 1 ,  202 , 2 1 1 ,  2 19-220 , 220- 226 , 
240-2 4 1 ,  2 5 7- 2 5 8 ,  264 , 2 7 1-2 7S , 
29 1 ,  294-296 , 304 , 308- 309 , 315n , 
316 , 341- 342 , 345 , 3 7 3 ,  411 , 429 , 
444 ; alternatives to , 2 7 ,  142 , 160-
16 1 ,  19 1- 19 3 ,  2 33 ,  269 ; oppos ition 
to , 6 ,  8, 9 ,  10 , 11,  13- 14 , 16 , 20 , 
22 , 26 , 35 , 44 , 9 8 ,  115 , 1 3 7 , 14 1 ,  
146-14 7 ,  1S6 , 159 , 16 3 ,  189 - 190 , 
2 12 ,  2 16 ,  2 19 ,  220-22 3 ,  2 3 3 ,  2 40 , 
2 5 7 , 2 74-2 75 , 29 1 ,  3 7 3 , 429 ; 
taxation , 9 ,  11- 12 , 13 , 26 , 44 , 49 , 
59-60 , 94 , 115 , 142 , 15 3 ,  189-190 , 
200 , 220-22 3 ,  2 5 7 , 2 74-2 75 , 429 ; 
see also Amazon Bay Local Govern­
ment Counci l , Buka Local Government 
Council , Cloudy Bay Local Govern­
ment Council , Gaze lle Local 
Government Counci l ,  Hiri Local 
Government Council , H uon Local 
Government Counci l ,  Kabisawali 
Movement , Kieta Local Government 
Counci l ,  Kiriwina Local Government 
Council ,  Marshall Lagoon Local 
Government Counci l ,  Pindi u  Local 
Government Council ,  Warkurai 
Nigunan , Yangoru Local Government 
Council 
Local Government Ordinance , 189 , 19 1, 
19 2 '  202 ' 319 
Local Government (Declaration of 
Validity ) Ordinance , 152 , 15 7 
Local protest movrnents , 8 ,  10 , 12-
17 ; see also Ahi Association , Koiari 
Association , Mataungan Association , 
Napidakoe Navitu , Nemea Landowners ' 
Association 
Localization , 9 ,  lS l ,  1S6- 1S 7 ,  370 , 
375- 3 79 , 384- 386 , 402 , 40 7 ;  see 
also Public Service 
Lokololo , Tore , 1 3 1  
Lopio cult , s e e  Lopiong cult 
Lopiong, 76 
Lopiong cult , 76n 
Losuia , 258-260 
Losuia ( station and District) , 2 S 8-
259 I 268 , 2 72 I 2 78 ,  2 88 , 302 
Louisiade Local Government Council , 
309 
Loveday , P . , 366 
Lue , Joseph , 12 1 ,  129- 133  
Lul uai , 3 7 , 1S6 , 190 
Lus , Pita , 39 , 49 , 52 , 5 5 , S6 , 131 
Lutheran Church , 63,  65-66 , 6 7 ,  68 , 
70 , 7 3 ,  74n , 9 5 ,  9 8 ,  2 0 8 ;  see 
also Missions 
MODIPE , see Morobe Dis trict People ' s  
Association 
McCarthy , J . K . , 12 ln 
Mccoll , c . , 144 , 1S2 , 15 3 
McElhanon , K . A . , 76n 
McKay , I . K . , 12 2 ,  128 
McKillop , R . , 2 3 ,  3 31 ,  3 39 , 391 , 404 , 
429 ; Papua Besena , 329- 355 
McKillop plantation , 122 , 12 3 ,  12 7 
McKinnon , K . R . , 374 , 3 7 7n 
Mcswain , R . , 422n , 442-44 3 
Mabis , 116 
Macair Charters Co . Pty Ltd , 19S 
MacLaren , 306 
Madang , 36 , 48, 12 1 ,  442-44 3 
Maddern , Tony , 3ln 
' Magi c Money ' movement ,  72n 
Magico- re li gious world view , 61-62 , 7 1 ,  
86- 88 , 92-9 3 ,  9 8-99 , 10 7 ,  1 10 , 424 , 
441-442 ; s ee also Cargo cults , 
Prophets . 
Magnolius , Waitea , 384 
Magnukae , Pastor , 83  
Magnukae , Wosea , 8 3 , 88 , 10 2 
Mahe r ,  R .  F .  , 7 
Maiagolo , 181n 
Mailuan language family , 177n ,  18ln 
Makamaka Local Government Council ,  
319n , 322 
Malabita , 119 
Malaga Malaga , 3S0n 
Malahang plantation , 208 , 2 1 3  
Malekula Native Company , 7n , lOn 
Malengu, s ee Nakes Sauwia Marigi 
Malinowski , B . , 2 5 3n ,  256n , 2 5 7n ,  
26ln , 302 
Maloat , Paliau , see Pali au Maloat 
Mamak , A . , 22 , 119 , 1 3 7  
Manpower Planning Unit ,  335 , 375 
Maneke , John , 142 
Man garavi , 48n 
Man gzo ( Inner Fire ) Movement , 69n ; 
see also Skin guria 
Manibolanai , see Bouni clan 
Manoa, 144 
Manus , 7, 1 3 1 ,  4 38 
Mao Tse-tung , 2 86n 
Mape , 75n 
Maprik , 3 3 ,  34 , 50 , 54 , 5 7  
Maprik Open electorate , 39 , 49 , 50 
Maramatana Local Government Counci l ,  
308 ,  320 
Marambanj a ,  35n , 37 , 4 1-4 7 ,  50 , 5 3 ,  
55 , 56 , 59 ; see also Peli 
Association 
Marching Rule , 7n 
Margarida , 1 78 ,  184 
Marginal cargo cults , 10- 12 ,  30- 110 , 
42 1 ,  425 , 442 ; see also Cargo 
cults , Peli As soci ation , Pitenamu 
Society 
Mark , Lebasi , 30 7 ,  308,  3 2 1  
Mark , Mahuru , 30 7 ,  3 2 2  
Mark , T . , 2 1 , 387n 
Markham swamp , 2 1 3  
Markham valley , 86 , 88 , 102 , 207 , 
208 , 2 lln , 2 1 3  
Marsh , Davi d ,  1 7 7n ,  186- 187 , 192 , 
20 3 ;  see also Nemea Landowners ' 
Association 
Marshall Lagoon , l84 , 3 39 
Marshall Lagoon Local Government 
Council ,  1 79 , 189-191 , 19 3n , 202 
Masawa , Geibob , 22 3 
Massim, 302 , 304 
Mataungan Association , 3n , .12 , l3-
15 , 18 , 2 4 ,  26 , 5 1 ,  l 31 , 139-275 , 
183 , 200 , 204n , 2l9 , 2 8 3n ,  29 3 ,  
3ll , 36 7 ,  402 , 421 , 422 , 425 , 42 7 ,  
429 , 4 30 ,  4 31 , 4 32 , 4 3 3 ,  4 38 ,  440n , 
444 , 445 ; aims , 13 , l4 , 42 1 ;  
economic activities· , l4-15 , 142 , 
161 , l62 , 422 , 4 3 3 ;  establishment , 
13 , 139 , 141 ,  .165 ,  166 ; ideology , 
159 , 160 ; leadership , 15 , 150 , 
155 , 156 , 15 7 ,  165 , 166 , 171 ; 
organization , 155- 156 , 15 7 ,  159 , 
4 7 7  
164 , 168 ; political activities , 14 , 
14 3 ,  159 , 160- 16 1 , 16 3 ,  164 , 166 , 
169 , 170 , 1 7 1 ,  429 , 4 32 ; support , 
15 , 139 , 142 , 154 , 16 7 ,  16 8 ;  and 
local government councils , 13 , 116 , 
14 1 ,  148 ,  152 , 155 , 159 , 160 , 26 7 ,  
290 ; and provincial government , 
170 , 171- 172 , 1 7 3- 174 ; s ee also 
Mataunganism 
Mataunganism, 139 , 142 , 16 3 ,  174- 175 
Matupit , 142 , 148 , 150 , 159 
May , R . J . , 1, 24 , 60n , 329 , 36 3 ,  3 74 , 
42 ln ,  4 3 1 ,  4 3 7 ; 1-2 8 ;  Nemea Land­
owners ' As sociation , 177-205 , Peli 
Association , 31-62 ; Tonenei 
Kamokwita Movement ,  291- 300 , 42 1-448 
Mazrui , A .A . , 105n , 36 2 ,  4 35 
Mead, Margaret , 6n , 7 ,  34 , 368 , 440 , 
444 
Medlpa language , 387 
Mekeo Local Government Council , 341 
Mekeo Rice Schemes , 331 
Mel, Michael , 359n , 365 , 375 , 3 76 ,  381 , 
387 ,  389 , 39 ln , 392n , 39 3 ,  39 5 ,  39 8 ,  
399 , 400 , 409 , 4 lln , 4 16-418 
Melanesian Action Front ( Group ) , 396 , 
4 3 7  
Melanes ian Alliance , 1 3 8  
Melanesi an  Independence Front , 129 , 
149 , 15 3 ,  155 , 175 
Melanesian Way , 160 
Meller , N . , 40 3 
Melson , R. , 36 7 ,  446 
Membrey , R. , 344 
MeITK>rial gardens , 4 7-48 , 56 , 5 7 ,  58 , 
44 1 ;  see also Tangket cult 
Mendi , 359n 
Menzies , R. , 3 76 
Merani , 184 
Mercier ,  P. , 2n 
Methodis t  church , 116 , 12 3 ,  12 8 ,  150 
Micronationalism,  defined ,  1-4 ,  138 ; 
background to , 5- 10 , 4 34- 4 38 ; future 
of , 447-448 ; and cargo cults , 3 ,  6 ,  
4 39-44 3 ;  and nationalism, 443-44 7 ;  
see also Micronationalist movements 
Micronationalis t  movements , achieve­
ments , 42 1 ,  422 , 42 7 ,  42 8 ,  4 30- 4 34 ;  
economic activities , 422 , 428 , 4 30 ,  
4 3 3-4 34 , 440-44 1 ,  4 35 ;  leadership , 
4 2 1 ,  422 , 4 2 3n ,  424-426 , 4 3 1 ;  
membership , 2 ,  426-42 7 ,  4 3 1 ;  
ob jectives , 2 ,  6 ,  10 , 4 2 1- 42 4 ,  42 8 ,  
4 30 ,  4 3 1- 4 32 , 4 4 1 ;  organization , 2 ,  
42 1 ,  42 3n ,  424-42 8 ;  strategies , 4 2 1 ,  
428- 4 30 , 444 ; and gove rnment , 25-28 ; 
see also Marginal cargo cults , 
Local protest movements , 
Regional separatist movements , 
Self-help developments , Elites , 
Ideology , Separatism , Ahi 
Association , Damuni Association , 
Highlands Liberation Front , 
Kabisawali Movement , Mataungan 
Association , Napidakoe Navitu , 
Nemea Landowners '  Association , 
Papua Besena , Peli Association , 
Pitenamu Society , Tonenei 
Kamokwita Movement 
Middlemis s ,  Barry , 1 3 ,  113 , 12 2 ,  12 3 ,  
12 7- 130 , 131- 132 , 134 
478 
Migration , 4 ,  5 ,  6 ,  17 , 19 , 25,  35 , 
71 , 90-9 3 ,  138,  150 , 152 , 178 , 179 , 
186 , 194 , 204 , 209- 2 10 , 2 15-216 , 
2 18-2 2 7 ,  2 3 1 ,  2 34 , 239-240 , 2 42-24 3 ,  
245 , 333- 3 3 5 ,  35 7 ,  372 , 373 , 382 , 
411,  436 
Migrant settlements , 90-9 3 ,  209-210 , 
2 15-22 7 ,  333- 334 , 373 ; see also 
Migration 
Millenarianism, see Cargo cults 
Mi lne Bay Province , 20 , 2 1 ,  181,  
249- 300 , 301-326 , 335 ; 
Area Authority , 289 ,  314 ,  32 5 ;  
Deve lopment Company , 30 3 ;  
District Advisory Counci l ,  3 1 3 ;  
District Education Board , 3 13 ;  
Local Government Counci l ,  305 , 
307 ,  308-309 , 312 , 314 , 322 
Milne Bay Regional electorate , 307 , 
314 
Milne Bay Workers ' Association , 
310n , 312 
miLos uia ,  258 , 259 , 260 
minaKilivi l a ,  258, 2 59-260 
minaKulumata , 2 5 8 ,  260 
Mindik , 6 5 ,  67 , 72 , 80-81 
Mindik Lain Share Account , 80 , 81 
Mindik/Ebabang area , 81 
Minggende mission , 394 
Minj , 359n, 380 , 386- 387 , 39 3-394 , 
399 ,  401 , 410 ;  see also Olu Bus 
Miraiwa , 268 
Misima , 312 
Misima Agricultural Association , 
306 ,  307 
Missions , 5, 6, 7, 9 ,  33, 34 , 36 , 44 , 
55 , 70 , 144 , 156 , 208 , 252 , 2 5 3 , 
30 3 ,  305 , 306 , 308 ,  312 ,  361 , 42 8 ;  
see also Catholic church , Jehovah ' s  
Witnesses , Kwato mi ssion , Methodist 
church , Seventh Day Adventist 
church , United church 
Mi takata , 263 
Modernization , 5-6 , 9,  366 , 435 , 
446 
Mogu , B . , 27 
Moi , o . , 18n 
Moi , Tom , 2 36 
Moini , 135 , 137 
Mola,  Donatus , 129 ,  130 , 1 3 1 ,  134 , 
138 
Momis ,  John , 133-13 4 ,  1 35 , 138,  
370n , 409 , 4 45 
Money house (Moni haus ) , 75 , 76 , 
84 , 86 , 9 0 ,  44 1 ;  see also Paua haus 
Mongi river , 63 , 6 5 ,  8ln 
Moni haus , see Money house 
Moore , Rev . , 3 1 1  
Mopio , James , 339- 340 , 341 ,  346 , 348- 349 
Moral Rearmament Association , 118 , 
134 , 137 
Morauta , L . , 42 7 
Morawa , l8ln , 182 
Morgan , L . , 435  
Mori , 182n 
Mori-Bomguina land settlement 
s cheme , 184 , 187 
Morobe District People ' s  Association 
(MODIPE ) ,  2 3 3-237 , 2 45 ,  436 
Morobe Province , 1 1 ,  24 , 6 3- 110 , 
2 18n , 2 36 ,  243 ;  cultural centre , 
2 12 ,  432 ; ( District) Area Authority ,  
9 7 ,  106 ; Histori cal Society 
Journals , 207n ; PMV Association , 
9 1 ;  People ' s  Seminar , 2 36-2 3 7 , 2 44 ; 
see also Ahi Association 
Morobe Regional electorate , 9 3 ,  
2 18n , 235  
Morrison , w . ,  344 
Motu , 18 , 3 3 3 , 3 34 , 350 ; see also 
Papua Besena 
Moulik , T . K . , 3 0 3 ,  304 , 306 
Mt Hurun , Christian Democratic 
Association , 58  
Mt Turu , see Hurun 
Mount Hagen , 2 1 ,  359n , 365 , 375 ,  3 87 , 
39 ln ,  39 3 ,  399 , 408 
Mungkas Association ( Society ) , 2 2 , 
12 1 ,  135 , 427 
Mumeng , 63n , 79 , 89n , 90n ,  9 1-9 2 ; 
Local Government Council , 94 
Munster , J . , 25  
Murray , Sir Hubert, 182n 
Mus a As sociation , 12 , 16 
Muwo plantation , 296 , 
Mwayubu , B . , 17 
Mweyoyu , Chie f ,  269 , 2 70 ,  2 7 1 , 2 82 
NAMASU , see Native Marketing and 
Supply Ltd 
NGOC ,  see New Guinea Development 
Corporation 
NGIPC , see New Guinea Islands 
Produce Company 
NLP , see National Labour Party 
NP ,  see National Party 
Nabak people , 82n ,  9 7  
Nagovisi , 113 , 118 
Nakes Sauwia Marigi (Malengu) , 
79-9 3 ,  100- 10 1 
Namake , I . , 118n 
Namaliu , Rabbie , 29 5 
Napidakoe Navi tu, 3n , 12-1 3 ,  22 , 
2 4 ,  2 6 , 113-138 , 311 , 3 6 7 ,  402 , 
422 , 429 , 4 32 ,  4 3 3 ,  436 ; aims , 
12-13 , 113 , 12 3 ,  124 ,  138 , 422 ;  
economi c activities , 12 , 13 , 1 3 1 ,  
137 ; establishment ,  12 , 113 , 122 -
123 ;  leadership , 116 , 12 4 ;  
membership , 12 , 1 3 ,  113 ; 
organization , 12 4 ;  political 
activi ties , 12 4 ,  132 , 133-134 , 
138;  support , 1 3 ,  125 ,  126 ,  127 , 
129 ;  and development, 13 , 113 , 124 , 
129 ;  and Bougainville secession , 
13 , 113 ,  12 3 ,  129- 130 , 135 , 138;  
and government , 13,  26 , 125 ;  and 
local government councils , 13 , 
116 , 136 , 137 
Narabutau , Chief,  264-265 , 269 , 2 7 1 ,  
275 , 2 82 
Nasioi , 13 , 113 , 116 , 118 , 12 3 ,  132 , 
133 ;  see also Napidakoe Navitu 
National Capital District , 2 3 , 349 ; 
see also Papua Besena 
National Cultural Counci l ,  18 , 2 7 ,  
2 89 ,  29 7 
National Education Board , 32 1 
National Labour Party ( NLP ) , 42 , 
4 3 ,  49 , 5 1  
National Museum, 296 
National Parliament , see House of 
Assembly 
National Party ( NP) , 323n , 349 , 365 ,  
3 7 1 ,  381- 383 , 388 , 402 , 409 , 430 
National Planning Office , 292 
Nationalism, 6,  7 3 ,  149 , 174 ,  2 40n , 
310 , 405 , 4 2 3n ,  435 , 439 , 443-447 ;  
see also Ethnonationalism, 
Regional separatis t  movements , 
Separatism 
Nationalist Pressure Group , 169 
479 
Native Marketing and Supply Ltd 
(NAMASU) , 6 5 ,  67 , 6 8  
Natural Resources , Department o f ,  
386 
Naura , 3 0 8 ,  3 16 
Na uti cal Magazine , 2 49n 
Navitu Enterprises , 1 3 1- 132 , 135 ; 
see also Napidakoe Navitu 
Navuneram , 144 , 147 
Nawae , 6 3n ,  83 , 84 , 86 , 90 
Nawong ,  84 
Ndu , 33 
Negri , 34 
Nei lsen , B . , 389 
Nelson , H . , 141 ,  330n , 363 
Nemea Landowners ' Association , 12 , 
15 , 26 , 177-205 ,  42 7 ,  430 , 432 ,  
436 ,  438 ;  aims , 179 , 18ln ,  183-
184 , 2 0 4 ;  e conomic activities , 
180 , 19 5- 199 , 202 ; 
establishment , 15 , 17 7 ,  179 , 204;  
leadership , 180 , 203 ;  
membership , 181 ; political activi­
ties , 182n , 186 , 190-19 1 ,  203 ; 
support , 177 , 181 , 204 ; and govern­
ment ,  26 , 186 , 190-19 1 ,  203 ; and 
land , 179 , 182 , 183-188 , 19 8 ,  20 1 ,  
202 , 204 ; and local government 
council s ,  15 , 189 - 194 , 200 , 202 ;  
and Pangu Pati , 179 , 182 , 19 8 ,  199 ,  
200-20 1 ,  430 ;  and Papua Besena , 
183 , 204 
Nemea Local Government Counci l ,  19 1 
Neu Guinea Kompagnie , 208 
Nevi lle , R. , 378 
New Guinea Development Corporation 
(NGOC) , 15 , 142 , 161 ,  162-163 , 
168 ,  170 , 374 , 438;  see also 
Mataungan Association 
New Guinea Islands regionalism, 169 
New Guinea I slands Produce Company 
(NGIPC) , 142 , 162 , 163 ; see also 
Mataungan Association 
New Guinea Is lands Spe cial electorate , 
115 
New Hanover , 11 
New Ire land,  11 , 37 
New Left Movement ,  264 
New Men Movement , 7-8 
New South Wales Legislative Assembly ,  
147 
New Way (Movement) , see Paliau Movement 
Nigeria ,  367 
Nimoa Fishing Association , 303 
Niniku , Raphae l ,  136-137 
Nissan Society , 137 
Niugini National Party ,  see National 
Party 
Niupela Pasin , see Paliau Movement 
Nixon , Ri chard , 205 
Noga , Aloysius , 116 , 126-127 , 129 , 
130 
Nomad, 332 
Nomanene ,  7 1  
Nombri , Joseph , 385 , 386 , 402 
Nomgul ,  Gaiya, 2 10 ,  220 
Nopeki Kalipara , 313 
North Ameri ca , 446 
North Solomons ,  see Bougainville 
North Solomons Republic , 22 
Northern Irelan d ,  134 
Northern Kiriwina , see Kabisawali 
Movement 
Northern Province , 12 , 16 , 18-20 , 
181 , 184 , 3 3 1 ,  335 ; see also 
Eriwo Association , Komge Oro 
Noumea ,  313 
Nubos Etek , 69 , 77n , 78 , 83 , 84 , 
86 , 89-92 , 9 8n ,  99- 10 3 ,  10 7- 109 ; 
see also Pi tenamu Society 
Nuguria atoll , 137 
Nuku , 48 
Nukumanu atoll , 13 7 
Nupela Testamen , 40 , 42n , 45 , 58n 
Nyerere , J . , 37n 
Oboramia Soap Packaging Factory , 
8ln , 94n 
Ocean Trading Company Pty Ltd , 2 89 
Ogan , Eugene , 115 , 116 , 118 ,  12 1 ,  
12 7 ,  132 , 168 
Ogerarnnang,  65 , 70 , 72 
Ogut, Paul Kup , 359n 
Oio village , 177 
Okuk , Iambakey , 349 , 3 82 , 405 , 40 8-
409 
Olewale ,  Ebi a ,  3 87 
Oligadu , 79n , 80 , 82n 
Oliver , D . L . , 9n 
Olu Bus , 24 , 36 7n , 380 , 3 86-387 , 
390 ,  392n , 393 , 399 , 4 3 3 ;  see also 
Highlands Liberation Front 
Ornarakana vi llage , 2 5 3 ,  2 5 8 ,  262 , 
263-264 , 2 70 ,  2 7 1 ,  2 7 5 ;  Omarakana 
Co-operative Store , 265 ; see also 
Kabisawali Movement 
Ombudsman Commission , 402 
Opas , P . , 130 
Oram, N . D . , 7 ,  368 ,  369 , 3 85n 
Oro Province , see Northern Province 
480 
Organic Law on Provincial 
Government ,  350 
Overseas Deve lopment Group , 371 , 438 
Owen S tanley range , 16 , 179 , 181 , 182n 
P . N . G .  Contractors P ty  Ltd , 2 30 
PPP , see People's Progress Party 
PRFA , see Papuan Republic Fighters 
Army 
PSB , see Public Service Board 
Paci fic Is land Regiment ,  135 , 40 7 
Pacifi c Is land Timbers Ltd , 197 
Pacific Islands Monthl y ,  135,  136 
Pacific War , see World War II 
Pagini-Brambles Transport Pty Ltd 
9 3 ,  100-10 1 ,  102 , 106 
Pagwi , 34 
Paia , W . , 124 
Paliau Maloat , 7 ,  131 
Paliau Movement , 7 
Paneate , 311 
Pangu Pati , 11,  18 , 49 , 50 , 51,  52 , 
81 , 83 , 84- 85 , 87- 8 8 ,  9 1 ,  10 3 ,  
10 7 ,  120 , 12 1 ,  131 , 133 , 170 , 
179 , 182 , 199 , 200-201 , 214n , 2 17-
2 18 ,  2 19 , 2 2 0 ,  2 2 5 , 2 34-2 35 , 2 3 7 ,  
2 40 ,  314 , 363-365 , 385 , 402 , 408 ,  
4 30 ,  444 
Panguna , 131 ;  see also Bougainville 
Papina , 4 1  
Papua Besen a ,  2n , 2 2 ,  2 3 ,  183 , 204 , 
329-3 5 8 ,  3 79 , 404 ,  421 , 426 , 42 8 ,  
429 , 431 , 436 , 438 , 445 ;  aims , 
2 3 ,  2 39 , 336-3 37 , 348 ,  352 , 356-
3 5 8 ;  establishment ,  2 3 ,  336 , 39 7 ;  
leadership , 2 3 ,  329 , 337 , 340 , 
348 , 349 , 356 ; organi zation , 340 , 
347 ;  politi cal activi ties , 2 3 , 
336- 340 , 342n , 346 , 347- 349 , 354 , 
409 ; support , 2 3 ,  32 7 ,  3 4 1 ,  344 , 
350 , 351-352 , 356 ;  and Austral i a ,  
2 3 ,  3 3 7 ,  338 , 345 , 349 , 429 ; 
and Papuan development ,  344 ,  350-
351; and provincial government , 
347 , 350 , 351 , 357 
Papua Group , 2 3 ,  341 , 342 
Papua New Guinea Electrici ty 
Commission , 16 , 183 , 22 7 ,  338  
Papua New Guinea Development Bank , 
2 7 ,  80 , 19 5 ,  198 ,  199 ,  2 6 8 ,  29 5 ,  
304 , 310 , 317- 3 18 ,  32 1 ,  32 3- 32 4 , 
39 ln , 399 , 4 3 1  
Papua New Guinea Inves tment Corpora­
tion , 54 
Papua New Guinea Workers Association , 
180 , 2 18n 
Papua Party ,  346-34 7 , 354 
Papuan Black Power Liberation 
Movement ,  2 3 ,  3 4 1 ,  347 
Papuan Gul f ,  see Gulf Province 
Papuan Liberation Movement , 339 , 34 1 ,  
347  
Papuan Republic Fighters ' Army 
( PRFA) I 20 , 2 3 ,  342- 343 
Papuan separatism, 19 , 183n , 329 , 
330 , 332 , 336 , 342 , 346 , 347 , 
351-355 ; see also Papua Besena , 
Separatism 
Paramount chiefs , 2 5 3 , 263-264 ; see 
also Kabisawali Movement 
Parao , Anton , 364 - 36 7 ,  3 74-375 , 
380- 384 , 39 3 
Pardy , R. , 17  
Pare r ,  Ben , 79n 
Parker , R . S . , 4 3 7  
Parkinson , R . , 144 
Parochialism, 13 8 ,  4 35 
Paua haus , 46-4 7 , 4 8 ,  56 , 5 7 , 58 , 59 
Paypool ,  Peter , 388 
Pe li Asso ci ation , 10- 1 1 , 35n , 3 1-62 , 
42 4 ,  429 , 4 3 0 ,  4 39 ; aims , 4 3- 44 , 
49 , 5 3 ,  6 1 ;  economic activity , 
31 , 46-4 8 ,  5 3- 55 , 6 1-62 ; 
establishment , 10 , 4 1- 42 ; leader­
ship , 4 1- 42 , 425 ; membership , 42-
43; organ ization , 4 3 ;  politi cal 
activity , 1 1 ,  3 1 ,  49-53 , 6 1-62 ; 
support , 4 3 , 4 2 6 ; and government ,  
49 , 60 , 6 2  
People ' s  Kabisawali Government ,  see 
Kabisawali Movement 
People ' s  Progress Party (PPP ) , 
5 1 ,  1 3 1 ,  2 36 n , 365 , 400 , 408- 409 
People ' s  United Fron t ,  409 
Philhofer , D . G . , 69n 
Phillips oil company , 120n 
Piblika Association , 2 1 ,  387 , 390-
391 ,  399 , 422 , 4 2 6 , 433 ; Piblika 
Development Corporation , 2 1  
Pikei (Bai ts i)  Socie ty ,  137 
Pindiu, 6 3 ,  65-79 , 83 , 89 , 98,  99 , 
107 ;  Local Government Counci l ,  6 3 ,  
68 , 7 2 , 7 3 , 9 2 , 107 ;  see also 
Pitenamu Society ,  Tangket cult 
Piplika Association , see Piblika 
Association 
Pirung , 1 13n 
481 
Pitenamu Society ,  10 , 11,  6 3-
110 , 424 ,  4 30 , 439 ; aims , 
6 3 ,  85 , 88 , 96 , 105 ;  e conomic 
activities , 1 1 ,  7 7 ,  81-82 , 9 3 ,  
9 8- 10 1 ,  102 , 10 3 ;  establishment ,  
1 1 ,  6 3 ,  79 , 80- 83 ; leadership , 
88 , 89 , 9 2 , 108 ,  425 ; member-
ship , 6 3 ,  83 , 109 ; opposition 
to , 96-9 8 ,  100 ; organization , 
83-85 , 88-92 , 99-10 1 ,  10 7-10 8 ,  
110 ; politi cal activi ties ,  1 1 ,  
104� 10 7 ;  support , 88 , 9 0-9 2 , 
100 , 109 ; and Church , 9 2 , 9 5-9 6 ,  
9 7 ,  9 8 ,  106n ; and government,  9 3 , 
9 4 ,  105 ,  106n ; and local government 
counci ls , 96 , 9 8 ,  106n , 107 ; and 
Pangu Pati , 1 1 ,  84-85 , 87 
Pitoi , Sere , 34 7 ,  3 84 
Plantations , 5 ,  12 , 15 , 2 0 ,  2 1 ,  2 7 ,  
34 , 115 , 122-12 3 ,  12 7 ,  144 , 152 , 
163 , 169 , 17 7 ,  178,  184 - 185 , 188 , 
189 , 194 , 19 5 ,  2 0 1 ,  208 , 303 , 
314 , 32 1 ,  372 , 374 , 387 , 4 12 , 
422 , 4 30 ,  4 3 1 ,  4 3 4  
P lantation Redistribution S cheme , 
2 7 ,  4 3 1 , 43 3 
Pokawin , S . P . , 438 
Police Association , 385 
Politi cal education , 5,  2 1 , 2 6 , 
148 , 2 0 1 ,  399 
Politica l parties , 3 ,  49-5 1 ,  84-
85 , 87-88 , 103 ,  10 7 ,  1 3 1 ,  1 3 8 ,  
169 , 179 , 182 , 199 , 2 17-218,  
347 , 354 , 364-366 , 369 , 380-384 , 
408-409 , 429-4 3 0 , 4 4 3 , 444 , 4 47n ; 
see also Christian Democratic 
Party , National Labour Party , 
National Party , Pangu Pati , 
People's Progress Party ,  United 
Party 
Po ' o , T . , 3 3 5  
Poponde tta , 3 4 3  
Port Moresby , 8 ,  16 , 17 , 18 , 2 0 ,  
2 1 ,  22 , 9 3 ,  12 1 ,  129 , 136 , 152 , 
15 3 ,  17 7 ,  178 , 180 , 19 5 ,  198 ,  
199 , 249 , 2 78 ,  2 88-2 89 , 293 ,  29 7 ,  
3 12 , 3 30 , 332 , 3 3 3- 3 35 , 336- 3 40 , 
343 , 350 , 36 3 ,  364 , 368,  380 , 
386 , 387n , 398 ,  399 , 401 , 405 , 
428 , 437 ; see also Papua Besena 
Port Moresby City Coun ci l ,  341 ,  
342 , 347 
Port Moresby , women ' s  rio t ,  3 3 8-
3 39 I 343 
Port Moresby Workers As sociation , 
180 
Post-Couri er , 2 10 ,  2 30 ,  350 , 385 
Powel l ,  H . A . , 2 54n , 2 6 1  
Premdas , R . R . , 2n , 3 ,  329 
Pre ssure groups , 2 ,  3 ,  22 , 12 1 ,  
243 , 30 1 ,  347 , 367 , 3 8 1 ,  403 , 442 
Primary Indus try , Department o f ,  54 , 
195- 196 , 305-30 7 ,  3 16- 3 18 ,  320 , 
32 5 ,  3 4 1  
Primordial attachments , 2 ,  87 , 329 , 
405 , 406 , 445 , 446 ; see also 
Ethnicity 
Prince Alexander range , 3 3  
Prophets , 78 , 42 3n ,  42 5 ;  s e e  also 
Cargo cults 
Provincial government , see 
Decentrali zation 
Public Order Ordinance ( 1970) , 139 
Public Servi ce , 2 4 ,  170 , 317 , 35 3-
354 , 376-379 , 40 7 ;  composi tion of , 
377n ,  37 8 ;  and highlanders , 2 4 ,  
369- 370 , 375-379 , 384- 385 , 386 , 
396 , 402 ; and Papuans , 3 35 ,  347 , 
378 ;  and Tolais , 100 , 15 1 ,  169 , 
170- 17 1 ,  172 , 347 ; Public Service 
Associ ation , 2 17n , 395 ;  
Public Service Board , 376 , 377n , 
384 ,  386 , 402 ; Pub lic Service 
Commi ssion , 347 
Puling Sapa , 79-82 , 84- 85 , 88 
Pulitala, 269 , 2 75 
Puni Puni plantation , 320 
Purari Action Group , 16- 17 , 436 
Purari delta ,  8; see also New Men 
Purari hydroelectri c scheme , 344 
Pye , L . W . , 42 5 ,  42 8 
Rabaraba ,  3 2 4  
Rabaul , 15 , 3 7 , 5 1 ,  116 , 12 7 ,  129 , 
139 , 14 1- 14 3 , 146- 149 , 15 3 ,  157 , 
165- 166 , 364 ;  s ee also 
Mataungan As sociation . 
Rabaul Open e lectorate , 16 3 ,  166 
Rabesi , 2 59 
Radio Bougainville , 12 8 
Radio Morobe , 9 7  
Radio Wewak , 38  
Raluana , 146 , 14 7 ;  Raluana ki vung, 
144 
Ramu hydroelectri c s cheme , 2 2 7  
Rarua , Mahuru Rarua,  350 
Rarua , Oala Oala , 347-348 
Rationality , 6 1 ,  118 , 441-442 
Reay , M. , 2 4 , 3 75n 
4 82 
' Redskins ' , 119 , 126 , 127 , 135  
' Re luctant Flame ' ,  285n 
Regional separatist movements , 
3 ,  10 , 22-2 4 ,  2 6 , 372 , 42 1 ;  see 
also Separatism 
Reserve Bank , 385 
Returned Servi cemen ' s  League , 2 2 1  
Richert , E . L . , 76n 
Riker ,  W . H . , 175 
Rigo , 181 , 350- 3 5 1  
Rigo-Abau Open e le ctorate , 182n 
Rigo West Coast e lectorate , 350 
Rimoldi , M . , 8, 9n , 115 
Robinson rive r ,  19 8 ;  plantation , 
177 ; land claims , 184 ,  185 , 188 ; 
timber ,  19 7 ;  see also Nemea 
Landowners ' Association 
Rodger ,  John , 2 3 5  
Rofe , R . B . , 2 10n 
Rogirogi , Abraham , and Baniara 
Deve lopment Corporation , 3 2 3  
Roman Catholic Young Workers ' 
Association , 59 
Rome , 134 
Rorovana , 12 , 1 1 3 , 1 19 , 12 2 ,  1 2 3 , 
125 , 127 , 1 30 ;  see also 
Napidakoe Navitu 
Rotberg , R . I . , 105n 
Roth , G . , 446n 
Rotokas , 134 
Rovin ,  L . , 135 , 137 
Rowley , C . D . , 2 6 ,  363 , 444 
Ruaba pro ject,  323 
Rural Improvement Programme ,  2 7 ,  
199 I 3 5 3  
Rural Progress Societies ,  see 
Agricultural associations 
Russell D .  Taylor and Partners , 
2 1 3 ,  229 ; see also Lae Urban 
Deve lopment Study 
SWP , see Social Workers ' Party of 
Papua New Guinea 
Safia , 184 
Salamaua Local Government Council , 
2 l ln 
Sali , Boyamo , 9 3 ,  9 4 ,  2 17n , 222 , 
2 35 ,  2 35n ; see also Ahi 
Association 
Saliong , 72 , 7 7 , 7 8 ,  82n , 84 ; 
see also Tangket cult 
Salisbury , R. F . , 144 ,  146 , 150 , 
152 , 15 3 ,  156 
Samana , Utula , 2 37 
Samarai , 302 , 3 14 , 332  
Samuk , E li zabeth , 42  
483 
Sangara sugar indus try , 331 
Sarei , Alexis , 137 , 292 
Sandaun Province , see West Sepik 
Province 
Sauinambi , Nauwi , 39 
Sawos ;  33 
Schmi tz , C .A . , 76n 
Schutte , H . , 144 
Schwartz , T . , 7 
Scott , W . D .  and Co . ,  302 , 318n 
Secession , see Separatism 
Segi li , 177n , 180 , 181 
Select Committee on Consti tutional 
Development ,  14 , 131 
Self-government , 9 ,  13 , 51,  52 , 84 , 
103 ,  124 , 126 , 12 8 ,  133 , 14 1 ,  
167 , 16 8 ,  179 , 364 , 365-366 , 3 8 1 ,  
394 , 396 ,  39 7 ;  s e e  also 
Independence 
Self-help , 1 ,  2 ,  6 ,  10 , 1 5 ,  24 , 
244 , 353-35 4 ,  371 , 386- 387 , 407 ,  
424 , 430 , 4 3 3 , 437 , 438 , 441 , 
444 ; see also Self-help develop­
ment movements 
Self-help development movements , 
10 , 11 , 17- 2 1 ,  2 7 ,  407 ; see also 
Damuni Association , Kabisawali 
Movement ,  Tonenei Kamokwita Movement 
Separatism,  3 ,  1 3 , 14 , 22-2 3 ,  26 , 
12 3 ,  126-12 7 ,  129 - 13 1 ,  1 3 3- 13 7 ,  
175 , 329-330 , 332 , 3 36 - 337 , 340-
343 , 346 , 3 5 1 ,  372-37 3 , 39 7 ,  398 , 
40 3 ,  406 ; see also Bougainville , 
Regional separatis t  movements 
Sepik , 1 1 ;  development ,  4 3 ; highway , 
48 ; river , 3 4 ,  47 ; see also East 
Sepik Province , Wes t  Sepik Province 
Sepik Producers Co-operative 
Association , 54n 
Sepik Youth Movement ,  42n 
Seven Association , 58-6 0 ;  see also 
Peli Association 
Seventh Day Adventis t  Church , 3 4 ,  
116 , 12 3 ,  195 ,  312 
Sexton , L . , 25  
Shell Oi l Company , 296  
Shils , E . , 2 ,  4 46 
Siassi compound ,  80n 
Sidini Manabore , 3 1 3  
S i ' ini , 18ln 
Sima, Bonihi , 2 35-236 
S imbago , Jimmy , 5 1 ,  5 4  
Simbu , s e e  Chimbu 
Sinakata , 2 80 
Sinake Giregi re ,  see Giregire , 
Sinake 
Singapore , 387 
Singh , S . , 4 3 1  
Singiliong,  Mek , 67 
Siri Siri , 3 1 8 ,  320n 
S irinumu dam , 338 
Siwai , 113 , 118 
Skeldon , R. , 2 5 ,  42 7 
Skin guri a cult,  69-70 , 7 1 ,  73 , 
74 , 75 , 76 , 104 ; aims , 69 ; 
and government , 7 0 ;  and missions , 
70 ; see also Tangket cult 
Smith , A . D . , 42 3n , 4 44 ,  446n 
Social Development and Home Affairs , 
Department of , 9 3 ,  94 , 100 
Social class , 4 ,  86 , 110 , 305-
308 , 3 7 1 ,  445 ; see also Elites 
Social Workers Party of Papua New 
Guinea ( SWP) , 2 3 ,  341 , 430 
Sogeri , 3 3 7 ;  Sogeri Local Govern­
men t Counci l ,  338 
Solomon Association , 38  
Solomon islands , 7n , 12 , 113 , 120 , 
12 7 ,  129 ; see also Bougainville 
Solomon , John , 309 , 32 3 
Somale , B . , 309 
Somare , Michael ,  14 , 2 3 ,  26-2 7 , 39 , 
49 , 5 5n ,  9 3 , 126 , 1 3 1 ,  136 , 182 , 
202 , 222 , 2 9 1 ,  3 3 8- 3 39 , 340 , 363 ,  
365 , 371 , 377n , 3 84-387 , 397 , 
402-403 , 406 - 40 7 ,  409 , 4 3 2 , 438 , 
447n ; see also Central government 
Somsi company , 77 , 8ln ,  94n ;  see 
also Tangket cult 
Sopi Arts Centre , 2 79 ,  29 7 ;  see 
also Kabi sawali Movement 
Sote Kankan , see Kankan , Sote 
Southern Highlands Province , 334 , 
335 , 344 , 36 1 ,  362n , 3 8 8 ,  402 
Southern Highlands Regional 
e lectorate , 3 7 8  
Standish , Bill , 334 , 362 , 36 3 ,  364 , 
365 , 380 , 383 , 385 n ,  386 , 388n , 
39 1 ,  392n , 39 5 ,  396n , 39 7n ,  4 0 1 ,  
402 , 40 3 ,  406 , 40 7 ,  408 , 428 , 437 ; 
Highlands Liberation Front ,  359-
413 
S taniland , M . , 371 , 403 
S tanner , W . E . H . , 440 , 444 
S tatus , 5 ,  6,  10 , 78, 106 - 10 8 ,  2 56-
264 , 269 , 2 70 , 2 7 5 , 2 84 ,  296 , 304-
307 , 3 12 , 326 , 368 ,  371- 37 3 ,  390 , 
39 1-39 4 ,  400 , 4 1 8 ,  422 , 42 3 ,  42 7 ,  
439 ; see also Elites , Social c lass 
S teinbauer , F . , 69n , 329 , 380n , 3 81 
S ten t ,  W . R . , 45n , 47 , 48n , 442 
S tephen , D . , 3n , 36 , 309 , 312 
Stephen , M . , 4 4 3  
Stevens , F . S . , 2 85n 
Stone , D . , 365 
Strange , Mr. , 32 1 
Strathern ,  M . , 368n , 373  
Stre lan , J . G . , 4 39 ,  4 4 3  
Students for a Democratic Society , 
154 
Students Representative Council ,  
371 ,  388 , 400n , 409 
Stuntz , John , 315 
4 84 
Supreme Court of Australia , 2 15 ,  2 20n 
Suva, 313  
Switzerland , 134  
TANU , see Tanzania 
TIA ,  see Tutukuvul Isukal Association 
TK Development Corporation Pty Ltd , 
2 9 3 ,  29 7 ;  see also Tonenei 
Karrokwita Movement 
TK Movement , see Tonenei Kamokwita 
Movement 
Tabalu,  2 8 ln 
Tabalu Association , 2 8 1 , 292 
Table Bay , 196 
Tabu kenakusi , 292 , 299 
Taiwan , 387 
Tali , Nathan , 2 36 
Talmon , Y . , 425 , 440 
Tamigadu, 79n ,  80 
Tammur , Oscar , 14 , 5 1 ,  131 , 141 ,  142 , 
143 ,  147 ,  158 ,  164 , 166 , 16 7 ,  1 7 1  
Tanby , Billy , 309 , 310 , 3 11 , 32 1 
Tangket cult , 6 3 ,  6 8 ,  69 , 71- 7 8 ,  79-
80 , 84 , 86 , 88-89 , 9 3 ,  9 8 ,  104 , 
107 ;  see also Pitenamu Society 
Tanzania , 154 , 168 ,  2 8 3n ,  370 , 4 37 
Taraka , 9 7 ,  2 2 3  
Tari , 362n 
Task Force on Village Development , 
2 7  
Tau, Teori , 126 , 129 
Taureka ,  Dr. Reuben , 182n , 190 - 19 1 ,  
199 , 200 , 20 3 ,  401  
Tauruba , 350n , 35ln 
Tauu atoll , 1 3 7  
Tavara , 304 
Tavara Agricultural Association , 306 , 
30 7 
Taxation - local government , see 
Local government councils 
Teaching Service Commission , 347 
Teona , Pete r ,  136 
Teop-Tinputz Local Government 
Council , 12 3 ,  12 7 
Teori Tau , see Tau, Teori 
Teosin , John , 9 
Teve , Enos , 144 
Tewai , 6 3n ,  8 3 , 86 
Three Mile (Lae ) , 2 2 3 ,  2 2 8n 
Thrupp , S . L . , 4 2 5  
Tia ' s  Omili Store , 2 32 
Tilaka , 3 12 , 313  
Tilly I c .  I 174 
Timbi I B.  I 21  
Tingas a ,  G . , 82n , 95  
ToBaining , Ereman , and ITG , 171 
ToBaining , Vin , 15 7 
Toiapingal (Nissan )  Society , 137 
Tokial a ,  Nason , 15 7 
Tolai , see East New Britain Province , 
Gazel le Peninsula , Mataungan 
Association 
Tolai Cocoa P roje ct ,  13- 14 , 142 ; 
see also Mataungan Association , 
New Guinea Islands Produce 
Company 
Tolesi dudubi l e , 260 
Toliman , Matthias , 147 ,  148 ,  158 ,  
169 I 1 70 r 385 
Tomanibus , 260 
ToMarita,  Stanley , 15 7 ,  167 ,  171 
Tommy Kabu Movement , see New Men 
Tomota , 2 6 1  
Tonana ta , 2 59 
Tonelei , 119 
Tonenei KaIOOkwita ( TK)  Movement ,  18 , 
2 8 1 ,  29 1- 300 , 42 7 ,  4 3 3 , 4 38 ;  aims , 
292 ,  29 7 ,  300 ; economic activities , 
29 3 ,  296-29 7 ;  establishment , 292 , 298 ; 
leade rship , 2 9 3 ;  politi cal activity , 
295-296 ; organization , 29 3 ;  s upport , 
29 3 ;  and development , 29 8 ,  299 ; and 
government , 2 9 5 ; and Kabisawali 
Movement , 18 , 2 8 1 ,  2 9 5 , 2 9 8- 300 ; 
and Kiriwina Local Government 
Council , 94-9 5 ; and culture , 29 7 ;  
see also Kabisawali Movement 
Torau, 113 , 126 , 1 34 
Tordoff , W . , 335 
Torehai , Ani , 19 7n 
Tourism ,  17 , 18 , 2 0 , 2 4 , 255-256 , 2 75 , 
2 76-2 79 , 372 , 374 , 4 12 
Townsend,  D . , 6 5 , 425 , 446 
Tribal fighting , 5 ,  2 1 ,  2 5 4 , 395 , 40 1 
Trob ri and I s lands , see Kabisawali 
Movement , Tonenei Kamokwita 
Movement 
Tsibim, D . , 1 19 
Tubuan , 149 , 158 
Tufte , E . R . , 435 
Tul t ul , 156 , 190 
Tumata clan , 2 10 
Tumnang , 72n 
Tutukuvul Isuka l  Association ( TIA) , 
11- 12 , 439 
UN ,  see Uni ted Nations 
UNDP , see United Nations Deve lopment 
Programme 
UP , see United Party 
UPNG , see University of Papua New 
Guinea 
Uberoi , J . P . S . , 26ln 
Uchendu , V . , 368n ,  369n 
Ujamaa , 2 8 3n ,  see also Tanzania 
Ukaka , 306 
Ulagunan school , 169 
Ulapia,  152 , 158 
Ulia , Kokomo , 39 
Unabaha Association , 308 
Underwood ,  D . J . , 3 16-317 
Unite d  church , 2 5 5 , 2 7 8 ,  280 
United Democrati c Party , see 
Christian Democratic Party 
United Nations , 115 , 127 , 136 , 
200 , 315 , 343 , 3 7 1  
United Nations Development 
Programme ,  3 7 1 ,  437  
United Party ( UP ) , 5 2 , 131,  2 17n ,  
2 36n , 349 ,  364- 366 , 381- 382 , 400 , 
408 ,  430 
United S tates , 115 
Uniting Church , 175 
Univers ity o f  Papua New Guine a ,  12 , 
24 , 150 , 15 1 ,  265 , 3 1 1 ,  359 , 364-
365 ,  366-369 , 371 , 379 , 381- 3 82 , 
387n , 388 , 397- 398 , 399 , 400 , 
40 8,  417 , 435n , 4 3 7 ;  Black Power 
Movement ,  2 3 ,  13 3 ;  Catholic 
S tudents Society , 387n ; E conomic 
Students Association , 3 87n , 388 , 
3 9 7-39 8 ,  399 , 400 , 408,  4 17 , 
435n , 437  
University of Queensland , 264 
University of Technology , 2 34n ,  
379 , 400 
Upper Markham , 86 
Urekit , Koriam , 142 
Urban Development Study , see 
Lae Urban Deve lopment Study 
Urban migrant settlements , see 
Migration 
Urban ( ethnic)  associations , 25 , 
42 7 ;  see also Mungkas Association , 
Vitiaz Society 
Uyassi , M. , 2 7  
485 
Vaki , Eki ,  2 17n 
Vakuta , 2 80 ,  29 1 
van den Berghe , P . L . , 2n 
Vanimo , 40 
Vanoi , Chief ,  26 3 ,  269 , 270 , 2 7 1 ,  
272 , 2 7 5 ,  2 8ln 
Vanuatu , 7 n ,  lOn 
Varzin , 152 
Vi llage agricultural associations , 
clubs , see Agricultural associa­
tions 
Vi llage courts , 2 7 ,  2 7 4 ,  276 , 2 8 3 ; 
see also Local government councils , 
alternatives to 
Village development associations , 
3-4 ,  26-2 7 , 59 ; s ee also Self­
he lp development movements 
Village Development , Office o f ,  4 
Vi llage Development Task Force , 
2 7 ,  353 
Village Economic Development Fund , 
2 7 , 199 , 296 , 35 3 ,  4 3 1 ;  see also 
Vi llage Deve lopment Task Force 
Vi llage government , 2 7 ; see also 
Village courts , Local government 
councils , alternatives to 
Vitiaz Society ,  83 
Vivilua , Chie f ,  296 , 29 8n 
Voluntary associations , 2 
Voutas , Anthony , 81 , 1 3 1 ,  2 18n 
Vunamami , 150 , 159 
Vunapaladi g ,  142 ; s ee also Gazelle 
Peninsula 
Vuvu, High S chool ,  158 
Wabag Open electorate , 382 
Waddell , E . , 388 
Wafimbukia ,  Andrew , 54n 
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